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Abstract
This study is about famine in Sudan. The study has sought to explain famine in Sudan 
in political terms. It presents a critique o f conventional famine theory which 
emphasises the primacy o f natural causes such as drought. The study recounts the 
conditions which generate recurrent famines in Sudan in recent history, highlighting 
domestic and international determinants. It examines five major theories o f famine, 
giving a critique o f each o f  the theories examined. The theoretical appraisal reveals the 
inadequacy o f famine theory which we argue is partly responsible for the persistence o f 
famine in Sudan and elsewhere. This study has aimed to contribute to a better 
understanding o f the phenomenon of famine with a view towards eliminating it. It 
offers the view that famine can only be understood in a broad historical context which 
brings out the evolution o f economic and political relations within the Sudanese 
society, and its subordination to the international market economy which determines 
differential access to resources including food for different social groups such as 
renders some groups vulnerable to famine, while others escape and may even "benefit" 
from it. The study depicts two rural communities from Kordofan who were unduly 
affected by the recent famines; and a field-work study has been carried out to trace the 
historical processes underpinning their political marginalisation and economic 
exploitation which we consider to be responsible for their vulnerability to famine. 
These processes are accounted for on three levels: on a macro-level, considering 
internal and external constraints influencing state policies; on a regional level, and on a 
micro-village and household levels. Such an account is necessary for a better 
understanding o f famine since conventional famine theory has largely focused analysis 
on macro-level policies, ignoring what takes place among the rural village communities 
who actually experience famine. The study shows the interconnectedness o f processes 
on the three levels. The conclusion that can be drawn from the study is that famine 
becomes endemic among the poor and powerless groups. "Empowering" the rural 
populations would be the single most important action towards eliminating famine in 
Sudan, and elsewhere. However, "empowerment" o f  the local communities would be 
o f little benefit to them unless the international economic system recognises the welfare 
o f such groups.
ii




Table of Contents ............................................................................................... ....ii
L ist of Figures ...................................................................................................... ...viii
L ist of Tables ....................................................................................................... ....ix
List of M aps .............................................................................................................xi
Preface .......................................................................................................................xii
C hap ter 1 In troduction ................................................................................ ... 1
C hap ter 2 Perspectives Explaining Fam ine ................................................25
Introduction .......................................................................................................... ....25
2. 1. The Definition debate ................................................................................ ....25
2. 2. The debate on Mass Starvation ............................................................... ....27
2. 3. Theories o f  Famine ..................................................................................... ....28
2. 3. 1. The Naturalist Thesis .................................................................................29
2. 3. 1. i. Drought .......................................................................................... .......... 29
2. 3. 1. ii. Drought: A Reassessment .................................................................... 31
2. 3. 1. iii. Critique of the Naturalist Thesis .............................................. .......... 32
2. 3. 2. The Population Thesis ............................................................................... 34
2. 3. 2. i. The Tragedy o f the Commons .................................................... ..........35
2. 3. 2. ii. Critique o f the Population Thesis ............................................. ...........35
2. 3. 3. The Holistic or Interactive Approach .............................................. .......39
2. 3. 3. i. Indigenous Survival Strategies ............................................................. 40
2. 3. 3. ii. Colonialism and the Roots o f the Agrarian Problem .........................42
2. 3. 3. iii. Debt and International Trade .................................................... ..........46
2. 3. 3. iv. Agribusiness and International Grain Trade ........................... .......... 47
2. 3. 3. v. Conflicts, Wars and Refugees .................................................... ..........48
2. 3. 3. vi. The Impact o f the Oil Crisis ...................................................... ......... 49
2. 3. 4. Entitlements and FAD Approaches ................................................... ......49
2. 3. 4. i. Critique of the FAD Approach ............................................................. 50
2. 4. Crisis Literature and the Research Questions .............................................55
2. 5. Identifying the Famine Victims in Sudan .....................................................57
2. 6. Famine as Historical Process: an Alternative View ............................... ...59
2 .6 . 1. At Macro-Level: State Policies .................................................................60
2. 6 . 2. At Regional Level: (El Obied market organisation & structure) .. 61
2. 6 . 3. At Micro. Village Level: The Field-work ....................................................... 63
2. 6. 4. Procedures o f Data Collection and Rationale .........................................63
Conclusion .................................................................................................................65
C hap ter 3 A daptations and Survival in Old K ordofan ....................... ....66
Introduction ...............................................................................................................66
3. 1. A Short History o f Kordofan 66
3. 1. 1. Kordofan Before the Nineteenth Century: during the Fur and the Fung
Hegemony ......................................................................................................... ........ 66
3. 1.2. The Turko-Egyptian Rule over Kordofan ...................................... ........ 68
3. 1.3. Kordofan and the Mahdist State ...............................................................69
3. 2. Kordofan Natural Setting ............................................................................ ..70
3 .2 . 1. Climate and Rainfall .................................................................................. 71
2. 2. 2. Kordofan topography and soils ............................................................ ....72
3 .3 . Forms of Social Adaptations to Environmental Risk ............................ .... 76
3. 4. Indigenous Knowledge and Resource Management Systems ...................77
3 .5 . Pastoralism in Kordofan ................................................................................ 78
3 .5 .1 . Maximising Productivity: Mixing Herds ......................................... ....... 79
3. 5. 2. Mobility: The Pastoralist Cycle ........................................................ ....... 81
3. 5. 3. Pasture Resource Management ................................................................ 84
3 .5 .4 . Land and Water Resource Management ................................................. 85
3 .5 .5 . Contacts with other groups ............................................................. ........ 86
3 .5 .6 . Herbage, Grasses and Water (Knowledge o f the Local Botany) .. 86
3. 5. 7. The Gizzu .....................................................................................................87
3. 5. 8. Social Norms Governing Utilisation of Resources ................................ 90
3. 5. 9. Animals Breeds and Husbandry ........................................................ .......91
3. 5. 10. Tending the Herd and the Shepherding Contract ................................ 91
3. 5. 11. Animals Sales and Criteria for O ff take ......................................... ...... 92
3. 5. 12. Socio-economic Utility o f Animals ................................................ .......94
3. 6. Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar ...................................................................... .....95
3. 6. 1. Dar Hamid ....................................................................................................95
3. 6. 2. Dar Hamar ....................................................................................................97
3. 7. Production and Exchange in Kordofan During the Fur & the Fung .hegemony 99
3. 8. Food Security and State Provisioning in old Kordofan .............................104
3. 9. The History o f Famine in Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar ........................... ...105
3 .9 . 1. Famines in Dar Hamid ............................................................................... 107
3. 9. 2. Famines in Dar Hamar .......................................................................  108
Conclusion ............................................................................................................  110
C hap ter 4 The M odern Sudanese State ................................................... 112
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 112
4. 1. The Colonial Project in Sudan .................................................................. 113
4. 1. 1. Colonial Administration: Indirect rule ..............................................  119
4. 1.2. Colonial Agricultural Policy ..............................................................  121
4. 1.3. The Sudan Famine Regulations ........................................................  123
4. 1.4. The Import Trade ................................................................................  123
4. 2. National Rule ..............................................................................................  125
4. 2. 1. Post-Independence Era ......................... ................................................  125
4. 2. 1. The First Period 1950s . 1960s ..........................................................  127
4. 2. 1. i. The Character o f the Early Sudanese state ...............................  127
4. 2. 1. ii. Early National Plans in Sudan ...................................................  129
4. 2. 1. iii. Implementation o f the Plans ......................................................  130
4. 2. 1. iv. Taxing the Peasantry for State-Building .................................  131
4. 2. 2. The Second Period: 1970s: ................................................................ 132
4. 2. 2. i. The five-year Plan 1970/71 . 1974/75 .......................................  134
4. 2. 3. The Third Period: from late 1970s to Present ................................. 140
4. 2. 4. Foreign involvement ........................................................................... 144
4. 2. 5. The breadbasket strategy ....................................................................  146
4. 2. 5. i. Critique o f the Breadbasket Strategy ......................................... 148
Conclusion ............................................................................................................  156
C hap ter 5 The Political Economy of Kordofan ......................................  158
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 158
5. 1. The Political Bases of Development Policies .........................................  159
5. 2. Restructuring Kordofan Labour Force ....................................................  161
5. 3. Policies o f Livestock Production ..............................................................  163
5. 4. Institutionalising Market Forces ...............................................................  164
5. 4. 1. The Beginnings of Trade ....................................................................  164
5. 4. 2. The Import Trade into Kordofan ....................................................... 166
5. 4. 3. The Organisation o f Markets and the Export Trade from Kordofan 168
5. 4. 4. The Export Trade o f Kordofan Agricultural Produce ...................  170
5. 4. 4. i. The Gum Arabic Trade and Export ...........................................  170
5. 4. 4. ii. The Export o f Sesame and other Oilseeds ................................ 174
5. 4. 4. iii. The Export o f Dura and Dukhn ..............................................  177
iv
V5. 5. Government Revenue from Kordofan Produce ......................................  182
5. 6. Policies o f Transformation ........................................................................  184
5. 6. 1. Development o f Rural Water Supplies and Resettlement Programmes 184
5. 6. 2. Land Tenure System and Reform .....................................................  185
5. 6. 3. Changes in the Regime of Rural Resources ....................................  189
5. 6. 3. i. Official Ban on Local Cotton Production ................................ 189
5. 6. 3. ii. Official Ban on Damour and Local Cotton Growing ...........  191
5. 6. 3. iii. Free Distribution of Foreign-made Textiles ............................  191
5. 6. 3. iv. Flooding the Market with Imported Textiles ..........................  191
Conclusion ............................................................................................................  192
C hapter 6 Transform ation of the Village Economy ..............................  194
Introduction ..........................................................................................................  194
6. 1. Adaptations and Response to the Forces o f Change .............................  195
6. 2. Farmers Knowledge ....................................................................................  196
6. 2. 1. Seeds Selection and Mixed Cropping ..............................................  197
6 . 2. 2. Pest Control ..........................................................................................  198
6 . 2. 3. Indigenous Climatology .....................................................................  198
6. 2. 4. Grain Storage ...................................................................................... 199
6. 3. Indigenous Production and Resource Management Systems .............  200
6. 3. 1. Changes in the Regimes of Farm Crops ........................................... 201
6. 4. Changes in Farm Management Systems .................................................  203
6. 4. 1. Reallocation o f Labour .......................................................................  203
6. 4. 2. Reallocation o f land ............................................................................ 206
6. 5. Impact o f Change ........................................................................................ 207
6 .5 .1 . Effects on the Environment ..............................................................  207
6. 5. 1. i. The Impact on the Hashab "Acacia Senegal" Forests .............. 208
6. 5. 2. The Development o f Rural Wage Labour Markets ........................ 209
6. 5. 3. Internal Wage Labour Markets: ........................................................ 215
6 . 5. 4. External Wage Labour Markets .....................................................  218
6 . 6 . The Development o f Rural Trade ............................................................  220
6 . 6. 1. Trade, Traders and Rural Social Differentiation ............................  220
6 . 7. The Demise of Local Manufactures and Crafts ......................................  222
6 . 8. Impact o f Change on Coping Strategies ..................................................  225
6 . 8. 1. Responses to Seasonal Hunger .........................................................  226
6 . 8. 1. i. Planting Jubrakas (House Orchards) with Quick-Maturing Grains: 226
6 . 8. 1. ii. Grain Food Stores (Matmura) ...................................................  228
6. 8. 1. iii. Communal Sharing: ................................................................... 228
6 . 8. 1. iv. Sharing the Available Food ....................................................... ..........229
6. 8. 2. Response to Endemic Hunger ........................................................... ....... 229
6. 8. 2. i. Borrowing Grains (Gurdah) ...................................................................230
6. 8. 2. ii. Inter-village Grain Borrowing ............................................................. 231
6. 8. 2. iii. Intra-village Borrowing ....................................................................... 231
6. 8. 2. iv. Movements and Travelling ....................................................... ...........233
6. 8. 3. Response to Acute Widespread Hunger (Famine) .......................... ...... 233
Conclusion .................................................................................................................234
C hap ter 7 The Fam ine Crisis and Household Responses ........................236
Introduction .......................................................................................................... ....236
7. 1. The Two Villages ....................................................................................... ....236
7. 1. 1. The Method o f Data Collection ........................................................... ....236
7. 1. 2. Location ................................................................................................... ....236
7. 1.3. Population and Demographic Structure .............................................. ...237
7. 1.4. Land Resources and Household Allocation ........................................... 238
7. 1. 4. i. Farm Lands .......................................................................................... ....239
7. 1.4. ii. Grazing Lands ........................................................................................239
7. 1.4. iii. Forest Lands ...................................................................................... ... 240
7. 1.4. iv. Populated Lands ............................................................................... ....240
7. 1 .4 . v. Water Bodies ..................................................................................... .... 240
1.2.  Production ........................................................................................................241
7. 2. 1. Livestock Production ............................................................................. ...241
1 . 2 . 2 .  Agricultural Production .............................................................................243
7. 3. Income Sources ........................................................................................... ... 246
7. 3. 1. Household Income Categories ............................................................. ....248
7. 4. Vulnerability as a Condition o f Economic Differentiation ....................... 249
7. 5. The Household Expenditure ..................................................................... ....253
7. 6 . The Famine Crisis ....................................................................................... ... 256
7.6. 1. The Gneiss o f the Crisis ............................................................................. 257
7. 6 . 2. The Process o f Famine ........................................................................... ...258
7. 6. 2. i. The Drought ......................................................................................... ...258
7. 6 . 2. ii. Poor Harvests .........................................................................................258
7. 6 . 2. iii. Market Failure ................................................................................... ... 259
7. 6 . 2. iv. Rural Terms o f Trade ...........................................................................260
7. 7. Patterns o f Movements Induced by the Stress ...........................................266
7. 8. Migration ........................................................................................................ .268
7. 9. Sequence of Livelihood Strategies in the Face o f the Crisis ................... .270
vi
1.9.  1. Sale o f Animals ...................................................................................... ....270
7. 9. 2. sale o f Valuables .................................................................................... .... 271
1 . 9 . 3 .  Local Self-help ...................................................................................... ....272
7. 9. 3. i. Kins Help ............................................................................................. ....272
7 9. 3. ii. Reciprocal Self Help .......................................................................... ....273
7. 9. 3. iii. Charitable Forms of Local Help .........................................................273
7. 9. 4. Dietary Adjustments ............................................................................ ......274
7 . 9. 4. i. Cutting down on the Quality o f Food .............................................. ...274
G. 4. ii. Cutting down on the Quality o f Food .................................................... 275
7. 9. 4. iii. Mixing Dura with Melon Seed ....................................................... ....275
7. 9. 4. iv. Reducing the Number of Meals per Day ....................................... ...275
7. 9. 4. v. Tapping Forest Food Resources ........... .............................................. ..... 275
7. 10. The Effects o f Famine ....................................................................................... 276
7. 10. 1. Economic Effects: Loss o f Employment ................................................. ..277
7. 10. 2. Demographic Effects ................................................................................ ....278
7. 10. 3. Health Effects ........................................................................................... ......278
7. 10. 4. Social Effects ................................................................................................. 279
7. 10. 5. Effect on Education and Long-term Political Consequences ..................279
7. 10. 4. The Benefits o f Famine ...........................................................................280
Conclusion ............................................................................................................. ........ 281
Conclusion .....................................................................................................................282 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 296
A Refugee Population in Sudan until December 1991
B Estimated Displaced Population in Sudan in 1991.
C Total Sorghum Production and Food Availability in Sudan (1960/1 - 1984/5)
D The Economic Results from the Gezira Scheme to Investors 1926 - 1950
E Early Sudanese Political Leaders at Independence
F List o f Livestock Merchants in Kordofan, and Origins
G Local Plant Species, Local and Latin Names
H List of Local Tree Species which Disappeared from the Locality
I List o f Local Plant and Grass Species which Disappeared from the Locality:
J List o f Local Wildlife Species which Disappeared from the Locality:
K Aspects o f Sudan Economy and Trade
ix
List of Figures
Figure 1: Pastoral Movements ...............................................................................81
Figure 2: Gizzu Area ........................................................................................... ....88
Figure 3: Socio-economic Utility o f Animals ................................................  94
Figure 4: Trans-Saharan Caravan Trade Routes of Western Sudan ........... .... 101
Figure 5: Decline in Household Average Herd size in North Kordofan between 
1975 .1992: (heads) ............................................................................................  242
Figure 6: Fluctuating Productivity per Makhamas for Four Major Crops in Al 
Saata and Omdofais areas between 1982/3 .1990/91 ...................................  245
Figure 7: Declining Productivity per Makhamas for the Various Crops in Al
Saata Area between 1975 .1985 ......................................................................  246
Figure 8: Cash Crop Prices and Food Prices at El Obied Market 1982/3 .
1990/91 ................................................................................................................... 263
Figure 9: Livestock and Cash Crop Prices against Food Prices at El Obied
Market 1982/3 . 1990/91 ...................................................................................  264
Figure 10: Population Movements Induced by Stress .................................... 267
XList of Tables
Table 1: 5-Year Plan Initial and Revised Investment Allocations (£S. Million) 134
Table 2: Imports o f Sugar, Tea, Coffee, and Cotton Fabrics in Five-Year-Period 
Averages 1904 . 1946 as % o f 1907 (1907 = 100) .........................................  {6?
Table 3: Quantities of Gum Exported from Sudan in Ten-Year Periods between 
1900 . 1986 (in kantars): ....................................................................................  jy j
Table 4: Gum Arabic Production 1960 . 1986; Hashab Gum (in 000 M. tons) 171
Table 5: Gum Arabic Auction Price at En Nuhud and Export Price at Port Sudan 
1971/2 .1981/2 ................................................................................................................  ]72
Table 6: Government Revenue from the Gum Arabic Company's Sales ..........172
Table 7: Source and Share o f Income in 2 types o f Households .................. ....210
Table 8: Farm Operations, Season and Bases of Payment in Rural Wage Labour 213
Table 9: Division o f Rural Wage Labour between Food Crops and Cash Crops 213
Table 10: Timing of Agricultural Activities for Cotton and Sorghum in the 
Traditional and Modem Sectors .......................................................................  217
Table 11: Items of Trade in Kordofan in 1910s ..............................................  222
Table 12: Number and Ratio of Women-Headed to Man-Headed Households 238
Table 13: Average Number of Animal Assets and Value per Household for the 
Different Animals in Al Saata and Omdofais in 1991/92: (Number in Heads) 242
Table 14: Decline in Household Average Herd Size of the Different Animals in 
North Kordofan in three Periods between 1975 . 1992 (Heads) ................... 242
Table 15: Household Average Farm Size and Production of the Various Crops in 
Al Saata and Omdofais Villages 1991/92 .......................................................... 243
Table 16: Productivity for Four Major Cops (Food and Cash Cops) in Bara and 
En Nuhud Area, in the Period between 1982/83 . 1990/91 (Kgs/Feddan).............
Table 17: Average Yield per Mkhamas for the Various Cops in Al Saata Area in 
Three Periods between 1975 . 85: (sack/mkh) .................................................. 245
Table 18: Household Categories, Sources and % Share o f Different Sources o f 
Income ...................................................................................................................  248
Table 19: Changes in the Household Expenditure .........................................  254
Table 20: Production of the Different Crops in En Nuhud and Bara Area 1982/3 
1990/91 (in Kgs) .................................................................................................  259
Table 21: Prices o f Major Cash Crops in 1984/5.1991/2 (in S£s/kantar) ....  260
Table 22: Prices of the Two Main Staple Food Crops Over Same Period (in 
S£s/A rdeb) ..........................................................................................................  2gi
Table 23: Prices o f Groundnuts and Gum Arabic as % of Sorghum and Millet
Prices ...................................................................................................................... 261
Table 24 Livestock Prices at El.Obeid Livestock Market 1984/5.1991/2 ... 263
Table 25: Breakdown o f Migrant Numbers as % of Village Population and 
Households in 1983.5, 1990 - Present ..............................................................  269
Table 26: Rates o f Animal Loss by Death, Sale and Disease .......................  271
Table 27: Average Size o f Ownership of Herd Stocks and Loss between 1975 .





Map of Areas o f Chronic Food Insecurity in the mid-1980s, Sudan 
Map of Kordofan (Physical)
Map of Kordofan (Administrative)
Preface
Famine still represents one o f the big challenges in the modem world. This study is 
an effort towards a better understanding of the phenomenon o f famine. The study takes 
the case o f Sudan; a country which has been affected by recurrent famines in recent 
history. But even in Sudan, not all Sudanese have been affected by famine. It is a 
universal character o f  famine that it affects only the poor and powerless. No rich or 
powerful among the Sudanese have suffered. The study focuses on the fortunes o f two 
rural communities in one o f the underdeveloped and marginalised regions o f Western 
Sudan; who have been devastated by the spate o f  recent famines. The study traces the 
origins o f  their vulnerability to long-term processes o f  political nature which render 
them extremely exposed to natural shocks such as drought. Field-work research has 
been conducted among the two communities o f Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar o f 
Kordofan over a period o f six months between December 1992 and May 1993. The 




Hunger and famines still persist in the contemporary world; in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America millions go hungry everyday in a world equipped with the technical and 
scientific capabilities to produce abundance of food than ever before. Famine represents 
one of the big challenges in the contemporary world. What is lacking to eliminate world 
hunger is the political will to enforce one o f the most sacred rights o f all human-kind: 
the right to food. Deficient theory to explain the recurrence of food insecurity is partly 
to blame. Famine theories have offered partial, often conflicting explanations. If famine 
is to be prevented, it must first be understood. Effective policy depends on good theory, 
and the theory of famine is confused (Devereux 1993). This study is about the politics 
o f famine in Sudan: one of the countries most affected by recent famines. Existing 
literature on famine in Sudan has focused either on macro-structural processes such as 
overall national food production and consumption levels (O'Brien 1986; Shepherd 
1988); or on micro-level processes (De Waal, 1989, Keen 1994). This study takes a 
political economy approach by combining both macro- and micro- level determinants of 
famine, and related these to the actual conditions of the people in Dar Hamid and Dar 
Hamar; two rural communities in Kordofan who have been unduly affected by recent 
famines. But famine in Sudan and elsewhere is part of a wider global food problem.
T h e  D im e n s io n s  o f  t h e  W o r l d  F o o d  P r o b l e m :
The conception of a world-wide 'food problem’ did not come into existence until 
World War 2, when in 1943, in Hot Springs, Clorado, a conference was held which 
"looked forward to a world free from hunger" (Grigg 1985: 1). Since then there has been 
a proliferation of institutions and literature which focused on fathoming the dimensions 
o f the food problem. This effort helped to heighten popular awareness about the 
existence of a global food problem. The world food problem is characterised by a 
paradoxical situation where in one part of the world there is abundance of food supply 
and overproduction, while other parts o f the world suffer from chronic or acute food 
shortages and periodic famines. In fact, we live in a world of plenty, a world which 
produces and consumes more food than it needs. Yet, each year millions die of hunger 
due to poverty and the politics of food. On a global level, abundance best describes the 
world's food supply. Abundance characterised by such great amounts that per capita 
food intake would amount to three thousands six hundred calories for every man, 
woman and child on earth if the available food is equally distributed among the world’s
population (Lappee 1991). Yet it is estimated that around the world, a thousand million 
people are chronically hungry, twenty times the population o f Britain. The cause o f this 
is not famine or relative scarcity, but long-term poverty in a context of an ill-divided 
world (BBC 1991). A world where one half could watch the other half starve to death 
on television; as happened recently in the 1980s and 1990s in Ethiopia, Sudan, and 
across the Sahelian belt.
This paradox o f acute and chronic hunger amidst plenty, implies that large 
proportions of populations in many parts of the world; especially in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America live in conditions o f chronic hunger and related problems of 
undernutrition (defined as low calorific intake), and malnutrition (defined as unbalanced 
diet deficient in protein and vitamins), or both, in a world o f abundance and mounting 
grain surpluses. The exact numbers o f people living under conditions of chronic hunger 
cannot be precisely known. Various estimates give widely different numbers. As early 
as 1950, John Boyd-Orr; the first Director of the FAO claimed that: "a lifetime of 
malnutrition and actual hunger is the lot of at least a third o f mankind" (Boyd-Orr, 1950: 
183). Whether the Director's assertion was true needs to be taken with caution, but it 
highlights two important points: that the number of the world hungry is sizeable indeed; 
and that the problem is not new. In 1973 the World Bank estimated that 1373 million 
people in developing countries are undernourished; constituting 71 per cent o f the 
populations of the developing countries, the majority o f whom (924 million) are in 
South and South East Asia (Grigg 1985: 30). Other estimates put the number of 
undernourished between half a billion to two billion people. The World Food Council 
estimated about one billion people to be chronically hungry in the mid-1980s. The 
World Bank estimated 740 million people to be undernourished in some 87 developing 
countries (Barraclough 1991). By the beginning o f the 1980s the proportion o f the 
undernourished ranged from about 10 per cent of the population in some countries to 40 
per cent of the population in other countries of the third world (Grigg 1985: 26). 
Malnutrition is the world's biggest killer. It afflicts a fifth of humanity. Most of those 
who die- between thirteen and eighteen millions a year- are children under five (Lipton 
1991). Adults face malnutrition-related problems in working, and health problems 
associated with acute hunger for about one in eight to one in ten of the population in 
poor countries. Sen (1981) distinguishes between two types o f hunger: "endemic" or 
"normal" hunger and "acute" hunger; and states that "normal" hunger is a regular feature 
o f life in many parts o f the world with which people have learnt to live, but this 
"regular" starvation has to be distinguished from violent outbreaks of famines (Sen 
1981: 39). And that acute hunger like the experiences o f famine are exceptional; which 
nonetheless portend o f deep-rooted social malaise in the societies in which they occur. 
Kates et al (1988) have pointed out that hunger is not confined exclusively to third
world countries. They have indicated that in the USA, the richest country in the world, 
in 1985 there were some twenty million Americans, nearly one-tenth of the population 
who did not have enough to eat due to poverty. Pockets of malnutrition continue to exist 
in parts of the developed world.
On the other hand, in some parts o f the developing world where some countries have 
achieved high levels of food production comparable to that o f advanced economies, 
problems of hunger and malnutrition are as pervasive as in other parts of the developing 
world. This suggests that high levels o f food production and the physical availability of 
food do not provide sufficient guarantees against hunger. In Latin America, there is no 
shortage of food for those who can afford it; like in Mexico and Brazil where the 
quantities of food available are well above national requirements. In Mexico, the FAO 
estimates that food availability is almost the same as in many industrialised countries of 
the North (Barraclough 1991). And Brazil produces an abundance o f food comparable to 
that in America and Europe, but the majority o f its people are poor, and many go 
hungry.
Brazil is usually described as the coming country. In the twenty first century it would be 
one o f the largest industrial countries in the world. But, the inequality in Brazil is such that 
people with an average per capita revenue close to US$ 2000 a year: the poor in Brazil are 
easily sixty per cent. The Minister o f  Agriculture in Brazil said that there is 90 million 
Brazilians; about two thirds o f  the population did not have an adequate caloric intake 
(George 1991).
Appalling conditions o f hunger and malnutrition still persist in Mexico and Brazil. 
India is another good example for the existence of hunger amidst an abundance of food 
supply. India has built up food stocks o f between twenty to thirty million tons o f grain 
mostly wheat, in government food reserves, but most of the poor cannot afford to buy 
that food. So India has come to have the very remarkable success in improving grain 
production, in both rice and wheat, while poverty remains so severe that the problem of 
undernutrition while it gets slightly better does not substantially improve (Lipton 1991). 
The clear inference is that hunger can be pervasive in the midst of plenty. And for 
reasons to understand hunger, it is necessary to examine themes other than availability 
of food. These facts point to the firm conclusion that the problems of hunger and 
malnutrition have no necessary correlation to the overall availability o f food, nor do 
they suggest that increased volume of food output can guarantee food for all groups. 
Indeed, overall availability of food and increased food production can go hand in hand 
with increased poverty and food insecurity (Sen 1981, Dreze and Sen 1989; Barraclough 
1991). Politics, not availability, lies at the root o f the food problem.
The recurrence of hunger and famines during the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s is the 
most stark manifestation o f the problem. Famines have recently occurred at a time when 
food production has registered unprecedented growth in output on an international scale.
In Western Europe and the USA, immense increases in food output o f an annual growth 
rate o f about 3.5 per cent has been made possible by the improvements afforded by plant 
breeding science; in introducing high yielding varieties and hybrid strains, by the 
substitution of the agricultural labour force by machinery and power traction. These 
innovations have indeed brought complete transformation o f agriculture; almost an 
agricultural revolution. This has led both to a reduction in the cost o f production 
concurrently with a massive increase in agricultural productivity. Agricultural science 
and research also contributed by making available to farmers a vast array of fertilisers, 
pesticides, herbicides and fungicides. Active government support to agriculture has been 
crucial to boost production and sustain agriculture (Raikes 1988; George 1978, 1976; 
Boserup 1981. 1965; Gribben 1976 ).
Livestock breeding, on the other hand, received a similar revolutionising 
transformation. Improvements occurred on disease control and veterinary services, 
livestock breeds, balanced feeds, fattening and artificial insemination techniques, range 
management and grass varieties. These revolutionising trends have greatly transformed 
agriculture in the developed world. The increase in production in food grains, especially 
in cereals, has been dramatic, leading in effect to a glut in the market and a problem of 
overproduction. Food grains as well as dairy products, canned and refrigerated foods 
continue to pile up in stores in America and Western Europe. Huge surpluses of 
foodstuffs have come to pose problems to farmers and governments alike; problems of 
pricing, marketing and storage. As stores overflow, policies needed to be devised as to 
cope with the emergence of "grain mountains", which also needed considering future 
food production strategies. Cutting down on cropped areas of land, dumping part of the 
surpluses, and maintaining government support to farmers in forms of subsidies have 
been some of the policy options adopted by the overproducing countries in order to 
stabilise production and maintain prices (Gibbon et al 1994; Raikes 1988; Grigg 1985; 
Sinha 1978; Barraclough 1991).
Subsidising agricultural production has since World War 2 been one of the 
fundamental strategies in food policy and agricultural planning throughout the advanced 
world. Subsidies, together with other factors, i.e., technology and agricultural scientific 
research, have combined to generate surplus stocks which have become a problem. 
Surplus production has spurred the need for outside markets. As a result, the slogan 
"trade and aid" became the guiding spirit of the day; pushed with all vigour. Thus an 
aggressive international food trade was evolving, dominated by a few of the Western 
surplus-producing countries both on the supply and demand sides of the trade (Raikes 
1988; Gibbon et al 1994; Barraclough 1991). The USA is by far the major dominant 
force accounting for over 50% of the total world’s trade in cereals (especially coarse 
grains). The USA, together with Canada, Argentina, Australia and the EU account
among them for some 85-90 per cent of total world's export of grains. While the North 
American "prairies" overwhelm world trade in cereals (maize, wheat, soybeans), the EU 
countries, on the other hand, have become the major international dominant exporters of 
dairy products (Raikes 1986). This has followed a major shift in European agricultural 
policy since the turn of the century. The major emphasis behind this shift, induced by 
pressure of competition from the "prairie lands" has been from cereals to dairy 
production. Since then, protection under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has 
produced "persistent and substantial surpluses", such that the EU now "accounts for 
over 50 per cent o f world exports for most dairy product categories, this rising to almost 
70 per cent for Skim Milk Powder (SMP) (Ibid).
In the context o f global food overproduction, a process o f "specialisation" in the 
world food trade seems to have emerged since the 1950s, with North America 
predominating the trade in cereals while the EU dominating dairy products including 
meat. The imperative to market the surpluses necessitated the active promotion of 
increased market demand in outside "spheres o f influence" for the food trade. Thus, 
parts of the third world; in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia became target 
markets for the major food exporters. However, during this time in the 1950s and 1960s 
most African countries were self-sufficient in food grains. Added to that the urban 
population in African cities was yet small, and smaller still was its middle class element, 
such that its need for "refined urban foods" was small and relatively inexpensive. The 
prevailing circumstances in Africa during the 1950s and 1960s, therefore, made 
marketing US and EU food surpluses in Africa on profitable market terms untenable. It 
was conceived that the only possible way of disposing of these surpluses was to be on 
concessional terms in the form of aid or on low-market price concessional long-term 
loans. The dual objective o f the food aid and concessions was meant both to offload the 
surpluses while at the same time pushing forward and promoting market demand 
overseas, by gradually altering food tastes, especially targeting the emerging urban 
classes for the new foodstuffs in the new markets. It is during this period that policies 
were designed to encourage urbanisation. Under these circumstances, ushered the era of 
"trade and aid" in which the American Public Law 480 was set in force in the 1950s 
(Tarrant 1980: 232). Between 1959 and 1964 "food aid accounted for no less than 34 per 
cent o f total US grain exports" and, conversely "it accounted for fully 57 per cent of 
developing countries imports of grain from the USA over the same period" (Ibid). 
Although it is certainly in the interests of America and Europe to export their grain 
surpluses to the third world, this strategy has damaging effects on the long-term 
prospects for countries like the Sudan of feeding their own populations. The export 
promotion of food aid has been detrimental to domestic food security in developing 
countries. As Raikes has pointed out:
aggressive export promotion by Europe and the USA, making use of both food and other 
forms o f aid has combined with policies in most o f  the states o f Sub-Saharan Africa, to 
generate patterns o f  urban food consumption and o f food processing and even production 
which are grossly out o f line with the capacities o f the countries in question to support and 
with negative effects upon the food availability and security o f poorer sections o f  their 
populations (Raikes 1986: 169).
Here, the activities of agribusiness transnational corporations (TNCs) is of immense 
significance in their oligopolistic control over the international grain trade. The world 
grain market has been characterised by the predominance o f a small number of countries 
in the developed world both on the supply and demand sides. As a result, over 85% of 
wheat and 80% of the coarse grains entering the world markets go to the developed 
countries. Transactions are governmental, therefore are influenced by political 
considerations. Grain trade, thus becomes part and parcel of the politics of international 
power relations. Many authors have pointed out that this strong oligopolistic control 
over international grain trade and the issue of political power involved in it lie at the 
heart of the world food problem (Raikes 1988; Bush 1988b).
Agribusiness TNCs have been criticised for their role in channelling third world 
agricultural activity to meet the market needs o f advanced industrialised countries. This 
they do by their effective control over production, pricing, processing and distribution 
o f food stuffs world-wide. Bush observes that "[ajagribusiness has established a food 
system - an international supermarket- where low nutrition luxury food stuffs are grown 
in poor third world countries to export to out of season European dinner tables" (Bush 
1988b 6). The case against agribusiness is critical of the way they structure the agro­
food system in a way that increases inequality, dependency, poverty and insecurity.
The net effects o f the "trade and aid" strategy over the years since 1950s, with its 
concessional terms and direct food aid, have been so irresistible for third world 
governments such that demand for these products continued to rise steadily. Third world 
governments saw in the ready provision of foodstuffs on terms well below international 
market prices, an opportunity to relieve their strained economies and their dwindling 
foreign reserves. At the same time to keep happy and content the potentially disruptive 
urban populations by providing them with cheap food. The fast growing urban 
populations in third world cities, thus developed new tastes for the new products. White 
bread, milk and milk powder, butter and canned beef have become part of the preferred 
diet for the emerging middle classes. The promotion of overseas market demand, 
promoted initially by food aid, ultimately set in motion a process in which "North 
American's pattern o f consumption is being internationalised among the urban middle 
classes of the third world, involving the increasing importance of wheat products, dairy 
products and meat" (Raikes 1986: 167).
This changed pattern of food consumption has had profound effects not only on local 
food production, but also on domestic politics, since urban demands on the state came to
determine the political survival o f governments. Local food producers, mainly small 
peasant farmers, lost a big share o f their domestic market to the imported foods. This 
combined with discouragingly low food prices which made agricultural food production 
an unprofitable enterprise. Added to that most African countries taxed agriculture 
heavily as a perennial source of revenue to promote other sectors o f the economy; a 
strategy which stands in direct contrast with US and EU strategies which consistently 
subsidise agriculture. With declining domestic food production, African states became 
increasingly dependent on food imports from outside to quieten the demand of the 
volatile urban classes for refined foods. And with African economies meagre foreign 
reserves, they cannot sustain long-term food security relying on food imports, thus food 
insecurity and political instability go hand in hand.
The end result o f the US and EU strategy o f export promotion led by the aid 
programme, ultimately created a state o f dependency in African countries on imported 
foodstuffs from external suppliers. The risks inherent in such a dependency are that the 
food security of African states has now become a strategic issue that is beyond their 
immediate control, and that depending on the international market for food implies that 
African states can have no control over prices either o f food grains or for their own 
exportable products. Internal food security becomes firmly skewed in the ability of the 
state to purchase food from the international market. The avoidance of famine implies 
that if  the state has the foreign exchange necessary to buy food, there would not have 
been famines developing in poor third world countries. The danger of dependency on 
external supplies of food resides in the fact that any shifts in international market prices 
either of foodstuffs or for their primary exports would precipitate the food security 
situation internally. Conversely any internally-induced shocks (such as a drought) can 
also undermine food security in two ways: (a) directly: by reducing food supplies from 
own production thus upsetting the very delicate balance by increasing the food deficit 
gap and impelling the need for more supplementary food imports; and (b) indirectly; 
through reduced general agricultural production such that exportable agricultural 
products needed for foreign exchange earnings to finance food imports are also 
substantially curtailed. The state o f dependency on food supplies from outside sources 
has consequently put the food security o f African states like the Sudan in a precarious 
position, and especially for the poorer and vulnerable groups in the rural areas. Indeed 
the famine experiences over the past decades is a clear illustration of these long-term 
internal and external processes. As we will see later, while these processes are 
progressively eroding the internal and local-level food security, short-term shocks can 
deal the final blow and turn a long standing vulnerability into a famine. The prevalence 
of the experiences of hunger and famine in many parts o f the third world, and especially 
in Sub-Saharan African countries like the Sudan, suggests a clear polarisation between
rich and poor both on an inter-state global level, and within individual states between 
different social groups. Sudan is one of the countries worst affected by the recent 
famines.
FAMINE IN SUDAN:
The case of Sudan indicates that the underlying factors here explain the paradox of 
hunger in a world of plenty. Sudan is one o f the countries worst hit by recurrent 
droughts in Africa. The news coverage o f Sudan's crisis concentrated on the famine, a 
tragic, but relatively a short-lived emergency; tended to overlook the deeper underlying 
trends that hunger in Sudan is a long-term condition, brought on as much by natural 
disaster as by poverty. Yet, famine is a very rare occurrence. Famine is the end of a very 
long process, it is a crisis in society, and it takes a long time to build up, so that when 
we see the images o f starving people, literally collapse and succumb by the side of the 
road, this means that these people have gone through a very long process of scarcity, of 
selling off resources, of out-migrating, and finally we see them in the last extremity 
when they reach the stage of destitution and exhaustion. One estimate o f mortality from 
famine in Sudan during the 1980s was estimated as running at a rate of about 150 
persons per day as a result of starvation and diseases (Sudanow 1985: 7-9). But all this 
loss could have been avoided. Sudan is a country of great agricultural potential, which 
can very easily grow enough food, so that there is ample food for each Sudanese person 
to eat well if  that food is equally distributed. Agricultural production can be made much 
more intensive in the Nile Valley, wheat, rice and grains production can be pushed 
much more higher in that area, so that Sudan could produce ample food to feed itself 
and become a major exporter (Lipton 1991).
Sudan is the largest country in Africa; about the size of Western Europe. Not only 
does it have the potential to grow food, but it has for many years produced enough for 
its own people and a surplus for export. But this abundance is not shared equally among 
its 22 million people; most of whom are only too poor to buy food if their animals die or 
their crops fail. In recent times, a number o f man-made factors have been working 
against them. Many people have been pushed into marginal areas, by modern 
commercial farming where much o f Sudan's best land has been turned over to export 
crops. These lands are rich clay soils covering the best parts of the central rainlands of 
Sudan, which formerly supported sedentary pastoralists who practised small-scale 
farming and animal husbandry. However, since the late 1940s, these legitimate owners 
of the land have been systematically pushed aside by the expansion of commercial 
farming where big commercial farmers - with the active support of the state- 
appropriated the best lands each farm is about 1500 feddan, some farmers owning more
than one farm. So by the time the latest drought struck, Sudan's people were already on 
the brink of disaster. The catalogue of adversities is not yet complete. There have been 
long years of drought, gradually increasing over the past two decades, as part of global 
trends associated with secular changes in the global climatic conditions which have little 
to do with the local farmer but have their origins in the emissions of gases emanating 
from industries (Hulme 1991). Sudan hosted over a million refugees from neighbouring 
Ethiopia and Chad (see appendix 1). The Sudan also had had one o f the largest refugee 
communities in the world. A civil war that has been raging on for fifteen years, with a 
cost on the war machine estimated at one million dollars a day, has drained the country's 
resources, driven the local populations from their villages, and disrupted production. 
The catalogue of adversities can be endless, but famines have become a recurrent 
phenomenon in Sudan.
(a) The 1973 Famine:
Sudan has suffered three major famines in twenty years - between 1973 and 1991. 
The Great Sahelian Drought which devastated the Sahel countries in 1973 had left 
Sudan relatively unscathed (O'Brien 1986). O'Brien argued that:
the conditions which were responsible for Sudan's good fortune derived from a pattern of 
agricultural development during the 1960s which was rare in Africa and indeed in the entire 
third world, based as it was on the expansion of capitalist food production supporting internal 
markets rather than expansion of export production (Ibid: 193).
The expansion of capitalist food production supporting the internal market cannot, as 
O'Brien argues, provide a comprehensive explanation of why Sudan escaped the 1973 
famine. Rather than being a mitigating factor in containing famine, commercial food 
production has indeed been one o f the major factors contributing to the development of 
famine in recent decades. Not only is the monopolistic control of the grain merchants of 
both the domestic and export trade an immediate cause of the famine, but also the way 
in which they exploited the land caused deep mining and degradation o f soils. As we 
will see below, capitalist commercial farmers control the domestic grain trade entirely 
for their advantage, and act through cartels of regional grain traders who fix extortionate 
prices, especially during times of food deficit.
The rural populations were relatively wealthy until the 1970s and economically able 
to afford to buy available food, than is the case in recent years when they have become 
progressively poorer. Although commercial food grains are available in the market in 
the recent famines as they had been in the 1970s, the ability of the rural populations to 
avert the 1970s famine was therefore a condition of their ability to buy the available 
food. Using Curtis's concept of "assets" (Curtis et al 1988), the assets conditions of
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Sudan's rural populations were then significantly healthier to insulate them from the 
ravages of the drought, as well as from the extortions o f the grain merchants, given the 
fact that until the 1970s Sudan's GNP per capita income was US$ 400 compared with 
US$ 220 that o f other Sahelian countries (Sutcliff 1986). This was a reflection o f better 
conditions in the rural/urban terms o f trade.
Additionally, the Sudanese state was until then keeping a measure of institutionality 
(i.e. the state is committed and able to carry out the dictates of its institutions) and 
responsibility, and was able to procure purchases o f food from the international market. 
Indeed, O'Brien notes that "observers in Khartoum saw transport planes taking off from 
the capital to deliver relief food supplies to DarFur towards the end o f this period" 
(Ibid: 193). This suggests that the state was indeed concerned and able to procure food 
and to deliver that to deficit areas. Individual households were able to buy their food 
needs from the internal market. The "ability" to buy the "available” food, was the reason 
why Sudan was able to escape the 1973 famine relatively unscathed, not the 
"availability" of commercial food. The massive expansion in commercial agriculture 
during the 1970s and 1980s did not, however, avert the famines in 1983-85 and 1990- 
91. The physical availability of food in the market, proved no guarantee against hunger 
(Sen 1981, Dreze and Sen 1989). Indeed, it could well be that rather than preventing 
famine, commercial capitalist agricultural food production is the underlying cause for 
the development o f famine in Sudan. It has been recognised recently that famines as 
disasters can result from the conscious exercise o f power in the pursuit of gain and 
advantage (Keen 1991, 1994, Duffield 1992). In Sudan, the agrarian bourgeoisie wield 
immense political and economic power over the state's apparatus. The exercise o f power 
for gain could be that famine conditions can wilfully be allowed to develop on the 
calculation that higher gains could be reaped by the agrarian class from the conditions of 
famine. In such a situation where the agrarian bourgeoisie stands to gain from famine 
conditions, not only is famine "good for business", but that its development may be 
consciously allowed. In this political dimension in the exercise o f power, famine 
represents a moment in the process o f assets transfer from the poor to the rich, and its 
recreation ensures the systematic consolidation of the power o f the rich and powerful 
vis-a-vis the poor. "Within this framework", Duffield notes "it is possible to regard 
famine as an outcome o f a process of impoverishment resulting from the transfer of 
assets from the weak to the politically strong" (Duffield 1992: 3). This indeed could 
explain why famines continue to ravage the Sudan's poor, while in most o f the Sahelian 
countries drastic measures have been taken to prevent repetition o f the disaster (Sen 
1981; Shepherd 1988, Barraclough 1991). In this context, it is instructive to observe that 
per capita food output in Sudan declined during the 1980-86 by 3% compared with 
1974-76 level, while other African countries experienced much higher declines without
actually experiencing famines as Sudan did. For example, in Zimbabwe, per capita food 
output declined over the same period by 23%; in Senegal by 33%; Kenya by 33%; and 
in Botswana by as high as 44%; without these countries having experienced famines 
(Dreze and Sen 1989: 33). Many African states have been able to avert recurrence of 
famine by direct government intervention and support, like Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe. Many others have taken serious 
government action to avert a repetition o f famines such as Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Chad after the 1973 Sahel famine, Ethiopia after the 1985 famine (Ibid: 71). Sudan 
stands out as a sad exception from the marvellous record achieved by other African 
states in stemming famines.
A decade later from the 1973 famine, another famine devastated Sudan. The famine 
o f 1985 reinforces the view that capitalist food production in the commercial plantations 
in the clay plains o f East-central Sudan could not guarantee food security. Indeed, 
instead it could contribute to food insecurity o f the mass o f populations in the process of 
asset transfer described above.
(b) The 1983-85 Famine:
More than half of Sudan's total population of twenty two millions were estimated to 
have been affected by the famine conditions in mid-1985. About 2.5 millions were 
classified as vulnerable (Sudanow 1985: 7-9). O f these about one million were forced to 
leave their villages and seek refuge elsewhere in the country as migrants and squatters in 
shanty towns surrounding the main urban cities. O f those displaced, Kordofan had a 
share of more than 322000 about a third (see appendix B). By mid-1985, the UN 
estimated 12 million Sudanese to be at risk o f starvation (O'Brien 1986). By the end of 
1985, some five million people were still affected by famine conditions; requiring over 
500 thousand metric tons o f food at an estimated cost of about US$ 30 million (Abdel 
Ati 1988: 267). The worst affected regions were the Western provinces o f Kordofan and 
DarFur, and the inhabitants of the Red Sea Hills in Eastern Sudan. Kordofan and 
Dar Fur among them accounted for about 5.7 millions of the estimated total affected 
populations; and for about 2 millions o f the 2.5 millions classified as vulnerable (1.2 
and 0.8 million for Kordofan and DarFur respectively). O f those classified as at 
nutritional risk groups, especially pregnant and lactating mothers and children under 
five, o f these groups about 700 thousand were in Kordofan and 800 thousand in DarFur 
(Oxfam, UNICEF and Kordofan 1985a, b, c 1986). It has been estimated that while 
about 200 thousand children can die from disease in a "normal" year in Sudan, in 1984 
the number reached between 350000 and 700000, and in 1985 the number reached about 
a million (Newsweek "We are the Children", 3 June 1985:18-26). One in ten of Sudan's 
children die in their first year. Those who survive malnutrition and disease, still face an
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early death, life expectancy is only forty eight years. Oxfam's nutritional surveys in 
Kordofan and DarFur revealed levels o f malnutrition four times the normal in Africa 
(Cater 1986). The surveys revealed that severe malnutrition and undernutrition were 
widespread among the rural communities, especially among children and lactating 
mothers. In El-Malha camp, for example, vitamin deficiency was reported among 92% 
of the children, and among 77% in Tendelti (Baldo, cited in Abdel Ati 1988). And 
among the Beja nomads of Eastern Sudan, it was reported that only about 27% of the 
children in Haya area were not malnourished (Oxfam 1984). These widespread 
conditions of malnutrition among the famine-affected communities in Western and 
Eastern Sudan compared with a low percentage level o f malnutrition of only 1% in the 
Central Regions of Sudan (Ibid), reveal the contours of inequalities and differences in 
standards o f living within Sudan.
Livestock losses were estimated at between 50-70% in Kordofan and DarFur in 
1985. Animal wealth as the principal form o f asset was lost by death and sale. In 
Kordofan in 1984/5 animal losses by death was 78% and 22% by sale (Abdel Gadir 
1988). Total animal loss in Kordofan during these years was in the region of 8.1 - 9 
million heads (of cattle, sheep, goats, camels and donkeys combined). In 1984, Eastern 
Kordofan alone lost an estimated 40% of its animal population. Oxfam (1985) reported 
losses between 70% and 80% in Northern DarFur. Many have lost whole herds, and 
came out o f the drought only narrowly with their lives saved. The decimation o f animals 
for these groups, especially among the nomads, was catastrophic since it meant loss of 
their only means of livelihood, and was therefore the more devastating because it 
entailed permanent vulnerability and insecurity. Moreover, these groups have a low 
level of literacy, o f only about 3% among the nomad populations, and have few of the 
skills required for settled or urban work. These represent limiting factors on the 
possibilities o f access to alternative means o f livelihoods in urban centres. Their 
vulnerability becomes even more aggravated by trying to seek refuge in urban centres 
where they end up forming the large pool of the urban poor in slum areas.
In 1984/5 animal prices in Kordofan fell by about 74% from that o f 1981/2 (Ibrahim 
1985). By 1985, a head of cattle would fetch about S£ 121 in El-Obeid market; a value 
which would pay for approximately one sack of dura and for only 0.8 sack of millet in 
the same market. While in the market o f Nyala in DarFur in December 1984, one head 
of cattle was sold for S£ 182, enough to buy only 0.8 sack o f millet (calculated from 
Bush and Pankhurst 1988; and Tesfaye et al 1991). The prices o f smaller animals were 
even lower. People reported that village traders would not accept a goat in exchange of 
one malwa o f dura. One would need two goats to buy only one malwa (1 malwa = appr. 
3.2 Kgs). People also lost their assets, especially women lost their jewellery and gold, 
and merchants offered very low prices. People reported that some merchants made quick
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fortunes out of buying cheaply from the distressed people and selling them very dearly, 
thus became very wealthy during the famine, to the extent that some of them wished the 
drought would continue for some more years. This is a worst example of the process of 
asset transfer which also works in another direction where merchants charge exorbitant 
prices for their goods. A sack of dura would cost about S£ 200 much beyond the reach 
of the overwhelming majority of the rural populations. With extremely low prices of 
their livestock and valuables, and rocket-high prices of basic food grains, the 
populations were unable to face the gathering disaster. Bush observes that in the 
circumstances, it was impossible for an average family o f seven to acquire its daily 
grain requirements o f 1 malwa which cost between S£ 5-7 (Bush 1988).
Mass migration from the rural areas to towns and relief camps ensued. Ibrahim 
(1985) found the number o f the displaced from Kordofan's rural areas to be 200,000 
received in camps around El-Obeid, and another 81,000 who migrated to the Central 
Region and the Gezira. Another 41,605 displaced persons from Kordofan found their 
way to camps and shanty towns in and around Khartoum and Omdurman. The majority 
o f these immigrants to the capital were from Northern Kordofan pastoralists who were 
particularly hard-hit by the famine. Bush and Pankhurst (1988) gave the figures that by 
1985, o f some 360,000 displaced people congregating in the Central Regions of Sudan, 
about 70,000 were from DarFur, 135,000 from Kordofan while some 200,000 moved to 
live with relatives in the irrigated schemes (see appendix 2).
The magnitude o f the human tragedy was further compounded by the greater scale of 
animal decimation. Livestock population in Kordofan was estimated as numbering 
about 12.4 million heads in 1983 and 13.5 million in 1984; out of a national figure of 
about 50 million (Regional Ministry o f Animal Wealth, El-Obeid, 1985); with a national 
average growth rate estimated at 4.1% between 1976-80, and 2.25% between 1981-85 
(calculated from Tesfaye et al 1991). The stark realities about the devastation of the 
famine in Western Sudan have no simple explanation, but are the outcome o f a 
multitude o f a complex composite o f factors. It is only possible to give a general 
schematic overview of broad categorisation on the type o f factors which caused the 
famine. It is possible to distinguish between (a) long-term processes o f political-socio- 
economic character which have been responsible for creating the conditions of 
impoverishment, vulnerability and insecurity; and (b) short-term shocks in the form of 
natural fluctuations and the drought arising from these fluctuations.
The central government, following the flood o f displaced populations from the 
affected regions, feigned a programme of rehabilitation. A component of the programme 
was a campaign to move the displaced populations in homebound repatriation; almost 
an act of mass eviction, from camps surrounding the Capital City. Each family was 
given a sack of Dura and free transport to go back to their villages for cultivation. The
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political motivation o f such policies is not difficult to understand. The presence o f these 
groups in the centre of power, was deemed dangerous for the dominant ruling 
establishment and considered subversive for the status quo. These fears were often 
dressed up in the guise o f national stability and security. These policies o f forced 
repatriation were often justified in terms of directing the displaced to areas of 
production. The net result was that, either through persuasion or coercion, the majority 
o f the displaced were moved back to the countryside, without the least guarantees or 
basic securities. The remaining fragments o f the displaced populations were subjected to 
systematic policing. Al Bashir described the situation:
While freedom o f movement during civilian rule had been guaranteed in the national 
constitution, ... attempts were made to restrict access to the main cities. Town planning and 
municipal authorities launched several campaigns to dismantle illegal settlements (Al 
Bashir 1991:49).
(C) The 1990/1 Famine:
The 1990-91 famine was very widespread affecting large areas in Sudan (Al Bashir 
1991; FAO 1991; Kaballo and Bush 1991; De Waal 1991). The difference between this 
famine and that of the 1970s and 1980s is that those previous famines affected 
traditionally marginalised areas in Western and Eastern Sudan where famine became an 
endemic phenomenon, but the 1990-91 famine affected in addition to these regions, 
other areas and groups hitherto considered immune from famines. These areas and 
groups included mainly the poor, the working classes, the unemployed, and many 
sections o f those formally employed in the public government sector who mainly live in 
towns. Many households in the towns experienced hardships. Food became scarce in the 
rural areas and prices soared quickly in the towns beyond the reach of many households. 
Mass movements from the countryside to the towns ensued; the majority flocked to the 
centre. By August 1991, the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) estimated the 
number of the displaced swarming into shanties in and around the capital to be in the 
region of 1.5 million, mostly from the South and West. From the point o f view of the 
authorities, these were considered "illegal" residents, and were not entitled to rationing. 
Their dwellings had been the target o f frequent raids by the municipality, the police and 
security forces. In desperation, the authorities finally resorted to the physical demolition 
and burning of shanty dwellings and forcible removal of people. {Kasha, i.e. forced 
repatriation).
Yet with all stark evidence, official government response has been almost "criminal". 
Government authorities denied the existence of the famine. There has ensued a political 
and ideological war following Sudan's stance siding with Iraq in the Gulf war. The 
donor community, led by the US and Britain, imposed restrictions and conditionalities 
on food aid to Sudan. The overthrow of the democratically-elected government o f Sadiq
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al-Mahdi in June 1989 by a military coup led to the mandatory enforcement by the US 
government of Section 513 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act which 
immediately prohibits further economic assistance to a country where a democratically- 
elected government is overthrown by a military action (Kilgour 1990: 127). The 
Sudanese authorities, on their part, refused to comply with American terms, and refused 
to declare the country in need o f emergency relief. Instead the authorities insisted that 
there was a temporary food-gap. The wranglings and recriminations on both sides were 
to cost hundreds of thousands of lives.
With very limited supplies of food, the government was virtually paralysed. A 
number o f measures had been tried to ration the limited supplies, control prices, 
restriction on grain movements, ban on private trade control over grains etc.. The 
government finally had to adopt a "life-boat strategy " in which it committed the 
available supplies to the urban populations through rationing, while ignoring the 
extreme hardships in the countryside. The significance o f this famine is that while it 
affected larger proportions of the Sudanese populations, government action was directed 
to the towns as a matter o f political expediency and ignoring the politically weak 
populations in the countryside. The neglect inadvertently led to mass movements from 
the countryside to the towns. The development of a famine of such magnitude in Sudan 
shortly after the 1980s famine was inexcusable.
There were a number of official institutions in Sudan whose role is to monitor the 
national food situation. There is the Sudan Famine Regulations; a detailed set of 
procedures promulgated by the British in 1920 after the Indian Famine Code (for more 
details see Shepherd 1988). There is also a "strategic Reserve Stock Unit" affiliated to 
the Ministry o f Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP), including, among other 
departments, a representative from the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS). The 
responsibility of the Unit is to monitor food production and the general food situation in 
the country as a whole and to ensure the maintenance of a permanent strategic grain 
reserve to be used as a buffer against famine emergencies. There is also the (RRC), a 
government department with responsibilities for ensuring proper distribution of relief 
aid. co-ordinating the activities of relief agencies operating in the country and advising 
on policies for reallocation and rehabilitation programmes. The RRC is also responsible 
for handling refugee issues. Following the wake of the recent succession of famines, an 
Early Warning System (EWS) has been installed in 1988, stationed at Khartoum Airport 
and run jointly by the RRC and the Sudan Meteorological Department, equipped with 
imagery-data-analysis wire. EWS enables the reception and analysis o f satellite imagery 
from METEOSA IR Space Station "which continuously records a complete scene of 
Africa every 30 minutes". The system receives, analyses and converts the data into 
information on near-time situation of rainfall and vegetation. (Hulme 1991: 71). There
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seems to be no lack o f the necessary institutional machinery to assess famine process, 
what is lacking is the political will to enforce famine-prevention policies. Yet, despite 
the evidence of the impending disaster in 1991, the government inadvertently decided to 
continue with food exports. We can not assess the possible outcome o f this strategy, but 
we need to assess the parameters of the food balance in the harvests immediately 
preceding the famine.
Sudan's annual consumption requirements is about three million tons o f grains. The 
1987/88 harvest marked a record of 5.1 million tons. A further 280,000 tons existed in 
carry-over stock from the previous harvest. There was a poor harvest in 1989 of 2.1 
million tons, short o f about a million tons from national requirements. This was made 
up for by importing 318,000 tons of wheat. There was a particularly poor harvest in 
1990, in which total cereal production was 1.8 million tons; indicating a deficit of 1.2 
million tons, from national requirements (FAO estimates November 1990).
The Agricultural Bank of Sudan, the official institution responsible for the 
management of the strategic grain reserve, held stocks of 1.59 million tons following the 
bountiful harvest o f 1988. This is more than half a year's consumption for the whole 
country. In early 1990 the ABS stocks were estimated to be around 200,000 tons. A 
further 800,000 tons were estimated to be in the hands o f private merchants and Islamic 
banks. Half of these resources were drawn down to meet the deficit in 1990, thus 
bringing the remaining reserve stock to half a million tons. Heedless of the ABS 
objections and mindless o f the grave risks involved, the government decided to export 
the entire reserve, exposing the whole country to an unprecedented crisis. De Waal 
details what happened:
contrary to ABS policy and common-sense risk avoidance, the government decided to export 
the entire reserve. ABS objections were overruled and from April the ABS played no part in 
managing the country's food policy, [in September 1990 Mohammed Adam Jellabi, the 
Director of the ABS, was transferred]. The incoming Minister of Finance, Abdel Rahim Hamdi 
(previously head o f the Baraka International Bank), made a radical shift in policy. The Baraka 
and Faisal Islamic Banks were given a monopoly on marketing Sudan's agricultural produce 
(both domestically and internationally), and a monopoly on importing agricultural inputs such 
as tractors and fertilisers. The ABS reserve was thus sold abroad by the two Islamic Banks. (De 
Waal 1991: 111).
The question to be asked is why the government exported the food amidst an 
impending famine. Here, international interests were the prime movers. After the 1983/5 
famine, Sudan -with the support o f the World Bank- again exported its grain surplus, 
amidst another widespread drought in 1990/91. Awad explains that the real problem was 
caused by the fact that when the drought hit Sudan, Sudan did not have any reserves in 
the country. That was because the four years which preceded the drought were years in 
which Sudan exported more than one million tons o f food. The amount o f food which 
was actually exported was quite enough to meet all the needs o f the country. The advice
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of the Production Relations Committee, which asked for the creation o f a reserve in the 
country had been ignored (Awad 1991). The strategy to build emergency grain reserves 
to avert famine in Sudan was opposed by the World Bank. The Bank's view was that 
Sudan's comparative advantage is to import food from the world's major grain 
producers, such as the United States. A Bank's spokesman expresses the Bank's view:
I think our view is that keeping grain; large security stocks that are necessary to deal with 
that kind o f problem, o f  severe deficit caused by a big drought; is not a paying proposition 
for those countries; it is simply too expensive. The storage to take that kind o f thing is very 
expensive, is very capital intensive. It is much better for these countries to leave this kind 
of food security to somebody else to pay the cost; to be paid by the people who are the very 
large and efficient producers o f  grain (David Dunn, o f  the World Bank 1991).
The little grain that was left was in the hands of private merchants, and they taxed 
prices much beyond the reach o f the majority of the population. The situation was 
further compounded by a diplomatic crisis in Sudan's international relations following 
its siding with Iraq in the Gulf war. The Sudan allying itself with Iraq antagonised most 
o f Sudan's traditional aid donors, especially Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, USA and 
Britain. An added adversity was that many o f the Sudanese Diaspora in Kuwait and Iraq 
were forced to return to Sudan, which deprived the economy of an important part o f its 
foreign exchange earnings. The cost to the Sudan economy has been estimated at around 
US$ 400 million, or 4% of GDP: ... equivalent to Sudan's total export receipts and twice 
the amount spent by Sudan on food imports in 1990 11 (ODI: 1991,2. cited in Kaballo 
and Bush, 1991). Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States, alarmed by Sudan's official 
stance, stopped all types of aid. The USA took a number o f tough measures against 
Sudan government. USA insisted that the Sudan government should take measures 
towards the restoration o f democracy and a peaceful settlement of Southern problem. It 
also wanted Sudan to make an official declaration of famine emergency; conditions 
which the government categorically rejected. Another hard blow came from the IMF. 
Following the failure o f its negotiations between Sudan and the Fund, the IMF declared 
Sudan "non-co-operative", the worst brand ever. This further worsened Sudan's 
prospects either to obtain aid or to make food purchases on the international .market. 
This was reflected in the poor response to extend aid to Sudan. By April 1991 only 
about one third o f the estimated shortfall had been pledged, and only a fraction of that 
had arrived in Port Sudan (De Waal 1991: 115)).
S t a t e  R e s p o n s e  t o  f a m i n e : A  q u e s t io n  o f  L e g i t i m a c y :
Ultimately, it is the responsibility o f the state to take preventive action against 
famines (Cutler 1991; Dreze and Sen 1989, Shepherd 1988; Pearson 1986). Sudan is not 
too poor to be able to deploy sufficient national resources to avert mass hunger. But for 
the government to take effective preventive action depends on the ideological
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orientation and political persuasion of those in the seats of power; and ultimately on 
their political will to take such action.
News o f the famine had been duly conveyed to the authorities by the local 
administrators. District administrators, as part o f their administrative duties, in Bara, 
Sodari and other Districts in Kordofan sent regular reports to the regional government at 
El-Obeid alerting the authorities to the worsening situation in their administrative 
localities during 1983- 85 and in 1990-91 (personal communication with D.As.). Both 
the regional and central governments in El-Obeid and Khartoum  were fully alerted to 
the seriousness of the situation, well ahead of the actual disaster to take the necessary 
precautions if they wanted to do so. However, the authorities turned a deaf ear to the in­
coming reports, and a blind eye to all evidence of collapse that was taking place. 
Instead, neither the regional government nor the central government wanted to hear any 
"bad news", and chose instead to attempt to cover it up. Instead o f redressing the 
situation by moving in food grains from surplus areas, or stabilising prices, the 
authorities lost valuable time and resources in the futile efforts of covering up the 
disaster. The Governor o f Kordofan at the time El Fatih Bushara, a military General; 
went to great lengths in the covert-up attempt to blatantly deny any existence of a 
famine situation in Kordofan. He entertained an affluent audience to a high-class 
expensive luncheon in the Hilton Hotel in Khartoum and openly denied to his audience 
any existence of a famine in the region (Bush 1988). But this episode says a great deal 
about the official mind and attitude towards Kordofan and its people.
When news o f the the 1983-5 famine finally reached Khartoum, the government went 
a long way to cover it up. The government wanted to give an image of achievement, 
however false, both to its internal supporters and its external backers. It therefore could 
not countenance to admit the plight o f a mass of rural peasantry who have no political or 
economic leverage to taint that image. The Sudanese government wanted to give a 
picture o f internal stability and economic efficiency to its external donors in a bid to 
reassure them to continue their political and economic support.. Most prominent among 
these external functionaries were the USA, and the international monetary institutions: 
the World Bank and the IMF, and other donors including some of the Gulf Arab States. 
These external allies wanted reassurances o f Sudan's ability to repay its aid loans, and to 
ensure good returns on their investments in order to continue their financial and political 
support. The essential prerequisites to satisfy these demands were internal stability and 
an efficient market economy. In this context, the occurrence of a large famine was 
evidently self-defeating to the regime's assurances to its external allies; hence the 
reluctance to admit the famine. In fact the 1980s famine has been a political malaise to 
the government in Khartoum and an embarrassment to its external backers. Under the 
circumstances, and in a cover-up attempt to save its face, the central government
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mounted regular policing operations in order to remove the displaced from the capital. 
For the Sudan external backers and foreign donors, the development of the famine 
engendered consternation and alarm. They were alarmed to witness a telling verdict to 
the failure of the development packages which they actively pushed since the early 
1970s in the tenets of the "open door market policy" akin to Al Infitah policy in Egypt at 
the time (Barnett 1986; Hassan 1986; Gad Karim 1986).
E x t e r n a l  R e s p o n s e :
The government o f the USA, then the closest ally to the Nimeiri regime, watched the 
situation carefully, and was fully aware o f the magnitude o f the famine. Indeed, the 
USA advised the Nimeiri government to declare the famine. But this is to be seen in the 
perceived American interests to intervene by massive food relief, thereby help off-load 
American grain stocks. Other Western centres, especially the EU, and other 
international agencies, inter-governmental organisations, the UN, the FAO, all had been 
well aware of the developing disaster, but paid little concern. The official response of 
the Western governments had been very modest or non-existent. International and inter­
governmental agencies took the approach o f "clearing" themselves from responsibility, 
therefore, opted to publicise the famine on a broad scale. The FAO, for example, stated 
that there was a wide engulfing famine in 1984/5 affecting some 500 million people in 
24 different countries. This publicity and the wide media coverage caused a wide 
popular outrage in many quarters throughout the world. The pressure put by various 
organisations on governments to take action, eventually forced them to provide food 
relief and other forms of aid, against their perceived strategic interests (Cutler 1991: 
177-8; Gill, 1985).
DISCUSSION: THE POLITICS OF FAMINE:
Discussions on famine have tended to polarise on two broad lines of debate: 
naturalist explanations which attribute the occurrence o f famine to natural causes such 
as droughts; and human-factor explanations which trace the problem to social and 
political phenomenon. These discussions, moreover, have overwhelmingly focused on 
macro-level processes; a few studies have investigated micro-level processes. Moreover, 
rarely have these discussions attempted to bring out the interconnectedness between the 
diverse factors which generate famine in a holistic paradigm. These polarities have 
tended to obscure the complexity o f the phenomenon, and yielded only partial 
explanations. The present study contributes to the on-going debate by introducing a 
different approach to explaining and understanding famine, based on a holistic paradigm 
which takes into account the linkages and interrelationships between the natural and
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human-made factors, and between the macro- and micro-level processes in a historical 
perspective. The main contribution o f this study is to argue that famine is a phenomenon 
which can only be understood in political terms; and as a political phenomenon, there is 
no simple explanation to famine. The diverse factors which contribute to the 
development o f famine cannot be treated in isolation from one another, but that the 
totality o f these factors needs to be analysed and understood in a broad context. We 
adopt a broad historical context, which we assume is more appropriate to accommodate 
the diversity of issues in famine analysis. This approach is here applied to Sudan.
Sudan in the mid-1980s is a place o f stark contrasts. On the one hand, lush farm land 
and abundant crops are a source o f great wealth to the commercial farmers who each 
own thousands of acres. It is a world apart from those parts inhabited by many of the 
poor. These end up struggling for survival in Sudan's arid wasteland. It is they who fight 
the losing battle against the natural and political adversaries. Cutting wood provides the 
sole source of income for many.. Eighty five per cent of Sudan's fuel comes from this 
source. It increases the possible spread of the desert; for many people, cutting wood 
provides the only means of earning a living.
Man-made water holes have sustained the herds, but paradoxically, they can help turn 
pasture into desert. The increase in the usage of land is a very important factor in the 
process of soil erosion within productive areas.
Many people have abandoned their villages and headed for the towns to find work for 
a living. On the outskirts o f the capital, Khartoum , the desert is dotted with make-shift 
dwellings of people on the move. Families displaced from the rural areas congregate in 
shanty dwellings around urban centres, living on whatever odd jobs they can find in the 
city. Some cannot go back to the villages since they have completely lost all assets, and 
become permanently trapped in the city; eking a precarious and sometimes dangerous 
life. For some people staying will be temporary, the scramble for food or jobs before 
returning to their families in the hinterland. For most, though, this is the end of the road. 
They have little choice, but to begin a relentless search for subsistence on the margins of 
city life. A fifth of the children in shanty towns are malnourished. The food is composed 
only of dura, there is no vegetables or dairy products. And so their diet lacks essential 
proteins and vitamins (BBC 1991).
The significance of Sudan's famine is that it happened in a country capable of feeding 
itself. Famine in Sudan cannot be explained solely in natural terms. A drought can 
trigger a disaster, it is not the only cause. Sudan's famine is part of a global trend, which 
suggests that people have become more vulnerable to natural disaster. One reason may
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be that as people are made increasingly poor, they have nothing to fall back on, and so 
the drought is only a stage in the process of emmiseration.
Sudan's agricultural resources are impressive, both in scale and potential. Estimates 
put arable land in Sudan at 200.000.000 feddans o f which only 10% are actually 
utilised. Sudan has an estimated animal population of about 58,000,000 heads. Besides 
rain water, the Nile and its tributaries provide a perennial source of irrigation for 
agricultural development. The Nile annual average flow is about 84 milliard cubic 
meters, of which the 1959 Nile Waters Treaty entitles Egypt to withdraw 48c m^ 
milliard, Sudan is to withdraw 4c,m milliard; leaving the remainder to flow into the 
Mediterranean. The revised Nile Waters Treaty entitles Sudan to a further 14.5° m 
milliard, bringing Sudan's total share from the Nile waters to 18.5C//,ri milliard (15.0 
million acre-feet: USDA 1968). Sudan's potentialities for increased food production are 
enormous. There is the Gezira, two million acres of irrigated farmland, the largest 
scheme of its kind in the world. But instead of providing the Sudan with a guarantee 
against hunger, the Gezira in recent years seems to have increased the risk. 
Responsibility lies not just with the Sudanese. Since the Gezira began, foreign interests 
have taken an important role. The project was set up early this century by the British, to 
provide cotton for the Lancashire mills (see chapter on Sudanese State).
Cotton, the "white gold" on the Gezira plain (Gaitskell 1959) was planned to be the 
country's main crop whose export will finance the whole country's development. But 
with damaging consequences to the future, the British decided that cotton alone should 
be the country's main resource of income. At present, stock piles o f unsalable cotton is 
one legacy o f their decision. As the world's cotton market has collapsed, so have 
Sudan's prospects of earning the foreign exchange needed to buy essential imports and 
pay off its huge overseas debt. Faced with falling cotton prices in the seventies, the 
Sudanese government decided to grow more food on the Gezira. This has to make 
Sudan self-sufficient, and provide a small surplus for export every year. Sudan increased 
the area under agriculture by about 2.5 million acres between 1970 and 1975, and there 
was a major surplus. Sudan had enough food from its domestic sources, could store food 
for bad years, and then export the surplus (Awad. 1991).
Yet, Sudan's "food-first" policy did not please everybody; least o f all its creditors in 
Washington DC, the International Monetary Fund and its partner the World Bank. Like 
any bank, the World Bank expects a good rate of return on its investments. The Bank's 
target in recent years has been ten per cent rate of return on their investments (Ed Shuh 
of the World Bank 1991). The Bank said Sudan's emphasis on food crops would not 
produce adequate returns. The Sudan already deep in debt had little option but to turn 
the Bank's line; to reduce the amount o f food it was growing, and return to cotton 
production (Gurdon 1991). Beginning about 1972, the World Bank became more
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insistent in pressing its arguments about Sudan's 'comparative advantage' lying in cotton 
production for export and against the policies adopted by the government towards 
diversifying production in the irrigated schemes, including growing more import- 
substitution elite food crops such as wheat and rice. The World Bank's Third 
Mechanised Farming Project of 1978 halted Bank loans for further expansion of this 
type of agriculture. The Bank, nonetheless, offered Sudan a massive 'rehabilitation' 
package, its largest undertaking in Africa, to rehabilitate the Gezira and other cotton- 
growing irrigation schemes (O'Brien 1986: 198).
The Bank's argument is that it is better for Sudan to promote its comparative 
advantage in cotton, and to use the proceeds of that crop to buy other needs, including 
food. Sudan can surely grow more food, but it would be more expensive. The Bank says 
that Sudan's comparative advantage is to go for the crop which gives the higher 
productivity and the higher profit and to use that money to support other means of 
getting food, either boost production elsewhere in Sudan or by buying food from abroad 
(David Dunn o f the World Bank 1991). According to the World Bank, one particular 
food crop the Sudan would be better off importing than growing itself is wheat. Much of 
the wheat Sudan currently imports comes from the United States; which is anxious to 
find overseas markets for its grain surpluses. Some critics say these and other Western 
interests are the true reasons for the World Bank’s insistence that certain food crops 
should be imported. The Sudanese Minister of Commerce exposes the Bank's line:
Sudan is not even allowed by the World Bank to grow wheat to feed itself. The country 
used to produce in the Gezira about half a million tons every year. Now the country is not 
allowed to grow wheat at all in these government schemes, and to rely entirely on imported 
wheat (Awad 1991).
The World Bank denied the charge; saying that its excuse is based simply on which crop 
brings the best profit. This is refuted by Sudanese former Minster of Commerce:
The Sudan can grow wheat cheaper than importing it. And this was proved by a study, by a 
cosultancy ... which was commissioned to make this study by the World Bank. They show 
that the costs o f production o f wheat are lower than the costs o f  importing it from outside. 
Nevertheless, the Sudan was required by the World Bank to cut the production o f wheat, 
and to import wheat from the United States and from other countries. At the same time to 
devote the area which is saved in this to the production o f cotton for exportation (Awad 
1991).
Enthusiasm for big and expensive projects are among the legacies of British colonial 
approach to Sudan's development. This was revived in the seventies. Once again foreign 
investors are the prime movers. The Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and 
Development (AAAID) wanted to turn Sudan into the bread-basket o f the Arab world; a 
source of food for neighbouring Arab countries. But o f the two hundred projects 
planned, only six survived, and all make a loss. Making Sudan a major agricultural
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exporter was the central purpose of ambitious projects such as The Kenana Sugar 
Scheme; the biggest in the world. It cost 400 million pounds to build, was designed to 
process twice the capacity of the average sugar plant. The world sugar prices in the 
1970s were at an all-time high and Kenana then appeared as an attractive business 
proposition. But by 1979, when it started production prices had plummeted. Kenana 
could not compete with other sugar producing countries, and the hoped for export never 
happened. There have been changing approaches to Sudan's development. These 
changing development strategies have been mostly disrupted, discontinued or simply 
abandoned, largely because they reflect changing external influences on the Sudanese 
state, which for the sake of its own survival, has accepted to implement a catalogue of 
odd development strategies, which ultimately ended in a complete fiasco.
For most of the Sudanese people, the ambitious agricultural investments of the past 
seemed to have achieved little. Over 80% of the fertile lands few have benefited from 
the expensive projects favoured by the former governments, and its foreign backers. The 
harsh irony is that on the world's largest irrigated farm; the Gezira, chronic malnutrition 
is still a common occurrence. Investment on cotton seemed to have brought little 
benefits to the people who grow it. Although large scale schemes o f export projects 
have failed to benefit ordinary people in Sudan, the trend continues. In el Gedarif area, 
merchant commercial farmers each owns 50 thousand acres o f land to grow only one 
crop, dura', Sudan's staple food. Commercial farmers, millionaires several times over, 
were closely allied with the merchants who sell the grains both in the domestic market 
and abroad. A few big merchants are the main monopolists and beneficiaries of the 
Sudan's grain trade. Because they control the distribution o f grains, they can realise a 
profit per sack a hundred times greater than the small producers, who cannot afford 
transport and storage. In Western Sudan, each single market is controlled by a cartel of 
seven to ten merchants. They can fix prices and control those markets for their own 
profit. Over and above that there are major grain merchants in Sudan, major grain 
producers, who control the domestic market as a whole and the export market. The 
small cultivators in fact have no title to the land which they have continued to live on 
for generations; and so they lose their land easily to big commercial farmers. The small 
cultivator falls prey to the encroachment o f the larger farmers. For many people, the 
trend towards commercial farming has endangered their traditional safeguards against 
famine. Reduced their food reserves and taken away their land, it offered them little in 
return. The more farms are mechanised, the fewer jobs remain. There are other 
consequences, not least for the land itself. They dispossessed both the pastoralists and 
settled farmers on those areas, and occupied the land, often illegally. They move on to 
new land as they are clearing it. And then a process sets in wherein the soil is totally 
deep-mined, there are no fertilisers used, the crop yield after about three years begins to
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crash, and then the land is abandoned. Then it is virtually useless at that stage, and it 
will take a long time to regenerate. The destruction to Sudan's old-established farming 
methods, has placed Sudan high on the list of countries vulnerable to famine.
Historically, food was one o f the principal sinews o f power. Food was, and continues 
to be power in a most basic, tangible and inescapable form. Food was also fundamental 
to the structures of dominance and dependency that arose out of this most vital of all 
commodities. Famine in Sudan, as elsewhere, is a highly political issue, enmeshed in 
international power and trade relations, domestic politics o f the state, access and 
distribution of resources, of regional polarisation and social differentiation. No rich 
among the Sudanese have suffered from famine, it is only the poor who suffered. 
Famine is a crisis in society; it provides the rare opportunity of understanding the power 
structures in a given society, the structures of dominance and subordination, and the 
relationship between ruler and ruled. Arnold puts the point succinctly:
Famine can provide a rare glimpse o f the lives o f  the common people; ... Famine opens up 
to our understanding at least a fragment o f the historical experience o f subordinate social 
groups and their interaction with the state and elites (Arnold 1988:.3).
This study is about the politics o f famine in Sudan in historical perspective.




This chapter reviews perspectives for explaining famine. It provides a theoretical 
appraisal of the current debates on the recurrent phenomena of famine in the 
contemporary world, and how this applies to the context of Sudan. There are five main 
strands of arguments in this debate. For each of the five theories examined, a brief 
presentation o f each theory is followed by a critique or counter-argument. The 
inadequacy of any one single theory as frame of reference for the Sudanese context will 
become evident; a reflection o f the complexity o f the phenomenon. The complexity of 
famine calls for a different treatment based on a broad perspective that accommodates 
the multiplicity of factors which generate famine. Based on such a conviction, a 
historical broadly holistic approach is adopted to account for the phenomena of 
recurrent famines in Sudan. Recognising that it is the poor countries in the world, and 
the poorer segments o f society within these countries who suffer from famines, a 
historical holistic account will allow us to gauge the processes of rural poverty and 
vulnerability to famine, as well as the continuum of social adaptations to political 
change and environmental stress. It also brings into focus the contours of the relations of 
power, as they have evolved in the course of history. How these relations of power have 
been structured and how they in turn structure socio-economic and political relations 
between dominant and subordinated social classes, inevitably determine the fortunes of 
different social groups in the struggle for control over resources, and over entitlements 
to food. Such an approach marks a departure from the unresolved dichotomies which 
characterise current debates; those o f nature Vs human-agency, of macro Vs micro 
structures, o f internalist Vs externalist explanations, o f Food Availability Decline 
(FAD) Vs Entitlements, etc. Such dichotomies are not only inadequate, but can be 
misleading. Natural causes such as droughts, for example, can exacerbate 
environmentally damaging human actions already under way. Conversely, human 
actions can trigger natural disasters. The complexity is not least compounded by the 
difficulty of defining what famine really means conceptually.
2-1-  The Definition Debate:
Most attempts to define famine in fact merely describe its commonest causes and 
effects; and the boundaries between definition, description and explanations are often 
blurred (Devereux 1993). Some have even questioned the usefulness o f defining it (Sen
- 2 6 -
1981). Nonetheless the debate on the definition of famine has addressed two major 
issues over which there is much disagreement. The first focuses on whether famine is an 
event or a process/structure. The second addresses the more complex question o f 
whether famine involves starvation and mass death as a necessary defining condition. 
Those who see famine as an event couch their argument in the following observations: 
that famine usually occupies a definite time and space; is typically characterised by 
exceptional severity in a manner that sets it apart as a singularly salient event, and that 
in many cases it is accompanied by natural or man-made disasters such as floods, 
droughts and/or wars. Cutler, a representative o f this school, maintains that: "famine is 
an abnormal event characterised by a breakdown in social relationships giving rise to 
epidemic starvation and excess mortality (Cutler 1985: 12 )
Another group views famine as a process; a phenomenon that develops over a long 
period o f time, and has its roots in the structures of the society. This group contends that 
famine cannot be singled out and treated as a separate event divorced from its socio­
economic, political, and historical contexts. Rather, famine and its devastating effects 
mark the ultimate final stage o f a long process involving social tensions and 
contradictions o f interests. According to this view famine serves as a trigger that sets 
forth a violent eruption of events. Arnold, expresses this view in the following terms:
famine is rarely a bolt from the blue, a wholly random and unpredictable occurrence that 
can be meaningfully considered in isolation from economic, social and the political 
structures o f a specific society. ... The proximate causes o f a famine (such as natural or 
man-made disasters); are often no more than the precipitating factors , intensifying or 
bringing to the fore a society's inner contradictions and inherent weaknesses (Arnold 1988:
7).
Watts shares the same view. In his words:
Famine is a process not an event, it can be about abnormality and collapse, but it also 
implies extension and intensification. It is defined by disease and mass death, which is 
terminal and biological. That famines are often long and drawn out o f interactive social and 
biological processes. ( Watts, 1991: 10).
Tawney sees famine as the "final stage of a disease which, though not always 
conspicuous, is ever present" (Tawney cited in Watts, 1991). For this group, famine 
represents the final stage of the process; its most concrete and tangible manifestation. 
According to this view, natural disasters act as "precipitating factors" (Arnold 1988); as 
"trigger events" (Bush 1988b); or as "intensifiers' (Watts 1991). This contrasts with the 
"event" view which accords natural causes a primary causative function. It is 
worthwhile noting that the view of famine as a process has the merit o f resolving the 
paradoxical nature o f famine as being both event and process. That is because while 
recognising structural determinants in the genesis o f famine, it does not deny its 
episodic nature, but places this at a terminal stage. It is also revealing to note that there
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is a qualitative difference to these views. While the "event" view is basically neutral 
explaining famine in natural terms, the "processual/structural" view is essentially critical 
blaming human actions as the main cause of famine.
2- 2- The Debate on Mass Starvation:
Another debate addresses the more complex issue o f whether, or not, famine involves 
mass starvation as a necessary condition. The difference in opinion with regard to the 
discussion on mass starvation in famine owes its origins to the "Malthusian debate" on 
the menace o f over-population. Writing towards the end o f the 18th century, Malthus 
argued that the earth had limited resources to feed its inhabitants. Moreover, while food 
supply increased on an arithmetic scale, population increased geometrically. Therefore 
an inevitable situation o f imbalance would arise at a certain point where the ever- 
increasing population outstripped available food supplies and substantial numbers of 
people would perish for lack of food (Malthus 1798).
According to Malthus, famine acts as "nature's court of last resort" to hold in balance 
an otherwise unchecked population growth. Malthus identified two types of checks to 
keep the optimum balance: "preventive checks", which consist o f human means and 
devices to control population growth. Failure from the part of humanity to adhere to 
nature's imperatives for effective preventive measures, would result in nature exacting 
its inexorable laws in the form of "positive checks", such as pestilence and famines. 
Mass death is therefore a central necessary condition in the Malthusian concept of 
famine. Many authors have since followed the view that famine involves mass death. 
Post has expressed this view: "famines cause deaths from starvation and disease which 
follow the extreme shortage of food" (Post. 1977: X I 11 ). Bennet shares the same view 
when he says that famine occurs when there is "shortage o f food so extreme and 
protracted as to result in widespread persisting hunger ... and a considerable elevation of 
community death rate attributable at least in part to deaths from starvation (Bennet 
1968: 322 ).
Currey presents the internationally accepted definition; "widespread food shortage 
leading to a significant regional rise in the death rates" (Currey 1978: 87). John Rivers 
and his colleagues have stated that "starvation is a semantic prerequisite for the 
definition of famine" (cited in De Waal, 1990: 10). The FAO definition o f famine 
cautiously evades explicitly stating the condition o f death. The FAO definition of 
famine is "a food situation in which there are clear indications, based on careful and 
impartial study, that serious catastrophe and suffering will occur if international 
assistance is not rendered" (cited in Dando, 1980: 62). Sen says that famine is a 
"particularly virulent form o f starvation causing widespread death" (Sen 1981: 40). 
Many more authors follow the view that high mortality is inseparable from any
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definition of famine. The overwhelming agreement in views on this matter suggests that 
mortality has become central to the definition of famine. This is captured in the standard 
definitions o f famine in English Dictionaries. English Dictionaries define famine as: "a 
scarcity of food producing hunger and starvation" (Webster's New International 
Dictionary, 1950: 916).
And yet there is another group who challenge this view. De Waal (1989) dismisses 
the "most common English sense" o f the term as is employed by others as inapplicable 
to different famine contexts. He argues that this "common sense" term has evolved in a 
specific historical context from the nineteenth century Malthusian debate. Accordingly, 
he dismisses the centrality o f mass mortality to the concept o f famine as being a recent 
phenomenon in the English intellectual history. In his words:
The central role o f  mass starvation in the concept of famine is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. ... the modern English notion o f famine is an aberration o f intellectual 
history. The conception o f famine as mass starvation unto death was an outcome o f the 
Malthusian debate o f the nineteenth century (De Waal 1990: 10).
De Waal argues that the centrality of mass death to the concept o f famine is a logical 
necessity to Malthus's argument. That the constituents o f this concept "came not from 
the experience of famine, but from the logic of Malthus's argument".(Ibid: 17). De Waal 
concludes that this "erroneous" concept is more "an outcome o f social philosophy than 
of social experience"; and that who defines a situation as one of a famine is an issue of 
power relations. De Waal goes on to develop his own redefinition of famine based on 
what he calls the actual experience of famine victims in DarFur, of Western Sudan. 
Here, he argues, the concept acquires strong idiomatic connotations and overtones 
which make it fundamentally different from the abstracted intellectual European 
concept. He states that "hunger is in part an idiom; in part it is an experience". And that 
the meaning for the word "famine" in any society is an outcome of the idioms of famine 
and hunger used, and the history of actual famines experienced by that society. (Ibid: 
13). According to De Waal, famines have different tails; there are those which involve 
hunger, others involve diseases, others that involve destitution, and others that kill. But 
questions still remain as to what constitutes famine.
2- 3- Theories of Famine:
The different theories and approaches discussed below reveal a considerable overlap 
between them, with the inevitable implication of giving different and sometimes 
conflicting interpretations o f famine, as we will see later. The importance o f theory to 
understand the phenomenon of famine stems from considerations for practical policy­
making and vital issues which may mean life and death. This necessitates laying out a 
proper theoretical framework to understand and explain famine; on which understanding
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appropriate policies could be made. Five major approaches can be distinguished in the 
literature on famine. These are: (1) the naturalist thesis, (2) the population thesis, (3) the 
holistic or interactive approach, and (4 & 5) the Entitlements Approach, and the Food 
Availability Decline (FAD) Approach.
2- 3 - 1 -  The Naturalist Thesis:
The naturalist argument holds that "natural phenomena" are the prime causes of 
famine. Natural causes are in fact an amalgam of diverse natural phenomena, including 
aspects of the physical environment such as climate, drought, rainfall patterns, 
desertification, and soil erosion. According to the naturalist school, all or some of these 
aspects are responsible in varying degrees for the creation of a famine.
2- 3- 1- i- Drought:
The intensity and frequency of the Saheliian drought has been a subject of 
controversy. Rasmusson (1987) points out that the extent of the mid-1980s drought has 
been exceptionally sweeping, and admits that "the coincidence of drought over such a 
vast region was the result o f complex climatic processes which are inadequately 
measured, difficult to describe and poorly understood" (Rasmusson 1987: 3). It can be 
argued that the confusion surrounding the nature o f the drought stems from the fact that 
the phenomenon has until recently sought purely "technical" climatological explanations 
offered by climatologists. It is only recently that the recognition of the anthropogenic 
social impact on the ecology and climate has gathered momentum (Redclift 1994, Sage 
1994, Glantz 1978, 1987; Watts 1983, 1987, Franke and Chasin 1980; Nicholson 1986; 
Folland, Parker and Palmer 1985). Nicholson, for example, observes that the recent 
drought is particularly severe and prolonged. He observes that since the early 1960s a 
regular downward trend in rainfall over the Sahel is clearly the most severe o f the 
twentieth century. He adds that the processes associated with the downward trend are 
not clear, but they may be distinct from those associated with the shorter, more intense 
drought episodes (Nicholson 1986). Recently, attention has been drawn to an apparent 
relationship with global-scale changes in sea surface temperatures (SST) (Folland, 
Parker and Palmer 1985) to be the determining force of climatic change and variability.
At a theoretical level, Shukla (1984) argues that climatic variations can be viewed as 
resulting from two mechanisms: (a) internal atmospheric dynamics and (b) boundary 
forcing (Shukla 1984). The first set comprises the internal structure o f the atmosphere, 
i.e. wind, temperature and moisture. The second set are associated with complex 
interactions between the atmosphere and the lower boundary and are influenced in the 
lower boundary by changes such as SST, snow, soil moisture, albedo ( in-coming and
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out-going solar radiation) and vegetation cover as it affects the exchange of heat and 
moisture between the earth's surface and the atmosphere (Rasmusson 1987: 16).
In this complex interchange of processes the human social impact on the ecosystem 
is unmistakable. As social communities and their activities occupy the lower boundary, 
they can potentially upset the boundary forcing mechanisms. Excessive farming and 
deforestation can lead to loss o f the vegetation cover, and consequently upset the 
balance o f heat and moisture and between the earth's surface and the atmosphere. Or 
again, excessive heating can upset albedo balance (the in-coming and reflective 
radiation) and can thus lead to the phenomenon of "global warming" and the problems 
of the "greenhouse effect". Many or any of the human practices can have strong impact 
on the ecosystem.
Mattsson identifies four geophysical correlations to the drought. First, a correlation 
between sea-surface temperatures south of the Equator and monsoonal rainfall in the 
Sahel. It has been discerned that high summer temperatures in these waters are 
apparently related to the Sahelian drought. Second, It seems that some oceanographic 
atmospheric circulation (the so-called El Nino) are in some way connected with the 
Sahelian drought in 1984. Third, It seems that several long-lasting episodes o f decreased 
salt concentrations in the upper layers o f the North Atlantic Ocean have during the last 
14 thousand years coincided with periods of drought in the Sahel; and fourth. It has 
been suggested that deforestation in the Congo River basin in recent decades has 
contributed to the droughts that have occurred in the Sahel since 1968 (Mattsson 1991: 
174-5).
Rising Sea-Surface temperatures which is associated with global warming remains a 
strong probability for the drought. Global warming is a phenomenon of far remote 
origins which affects local climatic and production systems.
The predominance of fossil fuel combustion is the primary cause of global warming. 
The concentrations of radiate gases emanating from fossil fuel burning: i.e. carbon 
dioxide (C02), methane (H4), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), low-level ozone (03), and 
nitrous oxide (N20) are predominantly the prime causes of global warming and are 
collectively called the "greenhouse gases" (Hulme 1990). However, as Redclift has 
argued, increasingly environmental problems are looked upon as scientific problems, 
amenable to scientific "answers". An example is the way global warming is treated.
Since global warming is a "scientific" problem, it is assumed that it must have a scientific 
solution. The "greenhouse effect" is viewed as carrying social and economic implications, 
but scarcely as an "effect", in that the human behaviour which underlies global warming is 
rarely considered (Redclift 1994: 30).
The mechanisms of how global warming affects the global climate are complex. The 
gases are known as greenhouse gases because they are transparent to incoming short­
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wave radiation. Their effect is to trap heat in the lower layers of the atmosphere thus 
causing surface air temperatures to rise. This phenomenon is known as the greenhouse 
effect and threatens to alter the global climatic environment to conditions never before 
experienced by the human species (Hulme 1990: 4; 1991, 1992; Gleick 1989; 
Romanthan 1988; Warrick and Jones 1988; WMO 1988)). The implications for 
precipitation in the Sahel is that "at least in the case of the African Sahel a plausible 
mechanism for linking decreased precipitation and warmer oceans has been established" 
(Ibid 1990: 7). The economic consequences o f contemporary climatic variability are 
generally regarded as more severe in less developed countries than in developed ones. 
This is because o f the negative feedback effects on the climate system and on water 
resources, agricultural and food systems, energy sources and the general ecosystems. 
The discussion on drought has to be put in a wider global political/ecological 
perspective that brings out the relationship between the social organisation and the 
physical environment. Redclift identifies the root of the problem to be the expansion of 
economic growth, and argues that
economic growth clearly poses problems for the biological and climatic systems which are 
indispensable to our survival. The "laws" which govern the workings o f nature, ... involve 
the conversion of one form of energy into another. The natural capital o f  the globe is 
transformed, through economic growth, in ways which modify such processes (Redclift and 
Sage 1994: 2).
And that:
by concentrating investment of surplus value in order to maximise the accumulation of 
industrial capital, we have tended to neglect natural capital (environmental goods and 
services). Instead we have focused our support on the development o f human capital ... and 
wasteful resource uses (Ibid: 31).
This entails an examination of the social/ecological relationship and the effects of 
human practices on the environment, the resultant ecological changes and in turn the 
social readjustments to the new changes. In this sense the social system and the 
environmental system are to be seen in a state of dynamic flux of change and 
readjustment (Anderson and Johnson 1988). The human variable is a critical factor in 
the ecological equation which needs to be harnessed as far as resource utilisation is 
concerned for vital future sustainability o f international resources.
2- 3- 1- ii- Drought: A Reassessment:
The on-going debate on the nature of the drought has polarised in broad terms on two 
lines of argument: the first sees drought in technical terms as a natural phenomenon, and 
that it is part of the semi-arid climate. The second argument as we have already 
indicated sees drought in critical political terms as a man-made phenomenon. This view
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of the drought points to the responsibility of both individuals and states to have adopted 
ecologically damaging farming and stocking practices, and misguided development 
policies as well as the functioning of a distorted market system. This view invokes a 
notion o f drought as an "environmental problem"; a product of people's relationship 
with 'nature' (Redclift and Sage 1994).
Climatologists and scientists point out that explanation of recent droughts in absolute 
natural terms is certainly inadequate. Most scientists agree that changes in climate are 
not responsible for the vast areas of semi-arid land going out o f production each year. 
Horowitz and Little (1987) observe that low rainfall, even over an extended period, does 
not alone affect the biological viability of a habitat. The evidence seems to suggest that 
human misuse of the environment lies at the root of the environmental problem. But 
recent droughts are different from natural climatic stresses to which people have long 
learnt to cope with. Recent droughts are exceptional and different in character from past 
ones in terms o f their persistence, their severity, intensity, and their geographical sweep. 
The prolonged drought over the Sudan/Sahel zone from the 1970s through the 1990s is 
an exceptionally long one which has a 1 in 125000 probability of occurrence 
(Winstanley 1985). People's responses are adapted to cope with short-term stresses 
spanning between 2-6 years (Nicholson 1986, Rasmusson 1987) which are part of the 
semi-arid climate. Many past droughts were localised occurrences; the affected 
communities could escape the stricken area by moving to unaffected neighbouring 
areas. Such long-established local-level movements attest to the fact that droughts in the 
past were not so pervasive. It is difficult to find in the past history of the region an 
instance of drought where all communities had been simultaneously devastated, except 
possibly more than 5000 years ago when a period o f prolonged drying up followed the 
wetter Holocene period. Gowlett testifies to this by recourse to archaeological evidence:
Between 5000 and 4500 BP (3800-3100 BC) the sudden onset of much more arid 
conditions, which are reflected in marked falls in lake levels, ... by shoals of dead fish 
found in former lake beds, an indication o f very rapid drops in water levels. Human 
occupation in the Northern belt must have been hit as hard or even harder as populations 
affected by the famine o f recent years (Gowlett 1988: 38-9).
From the evidence above, recent droughts in the Sahel zone need to be understood in a 
different perspective; one which gives prominence to the role of human actions.
2- 3- 1- iii- Critique of the Naturalist Thesis
A major departure from the mainstream naturalist thesis is the more popular view 
which focuses on human-agency to explain the occurrence of droughts and famines. 
Proponents o f this view present two major arguments: that
1- famines do not necessarily follow from droughts; and;
2- that droughts themselves originate from human actions.
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Many authors have explained why droughts need not result in famines and famines 
do not necessarily have their origins in droughts. (Sen 1981; Watts 1983; Bush, 1988; 
Torry 1984, Arnold 1988). In his studies on the Bengali and the Ethiopian famines, Sen 
has shown that there had been no real shortage in the amount of rainfall, nor had there 
been any significant reduction in the volume of food output. The occurrence of famine 
in these contexts discredits the argument that famine is primarily caused by drought. 
Drought cannot be explained in terms of rainfall. An aspect o f rainfall patterns is what is 
called the "spatial variability o f rainfall". This means that there may not be a real 
shortage in the overall amount o f rainfall, but that the rains are unevenly distributed 
across geographic space; such that some areas receive insufficient share of rains 
required for the normal growth o f crops (Glantz 1987). Glantz also distinguishes 
between three types o f droughts; meteorological, hydrological, and agricultural 
droughts. Meteorological drought can be defined as "a 25% reduction o f the long term 
average rainfall in a given region Hydrologic drought " has been defined as one in 
which stream flow falls below some predetermined level". Agricultural drought occurs 
when there is not enough moisture available at the right time for the growth and 
development o f crops. Glantz stressed the importance of the timing o f precipitation at 
crucial phases in the development of crops. This is because different crops have varying 
degrees of moisture requirements at different phases of growth. He observes that 
drought must be defined in terms of the water requirements o f specific crops; and 
concludes that reductions in rainfall do not "necessarily translate into reduced 
agricultural production"; and that "there is no simple correlation between meteorological 
drought and declines in agricultural output" (Glantz 1987: 39,47). Some studies have 
emphasised the importance of nitrogen and phosphorus nutrients rather than rainfall for 
plant and range growth (Djiteye 1982; Bremen & De Wit 1983). This evidence warns 
against generalisations about drought and rainfall variables as the main causes of 
ecological degradation.
The second argument of the anti-naturalist thesis emphasises the role o f human actions 
in the creation o f droughts. MacLeod, for example, argues that the main cause of 
drought is dust. As dust increases in the outer layers of the atmosphere less thermal heat 
reaches the earth's surface, and consequently "cold spots" are created. Cold spots hold 
low moisture content, and produce droughts. The process starts in this way: The 
presence of grass cover fixes iron and other chemicals to the ground and consequently 
keeps the soil intact. Removal or destruction o f the grass cover "would lead to the 
establishment of temperature bands o f abnormally high differences from one to the 
other. These bands in turn would bring on air turbulence or localised wind currents. 
Once the grass cover has been lost, nothing holds the soil in place, and these wind 
currents catch up the loosened soils and carry them upward into the atmosphere where
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they become the dust that inhibits the sunlight and brings on the drought (MacLeod 
1976: 220-22). As Richard Franke rightly observes, it is not so much the drought that 
destroys the land, but the destroyed land that brings on the drought. The critical issue 
here is how the land comes to lose its vegetative protective cover MacLeod's theory 
points to human actions to be responsible for the destruction o f the grass cover, and the 
resultant drought. Fluman practice in excessive extractive farming, insensitive use of 
marginal lands and fragile ecologies, overstocking, are all part of the misguided human 
actions which have combined to produce environmental problems. The most recent 
explanation of the causes of drought has been found to be related to global warming and 
the "Greenhouse Effect". Countries in the North contributed much more to carbon 
emissions on a per capita basis, since they consumed more of these resources (Redclift 
and Sage 1994; Agwaral and Narain 1991).
2- 3- 2- The Population Thesis:
The population thesis has been advanced as another theory of famine causation. The 
population arguments date back to the Malthusian debate at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century (see section on Mass Starvation earlier in this chapter). A 
contemporary version o f the old Malthusian concept holds that due to modern medical 
advances, large numbers of humanity have been spared from the scourge of diseases and 
epidemics, thus eliminating one of nature's most potent "positive checks", unleashing 
famines to take their toll to trim populations to sustainable proportions. This modern 
version has come to be known as the "Neo-Malthusianism". Ehirlich, for example, 
declares in the "Population Bomb" with such fatalistic finality that "the battle to feed all 
of humanity is over ... hundreds of millions o f people are going to starve to death before 
this decade is out" (Ehirlich, cited in Franke: 1980). Many authors have pointed to the 
links between population, overstocking and desertification. Ferguson, for example, 
postulates that:
overstocking and the lack o f managed grazing patterns in the Sahel, are the most important 
causes of desertification in the region and that desertification is a symptom o f more 
fundamental problems o f rapid population growth and ... land management and 
conservation techniques. (Ferguson 1977:.7).
Ibrahim voiced similar worries about the impact o f population on the ecosystem:
shifting cultivation turned into land misuse, and a chain o f processes of deterioration of 
land productivity was begun: population increase led to excessive cultivation, which, in 
turn, led to enhanced soil erosion and soil impoverishment. This resulted in the decrease of 
millet yields ... To make amends, population which is constantly increasing at an annual 
rate o f 2.5%, had to increase the area cultivated with m illet... this expansion o f cultivation 
meant a fresh wave o f  desertification (Ibrahim 1984: 110-18)..
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Ibrahim places population growth at the onset of a complex chain o f concatenated 
processes o f land mis-management, declining yields, overcultivation of fragile lands, led 
to soil erosion and ultimately desertification. But, for Ibrahim, population growth marks 
the onset for the whole process.
2- 3- 2- i- The Tragedy o f the Commons:
This is the debate about the mismanagement of the communal lands, which forms a 
variant of the population thesis. Garret Hardin in a 1968 article proposes that "rising 
populations render the common use o f common resources no longer possible without 
serious environmental damage". The problem resides in a contradiction in ownership 
between private and public property. That rangelands are "communally " owned; public 
property, whereas herds are privately owned. Individual actions to increase private 
benefits from the use o f the common resource conflict with the common interests of the 
group in the long run. Thus while the individual user gains the full benefits of any such 
increase, the entire community must suffer the consequence o f the decline in overall 
resources. According to Hardin, contradiction is not evident until a certain population 
density is reached The "tragedy of the commons" is also a population theory (Hardin 
1968). The tragedy o f the commons argument has implications for other contentious 
issues such as overgrazing and land carrying capacity. As Horowitz and Little observe:
Since each herd owner seeks to maximise his numbers o f animals, charge rapidly exceeds 
carrying capacity o f the range. At first the effect may be contained within the herd itself,...
But soon the costs are transferred to the range in the form of overgrazing, erosion, 
declining biological productivity and desertification. It is a persuasive scenario . Yet it is 
vulnerable at a number o f points( Horowitz and Little 1987: 66-7).
This last comment indicates the shortcomings o f the hypothesis as a comprehensive 
explanation for the environmental crisis in the Sahel. Evidence has been mounted 
against the population thesis in general and the tragedy of the commons in particular. 
The following is a critique of the population thesis as a way of explaining famine..
2- 3- 2- ii- Critique o f the Population Thesis:
Recent studies have emphasised the importance o f levels of consumption, rather than 
the numerical force of population on global resources. These studies have shown that 
although the population number in poor countries is far greater than in the rich 
countries, the key issue is that it is the populations in the rich countries who consume by 
far the overwhelming share o f global resources. For notwithstanding projected figures 
from UN sources that 90% o f the expected 4.7 billion people who will be added to 
world population by 2050 will be born in the South, it is the industrialised countries that 
currently present the biggest threat to global environment resources. Despite supporting 
only 24% of the world's population, the industrialised countries consume 85% of the
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world’s metals, 92% of its cars, 85% of its chemicals, 81% of its paper, 78% of sawn 
wood, 72% of milk, and 48% of cereals. They also consume 82% of gasoline, 72% of 
diesel, 85% of gas, and 82% of electricity (Sage 1994; Parikh 1992). In 1965 the high- 
income countries enjoyed 70% of the global GDP, while the South took 19%. By 1989 
the 16% of the world's population living in the North accounted for 73% of global GDP, 
while the 78% living in the South received less than 16% (Sage 1994, Harrison 1992).
One of the weak points in the population theory is that it treats people as masses of 
passive objects who need to be fed and cared for. It seldom views population positively 
as an active agent capable of effecting positive transformations in their environment and 
living conditions. Franke put this point succinctly. He is worth quoting at some length:
It is assumed by population theorists, ... even though rarely stated - that people are primarily 
mouths and stomachs to be fed. That they are also hands to work and minds to think and 
create is rarely mentioned. The people o f the Sahel ... were also producing more from the 
land and for outside markets as well as for themselves. ... larger and more dense populations 
would have had more human resources to put to work in both relief efforts and efforts to 
salvage the environment and begin the process of reconstruction. That people were not put 
to work at these tasks can hardly be a by-product o f their numbers per se. ... we can 
highlight the logical difficulties o f assuming that population growth was a major cause. It is 
just as logical to assume that population growth should have been a major cause of  
overcoming droughts (Franke 1980: 114).
Franke and others argue that it is no less logical to view population positively as a 
dynamic force of change. As another expert has commented on the inappropriacy of aid 
rehabilitation and development programmes in the Sahel, that these programmes would 
be better advised to provide the Sahelian with a spade than a spoon. What Sahelians 
need is to enable them to work for themselves, and give them the opportunity to go into 
useful productive activity.
Another more powerful counter argument to the population theory is the one that 
recognises the potential for agricultural growth (Boserup 1965; 1981, Simon 1981; 
George 1976, Gribben 1979). Critics have pointed to the great potential and elasticity of 
agriculture. The potential for agricultural growth is overwhelmingly capable of carrying 
infinitely greater population densities than those prevailing at present. In this connection 
agricultural growth can receive added impetus from increased population numbers in 
terms of labour force and for providing extensive market bases for agricultural 
production. Population growth, rather than being an instance of alarm, should be 
welcomed as reason for optimism.
Boserup is one of the prominent advocates o f this view. In her book The Conditions 
fo r  Agricultural Growth, Boserup has presented a powerful argument against the 
population theorists. She has pointed out how agriculture has consistently expanded and 
adapted to meet the needs o f ever-increasing population numbers. That the great 
advances that have taken place in recent history in the reach of productive means have
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indeed transformed agriculture from subsistence into almost a limitless source. 
Increased production has been made possible through a variety of means: intensive, 
multiple, and cross-farming techniques, coupled with technical innovations in 
mechanisation, irrigation and fertilisation have all been part of the process towards 
abundant food production. Boserup argues that the resourcefulness and adaptability of 
agriculture is not a matter of random choice, but arose from the necessities involved in 
the demands exerted by demographic pressure.
An elastic "carrying capacity" o f agriculture has been recognised by different 
authors. Dando, for example, estimated the earth’s carrying capacity to be ten to twelve 
times its present; of about six billion people. This he attributed mainly to the dynamic 
nature of agriculture and to the positive experiences of developing countries (Dando 
1980: 90). On another estimate, the world's carrying capacity is calculated to be five 
times the present charge,(if livestock were not fed a diet that could be used by man). 
Another estimate suggests that the world's agriculture has the potential to feed as many 
as 67 billion inhabitants; 17 times as presently alive If, for example, the arable lands in 
the whole planet were cultivated as efficiently as farms in Holland. The FAO estimated 
that the total arable land in developing countries presently stands at 740 million 
hectares, out of which only 93 million are currently under irrigation .
Population theorists deplore the high birth rates in many poor areas o f the world 
where hunger is endemic. This view has also been disqualified in many ways. Bush, for 
example, points to the important fact that in these areas child mortality rates are also the 
highest in the world (Bush 1988). This is to say that high birth rates are counter­
balanced by equally high mortality rates. General mortality rates are also the highest; as 
also life expectancy is the lowest in the world, ranging between 40 and 50 years. Taking 
account of high child mortality rates, general mortality rates and low life expectancy, 
the technical 2.7% birth rate in Africa and in the Sahel probably does not exceed normal 
world averages, and cannot add significantly to an increased population numbers in the 
region.
Studies have been conducted to explain the propensity of the poor to have larger 
families. Mamdani and White carried out studies on poor Punjabi and Javian households 
respectively, concluded that the tendency among the poor to have larger families has 
been motivated by the demand for child labour as a response to economic necessity. 
Child labour contributes to family income. Accordingly, poor villagers consciously 
perceive of their children as labour assets. Franke explains that this phenomenon has 
"been created by the particular needs of the colonial system of profit-making, which in 
turn is perpetuated by the class structure and land problems that the system has 
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The "tragedy of the commons", has in turn been attacked along the following lines: 
F irst, there is no evidence to suggest that private ranges are better managed than public 
ones. Sanford (1983) notes that "overstocking and environmental deterioration appear to 
be just as common and serious in areas of rangeland where, as in parts of the USA and 
Australia, both land and livestock are individually owned". Pastoral communities have 
their own moral codes and restrictive rules governing access to and use of communal 
ranges. Horowitz and Little ascribe the general malaise of the Sahel to the departure 
from these traditional "egalitarian norms". The transition from more egalitarian to more 
differentiated communities is clearly associated with a decline to a commitment to 
general morality (Tausing 1980). But this transition is normally accompanied by the 
very privatisation of public resources.
The notion of overgrazing, so central to discussions of desertification and rangelands, 
has given rise to three different representations. (1) Excess charge is being removed by 
death or sale and the balance is being constantly restored between charge and carrying 
capacity. This is represented by an "equilibrium model". (2) The capacity of land to 
sustain excess weight deteriorates and is being permanently damaged. This is 
represented by a "degradation model". (3) Stocking rate and carrying capacity are in 
some kind of association, such that temporary increases in load cause short-term 
declines in the carrying capacity, but that capacity is restored over time as the charge 
pressure is reduced. This is illustrated by a "resiliency model" (Horowitz and Little 
1984: 68). Writers of the structural school tend to favour the equilibrium model. British 
and American scientists have historically been associated with the degradation model, 
and one which is most commonly invoked in official documents. Researchers who have 
extensive field studies find the resiliency model to accord better with the empirical 
situation (Horowitz and Little 1987).
Many studies have documented the complex co-adaptive mechanisms between the 
human, animal, and plant species in an eco-system. These studies have pointed out that 
pressure exerted on plants by selective grazing of animals, leads to these plants evolving 
certain genetic characteristics which enable them survive the pressure (Lewin 1985; 
Nyerges 1982; Scott 1984; Conant 1982). The ecological balance of an ecosystem to 
remain in a state of equilibrium entails a beneficial interaction and co-adaptation 
between species; such that as both humans and animals benefit from plants, so plants 
benefit from the human and animal species. This implies that removal of one or another 
constituent member to the equation may adversely upset the whole balance. This is what 
Conant (1982) has documented in a study on the effects on the eco-system by the 
removal of a local community in Eastern Africa. Conant found that the removal of 
humans and animals from the locality has led to the phenomenon of what he called the 
"green desertification". By this he refers to the colonisation of the locality by several
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varieties of one plant species; namely acacia, "which have almost completely taken over 
a traditional grazing area known as Simbol on the Masol plains of North-western 
Kenya" (Conant 1982); and asserts that: "not only is traditional pastoralism an integral 
component of the eco-system, but that removal of it can in some cases lead to results 
that are more unpredictable than the effects of overgrazing already diagnosed as 
incipient desertification (Ibid 111).
Sandford even reverses the logic of the overgrazing and the land carrying capacity 
arguments. He maintains that since ranges depend on rainfall, the volume and density of 
range varies considerably from year to year in accordance with the variability of rainfall. 
Accordingly, in most years, the range could sustain far more animals than actually 
utilise it. Sandford refers to this as "under stocking"; and asks, over the long-term, 
which strategy is commercially sounder; one that habitually overstocks or one that 
habitually understocks (Sandford 1982). An ecology team conducting a study in Niger, 
discovered that moderate grazing provided for greater residual moisture- i.e. a soil 
moisture reserve. This had the regenerative effects of extending the green feed period 
for animals and increasing perennial regrowth. The team also found that many pastures 
were actually under-utilised (Horowitz and Little 1987: 70). Some studies suggest that 
overgrazing even improves pasture through an evolutionary process imposed on plant 
species by animals' selective grazing (Lewin 1985: 567). These findings seem to suggest 
that the population thesis, and the other associated arguments of overgrazing are 
inadequate in explaining recurrent famines. Or at least they give the suggestion that 
population would need to be put in a different perspective - one in which people are 
viewed positively as active agents, interacting with and transforming the political, socio­
economic, and the physical conditions of their environment.
2- 3- 3- The Holistic or Interactive Approach:
This approach encompasses diverse factors; internal, external as well as historical 
ones. That these factors interact with one another in a way that makes them inextricably 
linked and inseparable for analytical purposes. Internalist analyses focus attention on the 
specific internal situations in given African or third world states which are thought to be 
directly responsible for the creation of poverty and hunger. Such internal determinants 
include diverse influences such as economic and development policies which foster and 
maintain inequalities and class formation, biased agricultural policies favouring cash 
crops and against the peasantry, and political structures characterised by dominance and 
control over and insensitivity to the interests of the vast majority of the rural 
populations. Almost all of which are invariably dominant features of internal African 
politics. Cummings lists a number of internal factors which, he suggests generate
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famine. These include: inefficient development of human resources, continued 
maintenance of inherited colonial institutions and structures, the existence of many 
small economies, negative trends in food production, poverty, high population growth 
rates, increased dependence on food imports, and violation of the delicate balance 
between environmental realities and the necessity of agricultural development 
(Cummings 1987: 112).
Externalist explanations, on the other hand, depict as issues of primary concern, the 
impact of colonialism on the past and future prospects of African states. How in a given 
historical context, colonialism has underdeveloped Africa. That it had created modes of 
production congruent with the interests of the colonial powers and incompatible with 
African needs. Externalist explanations also focus on the precarious position which 
Africa as a whole is allowed to occupy in the world economy and the nature of the 
world capitalist system which uses Africa as a domain of extraction of cheap resources. 
The character of international trade, the growing power of agribusiness and the 
emergence of a new pattern of an international grain trade, the debt crisis, and the 
energy shocks are all themes which figure out prominently in the externalist arguments.
2- 3- 3- i- Indigenous Survival Strategies:
One of the most powerful themes in the holistic approach is the argument that 
peoples who live in precarious environments adapt to their environments in a variety of 
ways. Scores of research studies in the Sahel have accumulated evidence to suggest that 
Sahelian peoples have managed through the ages to synchronise their way of life to the 
vagaries of their environment through various forms of adaptive mechanisms and 
survival strategies. These mechanisms have for a long time enabled maintenance and 
reproduction of the system on fairly stable bases. It is only at certain historical 
junctures, through the inroads of colonialism and capitalist penetration that these 
survival systems have been frustrated and weakened. Prothero, for example, argues that: 
"[I]n physical conditions which are in all respects marginal, the relationship between 
people and land in cultivated or pastoral economies or some combination of the two, are 
very finely adjusted and delicately balanced" (Prothero 1974: 163). Herders and farmers 
have long lived a life of complementarity of needs and exchange of resources; a form of 
symbiotic co-existence. They also have a thorough knowledge about their environment. 
Scott, points out that: "herders and farmers are extremely knowledgeable about their 
environment. Farmers for example, distinguished micro-environments, several species 
of certain grains that they in turn associated with particular micro environments" (Scott 
1984: 3). Farmers have plant indicators to judge the conditions of soils. Selected plants 
were also grown to stave off the inevitable hunger period (Haswell 1953: cited in Scott, 
1984: 4).
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In his most extensive study of Hausa communities in West Africa, Watts describes 
their adaptability that they "were in some sense geared to environmental risk, and 
possessed some sort of adaptive flexibility and adjustment capability with respect to 
drought and oscillations in the availability of food" (Watts 1987: 127). Quoting 
Raynault, describing 19th century Hausaland adjustment patterns, adds that these 
mechanisms included individual as well as collective practices which permitted the rural 
community,...
a margin o f  security ... traditional techniques o f  storage permitted grain to be stored for 
relatively long periods ... which made possible the constitution o f  reserves ... after the 
harvest the seed destined to be planted the next year as well as the quantity o f  grain 
necessary for the subsistence o f  the group during the planting season were stored by the 
clan head in a large granary which could not be opened until after the first rain (Raynault 
1975, cited in Watts 1987:127).
Bush, in his study of famine in Western Sudan, attends to one of the most important 
adjustment strategies of these communities, namely; migration. Bush sees migration not 
merely as a seasonal contingency to be relinquished when conditions improve, but that 
it has become a real "lifeline" for many households. Not that it is a "retrenchment" 
strategy as De Wall suggests, but has become "transformatory". He argues: that "it was 
the combination of cultivation and cash income from local or migrant labour that proved 
to be the lifeline for most villagers ... it has become transformatory to the livelihoods of 
many" (Bush 1988a: 18). Herders also employ different strategies to cope with the 
vicissitudes of their environment. One such strategy is to maximise the size of herds. 
Swift, for example, points out that "the size of one's herd is a hedge against bad years" 
(Swift 1973: 74). This was associated with good husbandry and productivity. Other 
strategies include herd diversification (Ibid); long distance migration in search of 
pasture and water (Stenning 1959); a complex network of sharing of gifts or loans 
among kinsmen - what has become known as the "logic of the gift" (Stenning 1959; 
Swift 1973). But the most effective "risk minimising" strategy has proven to be "holding 
the maximum number of productive animals in the face of heavy loss" (Baker 1974).
Earl Scott has suggested that the adaptive flexibility of pre-capitalist communities 
was organised around the problem of risk aversion and a guaranteeing of a "margin of 
security" to their members. They have evolved a "subsistence ethic"; i.e. a form of a 
moral economy - which in essence was a system of co-operation, complementation and 
communal sharing. It is also based on age-long evolved folk knowledge about local 
agronomy; e.g. locally adapted cereal varieties, a preference for the consumable versus 
the marketable, inter-cropping strategies, knowledge of the local botany so that wild 
resources could be exploited when necessary (Watts 1987: 29-30). Scott further 
developed a socio-ecological approach - what he calls "the Human Ecological
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Approach". In essence, the human ecological approach makes the human being an 
organic part of their physical environment. He defines the boundaries of his approach:
The Human Ecological Approach allows us to perceive man as a human organism in nature 
interacting with other species o f  organisms (i.e. the nature o f  the interrelationships between 
living organisms and their physical and biotic environment ) (Scott 1984: 50).
It assumes a symbiotic co-existence between organisms - the principle of a balance of 
nature - the tendency of the organic community toward homeostasis within the 
limitations of its living space. In such a co-operative co-existence "the probability of the 
survival of the individual living things or of populations increases with the degree with 
which they harmoniously adjust themselves to each other and to their environment" 
(Allee et al 1949, cited in Scott: 50 ). Such refined orchestration of the human being to 
their environment has been an age-long feature of rural communities. However, 
externalist explanations ascribe the weakening of these mechanisms to the advent of 
colonialism and the adverse impact of capitalism which have transformed the traditional 
systems to serve external interests rather than the security needs of local communities.
2- 3- 3- ii- Colonialism and the Roots o f the Agrarian Problem
Many authors have pointed to the debilitating effects of the colonial legacy as it has 
continued to plague African states. Glantz (1987) attributes the problems of hunger in 
many African states to poverty, the seeds of which lie in the continent's colonial past 
and in unwise policy choices made in the early days of independence by national 
governments and external aid donors. Glantz describes what he calls the "considerable 
colonial baggage" which continued to burden African states. He lists a catalogue of 
problems as legacies from the colonial rule: "unsettled frontiers, highly dependent 
market-economies keyed to the export of commodities of interest to the metropolitan 
powers, neglected food production systems and imitative life-styles and institutions". 
The cumulative impact has been the biases in African social and economic systems 
favouring modern/urban sectors over natural/rural systems, the former dominating 
political choices before as well as after independence (Glantz 1987: xiv). This bias is 
nowhere more evident than in agricultural development policies which invariably 
encouraged cash crop production to be exported to the colonial metropolitan markets, 
and neglected food production. These biases entailed that by the time of independence 
the new emerging ruling elites had high political and economic stakes to guard through 
perpetuating the inherited structures and institutions and by tying up the continent's 
productive means to the demands of outside markets. This has led to agricultural 
development policies having in common the following salient features (a) favouring of 
cash-crops at the expense of stable food production, (b) low prices offered to
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agricultural producers, (c) low wages for agricultural labour, (d) government control 
over pricing and marketing.
Policies oriented towards cash-crop production have in fact been consistently 
motivated by short-term political expediencies than by the imperatives of economic and 
social development. The cumulative effects of these policies have been discouraging to 
food production and increasing the vulnerability o f the rural communities who depend 
on agriculture. Agriculture has become a source of extraction to generate the foreign 
exchange needed to expend elsewhere in the economy. One such sector which claims a 
substantial share o f the hard-won foreign exchange is industry. Lofchie observes that 
"agriculture came to be treated as an object of economic extraction, an almost 
infinitely elastic source of tax revenue for state expansion and finance capital for 
enormously expensive industrial projects (Lofchie 1987: 91).
The bias in favour of cash-crops in African agriculture and the neglect o f food 
production has resulted in a rapidly declining per capita agricultural production and 
huge food deficits. The FAO estimated that countries affected by food shortages 
would need as much as 7.0 million tons of food during 1984-85. To make up for these 
deficits required the import of massive quantities of food to be purchased in the 
international market. Consequently this has posed immense strains on the meagre 
foreign exchange resources. Nowhere is this bias so bitterly felt than in situations 
where export crops are flowing out while people are dying of hunger. This is what is 
called "Africa's agrarian paradox" (Bates 1986, 1981; Commins 1986; Lofchie 1975), 
in which "a continent unable to produce sufficient food to provide the majority of its 
citizens with even a barely minimal diet has been able to record sharp increases in its 
annual production of agricultural goods destined for external markets (Lofchie 
1975:554). Cash crops are considered so important that the export of such crops 
continued or increased during the droughts and famines in the Sahel and Ethiopia 
during the 1970s and 1980s while the production of food crops declined sharply 
(Lofchie 1984). But why do African states follow such policies biased against food and 
exposing the vast majority o f the rural communities to the risks o f hunger and famine. 
Glantz locates the underlying causes of the continued emphasis on cash crop 
production in the colonial legacy, which has come in contemporary world politics to be 
explained in terms of comparative advantage and the harsh realities o f the international 
market. "A legacy of the colonial economy, this bias is now explained by reference to 
comparative advantage and to the harsh realities of international markets, which do 
little to encourage the diversification of traditional trade patterns by weak participants" 
(Glantz 1987: xvi). Raikes explains the theoretical economic bases o f the comparative 
advantage of cash crop export-led-growth strategy, and points out the limitations of 
the comparative advantage theory. He says:
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The argument is that the foreign exchange earned from export-crop production would 
buy more (imported) food than could be produced locally with the same resources. 
Alternatively,... that it is preferable to concentrate on export crops when prices are such 
that more food could be imported from their export proceeds than could be grown with 
the same land, labour and inputs. So far as it goes, this is a perfectly reasonable 
econom ic argument. Other things being equal,... (Raikes 1988: 8).
Most critical of all, however, is the unequal nature of income distribution.
Encouraging export crops may imply concentrating on the already richer regions of a
country. It may precipitate a land-grab in which the rich and politically influential
dispossess the powerless. Men may increase their cash income and expenditure while
women and children lose part of their previous food supply. Mechanisation may reduce
labour requirements and thus wage income. High-risk innovations can lead to losses or
debt (Raikes 1988). The issue of prime concern here is whether the strategy meets its
stated goals of committing the foreign exchange earned to import food, and whether
that contributes to increased food security or vulnerability of the rural communities.
Government commitment to cash crop production assumes that cash earnings would
be utilised to purchase food to offset shortfalls. It has become evident, however, that
there is no guarantee that this will be the case. There are reasons for doubt:
There are strong reasons , however , for doubting whether poor people's access to food is 
likely to be improved by increased emphasis on export-crop production. Just because the 
foreign exchange from export crops could pay for food imports, does not necessarily  
mean that it w ill do so. There is no reason to suppose any relationship between the two.
Nor is there any assurance that i f  food is imported, it w ill be destined for, or suitable to, 
those most in need - or priced and distributed to allow them access to it (Raikes 1988: 9)
Comparative advantage of export crops production is assumed to generate foreign 
reserves to facilitate and indeed lead growth. This strategy of export-led-growth is 
justified, Glantz argues, by African leaders and their foreign advisers and financiers as 
the short-cut to build an industrial base on modem lines. But the effects o f such a 
strategy have been the emergence of a growing urban labour force demanding of cheap 
food, health and education services and other urban needs. Food has to be subsidised 
for the growing urban populations. All of these demands have exerted increasing 
pressure for the generation of more foreign exchange which in effect meant further 
expansion in cash crop production. As a result more and more land came under cash 
crop cultivation. Governments resorted to marketing and pricing controls, and 
introduced policies that have been designed in ways that induce farmers to grow more 
cash crops by offering better prices for cash crops vis-a-vis food staples. This has 
resulted in a general mood of neglect of food production manifested in contraction of 
the area committed to food crops. Government pricing policies offer low producer 
prices, the bulk of the profit being appropriated by exporters and government 
parastatals, such as The Oilseeds Company, the Gum Arabic Corporation and The 
Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation, which have become common practice in
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most African states, turned into a means of accumulation for members of the emerging 
ruling classes. Glantz gives the following example from Niger:
The cereals shortfall is supposed to be recouped by earnings from groundnuts sales. The 
marketing o f  groundnuts, however, was monopolised by a government corporation - which 
along with a class o f  large traders, appropriated the bulk o f  the earnings with little benefit 
to the small-scale growers (Glantz 1987: 63).
The low returns from cash crop proceeds, coupled with the neglect of staple food 
production, diversion of foreign exchange earnings to other sectors and to unsuitable 
urban-targeted elite food imports, have had negative consequences on rural food 
production systems. Besides creating conditions of dearth and high food prices, they 
have culminated in a secular disorientation of rural agriculture, weakening of traditional 
survival systems and mass-scale dislocation of rural communities through migration. 
The old traditional systems can no longer reproduce themselves. Able men are forced to 
migrate to urban centres in search of wage labour to make remittances back home. This 
in turn adds to the already alarming rate of urban growth estimated at between 5 to 7 per 
cent in African cities. A US report states that "immigrants to African cities often come 
from impoverished rural areas and their movements add to the destablizing effects of 
rapid urbanisation" (USOTA, 1984).
In the short-term, migration does indeed provide an invaluable means of livelihood 
for members of households who stay behind and receive remittances from migrant 
members. In the long-term, however, it shifts the responsibility of bread-winning within 
households from a shared family undertaking (as it used to be in the past) to individual 
members especially women. In this way migration may render households more 
vulnerable in the log-term as they become increasingly dependent on remittances 
subject to the highly precarious conditions of the wage labour market. On the 
environmental sphere, moreover, the effects of cash cropping are no less devastating. 
Faced with the adversities of low cash returns for their products vis-a-vis increasing 
demands for consumer goods coupled with high food prices, farmers are forced to 
cultivate more and more lands in quest for bigger output. This has meant the extension 
of cultivation into marginal zones, thereby precipitating ecological deterioration creating 
the conditions of drought. Bush traces the roots of the problem to colonialism which ...
disrupted an indigenous relationship ... Colonialism altered the pace and nature o f  local 
recovery from drought. This is because European demand for the monetisation o f  local 
relationships and its use o f  the most fertile lands dislocated local food systems making 
African countries more prone to drought (Bush 1988: 6).
Arnold shares the same view with Bush and others. For him the exogenous 
influences of imperialism and the international economic system have seriously 
undermined Africans' ability to control and manage their productive resources, saying:
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Through the inroads o f  colonialism and an international economy dominated by Western 
capitalism, Africans have seem ingly lost the capacity to control their productive forces and 
to manage the environment in accordance with their own needs and past experience 
(Arnold 1988:33).
The final message that these authors convey is that under the exogenous forces of 
colonialism and an inhospitable international economic environment, African traditional 
systems of survival have been systematically weakened. They have been made to lose 
their in-built adaptive capacities.
2- 3- 3- iii- Debt and International Trade:
The strategy of cash-crop-led economic growth, as has been argued, ultimately 
initiated a chain reaction of social and ecological degeneration. The decline of staple 
food production has meant that massive quantities of food have to be imported. The 
food import bill, together with the energy bill and imported capital goods, have 
combined to strain the foreign exchange resources to breaking point and created chronic 
balance of payments deficits which n need to be balanced by borrowing from the 
international funding institutions. Debt has thus emerged, crippling African countries 
performance, limiting their margin for manoeuvre and slimming their chances of 
recovery (Bush 1988). The African debt crisis is "probably the most prominent catalyst 
creating famine in Africa" (Ibid). By mid-1980s Sudan's external debt stood at a about 
US$ 13 billion with annual service charges claiming over 85% of Sudan's total value of 
exports (Ali 1985).
The debt problem is closely linked to issues of international trade and the activities of 
international lending institutions. Transnational corporations, backed by the power of 
their respective home governments, exercise influence over much of the international 
commodity trade. They manipulate pricing policies in ways that adversely affect the 
terms of trade of countries producing and exporting primary commodities. Producers 
and exporters of primary commodities will always experience deficits in their balance of 
payments. Some advocates argue that unless the international market relations are 
rectified, there is little optimism for Africa, and indeed, for third world countries. 
Lofchie comments on this trend: there is a strong presupposition that unless the 
international economic environment can be made more hospitable, internal policy 
reforms will fall short of triggering economic recovery (Lofchie 1984: 90).
Many have criticised the performance of international funding institutions and aid 
donors as being biased in favour of big projects. They have pointed out that World Bank 
and other aid donors have been enthusiastic lenders to big projects of dams, highways 
and electricity networks to urban areas, with the negative effects of reinforcing the
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geographical bias in services and infrastructure and widening the development gap 
between regions. That the proclaimed "trickle down" strategy for development has 
failed to deliver the goods to the mass of the rural poor. These strategies confer their 
benefits on the already rich segments of society and concentrate on the already 
developed regions. These policies are basically differential in nature, benefiting only a 
handful of the elites, leaving the mass of the people behind fettered to pay off the debt 
bill. Ultimately these policies contribute to the conditions of rural poverty, migration, 
engender political discontent and national unrest. It has been contended that the World 
Bank's schemes to rescue the peasants from what it calls "absolute poverty" is in fact not 
intended to raise the standards of living of the poor in a way that would alter their 
position as an infinite source of supply of cheap labour. Rather, its consequences may 
well have been to set loan beneficiaries against the remainder of the peasantry, as 
limited credit funds will have to be doled out in piecemeal fashion (Sinha 1978: 377). 
Other observers have pointed to the commercial character of World Bank loans. The 
Bank raises and distributes some £3,000 billion of aid each year; and as a bank it has 
advocated and financed mostly "marketable" that is; "commercially profitable" projects. 
And as a development Bank, has been motivated by the need to repay depositors and 
hence to ensure a good return on the projects it supports (Lipton 1977: 14).
2- 3- 3- iv- Agribusiness and the International Grain Trade:
More intense discussion has recently focused on the activities of agribusiness 
transnational corporations (TNCs) and the nature of international grain trade, as bearing 
strongly on the weak economies of third world countries. Agribusiness transnationals 
exercise great oligopolistic control over much of the international grain trade. There are 
five major grain firms which account for 85% of the US grain export. Only four or five 
companies control 95% of world grain trade, (between them Continental and Cargil 
control nearly half, 50 million tons). American and Canadian-based transnational 
companies by their sheer sweep of power effectively set the pace and tone for the 
international grain trade. US and Canada released excessive grain stocks at relatively 
low prices in the 1960s. Their grain stocks in 1961 were 137 million metric tons, nearly 
4/5ths of total world stocks. Releases of stocks by US Commodity Credit Corporation at 
an annual price rate not exceeding 20% of the 1960s price, and this set the tone for 
world grain markets ever since (Raikes 1988; Johnson 1975). The strong oligopolistic 
control over international grain trade and the issue of political power involved therein 
lie at the heart of the world food problem. Food aid as a solution to the problem has also 
been criticised. Some analysts view this type of aid with scepticism. It has been 
observed that in the 1970s about a ^5th of US rice harvest (of one million tons) found 
its way abroad under concessional terms. Such massive quantities would have profound
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disruptive effects on the world rice market by damaging world prices forcing 
uncompetative producers out of the market, and finally setting the US effective control 
over the international grain trade. (Poleman T. 1974).
Agribusiness Transnationals wield sweeping economic and organisational power in 
international commodity trade. Some of these giant enterprises have far greater 
economic power than individual host countries. The scope and reach of the trading 
activities of these giant companies include trading in staple foods, animal feeds, fruit 
and vegetables, livestock and meat including the sale of high-quality breeding animals, 
artificial insemination, cotton and other fibres, seeds of all kinds including grasses for 
pastures, timber and related items, and the traditional tropical and sub-tropical products, 
etc.. Feder concludes that this new form of economy exceeds in scope, importance and 
impact the old plantation enclave economies beyond comparison (Feder 1975; Raikes 
1988). Agribusiness TNCs have been criticised for their role in channelling third world 
agriculture to meet the market needs of industrialised countries. This is most obvious in 
Sudan where the Gezira Scheme, the largest single farm unit in the world, continues to 
produce cotton for the world textile industry. They do this by their effective control over 
production, pricing, processing and distribution of food-stuffs world-wide. In the 1980s, 
25% of all cultivable land in the third world was turned over to cash crops for the 
markets of the industrialised world (Bush 1988b: 6 ). The case against agribusiness is 
critical of the way it structures the agro-food system in ways that increase inequality, 
dependency, poverty and vulnerability.
2- 3- 3- v- Conflicts, Wars & Refugees:
There are other themes in the holistic approach. Africa is viewed as a continent of 
generalised ailments of wars and refugees. Some critics have explained that the roots of 
wars lie in colonialism. That the colonial powers created the conditions for wars and 
political instability through the "partitioning" of the continent by drawing arbitrary 
frontiers, uneven development and through various devices of the "Indirect Rule" 
policy. Colonialism fostered social, cultural and religious contradictions which have 
eventually became disruptive to the stability and viability of many new independent 
states. In many cases, strife has taken the form of armed conflicts draining meagre 
national resources. The on-going civil war in Southern Sudan is an obvious example. 
The estimated financial cost to the war in Southern Sudan, for example, is about £S 1 
million a day (Africa Watch 1990; Cater 1986). Dreze and Sen have pointed somewhat 
discreetly to the involvement of the big powers in third world war conflicts, and argue 
that one of the biggest contributions that the "big powers" can make towards the 
solution of the problem of world hunger is to refrain from fuelling arms conflicts in the 
third world. They say that:
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The big powers have also been remarkably tolerant o f  regimes on their respective sides 
despite the persistent violations o f  the very principles o f  democracy ... It is a story in which 
there is little honour - either locally, or in the distant capitals from which many 
international conflicts have been pursued with such vigour and lethal arms pushed with 
such energetic cunning (Dreze and Sen 1989: 275).
The issue of wars in Africa is closely linked to that of refugees. It has been suggested 
that although Sub-Saharan Africa only has about 10% of the world's population, it hosts 
about 25% of the world's refugees; of approximately 2.5 million persons (Lofchie 1984: 
88). In mid-1980s, Sudan hosted the largest refugee community in the world, estimated 
over a million from neighbouring Ethiopia and Chad (see appendix A).
2- 3- 3- vi- The Impact o f the Oil Crisis:
The immense increase in liquidity which has accrued to the oil-exporting countries 
during and after the oil boom years, has negatively affected poor third world countries 
in two different ways. There is first the fact that increased liquidity or money supply 
without a corresponding increase in the availability of goods and services, has resulted 
in a general rise in prices. The effect this has had on developing countries are two-fold. 
(1) Directly, by straining the foreign exchange reserves as the energy bill has come to 
claim a large portion of the national budget. And (2) indirectly, through the general rise 
in prices of finished industrialised goods in the international market. Developing 
countries have found it increasingly difficult in this situation to meet their import 
requirements. Consequently they have become prone to facing a widening gap in their 
balance of trade, which they have to make good by resort to borrowing from 
international lending institutions, thereby adding to the already huge debt burden.
2- 3- 4 & 5- Entitlements and Food Availability Decline (FAD)
The FAD approach could be seen as a modernised version to the old Malthusian 
concept. According to the FAD view, famine arises from either an unproportional 
increase in population numbers in relation to available food supplies, or that some 
'disaster' causes a short-fall in food output to meet overall consumption needs of a 
population. FAD draws an equation, measurable in some technical terms between two 
variables: population numbers and the volume of food available. It assumes for famine 
occurrence, as indeed the term implies, that there is somehow a disproportionality 
between the two variables. FAD accords with the Naturalist and Population theses on 
famine in two respects: that (a) a natural disaster causes shortfall in food supplies 
leading to famine, or (b) that: big increases in population numbers outstrip available 
supplies of food leading to famine.
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2- 3- 4- i- Critique o f the FAD Approach:
The FAD approach has come under severe attack. Some of the criticisms raised 
include the criteria used to measure food production. FAD uses a four-fold classification 
model for measuring food production: above normal, normal, below normal and 
substantially below normal. The question is under what of these production levels 
famine is bound to occur. Critics point out that there is no guaranteed safeguards for 
some people against famine even under "normal" levels of food output, nor is it 
conversely necessarily the case that famine would occur if food output drops to "below 
normal" levels (Sen 1981). This observation has been attested to by the evidence 
presented from famine situations in Africa and Asia. The evidence indicates that in these 
famine situations there has not been dramatic deficits in the volume of food. On the 
contrary, it has been revealed that food did indeed flow out of the Wollo district, for 
example, during the 1973-75 Ethiopian famine. And as a general indicator, the National 
Bank of Ethiopia reported a slight rise in overall output (Ibid).
FAD assumes that since food is available to meet on aggregate the per capita 
requirements of a population, there is no fear of some people going hungry. Critics of 
FAD point out that this simple aggregation can not explain people's differential abilities 
to command food. That, it does not take account of the distribution side of food. In the 
market relations, command over food follows economic power that can translate into 
effective demand, and tends accordingly to be unevenly distributed. Different groups of 
people will have different commanding abilities over the food they need, commensurate 
with their economic purchasing power. Thus the economically weak groups with 
ineffective market demand, will fail to establish command over food even though it may 
be available in the market. This is a major dividing line between FAD and the ET. 
While the FAD remains broadly aggregate focusing on the overall availability of food in 
relation to population numbers, the ET is essentially disaggregative, acknowledging the 
differential commanding powers and the resultant distribution constraints that befall 
various segments of a society. Dreze and Sen make this point of departure:
One o f  the central differences between the availability view and the entitlement approach, 
is the necessarily disaggregative nature o f  the latter in contrast with the inherently 
aggregative perspective presented by the former. (Dreze and Sen 1989: 30).
Dreze and Sen have warned that the FAD view can be particularly dangerous when 
decision-making concerning economic policies is involved. In such a case, FAD can 
lead to "official smugness" on the part of the authorities concerned. In a situation where 
meticulous decision-making is required, government officials often smug on the 
"satisfactory availability" of the food situation, ignoring, thereby, or covering up the
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social realities of unequal access to food. This situation is apt to contribute to the 
development or continuation of a famine. They say:
The inadequacy o f  the availability view  is particularly important to note in the context o f  
the making o f  economic policy. Indeed an undue reliance ... on the availability view  has 
frequently contributed to the development or continuation o f  a famine, by making the 
relevant authorities smug about the food situation. There have been famines ... in Bengal in 
1943 and in Ethiopia in 1983, when the absence o f  a substantial food availability decline 
has contributed to official smugness (Ibid: 26-7).
FAD treats famine as a food disaster. It locates famine in the natural and normal, and 
thus implies uniformity and neutrality. The ET, on the other hand, views famine as an 
economic disaster, created by the collapse of people's market power and of their 
entitlements to food. The ET locates famine in the social sphere. It is not uniform, but 
differential. FAD says nothing about how individual persons and families fare in the 
struggle for food. Food may be available in the market, but because of poor people's 
inability to exercise effective market demand, they starve. Sen points to this differential 
nature of famine:
There is no reason to think that it [famine] will affect all groups in the famine-affected 
nation. Indeed it is by no means clear that there has ever occurred a famine in which all 
groups in a country have suffered from starvation, since different groups typically have 
very different commanding powers over food and overall shortage brings out the 
contrasting powers in stark clarity (Sen 1981: 43).
The ET logically raises issues of power and social differentiation. It focuses on: 
distribution rather than availability; different socio-economic and occupational groups; 
and the processes through which people establish (or lose) their entitlements to food 
.However, Dreze and Sen have warned against falling into the error of regarding the ET 
and FAD as being antithetical. They have shown that there are numerous and important 
links between the two. First, for some people, the food that they grow is also their direct 
entitlement. Second, people's abilities to command food is influenced by food prices, 
and prices are in turn influenced by the production and availability of food in the 
market. Third food production can also be a major source of employment and wage 
labour, and therefore enhances exchange entitlements. Fourth, if and when a famine 
develops, having a stock of food available in the public distribution system could be a 
useful instrument to combat famine and to counter soaring prices and protect people's 
entitlements (Dreze & Sen 1989: 25-6). The links, however, do not establish a tight 
connection between availability and entitlements in such a way that the food commands 
of different sections of the population move up and down together, in the same way as 
the total availability of food in the economy. Overall availability is thus a poor guide to 
the fortunes of different socio-economic groups (Ibid: 16).
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Distribution is a central theme in the ET and one of major departure from the FAD 
approach. Sen emphasises this central divergence that: "Starvation is the characteristic 
of some people not having enough to eat. It is not the characteristic of there being not 
enough to eat (Sen 1981: 1). The centrality of distribution involved in the issue of food 
has implications for accountability of both internal and external agencies. Some people 
go hungry because the available food is not being shared between people on both the 
local and global levels. Although the international dimension to the concept of the 
entitlements failure is considered to lie outside the structure of the argument, it is 
nevertheless a logical corollary to it. It is logical to extend the argument to the 
international distribution of resources to see how some states can not buy their food 
requirements from the international grain market. The issue of distribution is by 
necessity an issue of immediate relevance to the international grain trade and to 
international relations of power in general.
The ET. could be regarded as an internally focused analysis on the conditions of 
famine. In the structure of the ET, socio-economic and occupational groups are depicted 
as being necessary for analytical purposes. The most vulnerable of all groups to famine 
are peasant farmers, landless farm labourers and pastoralists. Besides being relatively 
politically and economically powerless, these groups are moreover more susceptible to 
the vicissitudes of the environment and the fluctuations of the market. The vulnerability 
of such groups is a condition of economic systems that endorse legally sanctioned rights 
of private property and ownership. The legally guaranteed rights of ownership, 
exchange and transaction delineate economic systems that can go hand in hand with 
some people failing to acquire enough food for survival (Ibid: 20). In a private 
ownership economy, command over food could be effected through either "growing 
food oneself and having property rights over what is grown" or through "selling other 
commodities and buying food with the proceeds" (Ibid). For the groups mentioned there 
is no guaranteed security against hunger. Entitlements of these groups are subject to the 
potential danger to failure. The first category's entitlements is called "direct 
entitlements" involving exchange with nature. Failure of these entitlements results from 
natural disasters and causes a "direct entitlements failure". The second category's is 
called "exchange entitlements" involving market exchange. Failure of this group's 
entitlements results from the adversities of the market conditions, insofar as labourers 
and non-food growers acquire food by means of wages in the case of labourers, and cash 
from sales of other products in the case of non-food growers, both of whom are subject 
to the market fluctuations. These groups are particularly vulnerable to hunger and 
famine as their entitlements are sensitive to market shifts and natural hazards; in the 
sense that a natural stress (e.g. drought) can result in crop failure and consequently a 
direct entitlements failure. Similarly, a downward curve in wage labour, or an upward
-53  -
market shift in food prices is more likely to result in an exchange entitlements failure. In 
the case of landless farm labourers: If food prices rise very rapidly, without money 
wages rising correspondingly, the labourers who have grown the food themselves may 
fail to acquire the food they need to survive. And in the case of peasant farmers; the 
precariousness of small farmers are hit by a collapse of their direct entitlement to the 
food they normally grow. The peasant farmer, like the landless labourer has no 
guaranteed entitlement to the necessities of life (Ibid: 21)
Another group that is susceptible to entitlements failure is the pastoral 
agriculturalists. This group may suffer loss of exchange entitlements in somewhat 
different ways from those of peasants and labourers. However, this group's effective 
demand is further restrained by three subsidiary factors in addition to the fall in 
agricultural output: (a) a fall in the market price of land, (b) loss of livestock and (c) fall 
in the market price of livestock. The plight of pastoralists is further compounded by 
both loss of and decline in animal prices. This was the lot of the pastoralists during the 
1983-85 famine in Sudan.
Entitlements have a legal character, and the failure of some people's entitlements is a 
factor of malfunctioning of the whole system of the legality of rights in general and of 
food in particular. That the legal rights of property and exchange normally operative in 
the society may sometimes work in such a way that benefits some groups to the 
detriment of others.
The legal system that precedes and survives through the famine may not, in itself, be a 
particularly cruel one. That standardly accepted rights o f  ownership and exchange are not 
the authoritarian extravaganzas o f  a heartless Nero ... They are, rather, parts o f  the standard 
legal rules o f  ownership and exchange that govern people's lives in much o f  the world. But 
when they are not supplemented by the state ... these standard legal rights may operate in a 
way that offers no chance o f  survival to potential famine victims. On the contrary, these 
legal rights, backed by the state power that upholds them, may ensure that the "have nots" 
do not grab food from the "haves", and the law can stand solidly between needs and 
fulfilment (Ibid.: 23).
The critical question here for the ET is perhaps why is it that some people or some 
groups fail to establish the legal rights to produce or exchange their food needs? Why is 
it that they remain in such precarious and vulnerable position in relation to the laws of 
ownership and exchange? Arnold raises this critical point:
Even the system o f  "exchange entitlements" begs question as to why certain sections o f  
society were placed in such dependent and precarious relationships that even without a real 
decline in the actual availability o f  food they could still be left without either work or food  
(Arnold 1988: 46).
The concern here is with the market as a central point in the analysis of food 
acquisition, and where it comes into the concept of exchange entitlements. Evidently, 
the legal rights of ownership and exchange are mediated through the market. Dreze and
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Sen perceive of these legal rights (and hence of the market through which they are 
mediated) as "parts of the standard legal rules of ownership and exchange that govern 
people's lives in much of the world". This conception places the legal rights of 
ownership and exchange and the market in the standard and normal. It does not question 
the socio-historical processes through which these rules have come to be legitimised and 
normalised. The ET gives no account of the processes of social power at work 
underpinning such apparently "standard" rules. It does not say how dominant groups in 
the society tailor the laws of ownership and property rights to serve their interests. The 
market is a "nexus"; a "socially created" arena (Watts 1984; Bush 1988). The ET can be 
appreciated as providing the theoretical framework to question the apparently normal 
socio-economic relations. Sen gives us the framework to ask a set of questions about the 
possible causes of famine. He also enables us, as Bush observes, to ask: who is dying, 
where and why. As Watts intimates: "the particular significance of Sen's (1981) analysis 
is precisely to question the economists' conventional story by posing economic relations 
and the market as socially and politically constituted" (Watts 1991: 8). This locates 
power in the market-place. Watts has raised this point in what he calls the "notion of 
history". He points out that "Sen is on somewhat shakier ground when he turns to 
history". That the ET focuses on the "immediate relationship between food and certain 
sorts of people", and "less on the processes producing a crisis of social reproduction; i.e. 
the historical political economy by which certain sorts of entitlements come to be 
socially distributed. In this sense it is questionable what sort of causality Sen has 
identified" (Watts 1989: 15). Watts argues that insofar as Sen himself notes that 
entitlements are mediated by legal and property relations, these necessarily demand a 
detailed examination of the socio-economic structures of society. He concludes that a 
history of a different sort is required to fully understand the causal links, namely a 
history of the "sources of power". The ET then does not go further to fathom the 
socially differentiated power in the struggle over food. It does not question the socially 
constituted nature of the legality of ownership and control over resources. Watts hints at 
this point that: "[o]ne needs to know how enforceable and legitimate are the legal and 
property relations which mediate entitlements and to recognise that all such rights are 
negotiated and fought over (Watts 1991:16). And since the legal rights of ownership and 
exchange are daily enacted and mediated through the market, the market becomes the 
arena of power struggle. This necessarily locates power in the market. The ET does not 
take us as far as the arena of struggle, it ushers us to its threshold, notwithstanding.
Bush views the market as a "social and material institution" (Bush 1988). Elson 
(1988) sees the market as a "nexus" between buyers and sellers, but that "this nexus has 
to be made". Such a social view to the market strikes to the heart of famine analysis. 
The market-centred view, as Watts observes, is now deeply enmeshed in famine
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discourse; what he calls "the social relations of trade and production". The market view 
to analysing famine allows us not only to account for the loss or maintenance of 
entitlements, but also to say who is victimised, under what conditions and why. Some 
studies (Gibbon et al 1994; Clough 1985; Saul 1988; Sutter 1987; Bonfiglioli 1988; 
White 1986; Bush 1986; Watts 1984) have documented the crucial role the market plays 
in the creation of famine. From international capital to the state's monopolistic control 
policies via marketing boards, to the regional trade collusion and cartels, down to the 
village trader, the market power is systematically turned against the rural poor. Local 
producers are forced into distress sales at harvest time or during periods of stress. 
Cumulatively, the market processes lie at the root of rural poverty and vulnerability to 
famine.
2- 4- Crisis Literature and the Research Questions:
Theories of famine have been conceived hastily at the time of "crisis", and have 
offered a wide spectrum of explanations. As Grigg (1985) notes the literature on famine 
has produced a "bewildering variety of causes": excessive population, the greed of 
Europeans and their addiction to meat, the evils of colonial and neo-colonial 
exploitation, the backwardednness of traditional farmers, the spread of deserts, and the 
heating up, as well as the cooling down of the earth's atmosphere (Grigg 1985: 3). It is 
not surprising, under this "bewildering variety" of explanations, that famine theories 
have offered to the best only partial explanations to the multi-faceted problem. A proper 
understanding of famine is necessary for effective policy-making if famine is to be 
eliminated. The policy recommendations and development packages that have been 
based on hastily conceived notions, have failed dismally to salvage the food crises. 
Instead, after more than three decades of such policy recommendations, the food crisis 
in Sudan (and in Africa generally) is still deep in the mire. Journalistic tradition about 
famine presented powerful images, loaded with commanding urgency. But this 
representation surely presents us only with a photographic snap, divorced of its 
historical context, and can be distorting and misleading. The images can arouse 
suspicions and questions, accusing everyone that "something terribly criminal is going 
on" (Dreze and Sen 1989; Watts 1991). They can also engender a sense of pessimism 
and defeatism in the absence of a proper understanding. As Parker (1989) has warned:
media images become implicit reference points [for representations o f  African crises]. The 
images oversimplify and distort reality. By providing misleading presuppositions they 
obstruct accurate perception and clear thinking (Parker 1989: 27).
The confusion of famine theory is partly to blame. The role of research must be to 
give those images meaning and context. This research is an attempt to address some of 
the gaps in the debate on famine. It is an attempt to contribute towards a better
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understanding of recurrent famines in Sudan. The contribution of this research is to put 
the diverse and seemingly heterogeneous causes of famine into context. We are 
suggesting a broad historical/ political approach within which the multitude of factors 
can be accommodated, and understood. The literature on famine in Sudan falls into one 
or the other of two traditions: the journalistic tradition, and the academic tradition. We 
are here concerned with the latter which includes a score of studies which have either 
tackled the problem from a macro-level approach, focusing on the Sudanese economy 
and policies, and international processes; or else dealt with the problem at the micro­
level of the actual victims in the rural villages (De Waal 1990; Keen 1991, 1994; 
Shepherd 1988; Bush 1986, 1988; Duffield 1992). None of these studies have sought to 
relate the macro- and micro-level processes and the linkages between the international, 
national, regional and local interrelationships which we argue are essential for the 
analysis and proper understanding of such a complex phenomenon. Nor have they 
examined in detail the ways through which the local communities have responded to 
external pressure and environmental stress, and the strategies which they employ in 
coping with famine. Famine could be utterly unintelligible if it is to be reduced to the 
narrow confines of a single theoretical paradigm, or to an event such as a drought or a 
crop failure. Any thorough and comprehensive understanding of famine will have to 
construe the social history of society, the history of the social relations of power, of 
dominance and subordination; the social arrangements or the "totality of rights " as Sen 
calls them, that govern the fortunes of different social groups in the struggle for control 
over resources including the struggle over food (Watts 1991; Sen 1991; Bush 1986; 
Dando 1980).
This research tries to fill some of these gaps. It looks at the missing links which bind 
the multiplicity and interconnections of factors that are inevitably enmeshed in the 
phenomenon of famine in Sudan. The research traces the interconnections between the 
macro- and micro-level processes. It also makes a contribution to an understanding of 
the positive experiences of the rural communities in the semi-arid environment in 
Kordofan; Western Sudan in dealing with political pressure, economic change, the 
environment and the associated problems of food shortage. The research examines the 
processes that in the recent history have contributed to weaken the people's traditional 
ways of survival and strategies of coping with conditions of stress. This requires a 
thorough examination of the social history of the Sudanese society. It seeks to explore 
the historical processes that have shaped the existing power structures in Sudanese 
social relations. The study aims to establish the links between these social structures and 
how they relate to the creation of certain patterns of vulnerability among certain groups 
and the consequent occurrences of famine.
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The recurrence of famines in Sudan over the last three decades, raises questions as 
to why Sudan has become so vulnerable to famine in spite of all its natural agricultural 
potential. At the same time, not all Sudanese suffer from famine to the same degree. 
There are some regions in the country in which famine has become endemic and some 
sections of the population who have become particularly vulnerable to stress 
conditions. These constitute the mass of rural populations in the peripheral 
marginalized regions in the Western, Southern, and Eastern parts of the country.
In order to fully understand the phenomenon of recurrent famines in Sudan, it is 
important to understand the causes of vulnerability, deprivation and poverty which lie 
at the root o f the problem. Such an understanding requires an examination of the 
interactions between natural (drought) and man-made causes, internal policy failures, 
market failures, international constraints, as well as the responses of the affected 
populations to these pressures operating upon them. This thesis takes a broad 
historical perspective which tries to disentangle the socio-political and economic 
structures of the Sudanese society, and the relations of power in that society since the 
turn of the century. Famine in Sudan, we argue, is the result of complex long-term 
interactive causes, which have a historical socio-economic and political character. We 
argue that the broad perspective also allows us to assess how the processes of change 
have impinged on peoples' survival strategies to cope with the drought and stress. We 
specifically address the following questions:
1 - Why has Sudan become so vulnerable to famine recently?
2- Who suffer from famine in Sudan? and why?
3- How have the people coped with droughts and stress in the past?
4- How and why their former security has been weakened in the more recent
history?
5- What is the role of the drought in the occurrence of famine? Can drought be
understood solely as a natural phenomenon? or as a man-made one?
6- What is the role of politics in drought and famine?
7- What are the local people's responses to political/economic pressure,
environmental stress, and social change?
In order to try and answer these questions, they need to be understood in a wider 
historical, political, social and ecological context. Such a broader perspective allows us 
to understand the complex interconnections between social adaptations to external 
political pressure and economic change, as well as to environmental stress, and the 
continuities of these adaptations across time.
2- 5- Identifying the Famine Victims in Sudan:
At a macro level, the classical famine victims are the rural communities in Sudan's 
peripheral regions: of Western, Southern and Eastern provinces. The recent famine in
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1990-91 has added further new social groups, not traditionally classified as such. 
These new groups include wage labourers and small salaried employees. This followed 
the fast acceleration of the process of impoverisation of whole communities and 
occupational groups. However, this macro-level analysis is rather crude, and can 
provide only general indicators. It does not say why even within these marginal 
communities, some individuals fare better than others. At a micro-level, it is our 
contention that famine victims are always those whose surplus labour value has been 
siphoned off through market forces. They are the subjects of the market who are kept 
farther away from a "trade line". The "trade line" as I call it, is the conduits of 
hierarchical structural flow of capital, top down flow of what the World Bank would 
call "trickle down" of resources. We argue that the "trickle down" strategy does not in 
fact reach the lower reaches of society. Rather, it creates a line of trade of beneficiaries 
at different levels from the international, national, regional to the local village level, a 
line of trading activities. It is only logical that international capital funds destined to 
develop agriculture and to trickle down, can not conceivably do so for all. It has to be 
selective, and rationed out to certain "eligible" groups, possibly those with the highest 
market-oriented proclivities in order to carry out the task of reaching the most remote 
communities and open up new markets. That, we argue, is what international aid has 
actually done; the creation of a "trade line". The better placed people are in relation to 
this line, the more assured they are of funds and of living; the more farther removed 
from it, as in the case of the majority of the village peasantry, the less secured they are 
against the uncertainties of nature and the insecurities of life. More precisely, at a 
micro-level analysis, the famine victims are those who lose in the market place. They 
are the subjects of trade; the weak partners in the market exchange relations who sell 
in distress and are taxed when they buy. Resources from the primary producers; the 
village peasants, move to the village trader, to the regional merchants, to the national 
state parastatals and exporters to outside markets. The way in which these two 
processes; of the flow down of capital along the trade line to eligible partners of trade, 
and that of the upward siphoning off of rural resources, form the specific unequal 
market exchange relations between merchants and producers, between capital and 
primary commodity production. It is at this specific unequal market nexus that rural 
producers lose and starve. Because the Sudanese economy is heavily dependent on the 
traditional sector for the generation of revenue, poor producers bear the overwhelming 
burden in debt repayment. It is at this level that we draw the relationships between 
international aid packages, debt, and rural poverty. And this is why we make the global 
market system our unit of analysis, in which the rural poor represent the weaker 
partners and ultimately become the victims of famine.
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2- 6- Famine as historical process: an alternative view:
The argument in this study precludes the view of a generic famine that could be 
analytically squarely put in any one particular theoretical framework. We stress the 
historical specificity of famine to the extent that even in Sudan the 1990-91 famine 
differed in many respects from that of 1983-85. It is because each famine has its unique 
character, that the vast ensemble of seemingly heterogeneous factors can only make 
sense and can be meaningfully understood if read in their broad historical context. In 
this argument we identify two types of processes: macro-structural long-term processes 
producing certain patterns of vulnerability, and micro-level ones. The macro-level 
processes, are enacted on the spheres of the state and in the international arena. On the 
level of the state these take the form of policies and power relations, that have been 
shaped over the years and adversely bearing on the fortunes of certain sections of the 
society leading to long-term patterns of vulnerability. On the international arena this 
takes the manner in which the Sudan economy has been incorporated in the world 
market system since the colonial period. Inevitably this unfavourable relation has 
produced negative results: negative terms of trade, growing balance of payments 
deficits, shrinking imports, precipitous growth rates, borrowing, huge accumulated debt, 
rising inflation and a general deterioration in living standards. This situation has greatly 
handicapped the state's action to intervene and moderate the stress at times of shortfall 
by purchases from the international grain market, thus causing a vulnerability of a 
super-structural nature. The relationship between the national and international is not 
lineal and is therefore not amenable to separate treatment for each dimension. Rather 
these processes are seen as interactive and interweaved reflecting the workings of the 
international system of which the Sudan is a part, annexed to it through the agencies of 
the state and the national bourgeoisie. We present these macro-structural processes as a 
continuum taking a historical trend. We argue that these macro-structural tendencies are 
responsible for the creation of the conditions of famine; of vulnerabilities, 
impoverishment, underdevelopment, alienation from long established self-provisioning 
systems.
However, we recognise that this type of macro-level analysis, does not capture the 
full details of the famine situation. It leaves unanswered the question of how individuals 
and rural communities respond to such extraneous macro-structural forces. In order to 
remedy the shortcomings of a macro-level analysis, we identify the second type of 
processes: the micro-level processes of famine at the grass roots with the people who 
experienced famine in the villages of rural Kordofan. Here we are concerned with the 
nature and dynamics of the famine experience, of how some people fare better and some 
lose, the ways in which the state's policies exacerbate rural vulnerabilities, what is the 
validity of "natural" causes, and what coping strategies these communities employed in
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the past to cope with the vicissitudes of their environment and what caused these to be 
undermined. The study traces the processes at three different levels: (a) at a macro level, 
(b) at a regional level, and (c) at a micro level.
2- 6- 1- At the macro level: State Policies
The areas of the state's policies which have had direct bearings on the fortunes of the 
rural populations in Kordofan will be identified. But the state is not independent from 
external influences which directly affect its actions and policy choices. The state, we 
argue, because of its weaknesses, functions as agency which facilitates the flow of 
surplus value of rural agricultural labour, and the subordination of rural communities as 
a vast pool of cheap resources whose labour power can be manipulated through the 
state's policies to serve the interests of the ruling elites and their overseas partners and 
clients. The state's ruling elites perceive that their economic interests lie outside with 
those of their overseas partners with whom they also identify ideologically as belonging 
to an international bourgeois milieu; a "lumpenbourgeoisie", cutting across national 
boundaries. We will address the questions related to the nature of the relationship that 
has existed between the modern Sudanese state and its external allies on the one hand, 
and between it and the region of Kordofan on the other, and how national and 
international interests militate against those of the rural poor. The type of state policies 
and the nature of this relationship led to the marginalization of the region both 
politically and economically in the recent history of Sudan. Underrepresented, 
politically unorganised, and lacking in political and economic leverage the rural 
communities have become areas of the state's extractive policies and the exploitation of 
its allied merchant class and foreign interests.
In order to account for the marginalization and underdevelopment of the rural 
communities, we need to trace the historical political developments in the country since 
the colonial era in order to see how the colonial state established political and economic 
structures suitable to its interests. And on the eve of independence, how the colonial 
administration carefully bequeathed political power to certain groups from central 
Sudan whose interests accord with those of the colonial metropolis. The colonial 
political and economic structures have remained unchanged until the contemporary 
period, attesting to the failure and inertia of successive national governments in Sudan. 
No wonder, then, that large segments of the rural populations in the Western, Southern 
and Eastern regions have been put in a state of chronic poverty and vulnerability to 
famines. A historical account to bring under focus the existing political structures and 
internal relations of power is required. This account will bring to the open how famine- 
affected regions have been marginalized, underdeveloped and underrepresented in the 
state's political structures.
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2- 6- 2- At Regional Level: (El-Obeid market organisation and structure)
The regional structures provide the intermediary link between the international and 
national, on the one hand, and between national and local village levels on the other. In 
the analysis, vulnerability of the rural communities to famine is seen to be the outcome 
of a long-term process of impoverishment and exploitation. This process is illustrated by 
the drain of rural resources from the village, to the regional centre, to the national centre 
and to distant international markets; systematically effected through market forces. 
Ultimately, such analysis challenges the "trickle down" theory in its basic tenets of 
development. Our contention is that the capital that is supposedly to "trickle down" to 
the lower reaches of the production process, does not in fact do so. It falls short of 
reaching the actual producer. Quite the reverse; it benefits only those on the "trade line" 
who use it as a means of power to drain rural resources to their advantage, in what may 
be termed as a "resource drain", and not a beneficent "trickle down" process.
El-Obeid is the regional capital city of Kordofan. It assumes international importance 
as the world's biggest market for gum Arabic exports. It also commands a big share for 
oil-seeds and livestock trade. With such an economic significance, El-Obeid attracts 
both local and international capital. Its market organisation and its internal structure 
exhibits unique and distinctive features. As an important regional trade centre, El-Obeid 
provides a link between national and international capital on the one hand and the 
capital of local traders on the other, both meet and feast on a lucrative trade of cash 
crops produced by the village peasantry. The in-coming capital either from inside the 
country or from distant international centres, is usually stationed at El-Obeid, 
particularly at harvest times and never finds its way to the actual producer. 
Representatives of national and international firms, companies and banks come to El- 
Obeid at harvest times in order to conduct purchases of produce on behalf of their 
respective firms. Many of El-Obeid merchants themselves engage in the trade on their 
own or act as agents for other firms or banks. El-Obeid merchants determine not only 
the sale prices of rural agricultural and animal produce, but also the prices of imported 
goods- a trade they predominantly control. They control both ends of the regional trade, 
the purchase and sales prices. Local traders, on the other hand, bring in to the regional 
market the crops which they have purchased from the village producers. It is important 
to note how these two groups of buyers benefit while the actual producers lose in an 
unequal exchange relation determined by an unequal balance of economic, political and 
financial power.
Most importantly, however, El-Obeid market has set the tone and pace for the 
production and consumption patterns all over the region. It sets the mood and the 
necessary distributive channels for the consumer goods to penetrate deep into the 
remotest rural communities; thereby contributing to the gradual alteration of long
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established production and consumption patterns. After dispensing with their truck­
loads of cash crops, local village traders purchase consumer goods from wholesalers to 
transport and sell to the village people at inflated prices. The market and the village 
traders, serve a crucial role in the mercantile chain as entrepreneurs opening up rural 
markets for the capitalist mode of production and consumption. The consequence has 
been further alienation of the rural communities from their self-provisioning survival 
systems, rendering them more and more vulnerable to food insecurity and famines.
Another important feature of El-Obeid market is that it is dominated by the Jellaba 
(literally meaning itinerant traders, but became a designation of the peoples of the 
Northern Sudan), who have their origin in the centre of Sudan. The Jellaba exercise 
monopolistic control over almost all economic activities in Kordofan to the exclusion of 
indigenous participants. Their monopolistic control over the market has been facilitated 
by their privileged position as belonging to the dominant political groups. This position 
has enabled El-Obeid merchants not only to have a free hand over regional resources, 
but also to have an influential say in who will to ascend to key positions in the regional 
government. They directly dictate to the central government their preferences on matters 
of political appointments, to which the latter usually acquiesces for considerations of 
kinship as well as mutual political and economic interests. In this state of affairs both 
the state's official regional governing body and the merchant lobby meet in an unholy 
alliance against the interests of the entire rural communities. Therefore, practices of 
hoarding, monopolising and cartel-forming are rampant phenomena in El-Obeid market, 
as the entire regional trade is concentrated in the hands of a few merchants. Fearless of 
governmental accountability, (as government regional officials are themselves part of 
the design), these merchants inflict damaging exploitation on the rural populations 
particularly at times of dearth. The effects of these processes on the poor are 
devastating. At times of shortfall in food supply, the tragedy of the poor is doubly 
compounded by merchant greed and official corruption, leaving the poor to the devil, 
while the merchants and their official allies thrive.
El-Obeid Chamber of Commerce is a good example of the distortion of the market. 
Its members are composed predominantly of the Jellaba merchants, who have little 
concern for the benefit of the people of Kordofan, but interested only in making big 
profits out of trade. The criticism here is not about making big (sometimes illicit) profit, 
but in the way the members of the Chamber invest their profits. The example of El- 
Obeid Chamber of Commerce illustrates how massive capital that has been accumulated 
through a process of "rural mining" of Kordofan, is never invested in the development 
of rural resources or services in the region, but is transferred to the centre to invest in 
industries or in big projects elsewhere. El-Obeid grains market merits special attention. 
We will see who controls the regional grain trade, the lines of production and the
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channels of transport and distribution. We also document, where possible, the collusive 
behaviour of traders at times of stress and how merchant cartels exacerbate rural 
vulnerability to famine.
2- 6- 3- At village level: the field-work:
We have tried to ascertain causes to a number of related questions: what survival 
strategies had in the past enabled reproduction of the social system; how economic 
transformation and social change attendant on the processes of integration have affected 
the local food systems; and what has the impact of these politico-economic processes 
been on the capacity of the local systems to support its population in the context of 
resource utilisation and environmental stress. A field-word study has been carried out 
over a period of six months ( between December 1992 and May 1993) two villages: Al- 
Saata and Omdofais, representing the two communities of Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar 
respectively. The role of the field-work study is to provide a detailed account on the 
processes of famine on the micro-level of the village, to complement our analyses on the 
macro-level polices of the state, and on the regional-level of Kordofan. The field-work 
study, focusing on the micro-level processes is considered to be a major contribution of 
this research to fill in the gap in the existing literature on famine in Sudan which has so 
far focused on the macro-level processes only.
The significance of the field-work is to support our theoretical analytical framework 
with empirical data. This study has adopted a holistic/historical framework, which we 
argue is more appropriate and superior to other approaches as explanation of the 
phenomenon of famine; like naturalist or economist explanations. The rationale of the 
field-work is to complement our analyses on the long-term historical processes of 
change attendant on the macro-state policies of rural transformation. This is done by 
giving a detailed account on the concomitant changes taking place on the village level 
over time.
2- 6- 4- Procedures o f data collection and rationale:
Gauging the depth and impact of change on the village life in the course of time has 
been the determining factor in identifying the type of data to be collected. The changes 
that are required to be measured are perceived to be those affecting the quality of life for 
the local community, as well as those affecting the levels of incomes and expenditures 
determining the degree of wealth or poverty of individual households. In order to obtain 
these types of data, we have formulated the field-work questions to obtain both 
qualitative and quantitative data. The qualitative-type data are obtained through open 
discussion interviews with the adult village members, and with older men and women to 
elicit information about the past. While the quantitative type data are meant to give
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estimates on the present conditions in terms of levels of production and consumption, 
and on incomes and expenditures which provide some indicators on levels of wealth and 
poverty in the villages. The exercise of the field-work is intended to give us a picture of 
village life under the forces of contemporary changes, and to enable us see who among 
the village populations have become more vulnerable to famine conditions, and who are 
not. It is also hoped to inform policy making with regard to targeting the more 
vulnerable groups in times of crises.
There are, however, some limitations of the field-work. Foremost, is the unreliability 
of the quantitative data, owing to the absence of accurate statistical records in the 
villages. The village respondents relied on memory, which can be unreliable. However, 
the scanty statistical data obtained from the villages have been supplemented by data 
from some studies which have been carried out in the area between 1985 - 1992. 
Additionally, vast distances, poor transport in rural Cordoban, and lack of funds have 
also been some of the disadvantages in collecting and verifying the data.
The two communities of the study: Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar of Northern 
Kordafan inhabit the semi-arid zone close to the Southern desert fringe, forming part of 
the Sahel zone. They are agro-pastoral whose members combine traditional rain-fed 
agriculture, gum Arabic collection with animal herding. The choice of Dar Hamid and 
Dar Hamar has been determined by the purposes of inquiry propounded in this study. 
Not least because the area received insufficient attention as an area of vulnerability, the 
communities have been especially hard hit by the recent famines. What sets Dar Hamid 
and Dar Hamar communities apart from other communities in the region is that they 
combine agriculture, gum Arabic collection with pastoral production which makes 
possible the analysis of diverse livelihood strategies. It is one of the aims of the study to 
explore the diverse strategies the local communities use to cope with the uncertainties of 
their natural environment. It also enables measuring the effects of both agricultural and 
pastoral practices on the environment. The choice of the two communities is not 
intended for comparison, but aims to cover a wider geographical area affected by the 
recent famines in order to give the findings more validity than if only one community is 
studied. The geographical location of Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar as part of the Sahel 
zone makes it possible to assess the climatic variation and the impact that might have 
had on food insecurity in the area. Its geographic location is also suitable, for it occupies 
part of the Northern limits of the acacia Senegal belt, in which El-Obeid, the regional 
capital of Kordafan occupies the centre as the world's biggest gum Arabic market. This 
location makes possible the analysis of how gum Arabic and the other cash crops are 
being traded and marketed from the village, to the regional centre and beyond. Both El- 
Obeid and Omdurman are market centres for livestock from the area. The location also
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makes possible comparative analysis of prices between the village and regional markets 
to determine rural terms of trade.
Conclusion:
This chapter has evaluated different approaches to explaining famine. It has shown 
that the different famine theories have offered partial, divergent and sometimes 
conflicting explanations of famine. The consequence of such divergence of opinion has 
been poor policies, and in spite of all efforts, famine still persists in Sudan and 
elsewhere. We argue that deficiency in theory is partly to blame. This study has 
proposed a different approach to understanding the causes of famine in Sudan based on 
a broad holistic/historical perspective which gives the seemingly heterogeneous causes 
context and meaning.. The holistic/historical approach is superior to other approaches in 
that it accommodates the diversity of causes in the study and analysis of famine, and 
gives these coherence and relevance.
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Adaptations and Survival in Old Kordofan
Introduction:
Conventional famine theory has treated famine as an "event" divorced of its historical 
context. The treatment of famine as an event is largely responsible for much of the 
misunderstanding of the phenomenon since it mystifies and obscures the underlying 
causes which originate in long-term processes that reach far beyond the immediate 
trigger factors such as a drought or harvest failure. The treatment of famine as an event 
divorces it from its context. This chapter provides the historical context against which 
famine in Kordofan can be explained. It lays out the historical background of two rural 
communities, and traces their way of life in the semi-arid environment of North 
Kordofan in former times, and argues that the adaptability of these communities had 
enabled them to survive the vagaries of nature. It is only in the recent history of the 
region under the incorporation of Kordofan into the fabric of the modern Sudanese state 
that these rural communities lost their capacity to cope with stress under the impact of 
exogenous forces.
3 -1 - A SHORT HISTORY OF KORDOFAN
3- 1- 1- Kordofan Before the 19th Century: (the Fur and the Fung Hegemony):
The ancient history of Kordofan prior to the Egyptian invasion in 1821 was little 
known; and the scanty material that is available is found in scattered evidence in the 
accounts and writings of travellers and geographers. The task of attempting to construct 
a picture of ancient Kordofan is very difficult. The difficulty is partly due to the fact that 
in Kordofan, unlike the other Sudanic Kingdoms, e.g. Sennar, DarFur, Wadai, Burnu, 
etc., there existed no records or chronicles kept in the Royal accounts from which 
accurate information could be obtained. However, the available evidence suggests that 
the earliest inhabitants of Kordofan were the ancestors of the present-day Nuba who 
occupied the land in the times of the Pharaohs and extended as far north as Haifa. The 
ancient Egyptians no doubt had political and trading links with them as the evidence in 
the Pyramids, graves and drawings in various relics of the ancient Egyptionics suggests. 
In the fourth millennia BC, the Pharaohs of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth dynasties at 
intervals raided or traded with the Sudan (Government of Sudan 1912; Mac Michael 
1912, Lloyd, Watkiss [Captain] 1910).
The peoples who inhabited the territories of Kordofan before the fourteenth century 
were thought to be those mysterious race called the Anag; a race now extinct, but to
Chapter 3
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whom any signs of human occupation previous to the coming of the Arabs is invariably 
attributed, Archaeological traces and findings appear to confirm the view that Northern 
Kordofan was indeed the early homeland of the Anag. The Anag are almost 
unanimously said to have formed the aboriginal populations of these northerly parts of 
Kordofan, and extending to the Libyan Desert, and east to the Nile. The Anag are said to 
have been a fair-haired pink-skinned race, and evidence suggests that they are connected 
with the old Berber tribes (Mac Michael 1912). The indigenous original inhabitants of 
Kordofan in more recent history were the Nuba. The Nuba were thought to occupy the 
entire land extending from the Lakes to the Libyan Desert. In 1275 the Arabs annexed 
the Sudan; and indeed since the time of the Arab conquest of Egypt, Kordofan and the 
rest of the Sudan became gradually permeated by a constant influx and infusion of 
Semitic blood. The coming of the Arabs in about the fourteenth century, added a new 
important dimension in the political and social history of the region, and made Kordofan 
what it is today, a mixture of diverse African and Arab origins, Indeed, Kordofan is 
Sudan's most ethnically and culturally diverse region; and as such it is indeed a 
microcosm of Sudan, and its African-Arab dichotomy is clearly manifest.
The history of old Kordofan differed from that of other ancient African kingdoms 
that flourished in this central part of Africa and gained wide fame such as Sennar, 
DarFur, Wadai, Burnu, Kanem, Bagermi, Sokoto etc. The differences between 
Kordofan and these other kingdoms being that while these latter formed powerful 
centralised organised states ruled over by royal dynasties, Kordofan, on the other hand, 
lacked such a centralised system of authority. Kordofan had never formed an 
independent state organisation. Consequently, its records have not been kept 
continuously, as happened to some extent in the case of the above-mentioned states, 
whose rulers, for their own glorification and according to the common practice of all 
independent states, have preserved a more or less true, though highly coloured accounts 
of their past history. Instead, it had always been an independent free zone territory, 
which variously fell under the real or nominal rule of its more powerful neighbours, 
namely Sennar and DarFur.
The relationship of Kordofan with DarFur dates back to the time of two dynasties, 
the Kungjra and the Masabaat who entered Kordofan from DarFur and subsequently 
ruled the country. In the eighteenth century, probably between 1768 and 1776 there 
emerged a prominent Masabaat leader, Sultan Hashim. He united the Masabaat in 
Kordofan under his leadership and drove out the Fung, who then laid nominal claim to 
the country, seized El-Obeid and made it his capital (Mac Michael 1912; Government of 
Sudan 1912; Captain Lloyd, Watkiss 1910). The Fur continued to rule Kordofan until 
the time of the Egyptian Conquest in 1821. The Fur rule over Kordofan was generally 
considered to be beneficial as there prevailed a certain degree of stability which
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contributed positively to production and to the flourishing of trade and a general 
prosperity. The rule of the Fung over Kordofan is said to have lasted only for seven 
years. During this time, Abu Likeilek- the Fung ruler over Kordofan- was mostly 
preoccupied with repulsing the attacks of the Fur from the West (Ibid). It can be 
inferred that the Fung rule over Kordofan was transient and only nominal. However, the 
significance of the Fung rule was that it brought the region more into contact with the 
peoples of the Nile Valley which was to have important implications in subsequent 
histories of the regions as Kordofan became more and more assimilated and drawn into 
the fabric of the central Nile Valley and Eastwards into an Arabic-Islamic cultural orbit.
In the days of the Fur and the Fung, Kordofan continued to be prosperous and 
peaceful; paying a voluntary present to the Fur Sultan. Cultivation and animal 
husbandry flourished, merchants were exempted from all duties and commerce extended 
in all directions. Caravans brought goods from Abyssinia, the interior of Africa and 
from Egypt into the towns of El-Obeid, and Bara from which centres the greater part of 
this trade was then passed into the hinterland. This represented the golden age of 
Kordofan (Pallme 1844; in O'Fahey 1980). This state of general stability and prosperity 
in Kordofan was ended by the Turko-Egyptian invasion in 1821.
3- 1- 2- The Turko-Egyptian Rule over Kordofan:
The Turko-Egyptian rule was the first true experience of Kordofan populations of 
organised political rule embodied in formal modern state institutions and exercised by a 
powerful alien central political authority. The experience, as can be expected, proved to 
be both traumatic and inspiring; which in the end led to a nation-wide liberating 
revolution that engulfed the whole of Sudan; which sprang essentially from Kordofan. 
As part of the grand design of Mohammad Ali Pasha, then Viceroy of Egypt, to achieve 
independence from the authority of the Turkish Sublime Porte in Constantinoble, he 
extended his dominion into Sudan in order to secure money and men to consolidate his 
power and achieve his goal of independence (Na'om Shuqair 1903; Arkell 1961). 
Accordingly, he invaded and captured Dongola, sent one army to invade Sennar and 
another to Kordofan under the command of his son-in-law, Mohammad El Defterdar. El 
Defter dar advanced towards Kordofan with a force of 4000 cavalry and infantry, 10 
pieces of artillery and 1000 Bedouins (Government of Sudan 1910, Mac Michael 1912, 
Arkell 1961). The invading army met at Bara with the army of El-Makdum Musallem, 
then Governor of Kordofan of the Kungara ruling dynasty. Firearms were unknown to 
the latter army, and El-Makdum was killed in battle, his army broke rank and Bara was 
pillaged. Two days later, El-Obeid suffered the same fate at the hands of the invading 
Egyptian army in 1821. The last resistance of the Arabs came from the Hamar who 
were shortly defeated and the Egyptian rule was firmly established. The conquerors
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(usually spoken of as the Turks) at once initiated a reign of terror, administering the 
country in defiance of every law of humanity and justice, entirely for their own personal 
benefit. When the heavy taxes levied could not be paid in cash, grain, cattle or slaves 
had to be delivered instead. Actual raiding for slaves in the Nuba mountains by 
organised military expeditions was undertaken annually, and by 1839 by this means 
alone more than 200,000 had been led into captivity (March 1948). Pallme describes in 
1844 the extent to which the state of affairs inside Kordofan had degenerated:
no pen can describe what oppression the country (Kordofan) ... subjected, all signs o f  
wealth have entirely disappeared, and it is, as it were, drained by the Turks. Many o f  the 
natives, tired o f  this oppression, have migrated with all their possessions ... nothing is now  
discernible but poverty and misery (Pallme 1844: 16).
The vicious exploitation of the population, the slave raids, the exorbitant taxation 
system and the extortionate manner in which it was collected, coupled with the gross 
mismanagement, abuse and corruption of the administration, turned Kordofan 
population into a desperate discontented mass, only to form the breeding grounds for a 
nation-wide popular revolt against the oppressors when the rallying call of the Mahdia 
was echoed. Kordofan discontented populations were the first to answer the call of the 
Mahdi; and from Kordofan, it gained grounds and in due course engulfed the whole of 
Sudan.
3- 1- 3- Kordofan and the Mahdist State:
The short-lived Mahdist state brought Kordofan no salvation, although the 
Revolution owed almost its entire success to the people of Kordofan. Although most of 
the Ansar were drawn from Kordofan, and the Khalifa, himself a Baggara Arab of 
Kordofan, became progressively distanced from his pastoral background, and sought to 
build a modern urban-based political authority. The Khalifa empowered his Amirs, al- 
Khateem, then Mahmud wad Ahmad, in Kordofan to carry out his policy of enforced 
migration to Omduramn. The tenets of the policy was to effect a wholesale mass 
migration of the rural communities from their homelands to join the armies of the 
Khalifa in Omduramn. The Khalifa's aims of the policy were three-pronged. The more 
obvious aim was first to consolidate the rule of the Mahdist State by enlarging his 
armies destined to meet the imminent military threats and the approaching Anglo- 
Egyptian forces. A second strategic aim was to pre-empt and undercut any possible 
invasion by the enemy forces from the direction of the north-west via the Desert, which 
the Egyptian and British intelligence were active to instigate the tribes against the 
Mahdists; capitalising as it were on the very bad and deteriorating general conditions 
and using the Kababish as aides and spies (al-Atta 1973; Mahadiyya Reports 1316 Hijri 
[1898 AD]; Government. Intelligence Report 1912; Mekki Shbieka 1967). However, a
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third political motivation for the policy of enforced migration was the Khalifa's 
apprehension of the ungovernable character of the tribes who could pose potential 
threats to his authority. He considered it imperative to bring these elements nearer to the 
seat of power under close eyes which would make it easier to control them under close 
quarters. This was seen necessary to elicit their allegiance and bring them under 
submission. The Khalifa's policy of enforced migration, was however, met with 
vehement wide popular resistance from the majority of Kordofan tribes. The tribes 
openly rejected the call for migration and were reluctant to leave their homelands, and 
openly defied the Mahdist orders. This open resistance impelled the Khalifa to order his 
Amirs to the use of force to see it carried out. The policy met with formidable obstacles 
in its implementation, and eventually turned into an open conflict between the Khalifa's 
forces under his Amirs and the general subjects. This had led to virtual wars to bring, 
once more, under the state authority most of the Arab tribes and the Nuba, and to 
suppress a rebellion of the Jihadia, the Khalifa's own conscripts. Punitive expeditions 
continued throughout the Mahdist period against the truculent and rebellious Nuba 
Mountain Meks and other tribes; especially the Kababish of Northern Kordofan and the 
Gimma in the south-east. More drastic devastation of the region occurred towards the 
latter years of the Mahdia when in 1897, the Khalifa issued his orders summoning the 
tribes to gather at Omdurman to enlarge his armies against the approaching Anglo- 
Egyptian forces. The Amir Mahmud; Amir of Western Sudan (.Kordofan and DarFur) 
"marching from DarFur to the Nile, swept across the province driving men, women and 
children before the extended detachment of his army, who, to render desertion 
impossible, destroyed every village and settlement as they passed and left a wake of 
utter desolation in their train" (Ibid. 1912: 89). Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar were among 
Kordofan tribes who joined the Mahdist forces in Kordofan, and later in Omdurman. 
The collapse of the Mahdist state by the invading Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1898 gave 
them the opportunity to break away from the forced settlement in Omdurman, and they 
returned to their homelands in central Kordofan. Unfortunately for the Hamar, the 
Mahdist years were a period of utter misfortune, in which they lost their former wealth 
of camel herds.
3- 2- KORDOFAN n a t u r a l  s e t t i n g :
Kordofan region lies approximately between 9° N and 16° N lat., and between 27° 
30'E and 32°15'E long. The region extends about 400 miles from North to South, and 
about 350 miles from East to West. It covers an area of about 130,500 square miles. It 
extends northwards into the Saharan Desert and southwards into the rich savannah zone 
of the tropics. There is considerable disagreement as to the origins of the name 
Kordofan. It is possible that the name Kordofan is Nubian in origin as the Nuba were
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the earliest to inhabit and rule Kordofan. Their last king was said to have lived in Jebel 
Kordofan, some few miles to the south of El-Obeid. It is now commonly agreed that the 
country derived its name from and named after Jebel Kordofan (Mac Michael 1967a).
3- 2 -1 - Climate and Rainfall:
North Kordofan lies within two climatic zones. The Northern parts of the region 
North of lat. 14° N lie within the tropical continental desert climate which has a mean 
annual rainfall of less than 200 mm, and a wet season of about one to three weeks a 
year. This climatic zone is suitable only for pastoralism. South to this zone to 12° N lat., 
lies the region of the tropical semi-desert climate, with a mean annual rainfall between 
200 - 500 mm, and a rainy season of between 2 - 3  months. In this climatic zone agro- 
pastoralism prevails, with wide-spread dry farming predominates. The rainfall in this 
zone is characterised by high variability, inter-annual and inter-seasonal fluctuations, 
which makes harvests very unreliable and subject to frequent failures. This zone is 
succeeded by the tropical sub-humid climate, which is more characteristic of Southern 
Kordofan. In addition to the seasonal and annual variability characteristic of the semi- 
arid climate, climatologists have noted a secular decline in rainfall trends in this zone, 
during this century and for the longer run (Walsh 1991). As part of the Sahelian zone, 
this semi-arid region of Kordofan has witnessed a secular decline in annual rainfall, 
particularly since 1965 (Trilsbach and Hulme 1984).; and that this decline has continued 
and intensified in the 1980s (Walsh 1988), and in the 1990s.
Climatologists have distinguished three distinct rainfall phases in this region: a rather 
dry period during the first two decades of this century, followed by a wet phase from 
around 1920 to the early 1960s, with particularly wet conditions in the 1920s and 1930s; 
and a very dry phase from about 1965 which persisted until the present time. The recent 
decline has been noted to be part of a general secular downward trend throughout the 
Sahel of Sub-Saharan Africa, and other parts of the continent. Accordingly, rainfall 
trends in Kordofan and central Sudan shows a corresponding downward pattern. A 
comparison between the rain maps of the 1920 - 1939 wet phase with those of the 1965- 
present dry phase, reveals that the 200 mm and the 300 mm isohyets have retreated 
southwards some 120 km. As a result, the semi-arid and sub-humid belts have moved 
southwards (Walsh 1991). This implies that the region is undergoing drier conditions. 
Historical accounts point to a series of dry spells of approximately equal intensity 
comparable to the current one, occurred in 1680, in 1740 - 60, 1820 - 40, 1895 - 1920, 
and a long dry period in AD 1150 - 1500 (Walsh 1991: 39). It appears that the mid­
twentieth century wet phase is rather an exception than the rule. The drier conditions 
appear to be more typical of this semi-arid zone over the past thousand years (Ibid).
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The dry conditions of the region are best suited for pastoral production. Indeed, the 
history and tradition of the region confirms that pastoralism had been the dominant 
mode of existence. People had successfully adapted their way of life to these dry 
conditions in accordance with the available natural resources and opportunities 
exploited to support animal husbandry, which in turn supported human life. It follows 
logically that the transformation of the pastoral way of life into sedentary agricultural 
labour may not have been the most rational way to promote livelihoods in such a fragile 
ecology. The ecological disturbances and the attendant environmental problem which 
have occurred in the recent history can be attributed to the adverse effects of 
transformation of the local systems, the alterations in production regimes and resource 
utilisation from an adapted pastoral system to a precarious one based on sedentary 
agricultural labour.
Rainfall remains a crucial factor of production and of livelihood in the region. It 
fluctuates widely in volume and distribution, and hence, dictates the mode of human 
occupation, the patterns of land use and the succession of ecological zones, and 
distribution of plant regimes throughout the region. The rainy season spans the period 
from mid-June to about mid-October. The rainfall has also been characterised by 
fluctuations and changes in the length, structure and reliability of the wet season, such 
that marked contractions in the wet season have been noted (Hulme 1987, Walsh et al 
1988). These contractions have occurred mainly at the end rather than at the start of it, 
making rainfall particularly erratic at mid- to late season. Such breaks in rainfall cause 
the dry spells locally called "sabna". The frequency and intensity of sabnas have been 
noted to have increased greatly in recent times compared with the past when elderly 
people reported that such dry spells were less frequent and less intense than at present. 
The dry spells may be transient, spanning between one to two weeks, or may be 
protracted for more than two weeks, therefore are potentially damaging and retarding to 
the development of crops and plants; and may cause partial or complete harvest failure.
3- 2- 2- Kordofan topography and soils:
In topographical appearance, Kordofan exhibits a clear demarcation between the 
sandy (Goz) soils to the North, and the rich clay soils to the South. A neat dividing line 
demarcates the Northern steppes from the Southern plains. This dividing line runs 
obliquely from 13° N lat. near the White Nile to 12 N° at a point on the Dar Fur border. 
To the North of this line lies the sparse steppes plains of Kordofan; composed entirely 
of sandy soils, except for few occasional rocky outcrops rarely exceeding 600 ft above 
the plain. In the Northern limits of these wide plains, some depressions occur forming 
Wadis (water courses) such as Wadi el-Milk and the Kheiran. These Wadis run during 
the rains and dry up immediately afterwards, to form shallow underground water
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reservoirs in which wells can be dug from depths of a few feet to depths up to 15 Rajil 
(man), of about 40 ft deep or more. These form groups of wells called "id" which are 
dug at the bed of a khor, whereas deeper wells called "sanio" are dug on the banks of the 
Wadi or khor. The usual method of drawing water from the wells is through the "delu". 
The "delu"- like a bucket- is a piece of loose leather flap which is suspended by strings 
wound to a loop of wood. This is itself fastened to a long rope. The delu is lowered into 
the well, and when it reaches the water level at the bottom of the well, it flattens 
allowing water to collect in the leather bucket. Then it is drawn by the long rope up to 
the surface. The Wadis and the shallow underground water beds that they form provide 
valuable sources of water for humans and animals for most part of the year in this 
otherwise waterless region. The vegetation of this country is semi-desert low scrub, 
seasonal grasses, thorny bush and some trees peculiar to the region. Of these trees is the 
hashab (acacia Senegal) or the gum Arabic tree. The Northern part of Kordofan is the 
habitat of this valuable tree. The tree occupies a narrow belt that runs from West Africa 
to the Ethiopian border, Kordofan is the centre of this belt, and produces over 80% of 
Sudan's total production of gum. The gum trade became the backbone of the rural 
economy during the colonial period and induced the massive settlement of previously 
pastoral communities.
Another important tree is the giant Tebeldi (baobab or Adensonia Digitata) tree 
which has a unique history in this region. The Tebeldi is closely associated with the 
history of the Hamar tribe who, in a unique form of adaptive response to the aridity and 
waterlessness of the region, used the huge trunks of the tree as water reservoirs in which 
they stored rain water for the hot dry Summer months up until the next rains. The 
Hamar came in about the eighteenth century to inhabit the vast plains West of El-Obeid 
and extending into Dar Fur frontiers. This region was completely waterless, no Wadis 
or shallow underground water on which to depend. The Hamar invented, towards the 
end of the 18th century, the practice of hollowing cavities in the huge trunks of the 
Tebeldi trees and used them as water reservoirs. Rainwater is collected during the rains 
from a shallow puddle prepared at the foot of the tree, hoisted by buckets and poured 
into the hollowed trunk and stored to supply water for humans and animals from about 
November till June. The big Tebeldi trees can hold a water capacity of up to 50 barrels 
(more than a thousand gallons), with little loss from evaporation. The water thus stored 
is usually supplemented by the use of water melons. The Tebeldi trees vary in diameter 
from about 10 to 15 ft; and the reservoir section is about 20 ft high. Water thus stored in 
the Tebeldi trees remains sweet until the end of the rainy season, and even after a lapse 
of three years or more, only a slight discoloration may be noticeable. The Tebeldi trees 
represent an important form of property to the Hamar, which can be let or sold. In the 
early years of this century, it is estimated that there were at least about 200 thousand
- 7 4 -
Tebeldi trees registered in En-Nuhud district alone (Intelligence Report 1912; March 
1948). The utilisation of the Tebeldis as water reservoirs in an otherwise waterless 
country represents one of the most magnificent examples of human adaptations to the 
limitations of a harsh environment, in this case water shortage. The water thus stored in 
the Tebeldi trees and water obtained from melons remain the only source of water 
supply for the Hamar from the time the rains cease until the time of the next rains. This 
was the water situation in Dar Hamar until after independence when a massive 
programme of digging boreholes was started to go hand in hand with and to aid the 
policies of sedentarisation and settlement of pastoral communities. Elimination of the 
problem of water shortage constituted a major pillar in the new policies, and continued 
to be a potent political card for politicians in rallying political support until today.
The Northern part of Kordofan provides an ideal habitat for camel breeding, sheep, 
goats and cattle. And because of its desert and semi-desert character, is strikingly 
similar to the Arabian Desert, and therefore, attracted many of the Arab groups who 
immigrated from Arabia following the conquest of Egypt by the Arabs about 651 AD. 
The Arab groups followed the Nile Southwards, congregated in Southern Egypt for a 
while and then infiltrated into Sudan from the 14th century and subsequent centuries. 
Arab influx into the Sudan took at least three different routes: (1) from the North; 
following the Nile to the Gezira and central Sudan, and other groups penetrated into 
Kordofan and Dar Fur from the Nile; (2) from the north-west, groups that came from 
north-west Africa, from Tunisia, Morocco and Tripoli; (3) earlier waves came across the 
Red Sea and Abysenia.
This Northern part of Kordofan is inhabited by various Arab groups who shot across 
the plains of Kordofan from about the end of the 14th century, inter-mixed through 
marriage with the indigenous inhabitants, such as the Nuba, the Nubians, the Fur, the 
Fung, as well as with other Nilo-Saharan groups who inhabited the semi-desert country 
West of the Nile to the Chad Basin, such as the Zaghawa, the Meidob and Kaja. The 
people of Kordofan are therefore a cosmopolitan admixture of these diverse elements. In 
addition elements of Berber and Nilotic groups are also represented in Kordofan 
ethnology such as makes Kordofan a micro-cosmos of the North African continent.
To the South of the oblique line that demarcates the North sandy steppes from the 
Southern plains, lies the country of black clay soils in which rise the range of the Nuba 
Mountains which give the region its idiosyncratic character. These mountains consist of 
rugged granite masses of varying degrees of altitude; sometimes rising to upwards of 
2500 ft above the plain as in Jebal Tegeli, and of mere hills of no more than a few 
hundred feet in others. The Nuba are ancient cultivators who cultivate the plains at the 
foot of their hills. These hill-foot plains are intersected by innumerable water courses 
during the rains which enable the local populations to grow a variety of crops, of
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sorghum, sesame, groundnuts, and cotton which the British colonial administration 
introduced in the Nuba Mountains Cotton in 1928, a brand of the American short-staple 
of the Southern prairies. The rich black clay soil is suitable for cotton cultivation.
The region lies within the rich savannah zone. Its vegetation cover is thick bush, tall 
trees and thick lush grass. This, however, gradually merges into the tropical zone proper 
towards its Southern frontiers with the districts of Rivers of Bahr el-Ghazal, and Bahr 
el-Arab in the Southern region. The rich vegetation of this region attracts the Arab 
herders who inundate the region in their seasonal movements from the North at the end 
of the rainy season when the swampy pools that form here by the rains dry up and 
become free of flies. Many of the pastoral and nomadic groups from the Northern part 
of Kordofan spend the whole of Summer months in these Southern environs where the 
rich grasses and bush provide the herds with excellent grazing. The contacts between the 
various social groups provides a valuable nexus of interchange for mutual benefits.
The Nuba rear goats and some sheep both of the short-legged small-statue mountain 
types. They also rear sizeable cattle herds of the long-horned Zebu type. Some of the 
various sections of the Baggara Arabs, such as the Humur , the Messeiriyya, the 
Rezaigat and Hawazma have long co-existed with the Nuba, intermixed with them 
through marriage, as well as with the Nilotic groups such as the Dinka further afield. 
The Baggara, so called for the cattle-breeding pastoralism, own large herds of cattle of 
the Zebu type. The Baggara, to all probability, have infiltrated into Kordofan from 
North-West Africa through DarFur via Wadai, Burnu and Kanem of the West African 
Kingdoms some four or five centuries earlier. First they came into contact with the old 
African Kingdoms, through DarFur before finally settling in the western plains of 
Kordofan, the plains providing vast grazing land for their large herds of cattle.
The constant movements of these various groups is one way of the adaptations to 
exploit the opportunities afforded by the different vegetation regimes and ecological 
zones. The contacts resulting from constant social mobility between the different social 
groups provided various forms of complementarities and interchange of mutual benefits 
between the pastoral communities and their farming neighbours. Though these forms of 
co-habitation and adaptations have evolved through a long historical process of tensions 
and conflicts between groups; this process thus ridden with tensions and conflicts, has 
nonetheless been hegemonising, such that eventually a form of a status-quo prevailed in 
which all partners engaged came to realise the mutual benefits which can be attained 
from co-habitation and peaceful co-existence. Accordingly, set rules of practice and 
norms governing the behaviour of the tribal groups concerned have been set in force and 
mutually observed. As a result of such a recognition, a certain measure of peace and 
stability prevailed, achieved through a consensus recognition of the necessity of sharing 
the available resources, and the mutual observance of the rights of the other co-sharer
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groups. Trading is also made to thrive, as other more permanent forms of social 
interchange; i.e. of intermarriages and friendships too. These forms of social contacts 
and movements index complex patterns of adaptations which ultimately made it 
possible for higher levels of social security to be attained by all partners engaged in the 
mesh of the local social organisation.
3- 3- Forms of Social Adaptations to Environmental Risk:
This chapter gives a picture of communal life in Kordofan about the turn of the 
century. It takes the view that peoples living in precarious environments of the semi-arid 
regions (such as North Kordofan) adapt to the limitations of their environment by 
evolving production techniques and social networks designed to avert or mitigate the 
risks of an uncertain environment (Scott 1976; Watts 1983, 1987; Gowlett 1988; Scott 
1984; Holy 1988; Prothero, 1974; Manger 1988; Widstrand 1975; Sobania 1988; 
Nyerges 1982, Western 1982). The character of the physical environment in the semi- 
arid zone has dictated the adoption of production patterns and husbandry practices well 
suited to the natural conditions and the availability of resources. The climate is 
characterised by alternating wet/dry spells that may be transient (between 1-3 years) or 
prolonged (2-6 or more) (Nicholson 1980, 1983, 1986: Glantz 1978, 1987). It is also 
characterised by extreme variability in rainfall from season to season (interseasonal) and 
from year to year (interannunal) (Lamb 1982; Nicholson 1980, 1983, 1986, Rasmusson 
1987). Interannual variation has been estimated to be between 20-30% or more 
(Rasmusson 1987); and spatial seasonal variability to range between 200-800 mm 
between regions in the Sudan/Sahel zone (Nicholson 1980). Rainfall variability in turn 
influences the distribution of both pastures and of crop yields, such that yields may vary 
considerably over very close proximities. On another plane, the interseasonality of 
rainfall influences both the spatial and temporal distribution of pastures (Sandford 1982) 
which in effect determines the seasonal movements of herds from North to South in 
accordance with the seasonal availability of pastures and water.
Adaptations can be seen as sets of functionally evolved production and resource 
management systems and social institutions developed in response to the constraints and 
opportunities of a given environment and aimed at securing individual survival and 
social reproduction. Adaptations are expressions of a general way of life, of the 
structures of a society's culture, morality, its ideology and world view. The discussion 
here presents a picture of the adaptations of Kordofan indigenous communities to the 
opportunities and constraints of their physical environment and their resource 
management systems. Adaptations and indigenous resource management systems and
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knowledge are presented not as antithetical alternatives to conventional development 
planning, but as a viable option to be considered in resource management and rural 
planning. Development planning can learn a great deal from understanding the practices 
and rationality of indigenous systems, and a synthesis between the two can go a long 
way towards addressing many of the problems associated with natural resource and 
environmental degradation. A case in point is the coping strategies and mechanisms 
people employ to deal with problems of food shortage in these semi-arid environments, 
which have proved more effective and life-saving than all the relief packages combined. 
The following discussion centres on the adaptability of both the production systems and 
social institutions to the conditions of the environment, and how these systems and 
institutions revolve around survival ensurance.
3 -  4 -  I n d i g e n o u s  K n o w l e d g e  a n d  R e s o u r c e  M a n a g e m e n t  S y s t e m s :
The village communities in Kordofan, have systems of knowledge and practice that 
are varied, diverse and extremely complex. The essential function of these various and 
complex systems is to ensure families, households and communities of the subsistence 
needs necessary both for individual survival and social reproduction in the contexts of 
resource scarcities. The common thread, obviously, is that the group as a whole has 
some abiding interest in survival, in cohesion, in the benefits and costs attendant to a 
particular use regime, and in economising on perceived scarcities. The range of means 
which rural populations employ for subsistence, to maintain their livelihoods and to 
cope with uncertainties, is impressive (Chambers 1989). The recognition of the merits 
of indigenous systems invalidates conventionally held views about "primitive" 
"backward" "native" cultures. The inherently grave dangers that such perceptions 
practically entail can largely account for the ills that have bedevilled African traditional 
communities, and can indeed be attributed, in part, to the ill-advised policies and 
development strategies based on such erroneous conceptualisations of indigenous 
systems. Many indigenous communities have long recognised the need for 
environmental sustainability and judicious conservatory resource use, and contemporary 
societies have much to learn from them (Redclift and Sage 1994; Dai 1993; Bean 1992; 
Berkes 1989; Richards 1985; Lino and Berkes 1989). The permanent threat of the 
depletion of non-renewable resources, and the dangers that this entails as the energy 
crises, for example, of the 1970s and 1980s so forcefully exposed, makes the imperative 
demand of seeking alternative ways of sustainable resource use. In this context, 
traditional methods of resource use and management stand as a viable option for policy­
making to consider, not least because these systems have been test-proven and managed 
to support local communities for millennia. The simple fact that these indigenous 
systems of resource use have been capable of maintaining livelihoods and reproducing
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the social systems without damaging natural habitats, endangering other biotic species 
or depleting their natural resource base, commends the rationality of indigenous 
management systems to encourage others to look into their in-built capacities that made 
them self-regenerating.
Among Kordofan communities resources used to be managed communally; access to 
resources was defined by rules of practice; of rights and duties to be observed. The 
functional value of such rules was to keep the community maintained within the limits 
of the biological opportunities available in their environment; a recognition on the part 
of the community that all members have an abiding interest to observe such rules of 
practice. This strict balance between community and its natural resource base explains 
much of traditional communities' attitudes of exclusion and defence of their common 
resources against other seekers. This explains the constant state of warfare between the 
various groups inhabiting these regions when access to the communal resource was a 
privilege of community members. Communal resources have never been open-access 
property, but remained strictly under community control and regulatory rules. 
Communal ownership of resources and the rules of governance acted as safe-guards 
against abuse. It is only recently, under centralised state's land reform policies, that 
communal resource management has been replaced by open-access arrangements 
designed to speed up the development process and exploitation of natural resources. The 
change has been largely induced by external pressures in the drive to bring rural 
economies under the control of the state, the market and capital. This has coincided with 
the period of rapid economic transformation and social change under the forces of 
colonialism, the rise of capitalism, commercialisation of subsistence resources into 
export staples and the development of technology for increasingly more efficient 
exploitation (Berkes 1985; Grima Lino and Berkes 1989). The result is that as resources 
get scarcer, developers and commercialists push their operations further into remoter 
areas for profitable extraction of natural resources in what is termed "sequential 
development". Sequential development follows a predictable trend of expanding 
operations from the more accessible to the less accessible areas, and from the more 
valuable to the less valuable species. Area after area and stock after stock are being 
depleted in the course a "sequential development" of natural resources (Ibid: 50).
3- 5- Pastroralism in Kordofan:
The major part of Kordofan lies within the rain-deficient zone (below 500 mm). 
Consequently, its development potential lies more in livestock raising than with 
agricultural farming. The soils in most parts of the Northern regions are not suited for 
anything other than grazing. Added to this is the absence of any local alternative 
avenues of either employment or investment, and as such pastoralism remains the only
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viable way of the livelihood for most people. Moreover, pastoralism requires very little 
capital investment compared to agriculture. Animal husbandry in Kordofan is an old 
practice probably started by the introduction of cattle from the Nile or from North West 
Africa in early times. However, present-day Kordofan hosts about 8 - 1 0  million heads 
of animals; cattle, sheep, camels and goats of Sudan's 55 million total animal wealth. 
The major concentration of cattle is in southern Kordofan. The Baggara cattle belong to 
the major grouping classed as North Sudan Zebu (Welson 1991). This section deals with 
animal husbandry as a socio-economic practice and how it has been managed and 
adapted to the conditions of the local environment in the quest of maintaining the 
highest level of security and social reproduction in the semi-arid region of Kordofan.
Pastoralism as a form of economic activity is ultimately governed by the two basic 
necessities of pasture and water. The spatial distribution of these two basic resources is 
in turn determined by seasonal climatic changes and the concomitant variations in the 
physical environmental conditions. Resources of pasture and water tend to be unevenly 
distributed across geographical areas of pastoral production. As a result, and in order to 
maximise the economic utility of the two resources, pastoral movements become the 
most rational practice in pastoral production. Moreover, the uneven distribution of the 
resources of pasture and water in geographical space in turn determines the composition 
of herds in terms of size and mix since different types of animals have different dietary 
needs and feeding habits hence exploit different types of grass and plant species. Cattle, 
for example, subsist mainly on grass and require frequent watering; therefore are 
confined mainly to regions of grassland with adequate water supply. Camels, on the 
other hand, subsist mainly on browsing and water on far less frequent intervals than the 
other types of animals. Sheep and goats graze on both grass and browse of trees and 
bushes. These factors concerning dietary needs and feeding habits of animals influence 
the way herders compose their herds in mixtures for the optimal exploitation of the 
available resources. They also determine the size of herds and the pace of pastoral 
movements in accordance with the ratio with which the grazing and water resources 
become exhausted by the herds.
3- 5- 1- Maximising Productivity: Mixing Herds:
Herds vary in size, mix, and male/female ratios. A camel herd, for example, can be of 
fifty heads and can reach up to three hundred or more. Herds of sheep can be of about 2 
or three hundred up to three or five thousand or more. Cattle herds can range from a 
hundred to three thousand heads. This is only an arbitrary estimation for there is no 
fixed number, nor a criteria by which to determine herd size.. However, it is customary 
to understand herd size as one that makes a viable unit of production and reproduction;
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in the sense of maintaining its own costs and those of the household unit dependent on 
it.
In the arid and semi-arid environments where resources are meagre, mixing the herds 
is a sound adaptive husbandry practice among the stock breeders. It offers an ideal form 
of resource management maximising the returns from the land and minimising the 
labour costs. Moreover, it is environmentally sound since mixed herds exert selective 
grazing on the different grass and plant species over wide areas, thereby reducing the 
pressure on the land and the grass cover and positively contributing to the biotic 
diversity. Mixing herds is therefore an ideal form of adaptation to the conditions of the 
environment. It is almost always the case that herds are nixed. Seldom do we find herds 
that are composed of only one type of animal. North Kordofan tribes usually rear 
camels, sheep, and goats together, and a few donkeys as burden animals. The mixing of 
herds is an old tradition in the animal husbandry practice in these environments. The 
practice of rearing mixed herds is locally denoted by a metaphor "Jamaat al-Sufa"; 
which means the mixing of different wool strands, a metaphoric expression meaning 
different animal types. Herders have long realised the great advantages of mixing herds. 
They tell that mixed herds is a high security measure against loss at times of disasters, 
such as droughts, diseases and epidemics; such that if one type of animals is decimated 
the other type(s) could survive the disaster and save the family from total loss and 
consequent poverty and neediness. It is this practice that has proved one of the most 
effective mechanisms in saving lives in the recent famines in 1983-85 and 1990-91. 
Many households in the severely affected regions in Northern Kordofan were able to 
survive the famine years by reliance on all three different types of animals. It is only 
those poorer households who may have only one type of animal to rely on, and 
especially the smaller stock, of sheep or goats, who suffered the worst effects of famine, 
and associated consequences of dislocation and possible loss of life.
Herd mixing, however, is a very sound practice of high environmental and 
management significance. Environmentally, different types of animals exploit different 
types of grass and plant species, therefore relieves the pressure on the land and plant 
cover by selective grazing. This maintains the biotic diversity of the ecosystem, than 
otherwise if herds are not mixed in which case the unitary-type animal grazing on 
preferred grass(es) would endanger that selected grass species. This is highly significant 
in maintaining the ecological balance. Mixed herds also disperses the pressure on the 
land and the grass cover, such that the grazing is distributed over a wide range of biotic 
regimes, and over wide locale in the vast expanses which animals traverse in their 
constant movements. From a management point of view, mixed herds has other 
advantages. First, it allows optimal exploitation of the available natural resource, 
especially pastures. Different types of animals can graze on different types of grass and
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plant in the same locality according to animal selection of favoured grasses, thereby 
maximising the returns from the land. It is also economically sound as it affords the 
maximum possible exploitation of the available resources with minimal labour cost, 
since different types of animals are tended together in the same area, thus reducing the 
labour inputs and costs than if they are tended separately.
Mixed herds, composed of big animals such as camels and cattle, and smaller stock 
like sheep and goats, are also suitable for different marketing criteria and according to 
needs. For small household needs and petty expenses, one or two of the smaller animals 
would suffice to take to the nearest market for sale. A small shortage in the household 
food provisions would take three or more of the small animals to fill the temporary 
shortage. Larger animals are usually reserved for more demanding purposes and bigger 
needs. Of the occasions which would require the sale of larger animals is marriage and 
the procurement of the household food grain stocks required for part of the year. Larger 
animals are also sold for the purposes of trade either in animals of younger age or for 
other trading activities (Field-work data 1993). A mixed herd, therefore, is more 
economically convenient in meeting such various needs and purposes without 
dangerously upsetting the economic viability of the herds if otherwise animals are to be 
drawn for sale indiscriminately to meet petty and important household needs from a 
herd composed, say of cattle only. In a mixed herd, smaller animals can be taken handy 
to the nearest market place whenever an urgent need arises. The sale of bigger animals 
will have to be carefully considered by the family over time. The animals will then be 
driven to the most prospective markets for sale. Because animals represent the preserved 
wealth of the family, a mixed herd is a mechanism whereby the family wealth can be 
managed more judiciously and meticulously by selling out proportionately according to 
need. This would guard against squandering the family wealth if the herd is composed, 
say of only larger animals in which case the proportionality between need and sale 
would not be tenable.
3- 5- 2- Mobility: The Pastoralist Cycle:
The physical conditions of North Kordofan semi-arid environment are ideally suited 
for the pastoral production. The tribal communities inhabiting North Kordofan, 
including the Hamar and Dar Hamid groups, and others like the Kababish, the Beni 
Gerrar, Kawahla, Shanabla, etc.. were originally pastoralists rearing mainly camels, 
and smaller stock like sheep and goats. They inhabited these drier parts of Kordofan 
since they infiltrated these environs from the North and North-west towards the end of 
the 14th century onwards. Their pastoral life style, and their long experience of life in 
the dry conditions in the North African Desert and the Arabian dry lands, whence they 
first came, found the semi-desert conditions of Kordofan more suited to their original
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way of life. Camels and the smaller stock which they reared are, most adapted to the dry 
conditions. The huge expanses of the countryside, with varied micro-environments, the 
gradient succession of climatic zones from absolute desert, semi-desert and savannah 
conditions offering diverse plant and grass regimes, made it possible for these groups to 
maintain their pastoral way of life moving from one place to the other in pursuit of 
fodder and water according to the cycle of seasons. They move from North to South and 
from South to North as the needs of animals for fodder and water necessitate. The 
North-South movement, Known as "Moutah", starts from the Northern parts as these 
become dry by the end of the rainy season in about October. They continue moving 
Southwards stopping for brief intervals at watering points to exploit the available water 
and fodder. This movement continues on a slow-measured pace and takes about two to 
three months, until by about February and March, they reach the rich Savannah 
grasslands in Southern Kordofan and the region of the rivers (tributaries of the White 
Nile) which by this time run dry and free of the disease-transmitting tsetse flies (Field­
work data 1993). These Southern environments of the Savannah, remain rich in grass 
and browse and support the herds for the whole months of the hot dry Summer. The 
pastoralists settle briefly during these Summer months scattered throughout the semi- 
desert and Savannah belt in small encampments. These brief settlements are called 
"Dammar", meaning "Summer camping". Frequent movements as an idiosyncratic 
characteristic of pastoralism, require that in order for households to move with the herds 
swiftly and with ease, there must be few possessions to carry about. And the few 
possessions that the nomad household owns are carried on the backs of animals. 
Therefore, the accumulation of material possessions becomes an unnecessary 
encumbrance. The encampments, therefore are simple dwellings made up of pitched 
tents made chiefly of mats woven from animal wool. In the encampments remain the 
family, which as a general rule is remarkably smaller in size than the sedentary family. 
The women and children are left in the camp; the women take care of the household, the 
children tending the smaller stock around the camp while the adult males go with the 
herds further afield and come to the camp only occasionally (Field-work data 1993). 
Therefore, there are long periods of separation between the man and the woman which 
functions as a mechanism of family control, which to a large extent explains why nomad 
families are much smaller in size than sedentary ones. This in turn is a basic adaptive 
behaviour whose function is to suit a way of life that is constantly on the move. A 
smaller family is more convenient to move from one place to the other as nomadic life 
requires, and easy to support in terms of the scarce supplies of water and food which 
need to be constantly fetched from local markets, and not without considerable effort 
and travelling. The economic viability of the household and its reproduction depends on 
a strict division of labour between its members. The women take complete
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responsibility of the household affairs, from weaving the tent mats and pitching the tent, 
to tanning skins, making seamless skin water containers, to fetching water and doing the 
marketing, besides the daily chores of the household of food preparation, child care and 
additionally helping with tending some of the smaller animals kept in the camp (mainly 
the kids and the sick of animals). The adult males, on the other hand, take complete 
responsibility over the duties of tending the main herds, following the distant grazing 
and watering opportunities, selling and buying of animals, and undertaking the purchase 
of the necessary household effects such as clothes, food and medicine, guns and 
ammunition for protection. The children tend the smaller animals around the camp. As 
they grow older, they gradually participate in tending the main herd, relieving in brief 
intervals the adult males in their occasional visits to the camp and when reaching 
adulthood, they become fully involved in the main activity of the males, which is the 
full-time engagement in tending the main herd. As the children become adults, they 
continue working, as members of the extended family, under the control of the father, 
who, with advancing age, delegates the responsibilities of the herd to his sons under his 
supervision. At marriage, the daughters move to live with the families of the in-laws, 
while the married sons and their offspring remain with the original family; thus the 
family gets larger, but nearly always wealthier in the course of time. The size of the 
family and the degree of animal wealth in fact grow proportionately over time, often 
during the life span of the big father. This would normally continue until the death of 
the father, after which the brothers and sisters would either continue as one family unit 
as before, or they could split each taking his/her portion of the inheritance, thus forming 
other family units, though strongly related as cousins and kins (Field-work data 1993).
It is important to stress that the pastoral family stands as a basic autonomous 
economic unit, within the wider context of the clan and tribal nexus. There are certain 
redistributive mechanisms to ensure that no member of the community is left behind for 
want of animals or food. Therefore, in as much as animals represent the main source of 
family capital wealth, the occasions of marriage contracts and inheritance represent 
divisions and forms of redistribution of capital. It is common among wealthy herd 
owners to contract plural marriages which requires giving out some of the animals as 
bride wealth and slaughter for feasting. Plural marriages naturally add to the family size. 
The marriage of the sons also requires further division of the animals capital wealth. On 
the other hand, the marriage of the daughters and sisters, especially of a poorer 
household, will add significantly to the animal wealth of their father through the 
mechanism of bridewealth paid at their weddings. As a general rule, a man pays the 
bridewealth of his wife according to his wealth, therefore marriage contracted between 
poorer and wealthier families generally have a strong redistributional effect. 
Redistribution is also enhanced by the fact that bridewealth is as a rule made up of a
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large number of contributions and is ultimately divided among a large number of 
recipients, and relatives at both ends of the marriage contract are involved as 
contributors and recipients. By the death of the father the inheritance (usually in 
animals) is distributed among the sons and daughters of the deceased man, if they so 
wished, a son taking twice as much as a daughter's according to Islamic laws of 
inheritance. These forms of capital divisions represent mechanisms of redistribution 
among the community members. Other forms of redistribution are expressed in 
occasions of gifts-giving at marriages, circumcision, Haj, hosting, feasting, and giving 
out to kins, relatives, and the needy. Thus the reproduction of the autonomous nomad 
household unit could thus be maintained, among other things, by certain mechanisms of 
adaptations, by forms of redistribution, by a controlled family size that grows 
proportionately with the increase in the family's animal wealth, by strict division of 
labour between its members, and by optimal exploitation of the available natural 
resources, notably of fodder and water (Field-work data 1993).
There is another movement from South to North which starts with the early rains in 
the Southern regions about June. These Southerly regions, are of black clay soils which 
become swampy by the rains, and pools of muddy water form and become the breeding 
grounds for insects and tsetse flies. The pastoralists move with their herds Northwards 
to escape this swampy fly-infested regions, as also to exploit the fresh grass, shoots and 
twigs of trees that by this time sprout by the rains in the Northern regions. This 
Northwards journey is called "Nushuq". The journey continues throughout the rainy 
season from about the beginning of July to mid-October, in which the pastoralists reach 
as far North as the desert fringe. During this rainy season, the pastoralists move their 
herds to the semi-arid region on the Southern desert fringe to feed on the grasses and 
pastures that grow in these wide expanses of land (Field-work data 1993). The general 
climate conditions are ideal, for the weather is generally benign and healthy for human 
and animal. The pastoral way of life that had existed in Northern Kordofan semi-arid 
regions had been synchronised with the opportunities and constraints of the arid 
environment, exploiting the available natural resources in seasonal movements from 
North to South and from South to North. Both humans and animals are adapted to the 
harsh natural conditions.
3- 5- 3- Pasture resource management:
Diverse species of flora grow in this semi-desert region during the rains forming 
valuable pasture which is communally managed. Pasture and rangelands are commonly 
shared by group members, and rules and codes of practice regulate the utilisation of the 
common resources to ensure members' access to them with minimum friction, but more 
importantly to keep the resource in a sustainable productive shape lest some vital
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species be lost if otherwise codes of practice are infringed. Common property rules of 
practice among pastoral communities may include the enforcement of periodic closure 
of pasture in a rotational cycle intended to allow for regeneration (Dani et al 1987). 
Tribal taxation system and social expenditure may also be imposed to reduce the size of 
herds as they approach critical limits (Gibbs and Bromley 1989). Types of livestock 
may also be regulated; such as the preference of certain animal type over another as a 
conservation measure to ensure the survival of certain desired grasses if these were 
endangered by the selective grazing of a particular animal type. There are sanctions in 
the forms of fines and social censorship that can be exercised to enforce the functioning 
of such rules.
3- 5- 4- Land and water resource management:
The notion of land ownership in traditional communities acquires important cultural 
connotations that make the concept fundamentally different from its common uses in 
modern development literature. Land "ownership" in traditional communities 
emphasises an intimate organic relationship between the human society and the natural 
environment in which land is regarded as the mainstay and defining character of the 
identity of the social group. The notion of land ownership embraces an interrelationship 
between physical, social and cultural dimensions, and encompasses the land-water area 
and its plants, animals, soils, and other natural resources and relates that to the human 
occupants living on it with their traditions, customs, beliefs, values and institutions 
(Baines 1989). This offers a different world view, that is holistic encompassing the 
physical, spiritual, mental, and intellectual development of the individual self and the 
interrelationship between the individual being and the social world with the earth and 
the natural world. It is a world view which emphasises survival through co-operation 
and unity with the earth (Dei 1993). As Bonnemaison has observed on the notion of 
land "ownership":
custom land is not only the site o f  production but it is the mainstay o f  a vision o f  the world.
Land is at the heart o f  the operation o f  the cultural system ... Each man must have some 
place, some land which belongs to him, which is his territory. I f  he does not control any 
land, he has no roots, status or power. In the most extreme cases this means he is denied 
social existence (Bonnemaison 1984; cited in Baines 1989: 275).
Land in this sense is associated with the cultural identity and existence of the group. 
This implies a notion of identity and existence, rather than of possession or domination. 
In effect, this negates the conception of land as a commodity or a factor of production 
which can be sold, transacted or exchanged. The community leaders and elders were 
responsible for the allocation of resources, for bringing new resources into production,
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the adjudication of disputes and setting dates for important ceremonial activities 
beginning or ending the planting, sowing, harvesting or collection seasons. Such 
custodians in the utilisation of natural resources are invariably vested on the ancestral 
lineage who allocate resources according to the principle of equity of access to all 
community members.
3- 5- 5- Contacts with other Groups:
In their movements, the nomad tribes of Northern Kordofan come into contact with 
various settled and unsettled groups. The settled groups with whom they come into 
contact include the Bederyyia and the Gawamaa, in central Kordofan, and the Nuba 
who inhabit the Mountains of southern Kordofan. They also come into contact with 
other nomad groups; i.e. the Baggara Arabs; the Baggara literally meaning the "cattle 
herders". In the contacts between these groups, diverse forms of mutual exchanges take 
place (Field-work data 1993). With the settled groups, exchange is essentially of grains 
exchanged for cash or animals, as the settled groups are traditional cultivators of food 
grains. Contacts were rife with conflicts and animosities between groups as slave 
raiding was rampant. The nomads engaged in slave raiding, and traded with Egyptian, 
Turkish and European slave traders. As for their relationship with the other nomadic 
groups of the Baggara, there was low-level exchange of benefits because as both groups 
are nomadic, there is little complementarity between them. Indeed, in many respects, the 
relationship between the camelmen and the cattle herders is characterised by 
competition over the scant resources of water and pasture.
3- 5- 6- Herbage, Grasses and Water (Knowledge o f the local botany):
Herders are extremely knowledgeable about the characteristics of the diverse grass 
and herbage species in the local environment. They know the nutritional value of 
grasses which enhance the animals general good health, and those which contribute to 
increase milk yield, fat and protein contents. These in turn determine the survival rates 
of the kids and calves. These characteristics also involve a knowledge about the toxic 
nature of certain plants and grasses, as well as the medicinal value of others. This 
knowledge extends to include what characteristics plant life has at different stages in 
their growth cycle, such that certain grasses are high value pastures at the beginning of 
their growth period, when they are young and fresh, but turn sour and of low nutritional 
value as they reach maturity and flowering age, and vice versa.
The acacia species are well praised by herders for their nutritional and medicinal 
value, especially for camels. It is regarded that acacia leaves greatly enhance the animals 
general good health, and enhances the immune system generally, therefore enhances 
resistance and reduces the possibility of diseases and helps the animals ' digestive
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system rid itself of worms. However, the high value of the acacia to the animals 
strongly militates with the other main value of the acacia as the source of gum, thus 
brings to the fore endless direct confrontation and disputes between the animal herders 
and gum collectors who own the acacia gardens. The grazing of animals on the acacia 
tree can prove disastrous on the productivity and indeed survival of the tree. In the 
areas where the field work study has been carried out, the owners o f the acacia 
gardens bitterly complain about the pernicious effects of animal grazing on the acacia 
trees, especially camels, which is more damaging to the tree than that of sheep and 
goats. Camels particularly cherish to graze on the young tender shoots o f the acacia 
boroughs as they shoot out just on the first showers of rain that mark the beginning of 
the rainy season. These young shoots, in fact, make up the life sap of the tree as they 
become the basis of the tree's food metabolism system through the photosynthetic 
process. At this crucial stage, and after long months of dormancy during the long dry 
Summer season, the tree becomes dry and barren. Just at the start of the rains, the 
young branches shoot out green to lead the process of synthesising food for the tree. If 
at this crucial stage the young green branches were cut off or eaten away, the food 
synthesis process would be disrupted, and the future of the tree's survival is at stake.
This grave danger is precisely what camels inflict by grazing on the tree's young 
branches. In Al-Saata area of Northern Kordofan, extensive tracts of acacia gardens 
stand idle, and ceased producing any gum since the beginning of the 1980s; and people 
have ceased tapping the trees because they no longer produce. Worst still, the local 
people reported that the majority of the acacia trees had already fallen, one factor 
reported is camels grazing. This is understandable since the disruption to the food 
synthetic process year after year is found to render the trees barren and eventually fall. 
However, grazing of smaller animals like sheep and goats on the acacia is not as bad, 
and indeed is sometimes considered beneficial. Sheep browse on the leaves and nuts 
(seeds) o f the tree, therefore, are harmless to the development of the tree. Goats, on 
the other hand, in addition to browsing the acacia leaves and nuts, have especially an 
insatiable appetite and avidity for the gum itself; and can eat of it unto death. Mild 
browsing of goats on the lower twigs of the tree is regarded as beneficial and 
stimulates the tree's shoots. Herders knowledge of the local botany includes the 
appreciation of certain grasses for their contribution to animals general health, on the 
quality and quantity of milk yield, as well as their medicinal value. One particular 
group of grasses commonly known by the "Gizzu" is highly valued by herders. The 
importance of the Gizzu qualifies for a short note here.
3- 5- 7- The Gizzu
The Gizzu is a generic name for a group of ephemeral succulent perennial lawn-like 
grasses which are especially relished by the animals. The Gizzu is highly valued by the
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by the herdsmen, and is considered the "elixir" of life for the animals. The Arabs 
distinguish several -about seven- different types of grass (Sa'adan or Sa'ad, 
Khisheini, Darmah, Handhal, Kheilasan. Qatab, and Dhahayan) which grow in the 
winter in the far distant deserts North and West o f Jebel Meidob. The country of the 
Gizzu lies approximately between 15° 30' and 16° 45' N. lat.; and 25° and 29° longs.. 
According to the native's description, it stretches from within sight of Jebel Meidob to 
within sight of Wadi Hawa, sprawling some 24 thousand square miles, an area the 
size of England (Newbold 1912) (see figure below). The grasses remain green from 
the end of the rains in about September until the following April. The Gizzu occurs in 
approximately 2 out of every 5 years (Wilson 1978), and from 1917- its first 
chronological mention- Gizzu years occurred 20 times (Ibid 1991). Sometimes, as in. 
1920-4, they appeared in a run of consecutive years (Newbold 1924); at other times 
there were none for as long as 8-10 years. The Arabs send their herds to the Gizzu 
generally about October to fatten, and remain there until the end of March when they 
return sleek and plump. The northwards movement to the Gizzu is not a casual 
drifting, but an organised migration demanding sufficient preparation. The main herds 
of camels and of sheep are sent to the Gizzu with sufficient men to look after them. 
The herds usually set off spreading fanwise in a Northwards movement after having 
their last drink given with plenty of rock salt.
Figure 2 Gizzu Area
Source: Newbold, D. 1924a.
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This is important since the animals will subsist entirely on the grasses of the Gizzu and 
are not watered at all for the following six months or so until they return to the south in 
about the end of March to enjoy their first drink at Wadi el-Melik. The longest 
documented period of animals and their herders spent in the Gizzu without water is 
about eight months. A once Government Inspector noted in his diary that a large herd of 
camels was "just back on its wells and having its first drink since the rain ponds dried 
up" (Davies 1957). Horses can not be taken because of the lack of water. Donkeys can 
only be taken to such parts as bear the little wild melon known as "Khandal". The major 
advantage of the Gizuu is that it provides both feed and water, making it possible for 
nomads to exploit these expansive stretches of desert land for production and 
reproduction of the pastoral way of life. The Gizzu has ecological equivalents in a 
number of desert areas. Life on the Gizzu is tough, though for the nomads it is rather a 
"loaf1. They eat Kisra with plenty of milk, flavouring it with certain berries to form 
yougurt. And those who have rifles can vary their menu from wildlife animals here, 
such as addra or dama gazelle, the addax, the scimitar-horned oryx, the desert cat or 
hare. But milk remains the main staple for the most part. Corn and water can be fetched 
on camel’s back from far distances. The cold is particularly intense, and temperatures in 
the desert at night are not far above freezing, clothes are scanty, and the desert bitter 
winter winds add to the discomfort. The pastoralists consider the cold the only real 
hardship in the Gizzu, as the desert-dweller is accustomed to pangs of hunger and thirst, 
but cold unmans him, and he lies on himself in his sheets until the morning sun is high 
in the sky. The advantages of bearing this tough life is that the animals return sleek, 
plump and healthy. The Gizzu is welcomed by herd owners, and in Gizzu years, there is 
seldom friction between the tribes utilising the grazing resources in the region.
Another grass particularly relished by animals is the "Blepharis limarifolia" locally 
named "Beqail". The grass is held to have positive health effects on the animals and 
greatly increases the quality and quantity of milk, with high protein and fat content, 
which in turn ensures high probability survival rates for the lactating kids and calves. It 
is held by herders that animals feeding on this grass will be immune from certain 
diseases, especially from some dangerous skin diseases. It also adds positively to the 
dietary regime of the owning household from the milk intake.
Another aspect of herders knowledge pertains to the animals' requirements of water. 
They know that different animals have different watering requirements, at different 
times of seasons. Camels are well known for their hardiness and endurance in resisting 
thirst, and can withstand thirst for very long periods sometimes extending for whole 
months. Animals' watering periods vary according to season and type of animal. The 
watering period is estimated by the herder to be the time lapse that the animals can go 
without water optimally without doing them harm. During the cool months of Autumn
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and Winter, the time interval between waterings gets longer; and shorter during the hot 
dry Summer season. Camels are the most thirst enduring of animals, and cattle and 
goats the least. The longest periods of watering are those o f camels during the cool 
months o f Autumn and Winter. At this time of year camels can go for as long as a 
month or even months (if grass is green) without watering. The shortest period is that 
for cattle and goats in the Summer months when they will require daily watering. Sheep 
are the second best thirst resistant animals after camels. They require watering on two 
weeks intervals during the rainy season, to about six days in Winter, to be lessened to 3- 
4 days in Summer. Cattle are watered on every other day during Winter and Summer, 
and only occasionally during the time o f rains.
3- 5- 8- Social Norms Governing Utilisation o f Resources:
Herders recognise the communal ownership of resources o f water and pastures, and 
in effect the right o f every member o f the community to make use of these resources. 
Because o f the potential likelihood of confrontation arising from conflicting interests as 
to the utilisation of water and pasture, certain communal norms have been evolved to 
diffuse the potential tensions o f conflict and to mitigate its effects when it happens. 
Conflicts that arise from competition over pasture are not common, but usually involve 
large tribal units when they occur, and therefore can assume intertribal warfare o f 
dangerous and bloody proportions. This is essentially because such conflicts are 
considered wars over land, either in the quest o f pushing further a tribe's Dar frontiers or 
in defence of a homeland territorial boundaries. Such intertribal wars over land are not 
common, since tribes tend to recognise each other's Dar or homeland once it has been 
firmly established. Another factor is the mutual recognition that such wars can be 
protracted and bloody inflicting huge human loss on both parties. Therefore, mutual 
fears o f the consequences of war curbs the drive for domination over other tribal Dars. 
The elders of the tribes usually sit to resolve such conflicts when they occur. Only rarely 
does the wisdom of the elders fail to come to a consensus or agreement on conflict 
resolution which could be binding to all parties involved. On such failure, conflict is 
sure to follow.
Conflicts over sources of water, on the other hand, are more frequent and more 
common, but tend to be low-scaled involving individual units. However, some of the 
social norms that have been evolved to organise the communal utilisation of water 
include the concession of right to watering to the first arrival at the watering point. In 
public watering points; e.g. wells and Haffirs, where water is public utility, priority is 
given to the first arrival if  water is scarce and does not permit plurality of utilisation 
concurrently with others. However, if water is plentiful, and there is a number of wells, 
several waterers can work concurrently to water their herds. For rain water that forms in
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ponds, pools and Wadis, the first arrival to the water reserves the place by dropping the 
rope-clips o f his animals at the water point. Subsequent arrivals would recognise the 
reservation right o f the first arrival who may or may not be present. It is customary 
among herders, especially camelsmen, to follow the shadow of rains. They can predict 
with amazing precision where the rains fall from very far distances. They then ride their 
fastest racing camels to reach the place of water and reserve it before others. If, 
however, the rider's camel is not fast enough and is overrun, the first arrival will reserve 
the water pool for his herd which may be a very long distance away from the place of 
water. This explains the importance camelsmen attach to the fast camels bred from 
certain breeds of particular racing qualities. When disputes over water do occur, usually 
between individual herders, this is commonly resolved by the elders o f the two 
contending parties, and grievances, if  happened, o f death, injury or loss of animals, 
settled. Such social norms designed to organise the utilisation o f communal resources in 
these regions where resources are scarce, are some of the mechanisms of survival 
designed to allow for the orderly exploitation o f the available scarce resource.
3- 5- 9- Animals Breeds and Husbandry:
Herders have continuously sought to improve their stocks o f animals, and have 
evolved, through long experience, certain breeds and breeding techniques. Herders 
breeding techniques include breed improvement which sought to improve certain 
qualities. The most desired qualities that herders look for in their animals and try to 
breed accordingly include the size of animal, bulk, colour, milk yield, resistance to 
disease and thirst, rates o f survival of the born kids and calves. Speed is another desired 
quality highly valued among the camel-breeders. The Kababish, for example, have 
evolved a breed of camels o f good resistance to thirst, very strong, and hardy of white 
skin colour, but are known to have relatively low bearing rates. Many o f the camel 
breeders in Kordofan and elsewhere in Sudan, cross-breed with the Bishariyyin camel, 
which is universally acknowledged in Sudan as racing camels. The Hamar, on the other 
hand, have evolved an excellent breed o f sheep, internationally acclaimed for its good 
taste o f meat, especially for its super large size and bulk. The Hamari lamb now fetches 
a high demand mainly in the Middle Eastern market where it is preferred to many other 
types o f lamb. The Hamari lamb breed has been improved over time, and now it is 
characterised by its large size, long big tail, its dark brown skin colour, and its capacity 
to increase in size to the maximum possible by natural or synthetic feeding.
3- 5- 10- Tending the Herd and the Shepherding Contract:
The herd is tended ideally by a member or members of the owning family unit. 
However, in many cases a shepherd(s) is hired to tend the herd, usually under the close
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supervision of the owner. Herd-owning households that have become settled but still 
own relatively big herds usually hire shepherds to tend the herds. The hiring contract of 
a shepherd usually extends for a year, automatically renewable subject to both parties 
satisfaction, and that each party meets its obligations. The obligations on the hiring 
partner; i.e. the owner of the herd, is to provide the hired partner; i.e. the shepherd, with 
the basic necessities o f food and clothing, in addition to the payment agreed upon in the 
contract. The wage of the shepherd is usually paid in kind in a fixed number o f animals 
from the herd agreed upon at the time o f the contract. At the moment of the agreement 
to the contract, he receives a ram as a gift; as a gesture of good will and blessing for the 
new relationship. As for the actual wage, the shepherd gets, in the case o f sheep, about 
10-16 lambs of different age groups to be drawn from the main herd in three terms over 
the year period. This share adds to his own property of animals which he usually keeps 
with the main herd with the expenses o f watering and salt being incurred on the hirer. 
For camels, the shepherd gets a camel o f mature age; between 6-8 years by the end of 
the year. For cattle, the shepherd gets a milking cow with its young calf, and sometimes 
up to three heifers, depending on the size o f the herd and the qualities o f the shepherd. 
Shepherding, therefore, can be a very rewarding enterprise for someone who has the 
ambition, but no capital or animals to start with. The shepherd with his basic necessities 
secured, and with little or no extra expenses, he can quickly build up his own herd. It is 
more often the case that shepherds thus hired end up building their own herds and in due 
time becoming wealthy themselves and hiring others. To all considerations, it is clear 
that the shepherding contract provides generous terms o f employment. However, not all 
shepherds are successful, nor equally industrious. Indeed, herd owners for their long 
experiences with animal life and needs, easily distinguish between good and bad 
herders.
3- 5- 11- Animals Sales and Criteria fo r  Offtake:
Mention has already been made to the conditions under which smaller and bigger 
animals are sold to meet specific needs and purposes. It is important to note the timing 
of sale o f animals and its significance. Herd owners sell out in small quantities during 
the Winter months when prices are generally good. Paradoxically, they sell out in large 
numbers in the Summer months when supply is high, the market glutted and prices low. 
It is apparent from this paradox that the timing of sale represents a sluggish response to 
market incentives. This, however, does not seem to suggest that herders are irresponsive 
to market demand, but that their priorities for sale lie with the security rather than with 
the economic side of the decision. In selling out, herders are more concerned with 
whether or not the herd(s) will survive a long hot (and sometimes drought-ridden) dry 
Summer season, than with a marginal increase in animals prices. During the Winter
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months, which coincide with the harvesting season, demand on animals is generally 
high as many of the farmers would want to buy an animal or two from the value of their 
agricultural produce to give them more security. But also this is a time when pastures 
are still plentiful and herds are far removed from the risks o f shortage of fodder. This 
remoteness of imminent risk induces herd owners not to sell out, except for the 
minimum requirements. During the Summer season, on the other hand, pastures become 
more and more depleted, and the animals emaciated and weak, the imminent danger of 
high losses looms large which impels herd owners to sell out in large numbers, 
essentially in order to minimise their losses and to reduce the costs of trying to maintain 
the herd(s) by costly feeding. But this is also a time when the local people run out of 
cash as the harvest season recedes, and animal prices crash in consequence. This is a 
good opportunity for merchants to step in and monopolise the market and reduce the 
animal prices to the lowest possible; capitalising on the general lack of money and on 
the herd owners desperation to get rid of animals for fear o f loss. Since herd owners 
tend to sell out all at one and the same time, the market becomes glutted and prices 
plummet. The sale of animals therefore comes out of the necessity to secure the survival 
of the herd by escaping loss, even with a bad bargain, than of following the economic 
rhythms of the market. The concern o f the herd owners is therefore more with better 
security than with marginal economic gain provided by comparative market incentives. 
The rationality of such a choice may be questioned, but for the herder in these harsh 
environments, long-term security and survival are much more important and lasting than 
short-term market economic gains.
Another important aspect concerning animals offtake is the criteria on which animals 
are selected for sale. Herders have a specific set o f criteria on which to select animals 
for sale. These criteria include age, sex, weakness, and the hereditary traits of animals. 
Older animals go out first for sale, as also the major part o f mature males. Only a few of 
the males are left with the herd as breeding stock, the rest are sold or, if  they are still too 
young for sale, are kept until they are mature and ready for sale. Weaker animals, and 
animals with certain distortions such as atrophied udders, one-eyed animals and animals 
with long horns are also eligible for sale. And animals with undesirable characteristics 
such as smallness in size, low milk yield, females of low breeding rates and unsighty 
skin colour are also selected for sale. This leaves the herd with a preponderant majority 
o f healthy young females in the prime breeding age, and a few o f the best breeding male 
stock having the desired breeding qualities. Animal offtake, in a sense, is a process of 
cleaning the herd to a manageable size to ensure more survival and reproduction and 
better chances of security. The rationality o f this is that livestock represents a form of 
capital asset; and their maximisation a form of capital accumulation. Therefore, the 
tendency among herders to retain the maximum number o f productive females and
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healthy, good breeding quality males is a device o f  capital maximisation. This ensures 
accumulation or net investment since the herder is motivated by the desire to create 
more heads o f animals than is being used in any given period o f production. This 
represents a form o f value added investment to the original capital asset, which is the 
main herd. Essentially, however, the herder's main drive is the attainment o f better 
security and the harsh environment makes it imperative to accumulate. Although other 
socio-cultural motives such as prestige also count in pastoral accumulation, these can 
also be explained in more concrete economic terms since prestige and social status also 
involve fending for one's family and close kins, and the obligation for helping the poor 
and needy in the society; as well as the social spending involved in building social 
networks across neighbouring communities. In these harsh environments, prestige goes 
hand in hand with better security; and cultural values have strong economic bases.
3- 5- 12- Socio-economic Utility o f  Animals:
Since pastoral life centres largely on the animal and its welfare, so are their needs 
largely derived from it. Animals provide the major part o f  the household needs, making 
the pastoral household economy largely autonomous. Animals provide food, shelter, 
wear, and household utilities, in addition to their economic, transport and social values. 
The following table illustrates the various uses which the animals render their owners.
Field_________________ Utility____________________________________________ ,
1- Economic - income from sale o f animals
- selling hides and skins
- selling clarifies butter
- exchanging wool for goods
- hiring animals fo r transport.














6- Household Uses and Furniture - wool and leather mats
- wool tent cover ( blankets)
- seamless water containers
- leather containers fo r grain 





Animals represent the main form of wealth in pastoral communities. There existed 
among the communities certain social values which govern the redistribution o f the 
animal wealth among the community members. In birth, death, circumcision, marriage, 
forging friendship ties animals are given out as gifts for relatives, kins and friends. 
These forms serve vital social and economic functions as forms o f redistribution which 
narrow the gap between rich and poor. Giving out from one's own animal wealth 
suggests the existence o f a surplus, and the various redistributive mechanisms 
enshrined in the social values are forms o f utilising these surpluses to produce a greater 
degree o f social and economic equality. In one sense, these forms o f redistribution 
function as factors inhibiting the concentration o f wealth and towards achieving higher 
levels o f social and economic homogeneity within the community. In this way the 
pastoral economy could be seen as one that is equitable, resilient and basically keeps 
the society in equilibrium since the drive towards concentration o f  wealth is matched 
by equally powerful mechanisms o f redistribution such as eliminates social and 
economic polarisation. It is only recently, under the motives o f profit wetted by the 
market forces that the vitality o f the redistributive mechanisms are weakened and the 
road towards concentration and accumulation is opened leading to social and 
economic differentiation between rich and poor within the rural tribal communities. 
The elimination o f the poorer pastoral households from the pastoral community further 
enhances the prospects o f more concentration o f wealth by the richer ones since this 
puts the resources o f pasture and water previously used by the now impoverished ones 
into the disposal o f the richer households, therefore adding more to their accumulated 
animal wealth.
The autonomous nature o f the pastoral household economy, complemented by 
local-level exchanges o f needs such as food grains, tools, firearms, and cloth makes the 
local economy virtually autonomous. However, the rise o f states, especially in the 
modem era, has thrown this traditional autonomy into disarray, as the local 
communities have been drawn into the fabric o f new states and their local systems 
incorporated into wider systems of production and exchange.
3- 6- Dar Hamid And Dar Hamar:
3 - 6-1 -  Dar Hamid:
Dar Hamid is a composite tribe comprising a number o f clanish groups, and the 
name is commonly used to include the following sections: Ferahna, Nawahia, 
Gilaydat, Hababin, Awlad Akaoi, Meganin, Meramra and Ariffia. O f the eight 
sections comprising the Dar Hamid confederate o f  tribes, the core sections who can 
claim the right to the title are the Ferahna, the Hababin, the Meramra and the
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Nawahia. The Dar Hamid tribes trace their "nisba" or genealogy to Hamid el Afzar, 
who is a descendant o f Abdulla el Guhani, the forefather and progenitor o f  the 
Guhayna tribes to whom the majority o f Kordofan Arabs trace their nisbas. Hamid el 
Afzar, founder o f the Dar Hamid lived approximately about three to five hundred 
years ago according to Mac Michael (1912). The commonly held story among Dar 
Hamid about their ancestry is that their forefather Hamid came through Egypt along 
the Nile and settled west o f the present site o f El-Fasher in DarFur at a place called 
Um Dufun where he married and begot his children. After Hamid’s death, the "nahas", 
or "drum" o f the tribe was held by his son Mohammad Mermer (commonly known by 
Kirialo), from whom the Meramera section o f the tribe takes their name. Until about 
this time the Dar Hamid tribes were still nomads in DarFur and were not yet settled in 
villages. However, the Fur Sultan either got suspicious o f the Dar Hamid tribes or 
wanted to more easily levy impositions on them, "gave orders to Kirialo to collect his 
scattered nomads and settle them round the capital" (Mac Michael 1912: 120). 
However, Kirialo demurred and was cast into prison. The Sultan sent out for the chief 
Sheikh o f Dar Hamid, who succeeded Kirialo, then his nephew Abdel Hamayd and 
entrusted him with the duty to execute his previous orders o f collecting the scattered 
sections o f  the tribe and settle them down, and gave him enforcements o f  troops to 
carry out the mission. Abdel Hamayd led these troops into Kordofan - then a territory 
under the nominal rule o f the Fur Sultan - where many o f Dar Hamid tribes are settled 
in their present sites in about the second quarter o f the eighteenth century. Abdel 
Hamayd sought protection from the Fung Mek in Sennar, who were in constant rivalry 
with the Furs over Kordofan. The Mek o f  Sennar, then thought to be Badi Abu Shiluk 
welcomed Abdel Hamayd and offered his protection in return Dar Hamid pay 
allegiance to him and pay tribute. This was agreed to, and most o f Dar Hamid moved 
from DarFur to their present Dar in Central Kordofan.
Dar Hamid tribes joined the Mahdiyya, and the head Sheikh o f  the tribe, then Simawi 
wad Tumsah was head o f the tribe by the close o f the Turkiyyia and became a 
prominent Amir under the Mahdi and the Khalifa. He served in Kordofan and DarFur 
under Othman Adam and died a natural death in DarFur in 1891 (Ibid 121). However, 
Ruppell mentions that sections o f Dar Hamid, including the chief tribe; the Hababin, 
with the Maganin, Maalia and Gilaydat have as late as 1829 fled Kordofan to DarFur 
under the oppression o f the Turkish Governor at El-Obeid (Mac Michael 1912). When 
Dar Hamid
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flnally settled in their present Dar in Northern Kordofan many of the tribe's sections 
were still nomads moving with their large herds of animals, mainly camels. Indeed 
many of the tribe's sections are still nomadic until today such as the Meramra and the 
Hababin. Some sections o f the tribe, such as the Ferahna are less nomadic, although 
they own large flocks and herds of animals, the Nawahia are also more settled. Those 
sections of Dar Hamid who are settled occupy what is considered the best land in the 
whole o f Kordofan; i.e. the Kheiran, (sing. Khor) or low-lying cultivable basins that 
stretch from near Shershar North to the vicinity of BaraSouth. The water in these 
shallow basins is sufficiently near the surface to permit irrigation by "saqia" and 
"shaduf. The Ferahna section of Dar Hamid occupy most o f the Kheiran, leaving a 
few o f them to the Hababin, and fewer still to the Nawahia and the Arifia.
3- 6- 2- Dar Hamar:
The Hamar are a large but loosely connected tribe with closer affinities with the 
groups comprising Dar Hamid, the Maalia than with the Gawamaa, Bidayriyya in the 
centre or the Baggara groups to the South. As a tribe, the Hamar are o f a comparatively 
recent formation, going to about five to seven generations back. Like most of the Arab 
tribes in North Kordofan, the Hamar claim descent from Abdulla el Guhani, and from a 
common progenitor, El Ahmar from whom they drive their name (Mac Michael 1912). 
Another story claims that the Hamar are a tribe from Fazara Arabs who infiltrated into 
Kordofan from Egypt and North Africa since about the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries (Yousif Fadl 1965). The story commonly held among the Hamar themselves is 
that they infiltrated into the Sudan from North Africa, in particular from a place called 
"Gurri" in Tunisia. They had been a nomadic tribe, living in DarFur and occupying the 
land around Um Shanga which is considered to be the early homeland o f the Hamar in 
DarFur before they finally migrated eastwards into Kordofan. The tribe has three major 
sections the Asakir, the Dagagim and the Ghariesiyyia, who each claim to be 
independent o f one another's authority. The tribe owes its greatness and organisation to 
the enterprise o f El Hag Munaym, of the Asakir division o f the tribe who lived as late as 
the beginning of the nineteenth century. In DarFur, quarrels arose between the Hamar 
and the Maalia, and the bulk of the Hamar migrated eastwards into Kordofan. Some 
settled in small villages for part of the year, but the major part of the tribe remained 
permanently nomadic roaming the country from El Odaya south to the open country 
north of Um-Badir, and as far east as Abu Haraz, Um Simayma and Jebel Abu Sinun in 
the vicinity of El-Obeid. As can be expected they were not welcomed by the nomad 
groups already laying claim to the grazing lands in these environs in central Kordofan. 
As a result, feuds sprang up between the Hamar on the one hand, and the Kababish, Dar 
Hamid, and Ziadiyya (who were at feud with one another), on the other. Especially, in
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the outlying Northern grazing grounds between Um-Badir and Um Sonayta, far from all 
government authority, forays and counter-forays occurred to the very end o f the Turkish 
regime (Mac Michael 1912).
The Hamar multiplied prolifically in Kordofan and not only did their herds of camels 
in the Turkiyyia exceeded those of most other nomad tribes on the West o f the Nile, but 
their villages also occupied extensive tracts o f land extending from DarFur frontiers in 
the West to Jebel Abu Sinun in the vicinity o f El-Obeid in the East. The vast wealth of 
camel herds owned by the Hamar made them the object of frequent requisitioning by 
the Turks for transport purposes; and in addition they were empowered to guard the 
DarFur frontier. In return, they were given a free hand to raise their tribute by sending 
looting expeditions to DarFur, and were in fact encouraged and even assisted in these 
raids. It was they, too, who late in the Turkiyya undertook the contract for the work 
involved in laying the telegraph line from El-Obeid to El-Fasher (Mac Michael 1912). 
Petherick writing in 1847, estimated that the Hamar could mount 2000 men, most of 
them in mail shirts and helmets. Pallme (1844) describes the Hamar as "one of the most 
amiable class o f people in this province"; and that "I never heard o f their having ill- 
treated or robbed any stranger, much less o f their having committed murder" (Pallme 
1844). Ensor, writing in 1876, says o f them "the Hamar are the richest of all the nomads 
in this part of Africa, far exceeding in number the nomad portion o f the Kabbabbeesh, 
and almost equally the whole of that tribe including the settlers on the banks of the Nile" 
(Ensor 1881). Speaking o f Hamar wealth o f camel herds, Ensor describes in March 
1876 that Um-Badir had about 500 wells with 10,000 camels watering daily. However, 
the Hamar lost almost their entire wealth during the Mahdiyya, and were more than 
decimated in numbers. To add to their owes, as soon as the power of the Khalifa was 
broken, their old arch foes, the Kababish, looted most of the camels remaining to them, 
and as a result, the Hamar's former wealth vanished.
the unfortunate loss o f  their herds o f  camels during the latter days o f  the Mahadiya, 
coupled with the colonial policies o f  "pacification", prohibition o f  slavery, the digging o f  
deep boreholes, the imposition o f  taxation and the accompanying new economic 
opportunities all provided the objective conditions under which the majority o f  the semi- 
nomadic Hamar moved to sedentary agriculture at the expense o f  their 19th century 
transhumant mode o f  adaptation (Ahmed 1987:).
The Hamar settled down, swallowing their nomadic pride, as sedentary cultivators 
and gum collectors in small villages dotting their extensive Dar. However, they still 
look forward to resuming their preferred mode o f nomadic life.
Dar Hamar where they settled is almost waterless, lacking in natural drainage to 
form Khors as is the case with the Kheriran in Dar Hamid', the sandy steppes absorb 
rain water where it falls. There are a few exceptions where there are wells at En-Nuhud,
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El-Odaya, Um-Bel, and Um-Badir. Apart from these wells sites, the Hamar derived 
their water largely from the rain water stored in the Tebeldi (baobab) trees which were 
used as water reservoirs. The herds depended largely on water melons. However, 
recently, the problem o f water shortage in Dar Hamar has been largely solved by the 
digging of boreholes and hafirs. This has proved both a blessing and a curse; a blessing 
in that it made available permanent water supplies the year round, and a curse in that it 
encouraged the great increases in animal numbers, and contributed to the spread of 
desert-like conditions around water sites by excessive grazing and cultivation. The 
Hamar employed different modes of adaptations; settlement patterns, agricultural 
techniques, animal husbandry practices resource management systems which are 
synchronised with the conditions of the local environment.
3- 7- Production and exchange in Kordofan during the Fur and Fung hegemony:
The character of the production systems o f these pre-capitalist societies depended on 
various forms of subsistence modes of production: e.g. domestic or lineage production, 
clientele or tributary relations, slavery and various combinations of these (Iliffe 1983: 
27). The orientation o f these subsistence production systems was directed primarily to 
domestic consumption and a degree o f local-level exchange. This had been conducted 
through an elaborate system of weekly organised markets which existed in Western 
Sudan for centuries and which facilitated, on the one hand, the exchange of goods 
between the farming communities, and between these and the pastoral communities, 
while complemented one another's needs and surplus goods, on the other. The character 
of social relations coded in the social system: of mutual relations of reciprocity based on 
kinship bondage and tribal affinities, precluded the development o f market exchange 
relations and the modes o f surplus appropriation characteristic o f the capitalistic mode 
of production. The only remote possible exception could be that the main form of 
appropriation occurred at the level o f the family where senior men exploited their 
juniors (e.g. sons) and their womenfolk (Ibid: 6). But an important aspect o f economic 
life in these pre-capitalist societies was a differentiation between the mass o f subjects 
who engaged in the daily activities o f subsistence production , and between a royal 
aristocracy in whose hands rested the prerogative control of a lucrative trans-Saharan 
caravan foreign trade.
The pre-colonial states in Kordofan, the Fur and the Fung', like other ancient Sudanic 
states; i.e. the Daju (before 1500 AD); the Tunjur (1500 - 1650); the Masalit Sultanate 
(1874 - 1922 ); the Shiluk Kingdom', the Sinnar Sultanate (1500 - 1821); and the recent 
Dar Fur Sultanate (1899 - 1916); all had long had an established trade with the 
Mediterranean culture through the trans-Saharan trade routes. However, the activities 
and benefits o f this old trade had been the exclusive prerogative o f the royalty and their
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court. The ruling family and the royal court usually exercised monopolistic control 
over this form o f trade. Commoners were excluded from participation and no 
indigenous class o f professional merchants was allowed. The commoners were levied 
for taxes in kind which were bulked to form the articles o f the royal export trade. 
Kapteijns and Spaulding describe the structure of this trade:
A  fundamental obligation o f  each subject group was to contribute to the support o f  the 
ruling establishment through labour services and the delivery o f  taxes in kind, notably 
in the form o f  grain, meat, ... cotton ... gold, honey, or ivory ... Local and regional 
exchange among commoners in basic resources was acceptable, but no indigenous class 
o f  professional merchants was tolerated; the system o f taxation was structured to gather 
precious goods o f  potential export value such as gold or ivory in the hands o f  the 
government which administered a monopolistic foreign commerce (Kapteijns and 
Spaulding 1991: 910).
Trade routes connected DarFur with Egypt, the Nilotic Sudan, the Chad Basin, 
Tripolitania, and Tunisia. The infiltration o f nomad Arab groups in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries came from Egypt, Nilotic Sudan, and to a lesser extent from 
Tunisia (Yousif Fadl 1977: 202-3). Trade was an important agent in the rise and 
power o f  the Fur Sultanate. The impetus o f change from a tribal chiefdom to a supra- 
tribal Sultanate probably came from the long distance Caravan trade (O'Fahey 1971: 
87). The interest o f the Fur Sultans in Kordofan possibly had economic causes; since 
they were bent on controlling the trade routes, the sources o f black slaves, and the 
trickle o f gold from southern Kordofan (Yousif Fadl 1977). Three trade routes 
connected DarFur with the outer world. The first, and possibly the oldest, was the 
inland route starting from Western Bilad al-Sudan, passing via Burnu, Wadai, 
DarFur, and the Fung Sultanate to the Red Sea Ports and the Hijaz. The second, was 
the famous Darb al-Arba'in (the Forty Days Road) to Egypt; and the third took a 
North Westerly direction to Tripoli and Tunisia via Fezzan (O'Fahey 1971, 1977; 
Lavers 1977; Yousif Fadl and Doombus 1977). Trading centres developed along these 
caravan trade routes where most o f the trading activities were conducted under 
government supervision. The first route was probably more significant culturally as the 
umbilical cord to nurture Islamic cultural influences into Bilad al-Sudan and its 
assimilation more into an easterly cultural Islamic orbit. The second route was possibly 
more significant from an economic point o f view. These caravan trade routes were an 
important source o f revenue to the state. In all market centres along the trade routes, a 
tax levy o f  a tenth o f the value of all traded goods was collected, with the exception o f 
slaves, where a fifth o f the value was collected by the state. The Sultan was the "major 
entrepreneur" o f  most o f the trading activities. The lucrative benefits that accrued to 
the Sultan and his Court from the "administered trade" gave the Sultan the necessary 
means to extend and consolidate his authority; the imported luxury goods were used as
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Figure 4 Trans-Saharan Caravan Trade Routes of Western Sudan
necessary political aides to consolidate the Sultan's authority by rewarding tribal 
chiefs, winning allies, and to add an aura o f royal dignity and excellence on the 
Sultan's Court.
There clearly existed two types o f trade: local and foreign. The local trade involved 
forms of local-level exchanges among the local populations; the subjects o f the 
Sultan. This type of exchange could hardly be called "trade", since it involved no 
large-scale transactions or the purposive extraction o f profit, but a characteristic 
feature o f it had been the satisfaction of basic local needs at the household and village 
levels through mutual exchanges involving small surpluses that the local people were 
able to make each from their respective trades. The medium of exchange o f this form 
of local trade had variously been different media: e.g. Damour, rings made o f copper 
or tin which constituted a form o f a coinage in DarFur. Barter exchange was also 
common practice. The local commodities exchanged were principally o f agricultural 
nature, including animals, and small crafts and trades. Agricultural produce included 
dukhn, onions, vegetables, cotton, and coarse cotton cloth called Damour, fruits, 
tamarind (or Ardeb). Items o f crafts and trades included agricultural tools (hoes, axes), 
crude metal ornaments, saddles, leather wear (shoes, ropes, knits), skins, hides and 
containers, wool mats, etc.; all o f which were made by both men and women and 
exchanged locally.
The foreign trade, on the other hand, is a restricted domain the exclusive 
prerogative o f the royalty; the Sultan and his Court, as was the case with most of the 
Sudanese states
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(O'Fahey 1971, 1977). The royalty had vested interests in this trade, therefore, the 
foreign trade enjoyed their patronage and protection. "The export of slaves, ivory, 
ostrich feathers in exchange for luxury imports complemented one another to such an 
extent that they became interdependent" (Yousif Fadl 1977: 204). Fine cotton textiles, 
silks, precious jewellery, weapons, firearms, ammunition, swords, gun powder, 
sandalwood were important items o f the import trade. Darb el Arba'in (the Forty Days 
Road) was a vital trans-Saharan trade route serving as the umbilical cord connecting 
DarFur with Kordofan and Egypt. It was actively busy since the mid-sixteenth century 
when Egyptian traders were exchanging arms for gold with the King of Uri, and 
exchanging goods with the Fazara Arabs of Barr al-Sudan; 'desert fringe1 (Waltz, 1975; 
cited in Yousif Fadl 1977).
Exports from DarFur included: besides slaves as the main export, gum Arabic, 
seamless water skins, natron, gold, copper, ivory, ostrich feathers, ebony, and rhinoceros 
horns. Imports included: fine cotton textiles, silks, metal hardware, weaponry, (firearms, 
gun powder, ammunition, swords, armour), jewellery, carpets, beads, sandalwood, 
saddles, riding horses, sugar and coffee. These items of the import trade came to 
DarFur and Kordofan from the Egyptian and North African market centres, which 
originally came to these centres from diverse sources world-wide; from India, Bengal, 
Europe, Syria, and from Egypt and the Eastern Mediterranean markets. The size of the 
caravans carrying the bulk of the trans-Saharan trade since the beginning of the 18th 
century varied greatly. Browne (1799) estimated a caravan of about two thousand 
camels and a thousand slaves to be large by DarFur standards. Other estimates ranged 
between 2400 to 5000 camels. The major part of the camels carrying this trade are sold 
in Egypt, thus the camel trade accounted for about 25% of the total value o f trade 
imported into Egypt from DarFur and Kordofan (Walz in Hassan 1977). The slave trade 
accounted for 40% and constituted the most important part of the trade.
The Bedouin tribes; e.g. the Hamar and Dar Hamid- who inhabited Bar al-Sudan, or 
the desert fringe of North Kordofan and North DarFur, were nomadic camelmen, 
owning large herds of camels and smaller stock, were the chief suppliers of the camels 
involved in the transport of the trans-Saharan caravan trade. They supplied camels for 
the transport of the volume o f both the export and import trade coming from the Nilotic 
Sudan conducted by the Jellaba traders, but most strategically, for the royal Courts of 
both the Fur and the Fung Sultans. Additionally, but most importantly, these Bedouin 
camelmen provided the expertise of guiding the way of the caravans in their travels in 
the unknown wilderness o f the desert where they have first-hand experience and 
knowledge. The Bedouin guides thus guided the loaded caravans through the unknown 
recesses o f the desert to arrive to safety at Egyptian and other North African and 
Mediterranean market centres. A necessary component of this expertise which the
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Bedouins provided was the insurance o f security for the travelling caravans from the 
predatory attacks and depredations o f wild Desert dwellers and vagabonds, and other 
desert predators. This security provision was the responsibility of the contracted tribe 
providing the caravan camels and guidance expertise. This arrangement necessarily 
called for the establishment o f networks and the forging of alliances on a tripartite basis: 
among the Bedouin tribes themselves; between them and the royal Courts, and between 
these and the Jellaba traders. These alliances which were structured around trade and 
sprang essentially for its promotion and safety indeed assumed strong political alliances 
serving the interests and mutual benefits of all partners involved. In particular, the 
alliance that sprang between the Bedouin camel-owning tribes and the Royal Courts 
assumed strong political character which required the mutual recognition and 
observance of the interests o f each party. The Bedouin camel-owning tribes from their 
part provided the required numbers of camels necessary to carry the trade, provided 
expertise and security without which trade would have been impossible to conduct. In 
return, the Royal Courts granted their tribal allies a good measure o f autonomy and 
independence from the central authority o f the state, and guaranteed o f non-interference 
in their internal tribal affairs, with a measure o f state protection. Thus, these Bedouin 
tribes remained largely autonomous and independent o f state central control. 
Nonetheless, they also remained strong allies and partners in the general prosperity that 
the trans-Saharan trade brought into DarFur and Kordofan, and the stability that 
consequently prevailed. These tribes continued to pay a voluntary annual gift to the Fur 
Sultan, mostly in terms of camels. In return, the Sultan granted them their autonomy and 
independence, indeed, gave them a free hand over other groups and considerable 
freedom in the slave trade. The Sultan also relied on them as indispensable partners in 
the slave raids on the regions further afield in Southern DarFur. Thus the Arab camel- 
owning tribes in North Kordofan desert fringe benefited, indeed prospered from the 
trans-Saharan trade as a necessary condition of the political alliances that had been 
forged between them and the Fur Sultanate. They prospered not only from the hire of 
their camels (and the subsequent sale thereof in outside markets), but also from the 
proceeds as partners in the trade. In a different alliance, these Bedouin tribes also 
benefited from hiring their camels to the Jellaba traders who carried their trade between 
the Nilotic Sudan and Western Bilad al-Sudan; i.e. DarFur and Wadai.
The hegemony o f the Fur Sultans over Kordofan was generally characterised by the 
prevalence of peace, stability, and prosperity as accretions brought by the trans-Saharan 
trade. The Bedouin Arab tribes, in particular, benefited and prospered from this trade 
since they became indispensable partners, and political alliances were formed between 
them and the Royal Court as necessary conditions in the conduct of the trade. This state 
of affairs continued until the Turk-Egyptian invasion in 1821, which ended the Fur
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hegemony over Kordofan. The Hamar and Dar Hamid were among the wealthiest o f all 
tribes in camel herds during this period. The Hamar, in particular, were said to be the 
wealthiest of all tribes in this belt o f Africa during this period.
Kordofan had known trade with the outside world before the advent o f colonialism. 
Pre-colonial foreign trade had been the prerogative of the ruling establishment both in 
the control over it and in the kind o f goods it brought to confer on the Court. This 
structure of the trade continued until it was eventually superseded by the market 
exchange relations brought in the contemporary era by the advent of the colonial rule; 
first to be established by the Turko-Egyptian invasion and the demise of the Sinnar 
Sultanate in 1821. This stage had witnessed a wider use o f money, and more 
importantly, it marked the rise o f an indigenous merchant class, especially from among 
members o f the riverine groups along the Nile Valley. The areas along the Nile had thus 
been the first to be exposed to increased intensification o f the market exchange 
relations. The interior of the country remained virtually insulated. This slow process of 
market integration, however limited, was brought to a halt during the Mahdia, only to be 
revived and greatly accelerated during the British rule in Sudan (Barbour 1961: Tully 
1988; Bernal 1991; Kapteijns and Spaulding 1991).
3- 8- Food Security and State Provisioning in Old Kordofan:
There is very little material on the state of food security and the role o f the state in 
food provisioning in those earlier days in Kordofan. However, some evidence suggests 
that the Fur and the Fung Sultans used to distribute food during times of dearth. They 
kept state-controlled granaries (called shunas), especially for the armies, but also for 
strategic food security purposes. It seems likely that, like most o f the Sudanic states at 
this period, the Sultan has an obligation towards his subjects during times of dearth and 
famines (Tully 1988; Watts 1983; 1984). An elderly informant told that during times o f 
acute food shortage and famines in Kordofan during the Fur hegemony, the Fur Sultan 
used to distribute food, or requisition grains from food-surplus areas to be moved to 
famine-affected areas, or else if food is not forthcoming, allow the hungry to loot 
regions where food can be available, especially the regions to the South. But an 
important aspect of the local food needs at that time, is that grain requirements for the 
pastoral household, such as the Hamar and Dar Hamid are minimal since they depend 
on animal products in the most part of their food. I was told that households used to 
consume little grain compared with their present consumption levels. At present 
households depend entirely on grains for their food needs following their sedentarisation 
and loss o f animals. For these reasons that the recorded famines during this period were 
few and localised. We hardly know of a wide-spread famine during this period. Only
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during the Turkiyyia and most notably during the Mahdiyyia did large famines occur, 
especially the traumatic Sanat Sitta famine. But even here the development o f such a 
wide famine should be understood in its political context, as Daly (1986) reminds us:
The cataclysms o f  the revolutionary period and the wars and rebellions that followed, 
culminating in the Anglo-Egyptian aggression o f  1896-98, caused severe economic 
disarray. The forced migration o f  "Western" tribes to Omdurman, the conscription o f  
agricultural and other slaves into the Khalifa's Jihadiya, and the methods o f  tax collection 
inevitably had adverse effects on agriculture, and no doubt contributed to the severity o f  
the 1889-90 famine. ... Foreign trade almost dried up, as a result o f  the Mahdist and British 
policy, the coinage was debased, the telegraph system all but destroyed, the cultivated area 
reduced and famine and epidemics befell the country (Daly 1986: 193 - 4).
Sanat Sitta famine was as much a result o f the Khalifa's policies o f enforced 
migration as it was o f the Anglo-Egyptian aggression, and concomitant dislocation of 
the communities and disruption to food production. The advent of the colonial powers 
in Sudan ushered in a new era in which Kordofan has been permanently drawn into the 
fabric of the modern Sudanese state. From the outset, the character o f the new state is 
understandably hostile to the region, apprehensive o f its Mahdist fervour and loyalties. 
The national forces who were to assume power on the eve o f independence were to 
prove no better than the departing colonial masters as far as Kordofan was concerned. 
The following chapter deals with the character o f the modern Sudanese state and the 
balance o f social forces who inherited political power at independence. These 
developments were to determine the future shape o f Kordofan and the fate of its people.
3- 9- The History of Famine in Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar:
It is very difficult to identify famine years that in the past have occurred in Kordofan 
generally and in particular Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar. There is however, several 
authorities giving different listings of previous famines in Sudan as a whole (Ibrahim. 
1985; Tesfaye et al 1991; Cater 1986; De Waal 1988). A quick look at these listings 
reveals two important facts: that famines are not a new phenomena to Sudan, and that 
past famines have generally been localised occurrences of transient or acute food 
deficits. The apparent preponderance o f such famine episodes is apt to lead to a 
simplistic generalisation that people have learnt to submit fatefully to the vagaries of 
nature and to live with famines. This implicit message o f determinism is carried in such 
phrases as ‘sons and daughters of drought’ used in such fatalistic finality by De Waal 
(1989). Indeed, De Waal, and the others who have stressed the theme that famines are 
part of the living human experience in these environments, have at the same time 
obscured the important fact that past famines have nearly always been localised
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phenomena confined to specific localities, and that local people’s resourcefulness and 
responses have always found ways o f procuring food grains from other areas and of 
other ways and means o f mitigating the severity o f the food shortfall. The blanket 
listings o f preponderant famines in Sudan, with its fatalistic note, reminiscent of the 
Malthusian tradition, emphasises the negative aspects of such cataclysms (see 
introduction for more details). The contention of this argument is to challenge such 
fatalism and to offer a more positivistic approach and outlook based on a thorough 
investigation and a living life experience in Kordofan countryside of peoples' 
resourcefulness, ingenuity and resilience to adapt their way of life in ways which 
enabled them to cope with the vicissitudes of life in the past as well as in the present.
The famines that have been reported to have occurred in Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar 
are few. However, we can distinguish between two types of food shortage: a temporary 
shortfall and an acute deficit. Harvests can fluctuate greatly in these environments in 
accordance with climatic fluctuations, soil types and fertility, labour inputs, etc., such 
that there may occur excellent bountiful harvests over some years, poor harvests over 
some years, or may completely fail. The local populations vary their food consumption 
strategies in accordance with the volume of harvests they gather. When harvests are 
bountiful, they usually have excess food which they either store in grain pits or lend to 
other borrowers in the food deficit areas, whether these be relatives, friends or 
acquaintances. The grains thus borrowed will be returned next harvest, so in a sense, it 
also represents a form o f social storage with added social benefits o f entitlement to a 
similar borrowing if today’s lender should experience food hardship at a later time. 
When harvests are poor, people seek to supplement their household food stocks by work 
or borrowing from neighbouring communities, or a bit o f ‘tightening the belt’ on normal 
consumption levels. This represents what could be termed a temporary shortfall in food 
supply. Only when harvests completely fail leading to acute food deficits that famine 
may develop. But complete harvest failure affecting the whole spectrum o f the different 
ecological zones has been rare; nor had such harvest failures been a necessary condition 
which automatically translated into famine. Only when other factors come into play, 
particularly those of a political nature, that harvest failure associated with climatic 
perturbations developed into famine, as Sanat Sitta of 1889-90 demonstrated. The 
development of mass famines had in many cases been counter-checked by the fact that 
rarely did harvests fail concurrently and simultaneously over entire ecological zones. 
This is why we see that most previous famines have been localised, and their worst 
effects have mostly been averted by importing food grains from better producing areas.
There were a few localised famines that had occurred in the past which the local 
people can recall with any certainty and have been passed down through folk memory in 
Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar. One important point to be emphasised is that most o f these
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were localised occurrences, and that a famine that was reported to have happened in one 
area did not in fact affect other areas except in the all-engulfing Sanat Sitta Famine in 
1889 - 90, and the most recent famines o f the 1980s and 1990s. Other episodes of 
hardships that have occurred in Dar Hamar and in Dar Hamid include localised 
transient or acute food deficits associated with normal climatic fluctuations and the 
success or failure o f harvests. These occurrences were part of the normal fluctuations 
associated with the semi-arid climate. The food deficits that result from such 
fluctuations are part o f the conditions in these environments which the local populations 
have learnt to cope with in so many different ways which enabled them to avert the 
occurrence of mass famines.
3- 9- 1- Famine in Dar Hamid:
O f the localised episodes o f acute food shortage that have been recalled in the past in 
Dar Hamid is a harvest failure associated with a hargah (drought) which occurred in the 
Dar at about the time o f the expedition sent by the colonial government to subdue 
Sultan Ali Dinar, Sultan of the Fur, to finally annex DarFur to the rest of the Anglo- 
Egyptian Sudan. This was about 1916. The drought year induced a movement o f people 
Southwards especially to Dar Nuba, where they either settled temporarily, worked or 
bought food from Kadugli and transported back to the villages on comeback. 
Accordingly, the drought year was named Sanat Kadugli, after the town of Kadugli in 
Southern Kordofan where people moved to. A small number o f people migrated from 
the villages to El-Obeid. No famine developed in this drought year (Field-work data 
1993).
Again, in Dar Hamid, and in Al-Saata area, immediately South o f the area described 
above, elderly informants recalled a bad harvest failure that had occurred in the mid- 
1940s. One important strategy employed to cope with the stress, was that people moved 
southwards to more affluent areas, mainly to Dar Hamar, Dar Bideiriyya, and Dar 
Jawamaa in search o f food. They settled temporarily in the areas whereto they moved, 
worked in the harvesting of grains on an agreed share of the crop, and shared with the 
hosting neighbouring communities their affluence and good fortune. They were 
welcomed by their neighbours who gave them residence, food and employment and a 
generous share from the harvest in which they took part. The movement and contacts 
with these neighbouring communities also provided a base for more enduring 
relationships, such that ties o f friendships, acquaintances and marriages were forged. 
Such enduring social bonds as occasioned by those movements hold until today between 
the Hamar and Dar Hamid, the Bideiriyya and Jauamaa. During such times of food 
scarcity, food grains had also been brought from as far West as Dar Fur by the Maalia
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camels men, who, employed their camels in transporting food grains helped by their 
knowledge of the desert routes (Field-work data 1993).
Another episode that have been recalled in the past in Dar Hamid is one called Sanat 
Salafiyya - (meaning the year of borrowing)- which occurred in Northern Dar Hamid. It 
is reported that in this famine a malwa (a small measure) o f sorghum Fatarita reached a 
record o f .25 piasters (25% of a Sudanese pound); which suggests that this famine may 
have occurred in the late 1960s or early 1970s. Until this period food grains have been 
generally abundant and prices low. This famine was severe judging from the few 
reported deaths that had occurred, and people resorted to eating Bejbeji; a porridge 
prepared from melon-seeds mixed with little dura flour, and resort to unpalatable wild 
forest foods such as the bitter berries o f the Mukheit (Boscia senegalensis). These 
indicators suggest that this famine has been severe. However, the local population in the 
affected area did cope with the famine without state provisioning. These episodes of 
harvest failure in Dar Hamid suggest that past famines in this area had been localised 
occurrences, and that the affected populations coped with them by moving to better- 
endowed areas. No mass famine was reported to have developed during that period 
(Field-work data 1993).
3- 9- 2- Famine in Dar Hamar:
In Dar Hamar, elderly people recalled two drought episodes, one o f which resulted 
in a severe famine associated with a large-scale failure of harvest over the major part of 
the Dar, the other resulted in a severe shortage o f water, not of food grains. The 
drought/famine year occurred when one elderly informant was about the stage of 
manhood. Judging that he was born at the turn of the century, this famine may probably 
have occurred between 1914-16. It was said to be a severe famine; food was scarce in 
the locality, and found with only one notable man, namely; Sheikh Bakhari, the Shartai 
of the Jawamaa. Sheikh Bakhari was well known for his meticulousness about keeping 
sizeable quantities of grains in reserve at all times. However, people mitigated the worst 
effects o f the famine by reliance on many useful strategies. They moved to the Nuba 
Mountains and brought food on camelback, although the grain brought was the 
unpopular sorghum (Field-work data 1993).
Another important strategy was that people resorted heavily to supplement their diet 
with meat. They hunted wild animals which were abundant at the time and in easy reach 
from the village. Hunting parties would go out for the hunt and returned with Gezzeles, 
foxes, rabbits, hyenas, wolves, feasts, wild geese, etc. Some of the village members 
were famous hunters, and they used to travel long distances for longer periods o f time in 
hunting parties composed o f a caravan o f camels and gunmen. They brought back the 
hunt in the form of sharmout i.e. dried meat to the village families. In the village of
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Omdofais, Sheikh Ajab al-Habib, founder o f the village, was a famous hunter, and in 
bad years he and others used to tidy his people by hunting wild animals, bringing fresh 
and dried meat by which to carry them through to the main harvest. Other food 
supplements, besides meat, are dates and milk, and merisa, locally brewed beer. The 
food regime, was evidently more diversified and richer in protein content than at present
A most effective strategy had been the collection o f wild berries called Mukheit. 
Large quantities of these berries were collected and brought in large leather sacks called 
Jurban, soaked in water for several days to remove their toxic bitter qualities, then dried 
and ground as flour from which food is prepared. The food thus prepared may be toxic 
if  the berries have not been thoroughly soaked in water. The village population fall back 
on this strategy only as the final resort when all others failed, which suggests a hardship 
of wide-spread proportions affecting larger communities simultaneously.
The other occurrence o f drought did not result in harvest failure and food shortage, 
but led to dryness and general lack of water. In Dar Hamar it was customary to store 
water in the Tebeldi (Boabab) tress, and supplemented by the use o f water-melons as a 
secondary source of water. The drought drastically curtailed the amount of water to be 
stored in the Tebeldi, and, coupled with a failure of the melon harvest, resulted in a 
severe shortage of water and incapacitated the two main sources of water supply in Dar 
Hamar at the time. Under the ensuing shortage, and the compulsion of the necessity of 
water, people moved Southwards to areas where water supply is more abundant for both 
humans and animals. Masses o f people moved to and settled temporarily during the dry 
season in damar camps, congregating in and around Abu Zabad, Um Jigru in the 
vicinity o f al-Turdah', a hand of Khor Abu Habil. Here water supply is permanent and 
more reliable and can be obtained from the shallow wells in Um Jigru and from the 
large shallow pool o f al-Turdah at Abu Zabad. This large pool provides permanent 
water the year round, and in normal years, but especially during years o f droughts, 
people move with their families and animals to water and graze here during the dry 
season. Thus, in this drought which occurred about 1918 - 19, people moved from areas 
of drought and waterlessness, and congregated in large numbers in the vicinity of Abu 
Zabad, driven by aridity and lack of water. The drought year was named Sanat Um 
Kreidmi, (meaning the year of crowdedness) in account of the large masses o f people 
crowded in this small area of plenty water (Field-work data 1993). It should be noted 
that no famine developed in this year, and no account o f shortage of food reported. 
Indeed, there are stories o f ties of friendships established, o f marriages, exchange of 
goods and benefits, and o f merry-making of friends meeting at drinking parties of 
merisa a local beer brewed from millet. All of these accounts suggest that people had 
been able to turn their adversity into a rather happy sojourn. The elderly village 
respondents reported that years o f droughts were frequent in the past, which may lead to
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poor harvests, or complete harvest failures. But complete harvest failure affecting the 
entire communities was rare. They distinguished between the seasonal hunger period 
which is an annual normal occurrence, experiences o f hunger associated with poor 
harvests, and a more protracted acute hunger, or famine which is rare. On the whole, 
the local people are not perturbed o f such occurrences, since they possess large 
enough scope for coping strategies sufficient to enable them overcome the adversities 
(Field-work data 1993).
Events and developments taking place beyond Sudan's borders were to determine 
the future shape and fortunes o f the rural populations in Kordofan. Kordofan had been 
the decisive agent in the creation o f the Sudanese state in its present boundaries since it 
is from Kordofan that the Mahdist state eventually made its success. Ironically, the 
feat o f  Kordofan as the major force in the building o f the modem Sudanese state has 
turned into a curse on her in recent history in which the region suffered 
marginalisation, exploitation and neglect. The next phase in the history o f Kordofan 
coincides with the development o f agriculture in the context o f the modem Sudanese 
state. The development o f agriculture has been greatly encouraged by the policies o f 
both the colonial and post-colonial governments. The following chapter focuses on the 
reorganisation, under official state policies, o f the rural production relations around 
agricultural labour for the realisation o f marketable agricultural surpluses. The 
important point to be stressed is that agriculture has brought new dangers and new 
risks, such as creates profound and grave consequences relating to matters o f  security 
and survival o f the rural populations.
Conclusion:
This chapter has drawn a picture o f life in old Kordofan until about the turn o f the 
century. The chapter is intended to provide a historical background to the social and 
political history o f  the region, and how social and political change had affected the way 
people lived, and how they adapted both to the conditions o f the arid environment, and 
to the political and ecological changes taking place in their social and physical 
environments. We have argued that the pastoral way o f life was/is most suited to the 
semi-arid conditions o f north Kordofan. That the pastoral communities o f  Dar Hamid 
and Dar Hamar came into contact with the Fur and Fung Sultanates, and both 
benefited, indeed prospered from a flourishing trans-Saharan trade. The rise o f the 
modem Sudanese state in subsequent histories and the gradual incorporation o f
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Kordofan in its fabric has had deleterious effects on Kordofan rural communities which 
ultimately translated into exploitation and impoverishment unto famine.
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Chapter 4 
The Modern Sudanese State
Introduction:
Theories of famine have invariably neglected discussions about the character of the 
state as irrelevant to the debate on famine. The character of the state indeed lies at the 
heart of any study of famine to the extent that famine affects certain groups in the 
society which calls for a close analysis o f the structures of power in that society to bring 
out why some groups are vulnerable to famine while others are not. Indeed some groups 
may even "benefit" from famine (Keen 1994). This chapter considers the structures of 
power in the contemporary Sudanese society; of dominance and subordination. It traces 
in a historical perspective the evolution o f the modern Sudanese state, and the 
emergence of the social balances of power in Sudanese social and political relations 
since the colonial era. This chapter establishes that Kordofan generally has been 
marginalised in the domestic politics after having been the main force in bringing out 
the Sudanese state in its present shape during the Mahdiyya. In the recent history o f the 
modern Sudanese state Kordofan has been progressively marginalised and relegated to a 
back garden, as a domain of extraction for the benefit of the state and the emerging 
elites.
This chapter traces the long-term structural processes which were responsible for the 
impoverishment o f the rural peasant producers in Kordofan and their ultimate 
vulnerability to famine. It will trace in a historical perspective the origins of the macro- 
structural socio-economic regional polarisation and social differentiation to the 
development policies of the colonial state in Sudan, and subsequent national rule. The 
aspects of the colonial state's policies which will be examined include a brief exposition 
of the colonial ideology as it evolved in its home context; its domestic and international 
underpinnings and the manner in which these had influenced the British colonial 
decision to extend British rule over the Sudan. It will be argued that the subsequent 
colonial policies in Sudan had laid the foundations for the integration of the Sudanese 
economy and society into the international market system, and in effect opened up the 
pre-capitalist local economies to the influences of international systems. Subsequent 
national rule has maintained the colonial structures unchanged, not just out of narrow 
self interest of the early Sudanese leaders, as Niblock (1987), Woodward (1990), and 
Khalid (1985) have argued, but for other more powerful interests associated with 
external forces bearing on the Sudanese state. We distinguish between three driving 
forces which have influenced political decisions on the choice and approach to national
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development planning in three periods in the post-independence era. During the colonial 
project, and in three successive periods during national rule, the approach to 
development has favoured certain groups, but has consistently been skewed against the 
interests of the rural populations. In all, external interests have played a decisive role. 
The distortions in the market between the structures of dominance and the subordinated 
rural economies which arise from the integration into the market have created conditions 
o f regional inequalities and social differentiation which, we argue, lie at the root of rural 
poverty and the related problems of hunger and famines.
4-1-  The Colonial Project in Sudan
The British colonial policy to extend their influence over the Sudan was initially 
motivated by strategic considerations. Britain had a large and vibrant trade with the East 
Indies, the Indian Sub-Continent, China and the Pacific. In order to secure a safe 
passage of this large trade, Britain needed to protect the Suez Canal which by 
implication meant to extend her influence over Egypt. And in order to accomplish this 
strategic objective, especially after the Egyptian Nationalist movement in the 1870s, and 
the rise o f the Mahdist State in Sudan in 1885, it became the more imperative to secure 
the sources of the Upper Nile. And the security o f the Upper sources o f the Nile would 
secure the British interests in East Central Africa which in turn link with her strategic 
dominions in South Africa and the Cape trade route. Thus, it was conceived by the 
British colonial Empire Builders Britain's sphere o f influence would extend from 
Alexandria on the Mediterranean to the Cape cutting all across East/Central Africa 
(Pakenham 1991). The central point of gravity o f the strategy was primarily a concern 
with Egypt and the safety o f the Suez Canal, if the Eastern trade was to flow securely. 
Therefore, other powers needed to be kept at bay from the sources o f the Nile, especially 
Germany and Italy. And more immediately, to eliminate the direct threat o f the Mahdist 
State in order to undercut the prospects of a Muslim state outreaching to the interior of 
the African continent. The decision was thus taken in 1898 under the Premiership of 
Salisbury to invade Sudan from Egypt (McIntyre 1966). The strategic explanation is 
only the obvious part in the story of the Anglo-Egyptian invasion on Sudan in the 
colonial Scrabble for Africa. Other more decisive factors were the economic and social 
problems facing the British government, and the commercial interests of certain 
influential power groups, and in the case of Sudan, namely that of the commercial 
interests of the influential lobby of the textile industrialists. The effects of the 
Depression combined with Britain’s blunted competitive edge were to create a host of 
domestic problems with which the ruling establishment had had to tender. The 
magnitude o f the problems produced fears among the British ruling classes about the
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possible social and political repercussions of such problems. The extent o f the problems 
which the decline of the British economy entailed was that:
This collapse manifested itself in several important ways. There was to be almost 
continuous underemployment in traditional export industries - especially cotton textiles, 
coal mining, shipbuilding and steel. European markets were disrupted by the war and, once 
reorganised, were to produce modernised industry capable o f  driving Britain out o f  their 
own and other markets. The liquidation o f  external assets and the acceptance o f  large 
American loans during the war increased the need to export ... Finally, the period also saw 
the rise o f  governments throughout the non-colonial world committed to protection and 
direct subsidies to displace British exports from their own markets and those under their 
colonial control (Brett 1973: 71-2).
These fears were expressed in terms o f the likely disruption to the state of law and 
order and threats to social stability, dislocation, discontent and social unrest. If 
conditions were allowed to take such a dangerous course, the whole capitalist system, it 
was feared, could be in jeopardy. Lloyd George, for example, talking o f the need to 
"quieten labour", warned that unless the workers’ conditions were to be salvaged, "they 
strike, and a strike may end in revolution"; and added that "you must give the people a 
horizon, or they will look at their wretched surroundings and once they lose hope, there 
is nothing but revolution and trouble" (Cited in Brett 1073: 117). Under the pressure o f 
domestic economic crisis, its likely dangerous social and political consequences could 
only be salvaged by boosting trade through direct and forceful control over overseas 
markets. The economic crisis made it difficult for the British government to commit the 
necessary capital for the development o f the colonies. The strains caused the policy of 
devolution to be launched. The spirit of the policy was to devolve responsibility away 
from the centre to the colonial governments so that they can each embark on their 
development programmes in a pace commensurate with their resources and to work 
towards self-sufficiency. This was envisaged to incur minimal costs on the metropolitan 
centre. The policy of devolution envisaged that:
British theory in this area constantly assumed that the contradiction between the need for 
change and the very limited availability o f  metropolitan resources to initiate and manage 
the change could be resolved through the devolution o f  power to effectively decentralised 
political and administrative structures, it was widely believed that colonies could be quickly 
equipped with the basic administrative and economic infrastructure and therefore meet their 
own costs from internal sources. Local structures - administrators, Legislative Councils, 
and even chiefs - were expected to carry out their duties with only minimal recourse to the 
centre (Brett 1973).
In the spirit o f colonial devolution, the Sudan colonial government embarked on its 
development programme of the economy that would in due time enable her to become 
self-sufficient. The role of the British textile industrialists has been decisive in shaping 
the colonial development project for Sudan. The textile industry was one o f the leading 
sectors in the British economy and one of strategic significance because it provided
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employment for a large section of the labour force. Consequently it had traditionally 
influenced the political decision in key areas o f the economy, especially with regard to 
the colonies, not least also because it had an influential lobby with a strong voice within 
the decision-making circles. Given this strategic importance of the textile industry the 
adversities which had befallen this sector were to overshadow not only the British 
economy, but also the society and politics. These adversities could be summed up in the 
following indicators: (1) the generalised effects of the depression since the War led to a 
depressed international economic activity and a general decline in the British textile 
purchases; (2) the high costs o f production of the British textile manufactures made it to 
lose competitiveness in the international market, especially with Japanese manufactures; 
(3) the unreliability of the American cotton supply as a result of the disease the "boll 
weevil", and the American Civil War which disrupted production in the Southern 
plantations prairies, in turn led to (4) rising prices o f raw cotton since the end of the 
War. These developments seriously undermined the performance o f the British textile 
industry in providing employment. This had in turn posed direct political pressures on 
the government to take immediate action . As a result, in the programmes for 
development of the colonies, priority was given to the demands of the textile 
industrialists in order to find and secure new sources o f supply o f raw cotton.
While the demand for self-sufficiency and the need to increase exports because o f  
unemployment tended to produce a generalised commitment to programmes o f  colonial 
development, that for raw materials tended to take specific forms derived from the needs o f  
particular classes o f  manufacturers in difficulties, by far the most important o f  these in the 
case o f  Sudan were the textile industrialists, who were forced due to the drying up o f  
American supplies to pay what they regarded as unreasonably high prices for raw cotton 
from the end o f  the war until about 1926. Their needs were to be o f  prime importance in 
determining both the nature o f  the aid programme ultimately evolved in east Africa and the 
areas in which it was to be spent. [Therefore], the Empire cotton Growing Association  
(ECGA) was set up ... [to ensure] an adequate Empire cotton supply (Brett 1973: 121-22).
In this context, the Sudan Plantations Syndicate (SPS) - a branch company of the 
Empire Cotton Growers' Association- was conceded in 1904 a lease by the Sudan 
Government to grow cotton in an area o f 11000 feddans along the Nile. This initial 
experiment, known as the Zeidab Scheme, proved a marvellous success which to a large 
extent were to determine the subsequent economic development choices for the Sudan. 
The experiment was soon transferred to the Gezira where the existence "of extensive 
land suitable for irrigation" was developed into the famous Gezira Scheme; the largest 
centrally managed farm of its kind in the world. The British government found it 
opportune when in 1905 it was approached by a request from the British Cotton 
Growers Association (a consortium of the cotton industrialists established in 1902 by 
the Lancashire lobby) for a loan to build the Sinnar Dam for the irrigation o f the Gezira 
Cotton Scheme, the British government immediately endorsed a loan of £ 19 million
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from the treasury on low interest, more because of political expediency than of 
economic necessity. The Dam was built, the Gezira opened and cotton production 
started in 1925 (Gaitskell 1960, Memro 1984). The Gezira Scheme was carried out 
within the framework of the colonial development project. This programme was initially 
envisaged to bring about the necessary social and economic transformation o f the 
colonies in the process of drawing the indigenous communities into the contemporary 
civilisation, and at the same time enriching international trade by bringing the products 
of these communities to the world markets. The civilisation side was soon abandoned as 
a result o f the economic difficulties associated with the depression and the decline of the 
British economy after the war. The colonial policy therefore concentrated exclusively on 
the development o f an export-oriented economy for the production o f raw materials, and 
limited the development of the social and political institutions to narrow enclaves that 
were necessary for the export economy.
The development of the Gezira Scheme and indeed o f the whole economy of the 
Sudan of which the Gezira occupies the centre of gravity, needs to be studied according 
to the postulates o f the colonial development project. The essence o f this project was the 
idea that the development of an export-oriented economy would secure the flow of 
cheap raw materials to the British industries to ensure the competitiveness of their 
products and hence of profitability; while at the same time the money that would accrue 
to the producers from such sales would be spent on purchases and orders of British 
manufactures. In this way, it was conceived, the money would come back to the mother 
country. This basic view put simply and forcefully at the meeting in 1923 of the Empire 
Cotton Growing Association:
... w e shall in the future see the whole o f  our cotton coming from our own Dominions ... I 
believe that we shall thus secure cheap cotton, cheaper raw materials for the use o f  our 
British manufacturers. I also believe that in doing that we will be supplying a market for 
our own people beyond the seas, and that the money that they obtain for their cotton may to 
a great extent be spent in making purchases from the mother country. It is an ideal for 
which we all ought to work, that the money obtained from us should in a different form 
com e back to this country (Empire Cotton Growing Association, Report o f  the Second 
Annual General Meeting, 1923: 8; cited in Brett 1973).
In this context, the Condominium invasion o f 1889 on Sudan was contemplated and 
completed to dismantle the Mahdist state and to establish the Anglo-Egyptian 
hegemony over the Sudan. By the time o f the Anglo-Egyptian invasion, the Mahdist 
state under the Khalifa was already overburdened with its internal problems, conflicts 
and warfare. But the state derived its main political support from the peoples of Western 
Sudan, especially from Kordofan. The unfailing support of the people o f Kordofan to 
the Mahdist cause became a most damning liability for the region in the new political 
climate in the modern Sudanese state; during both colonial and national rule. The
- 1 1 7 -
traditionally hegemonic riverine Nile populations saw in the short-lived domination of 
the "Gharraba” viz.; "Westerners" an anachronism which they could not stomach, and 
which greatly prejudiced them against the Khalifa and his supporters from Western 
Sudan. Such that when the opportunity came with the coming o f the colonisers, the 
riverine populations found in the new comers a powerful ally through whom they can 
hope to permanently eradicate the rule o f the "Gharraba" and any groups other than the 
peoples of the Nile Valley. On the other hand, the colonial mind, on its part, saw in the 
peoples of the Nile an invaluable ally through whose collaboration they can achieve the 
economic and political goals o f the colonial policy. The colonial policy was conceived 
of to develop modern economic enterprises in central Sudan along the banks of the Nile, 
therefore, needed the co-operation o f the agro-based sedentary populations o f the central 
riverine Sudan. Hence an alliance was forged between the colonisers and the people of 
the central Sudan in the building o f the new state, in which the rural Kordofan 
populations became the most disadvantaged and disfavoured partners in the modern 
Sudanese state.
The colonial state thus allied itself to the sedentary agro-based communities of 
central Sudan, and as a result concentrated the development programme in these central 
regions; especially in the Gezira and along the Banks o f Nile, for its own interests. In 
the general spirit of the colonial development programme, the Gezira Scheme was 
conceived and was officially inaugurated in 1924. The manner in which it continued to 
provide the British textile industry with a fresh supply of long staple cotton, and the way 
in which the money from cotton sales were spent on orders on British goods, and in 
consequence the opening up o f the Sudanese market for British goods strongly linked 
the Sudan into the British sphere, and finally paved the way for the integration o f the 
Sudan economy into the wider international economic system. The development of the 
Gezira Scheme and the related infrastructural developments that accompanied it along 
the riverine part o f the Sudan also laid the foundations for regional inequalities that were 
to have grave consequences in the future developments in the country. The tenets o f the 
colonial development programme were expressed in the Governor-General's first 
statement which set agenda in clear terms:
The task which the Sudan government has set itself to perform is primarily to confer the 
benefits o f  civilisation on the inhabitants by rendering secure, as far as possible, their 
persons and their property; by improving communications across those wide stretches o f  
desert or wilderness which intervene between the main centres o f  population and 
productivity; by adding the fertility o f  the naturally rich soil by means o f  artificial irrigation 
... ; and finally by providing - in addition to the great N ile waterway and railway which 
bind the Sudan to Egypt- a good port and harbour on the Red Sea within easy access o f  the 
interior, whereby the inhabitants may be more econom ically furnished with their 
requirements from abroad, and may find outside markets for their natural products 
(Governor-General Wingate, quoted in Gaitskell 1959: 34).
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In order to carry out this ambitious programme, large amounts o f capital outlays were 
needed in the initial stages. How to finance this development programme, however, was 
a dilemma. Government revenue was small, estimated in 1898 to be about S£8000, 
compared to S£221 000 of expenditure, with a deficit o f S£213 000. The deficit was to 
be bom by the government o f Egypt. It was not possible to raise taxes after the cruelty 
of the tax system under both the Turkiyyah and the Mahdiyyah. This was ruled out for 
fear that raising taxes was apt to arouse popular hostility and distrust towards the new 
government. It was also considered incongruent with the government's commitment to 
win the confidence of the people. Nor was it possible to obtain the required capital 
finance from the British Treasury owing to its own domestic difficulties. The country's 
future prospects o f increased wealth were envisioned to lay in the agriculture and animal 
sectors. This seemed the only possible means by which to generate the revenue required 
to carry out the task of civilisation as was set out in the Governor-General's programme 
for economic and social development. In this context the transformation of the different 
economies o f Sudan, including those o f Kordofan rural economies took place in order to 
achieve set goals within the framework of the colonial project (for Kordofan, see next 
chapter). The areas along the Nile had thus been the first to be exposed to increased 
intensification o f the market exchange relations. The interior of the country remained 
virtually insulated. This slow process o f market integration has been greatly accelerated 
during the British rule in Sudan (Barbour 1961: Tully 1988; Bernal 1991; Kapteijns and 
Spaulding 1991).
The Gezira Scheme, the largest centrally run and governmentally owned enterprise, 
was an expression of the alliance between the colonial state- the guardian of powerful 
foreign interests- and the agro-based sedentary populations of central Sudan. It came to 
be a tripartite partnership between the tenant farmers, the Sudan Government and the 
management of the Scheme, the Gezira Board (GB). An effective and highly organised 
centralised management system was set up. The infrastructure of communication and 
transport was quickly developed in order to facilitate the smooth flow o f resources. 
Social services of health, education, electricity and water networks were extended to 
villages, a developed system o f agricultural extension and research was set up. All such 
facilities were set up amidst an increasing circulation o f money which became 
increasingly available to the population from their cotton sales. Indeed, the development 
of the Gezira proved to be a rewarding "risk" from the part of the Financial Secretary 
Schuster, giving a "heartening finale" and handsome returns for the foreign companies 
which financed the project; and until 1950, the net profits to these companies came to 
over E£ 16 million (Gaitskell 1959) (for more details, see appendix C). Thus, the 
Gezira, became the backbone of the Sudan economy, together with the areas along the 
Banks of the Nile became modern prosperous enclaves relative to other regions which
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remained untouched with the new surge of modernisation. The British colonial rule, 
therefore, had greatly accelerated the process o f integration to a pace that was 
unprecedented in tempo and in pervasiveness. Within the span o f about fifty years of 
British rule in Sudan, capitalist market relations in production and in exchange 
penetrated deep into the remotest communities. Barbour captures the differential 
character o f integration into the international economy of different regions in the 
country:
The several regions o f  Sudan ... differ from one another not only in topography, climate, 
and population, but also in the degree to which their econom ies have been brought out o f  
isolation and integrated with one another and the world at large. On the one hand, there are 
cotton growing areas by the Blue N ile and White N ile where the daily rise and fall o f  world 
cotton prices are followed and discussed by interested tenants and proprietors; on the other 
hand, there are villagers in Jebel Mara or tribesmen in south-eastern Equatoria where 
occasional sale o f  some grain or an animal to pay their taxes is almost their only contact 
with money throughout the year (Barbour 1961: 263).
However, the impact of the processes of penetration and integration had been very 
uneven. While the riverine central regions of Sudan were relatively highly developed as 
modern capitalist enclaves and were directly integrated into the world market, other 
regions remained as they had been before in using methods and techniques of 
production. This has created a situation o f subordination of the traditional production 
systems precariously juxtaposed with the modern capitalistic enclaves in the centre.
4- 1- 1- Colonial Administration: Indirect Rule Policy:
The policy of Indirect Rule was conceived of and carried out with a view o f making 
both economy and efficiency, and to create conditions o f stability, o f law and order, 
conducive to the progress o f trade. The Milner Report to the Khedive o f Egypt in 1921 
stated that the future administration of the different parts of Sudan should be left, as far 
as possible, in the hands o f native authorities under British supervision for the simple 
administrative needs of the country; would make for both economy and efficiency (The 
Milner Report, cited in Mac Michael 1935: 191). The Native Authorities were not 
independent authorities but the executive agents o f the Central Government who carry 
out the Government policy. Some o f the objectives of the policy of Indirect Rule were 
to combat what the colonial mind regarded as the evils of individualism, nationalism 
and Mahadism by invoking the "ideology o f tribalism". But a tacit unstated objective 
was to countervail the rise of a distrusted educated Sudanese official class (Daly 1986; 
360). Apprehension and distrust o f this class became more urgently felt after the 
Egyptian nationalist revolution. Fears among the colonial authorities mounted that this 
revolutionary nationalist sentiment may be passed to Sudan through the Egyptian 
officials working there. As a result, these officials were returned to Egypt. A vacuum in
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the administration ensued which needed to be filled by Sudanese recruits. But because 
of the distrust o f the educated Sudanese, the government chose to rely on native 
authorities. The policy was henceforth actively pursued. In his "Memorandum to 
Mamurs", Kitchener, then Governor-General, urged his administration staff to actively 
seek the co-operation o f the "better class of natives". He urged:
The task before us all, especially the Mamurs (Governors) and Inspectors (District 
Commissioners), is to acquire the confidence o f  the people, to develop their resources, and 
to raise them to a higher level. This can only be effected by the District Officers being 
thoroughly in touch with the better class o f  native, through whom w e may hope gradually 
to influence the whole population (Kitchener, cited in Duncan 1957: 17-8).
The policy was pursued with such forceful vigour, and to confer on the Native 
Authorities the privileges of power and honour that makes it worthy of the respect and 
dignity of rule. The Governor General, Sir John Maffey, issued a Memorandum in 
January 1920 to Governors and DCs to observe that: "be prepared to grant a worthy 
scale of remuneration to the chiefships we foster, in the confident hope that we shall 
thereby be saved in the long run from costly elaborations o f our own administrative 
machinery (Sir John Maffey, cited in Mac Michael 1935: 195). The policy bore fruits, 
and an unprecedented record o f stability, and law and order eventually maintained. 
Peace prevailed over the country that was a necessary prerequisite for the stability of 
trade which was the government's ultimate goal. Law and order prevailed in the country.
That a woman could go unescorted to the well, or return after dark from the market 
laughing and chattering with her sisters, that a man could travel long distances unarmed, 
that robbery and house-breaking were rare and the offenders usually caught and punished 
... all these things were still a positive good in their eyes. They came afterwards to be 
accepted as normal and when breaches o f  the peace did occur Sudanese public opinion was 
shocked at incidents which would pass unnoticed in Damascus or Baghdad (Henderson 
1965: 50-1).
The system of Native Authorities successfully checked tribal disorder, feuds, and 
frequent forays. Thus, security and stability were maintained for the smooth and lawful 
looting o f the rural resources by the colonial government through the collaboration of 
the native authorities. The critical issue about this collaboration for Sudan's political 
future is that it has created a tribal aristocratic class allied to the state. In Gaitskell 
words: "pursued to its logical conclusion, this policy had an affinity with the oil and 
Sheikhdoms o f the Middle East and it carried the great danger o f corrupting traditional 
authority rather than revitalising it, producing Pashas in Pakaeds rather than a 
progressive peasantry" (Gaitskell 1959: 103). This has meant for the political future of 
Sudan that the colonial state had established a system of tribal aristocracy whose 
members were so moulded in the colonial image, established, privileged and were 
placed in positions of material power to succeed to the seats of power after their 
departing colonial patrons.
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4- 1- 2- Colonial Agricultural Policy:
The Condominium agricultural policy in Sudan, circumscribed by the postulates of 
the British colonial policy for self-sufficiency, advocated a commitment to expand 
internal and external markets as a condition for the generation of revenue. The general 
agricultural policy made the following commitments in the words of Tothill, the 
Director of the Sudan Department o f Agriculture and Forests:
... the present agricultural policy o f  the Sudan may be said to be designed to bring about 
social emergence o f  rural communities. Food crops are encouraged which are designed to 
produce an ample food-supply and a well-balanced diet; the production o f  an adequate 
milk-supply is almost as important; the provision o f  good drinking-water and o f  fuel and o f  
building poles is also encouraged. With these things satisfied the emphasis is placed on a 
cash crop to be fitted into the rotation; this crop is designed to produce m oney to enable the 
cultivators to pay taxes and to purchase those trade goods required for participation in the 
benefits o f  civilisation. The aim is to bring about the emergence o f  happy and prosperous 
rural communities rapidly becoming fully literate, financially able and mentally wishing to 
participate in the advance o f  civilisation (Tothill 1948: 2-3).
This statement on the principles of the colonial agricultural policy makes interesting 
reading. Clearly it points to the express objective of drawing the Sudanese rural 
economies which had hitherto been autonomous into the world market economy as 
denoted by the term "the social emergence o f rural communities". This had specifically 
meant, in the general context of the colonial development ideology, the drawing of the 
Sudan's rural economies into the British sphere o f economic activities. The process of 
integration will have to be effected on three spheres. First; to establish the base for food 
production as a necessary prerequisite creating the material conditions conducive to 
rural production o f a healthy, able-bodied agricultural labour force who can then; 
secondly, work the land to produce cash crops to export to outside markets; and, thirdly; 
provide a broad and thriving consumption market for the imported British-manufactured 
goods.
Looking into the stated objectives of the colonial agricultural policy, it became clear 
that the stated commitment to "produce an ample food-supply" was never seriously 
followed beyond a limited scope, and only confined to the centre o f the country, 
especially Khartoum area. A diary farm was founded by the Veterinary Department in 
1907 mainly to cater for "the demand which always exists in a British community, 
wherever it may be, for a good supply of clean milk" (Tothill 1948: 654). Other 
experimental work included nursery for palm date propagation and some rudimentary 
experimental work on rice (Ibid 323-24). "In this actuary the late Col. E.S. Jackson set a 
good example in date culture in his garden at Mansurkotti, and in 1935 Mr. T. D. Bevan, 
who had worked with Col. Jackson, became date expert, to the government to set up 
nurseries and begin the drive for good date propagation among the cultivators. The late 
Professor Sitas C. Masson did tours of dura. In some respects the government attitude
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towards the expansion of food production was negative, except when food production 
was intended for export. There are two instances to testify to this. One, the Governor- 
General Wingate's first idea in 1900 when he visited the Gezira was that the Gezira area 
was an ideal place for producing dura on a large scale. He wrote; musing about revenue 
and irrigation and wondering if the Gezira can solve his problem, not by the production 
of cotton, but by dura.
I recently rode across the Gezira from Wad Medani on the Blue N ile, to opposite Dueim on 
the White N ile, a distance o f  som e 80 miles, across a perfectly flat plain, sown almost 
throughout its entire length with dura. ...if a system o f  irrigation were feasible in the 
Gezira, It would become a huge granary capable o f  supplying not only the whole Sudan but 
other countries as well. (Wingate- cited in Gaitskell 1959:36)
Unfortunately, as far as food security was concerned, the events outside Sudan were 
to determine the future development of the Gezira-, cotton was to be the export product 
o f the Gezira, not dura. The story o f why Sudan since that time continued to commit the 
best o f its lands to the production o f cash crops, mainly cotton, while in recent decades 
millions o f its citizens suffered from famine explains much of the nature o f the 
international market relations. In this connection, reference is to be made to 
conditionalities attached to a massive 1983 World Bank loan to Sudan earmarked for the 
rehabilitation of the Gezira to boost cotton production, at a time when famine was 
raging in Western and Eastern Sudan. Another example of the colonial government's 
negative attitude towards food production was the conversion o f the government pump 
schemes from food to cotton-production. The government had a number o f pump 
schemes; four at Dongola, four at Berber, and one in the Whit Nile, all, with the 
exception o f the latter, were established primarily as "strong points" o f defence against 
famine which were apt to recur periodically in the Northern Sudan (Mac Michael 1935: 
302). Although the government advocated a commitment to food production, its practice 
did not support its statements. But failure to give due concern for a long-tern food 
strategy, sacrificed long-term food security for the short-term concern with revenue 
generation. The food production systems of rural communities remained as they were 
centuries earlier. However, food production on the clay soils in the central rain lands 
was mechanised and supported only as a response to external demand created by the 
food shortage during the war. Food produced in the commercial mechanised farms in 
these central rain lands has ever since remained export-oriented.
The colonial government did not seriously concern itself with a long-term food 
production strategy in Sudan. The government considered that since there was food 
available to meet people's food needs from their own production, to enable them 
simultaneously to carry out the task o f producing cash crops for export, it assumed 
irrelevant to develop food production beyond that capacity. The government's main 
concern was to expand the internal and external markets by developing export crops,
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and opening up the internal market for the import of British manufactures. The policy 
caught the rural farmer in the dilemma of having to divide his/her labour power between 
producing food for their families and producing cash crops for the market. This dual 
situation implied a loss for the farmer since s/he has to bear the costs o f both production 
and reproduction o f labour, while the buyer of the crop would pay a price that would 
cover only a small part o f the production cost. The buyer has no obligation to make 
towards the reproduction of labour involved in the production process, as would 
otherwise be the case in a fully-developed market economy. In the dual situation, the 
livelihood o f the farmer is considered to lie outside the market contract, consequently 
the costs of labour reproduction are not added to the value of the crop s/he thus produces 
for the market. This explains the low agricultural prices that are offered to the produce 
of rural labour. Such prices can be too low to meet even the production costs. Caught in 
this dilemma, the rural agriculturalist is rendered more vulnerable and food insecure, 
such if harvests fail cannot buffer their food insecurity, and they suffer as a 
consequence.
4- 1- 3- The Sudan Famine Regulations
The British instituted Famine Regulations; a set of elaborate procedures designed to 
act as preventive measures against famine, and to combat its effects if  it occurred (for 
more details see Shepherd 1988). The set of regulations and procedures, however, were 
rarely enacted since during this period from the time the Regulations were set in force in 
1920 until the departure o f the colonial administration in 1956, the food situation in 
Sudan was generally good, and an abundance o f food was made possible by a generally 
favourable climate during this period (Nicholson 1991; Tothill 1948). The Famine 
Regulations have existed ever since, but they have been completely overlooked, and 
never activated during national rule, which suggests the extent of lack o f responsibility 
of national Sudanese governments towards their citizens in the marginalised regions.
4- 1- 4- The Import Trade:
The import trade was greatly enhanced by the increased money supply that became 
available to the people from the sale o f their cash crops. By 1950, people's life styles 
and consumption patterns have radically changed from simple subsistence to one 
increasingly dependent on the market goods. Indeed, opening up internal markets "to 
purchase those trade goods required for participation in the benefit o f civilisation", in 
the words o f the Director o f Agriculture, was one o f the principal pillars of the colonial 
ideology. In the Gezira, for example, where money supply became readily available in 
the hands of ordinary men and women, averaging £E 800 per tenancy, the whole scale 
of values, o f needs and wants had been thrown upwards by the simultaneous flood of
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money and consumer goods. The encouragement o f consumerism at this scale in a 
society hitherto agro-based with little knowledge of the value of money proved to be 
dangerous since it transformed the society into a consumer market only. Gaitskell 
vividly describes the extravaganza in the Gezira in the 1950s:
Both income and expenditure rose to a scale hitherto unknown, and everyone engaged in a 
vast spending spree. After the satisfaction o f  priorities in food and clothing, social 
occasions stood out as pre-eminent in the state o f  values. In the general prosperity 
thousands o f  pounds went in the pleasures o f  social display, thousands more in wild  
competition for goods and services in limited supply, - a scramble in which prices soared 
and m oney went to waste like w ater.... Taxis crammed with well-dressed tenants sped from 
village to village. Scores o f  lorries carried the less opulent on their social errands . The 
markets were crowded with eager customers for goods o f  all sorts, the beer shops crammed 
with eager patrons, many more people than before took out trading licences, competition 
for flour-mill sites, ferry rights and the like sent auction prices soaring to fantastic heights 
(Gaitskell 1959: 317-18).
The money surpluses that would have been wisely invested in developing more 
complex forms of economic activity, have instead been directed towards wasteful 
conspicuous consumption. This strikes to the core of the colonial development project 
which encouraged consumption and inhibited economic development to go beyond a 
certain level. While it encouraged the production o f primary commodities, and 
encouraged consumption, it did not allow capital surpluses to flow into secondary and 
tertiary economic activities; i.e. processing and manufacture. Inhibition o f 
industrialisation in the colonies was a set colonial policy on which there was unanimous 
agreement among all British parties, Tories, liberals, and Labour alike, all stressing 
"Complementarity" between the colonies and metropolis: "[Tjhe economic ideology o f 
the period required both that colonial development be confined to forms o f production 
which would not compete with manufactures and that colonial consumers prefer British 
commodities however uncompetitive (Brett 1973: 75). Colonial industrialisation was 
therefore opposed in preference for the principle o f complementarity and elimination o f 
competition. The prospects o f investing the money surpluses that were accruing to local 
Sudanese in setting up manufactures and industries thus blocked, these surpluses had 
been wasted in conspicuous consumption, flown into more horizontal expansion of 
primary production, or found their way into petty trade as merchant capital, 
appropriating surplus rural labour.
The colonial administration did little to develop traditional rain-fed agriculture, 
especially in those regions away from the Gezira and the Nile strip. The little that was 
done, however, was mainly for a concern o f drawing the produce from the hinterland 
into the market. Therefore, markets were developed and organised in many local towns, 
El-Obeid, En-Nuhud, Um Rwaba, Tendelti, El-Rahad, Deleng, and Kadugli in 
Kordofan. These were linked with the main port by the railway line both to carry
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produce and man-power from the hinterland. Steamer services were also established to 
link the Southern regions with the Port for the same purposes. Other colonial 
developments also included the promotion of sorghum production on the Eastern clay 
plains near Gedarif This development came as a response for the colonial need for food 
supplies to cater for the allies' armies during the war.
In summary, the colonial project in Sudan came as a response to the political needs 
and strategic objectives of the colonial power. There was little concern for integration or 
linkages between the different sectors of the economy, and little concern for regional 
balances and integration into a wider national system. The traditional systems which 
hitherto characterised the Sudanese natural economies, were undergoing profound 
forces o f change under the sway o f capitalist penetration and incorporation into the new 
market exchange relations. The result was that certain regions were being developed as 
modern enclaves, others were left behind. The national governments in the post 
independence era thus came to inherit a situation characterised by deep rifts and 
structural imbalances between regions in terms of economic development, social 
services, levels of health, education and employment, wide income disparities, in 
general standards of living, and most importantly, in the tempo o f social change that 
was accompanying the processes o f modernisation and transformation. In this last 
regard, the central regions - already relatively developed on modern capitalist lines- 
were thus better placed to attain higher levels of development and capital accumulation 
while the other undeveloped regions would relapse even further. The end result is ever 
widening gap between the two sectors leading ultimately to national polarisation 
between the developed and undeveloped; between rich and poor. In the final analysis, 
this is a case o f polarisation and social differentiation between regions and social 
groups. Successive national governments did little to change the situation (Niblock 
1985; Woodward 1986). However, this is not because of ineptitude or sheer self interest, 
as Niblock and Woodward argue, but rather has to be explained in the context of 
Sudan's external relations and influences affecting government's decisions on 
development planning choices.
4- 2- National Rule
4- 2- 1- Post-Independence Era:
A commonly held thesis about Sudanese politics is that successive national 
governments have consistently perused economic and developmental policies that have 
neglected the traditional sectors, fostered regional and social inequalities and ignored 
the interests of the masses o f the peasantry in rural areas for personal or group interests. 
And that these policies have favoured the urban elites o f central/urban Sudan; those
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groups o f merchants, religious and tribal leaders, of military officers and bureaucrats, 
who form the core o f a national bourgeoisie and the guardians o f political power 
throughout the modern history of Sudan since independence (Niblock 1987; Woodward 
1990; Khalid 1985). Niblock, the most prominent proponent o f this thesis, expresses the 
view that:
those who framed government policy were not inclined to undertake a radical reformation 
o f  the country's socio-econom ic structure. The two kinds o f  imbalance or inequality which  
had becom e prominent under the Condominium - differentiating both regions o f  the 
country and social groupings within it - continued and, indeed, became more marked. ...
Those who ruled Sudan over these years sought to develop the country within the socio­
economic structure which they had inherited from the Condominium era, with minor 
changes. The interests o f  the incipient bourgeoisie found expression in the framework set 
by the Sudanese establishment. Ever-deepening problems arose, however, as a result o f  the 
perpetuation and intensification o f  the two critical imbalances in the system (Niblock 1987:
204).
Contrary to this thesis, and conceding the fact that socio-economic structures 
remained unchanged, the present argument offers a different reading of the rationale of 
Sudanese state policies of development. We argue that the Sudanese leaders in the post­
independence period have invariably pursued and maintained the colonial policies and 
structures unchanged for different reasons at different periods under different external 
influences. The present argument challenges the view that personal interests o f the early 
Sudanese leaders have been the primary motivation which underpinned the maintenance 
o f the colonial development planning in the period o f the 1950s and 1960s, but is 
certainly true for the subsequent decades since the military take-over by Nimeiri in 
1969. The present discussion is to argue that the apparent unchanging structure in the 
Sudanese development policy and planning since the colonial period can be understood 
to be a reflection of external influences, and agenda o f development imposed on Sudan 
from outside interests. Instead of a "personal-interest" drive, it is possible to distinguish 
between different driving forces underpinning the political choices and attitudes o f 
political leaders towards social and economic development of the peasantry in the rural 
areas. Three different moods have prevailed in three successive periods which have 
characterised political attitudes towards rural development in Sudan. (1) A first period, 
there had prevailed the same nationalistic feelings which inspired the struggle for 
independence, have also characterised the post-colonial years, and the national policy 
programmes for social and economic development in the 1950s and 1960s came to 
reflect this nationalistic mood. (2) A second period, coincided with the decade of the 
1970s, in which the nationalist fervour gave way to a narrow concern for the politically 
volatile situation in the urban centres, who decide the fate and future political survival 
of governments in Khartoum, gave rise to "urban biased" policies. (3) In the third (and 
current) phase, the concern of the state has shrunk to a concern for its day-to-day
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political survival. We trace these three phases in the changing mood which characterised 
development planning in Sudan in the post-independence era, and in so doing, provide 
the context within which the marginalisation of Kordofan may be explained.
In view of the preponderant role o f the state in the process of capitalist expansion as 
enacted through the various development strategies, it is necessary to examine the 
character of the state, its external connections and ideological persuasions; the 
interactions between the type of development strategies pursued, the internal forces and 
external alliances that influenced the state's decision-making, and the manner in which 
development strategies have been designed and implemented to service external 
interests, as well as the interests of certain internal power blocs at the expense of 
subordinate groups.
4- 2- 1- The First Period: 1950s - 1960s:
4- 2- 1- i- The Character o f the Early Sudanese State:
The early leading political elite was an agglomeration of diverse social groups, but 
who nonetheless was ultimately united as the main hegemonic cultural core by a 
common cause: to lead the struggle for independence and modernisation. The interests 
o f this rather heterogeneous mix were variant and sometimes conflicting. The only 
binding force was a universal commitment to the cause o f independence and national 
state building; although they lack a common ideology that would have informed policy­
making and bound the state to a strict programme of development to follow. However, 
after independence has been achieved, the contradictions inherent in such diverse an 
amalgam makes it difficult to sustain in the years to come. The formation o f a core 
strata in the centre benefited from the liberal attitude of the colonial administration with 
regard to the espoused civil liberties o f expression and political and social organisation. 
The removal o f restrictions on political organisation paved the way for the emergence of 
the "White Flag League", composed mainly of educated Sudanese and comprising other 
nationalist elements: the intelligentsia, a bureaucratic and economic elites, was a 
political organisation o f far-reaching significance; but one which from its inception was 
strongly urban in character. Insofar as its members came to represent different forces in 
the nationalist movement, but a common denominator is their common commitment to 
the national cause, notwithstanding their urban background and aspirations. And when 
these elements subsequently came to dominate the political scene in Sudan, and the 
economic domain, their views and perceptions with regard to social and economic 
development have naturally been influenced by their common aspirations and biases.
The early Sudanese political leaders received an education that was conditioned by 
the intellectual climate prevailing at the day; that underpinned by liberal philosophy and
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thought, it could be hardly surprising that their perceptions concerning social and 
economic development were not in any way different from those o f their departing 
colonial predecessor educators. They thus came to pin their faith in a " laissez-faire" free 
market philosophy and liberal politics. And since they were inspired by the 
"modernisation" theory prevailing at the day, their main concern was a commitment to 
the rapid building of an "advanced and modern" state. The ambitious liberation project 
for advancement and modernisation necessarily required the mobilisation of vast 
national resources for its implementation which can only be generated from the rural 
masses of the peasantry. These were considered to be unavoidable sacrifices to be made 
by the peasantry in the process o f the nation-state building. In this climate, when the 
new social forces assumed political power at independence, they invariably continued 
the same economic development paradigm that had been laid down by the colonial 
administration; namely that of continued support for the core enclaves of economic and 
social development in the Centre o f Sudan, in the Gezira, and along the Banks of the 
Nile; to which core the diverse rural economies in the peripheral regions are 
subordinated to provide cheap labour and cheap resources. In another direction, the 
perceptions and outlook of the emerging urban ruling elites with regard to social and 
economic development involved inherent conflicts, in which they saw themselves as the 
progressive elements in society leading social and economic change to modernisation 
and advance. Consequently, their perceptions towards development of pastoral and 
nomad communities are prejudiced by notions that these communities are kept 
backward by their traditional tribalistic structures and values which are considered to be 
detrimental to progress and modernisation. As a result, policies have been adopted and 
diligently pursued of resettlement and reorganisation of pastoral and nomad 
communities designed to effect permanent transformation of rural communities. For the 
first time, the rural communities witnessed the provision of social services, o f education 
and health, and the politicians were held to be generally accountable to their electorates. 
This explains the rationale for the post-independence policies which squeezed the 
peasantry for the collective "good" o f the nation-state. This is what is referred to in the 
literature by the "collective rational choice" theory (Bates 1981, 1983).
This explains why the early national governments that took over power from the 
colonial administration maintained the colonial economic structures unchanged in order 
to build the state, but which simultaneously also continued to be subservient to the 
interests of the metropolitan power. Successive national governments, however, 
maintained those structures unchanged with different motivations, reflecting the 
changing climate of external influences. The Gezira Scheme, for example, is essentially 
a colonial construct, and has remained so ever since. That is; it has remained essentially 
a project that provides raw material for outside markets. The Sudan economy has for
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long been dependent on cotton exports for its foreign exchange earnings which are vital 
for the process of state-building. The inherent dangers for a monocultural dependent 
economy are all too well known: the risks o f unreliable harvests and yields, the 
unpredictability of external market conditions and price fluctuations, competition from 
other producers, to mention a few constraints. In all, it leaves a legacy o f a precarious 
dependent economy which will be overwhelmed in the event o f turbulent international 
economic conditions and/or the vicissitudes o f internal physical conditions. The piling 
stocks of unsalable cotton as the international cotton market collapses, stands testimony 
to the legacy which bedevils Sudan until today. The question o f why successive national 
governments failed to alter the colonial development structures requires an investigation 
o f the whole planning process in post-independence Sudan.
4- 2- 1- ii- Early National Plans in Sudan:
(The Five-Year & Ten-Year Plans o f Social and Economic Development):
Planning in the Sudan had a chequered history, with ups and downs corresponding to 
political changes taking place in the country and in response to influences from outside. 
Although planning has existed since independence in 1956, it has failed to be 
institutionalised, mainly due to continuing political instability caused by internal as well 
as external factors. Fluctuations in the planning policy caused discontinuities and plans 
were disrupted or abandoned essentially in response to changing political circumstances 
and external alliances. The first plan to be drawn for the Sudan was made in 1946, when 
a Development- Priorities Committee was established to examine the projects launched 
for post war reconstruction and to decide on priorities with regard to their execution. 
The Committee proposed the First Programme of Development (1946-51) consisting o f 
public sector projects amounting to £S (Sudanese Pounds) 13.8,000,000. In 1949, in 
anticipation of the preparation for the independence, the status of the planning 
Organisation was raised to a Capital Expenditure Committee of the Executive Council. 
At the expiry of the First Five Year Plan in 1951, it was considered necessary to re­
organise the planning machinery, in preparation o f the next Five Year Plan. A 
Development Committee, formed from among the members o f the Executive Council 
was created with wider terms of reference. It was required to undertake an overall 
survey of natural and other resources in the Sudan and to make proposals for long-term 
strategies to conserve them and to improve the standard of living of the people. The 
result was the Second Development Programme (1951-56), with an estimated 
investment of £S 24 million. Like the First Programme, the Second one also covered 
only public sector projects. The two Development Programmes led to some significant 
expansion in educational, health and administrative services, and the rural communities 
tasted the fruits o f independence for the first (and last time). From 1956 up to 1960, the
- 130 -
plan was running according to its scheduled programme, and only annual budgets were 
prepared.
The new government of General Abboud which came to power in 1958 through a 
military intervention was anxious to boost up planning and launch more ambitious 
programmes of economic and social development. Accordingly in 1960, a 
comprehensive Ten Year Development Plan (1961-62 1970-71) was drawn with an 
investment of £S 565 million of which the public sector accounted for £S 337 million or 
59.8%, and the private sector £S 228 million or 40.2%. This was expected to generate 
an annual average growth rate of 5.2% in the GDP. An elaborate planning machinery 
was created at different levels to provide the necessary support for the Plan.
4- 2- 1 iii- Implementation of the Plans:
Unfortunately, the Ten Year Plan failed to deliver the goods for the public, 
essentially for political reasons, partly because o f its abrupt suspension in 1964 
following the popular October Revolution, and partly because o f the turbulent political 
climate that followed in the latter 1960s on the assumption o f power o f a parliamentary 
government. The rivalries between political parties, and wranglings over power, 
favouritism, and clientlism, were rampant, and the political leaders became more 
concerned about winning political support than with the implementation of long-term 
planning policies. This led to ineptitude and mismanagement, to the extent that the Plan 
did not produce an official evaluation report. Added to this, timely information from the 
ministries were not forthcoming. The Ministry of Planning reported in 1972 that "It is to 
be noted with concern that many of the ministries and departments do not submit, as 
requested, the underlying reasons and obstacles inhibiting the effective execution of 
their respective projects" (Democratic Republic o f the Sudan 1973: 93).
The Plan failed to materialise, inspite o f the fact that the financial investments were 
maintained; there were serious shortfalls in agricultural and industrial sectors. Lack of 
finance, or at least the domestic finance which is often cited as a major reason for the 
shortfalls in targets, was not a problem in the Sudan during the Ten Year Plan period. 
The causes of the failure o f the Plan were obviously political rather than financial or 
administrative, having to do with the predominance of a new type o f politics; of 
clientlism and favouritism to ally certain powerful urban interests in the centre o f power 
whose support was indispensable in the hot political climate after the dissipation o f the 
unifying force which characterised the liberation struggle. From this time on, the forces 
o f power became conscious of the political danger of the urban populations. The 
resultant popular discontent about the government failure paved the way for the military 
take-over under the leadership of Nimeiri in May 1969.
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4- 2-1-  iv- Taxing the Peasantry for Sate-Building:
Although traditional agriculture remains the major contributor to the national 
economy in terms of the rates o f returns of foreign exchange earnings, its supply of 
labour (of 70%), and its contribution to GDP (of about 40%), it continued to be taxed 
heavily in order to subsidise and expand other sectors o f the economy, especially the 
modern agricultural sectors and industry that are deemed necessary for the building of 
the modem Sudanese state. Therefore, we see that shortly after the departure o f the 
colonial administration, the Gezira Scheme was nationalised and enlarged considerably 
with the opening up o f the Managil Extension. In the Ten-Year Plan of Economic and 
Social Development (1961/2 - 1970/1), the concern was still focused exclusively on 
large-scale projects. In this Plan, cotton production figured high in the priorities as 
evidenced in the new extensions. And a recognition of the risks inherent in the 
dependency on the cotton monoculture, induced a shift in planning towards 
intensification and diversification o f production to include wheat and groundnuts 
(Shaeeldin 1986, Abdel Salam 1986). Mechanised farming was also considerably 
expanded. Large tracts o f land (of 1500 farm units each) have been allocated to groups 
of agrarian farmers, bureaucrats, and some army officers following the government 
take-over of the private cotton schemes along the Nile with generous compensations to 
the owners who then saw the opportunity o f investing their money in mechanised food 
production. Under the circumstances, the Mechanised Farming Corporation was set up 
in 1968 to regulate the farming allocations and to cater for the investment needs in the 
new projects. This period also witnessed the proliferation o f agro-industries such as 
sugar plants, oil mills, flour mills and textile industries, reasonably distributed 
throughout the country. The capital investment costs for the plan were envisaged to 
come mainly from domestic sources both private and public. The public sources were to 
be drawn from budget surpluses which recorded about S$ 60 million at the beginning of 
the plan. About 26% of the total required finance was expected to come from external 
sources (Gad Karim 1988).
It is in this context that we can understand the lack o f concern for and neglect o f the 
rural producers in traditional sector in Kordofan. According to the Plan, the traditional 
sector has been accorded only a subsidiary role to provide the necessary cheap labour 
force required for the modern sectors; and also as a permanent pool o f cheap sources of 
exportable products that are necessary to generate the foreign exchange earnings to 
subsidise the modern capitalist ventures.
External influences had little role in the early independence period. Until about the 
end of the 1960s, investment capital was in the main derived from domestic sources. 
International capital was limited to the domains of commerce and the import/export
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trade. In the Ten Year Plan, private foreign investment was about £S 22 million, coming 
to only 4% of total investment. Foreign capital investment did not have a decisive edge 
on domestic politics during this period. However, since about the late 1960s, and in the 
subsequent decades, external interests were to have a commanding voice in domestic 
politics, and planning options.
External influences fell on a fertile soil, since the conflicting interests within the 
ruling establishment turned into intense political rivalries between the two major 
political parties; the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) which came 
to dominate Sudanese political life. The Umma Party derives immense political support 
from its broad bases o f the Ansar, especially in Western Sudan and White Nile 
provinces. The leadership o f the Umma Party in the Centre represents the interests of 
the indigenous agrarian bourgeoisie. The DUP, on the other hand, derives its support 
from the Khatmayia bases, especially in Eastern and Northern Sudan provinces. The 
leadership o f the DUP in its turn, represents the interests o f the merchant capitalist 
groups (Woodward 1991, 1988, Niblock 1985, Ali 1991, O'Neil 1985; O'Brien 1985). 
The political rivalries, the conflicting interests, and the wranglings over state control 
and spoils arising from them have plagued the Sudanese political environment, and 
favouritism and clientele politics started to emerge, all favouring strong urban interests. 
The central core elite which led the cause for independence, now distanced from the 
concerns of the ordinary people, became more conscious of their own affiliations and 
stakes in power. Pressures thus came from different quarters. Divergent forces of both 
local and external origins; o f capitalists and local industrialists came to push in different 
directions; each demanding for favourable investment conditions thus added further 
complications to the entangled mix o f the Sudanese politics. In this climate, the 
organisation and promotion o f the Industrial Development Act (1967) came as a 
response to pressures from the industrialist lobby. The Act made big provisions and 
generous concessions aimed at fostering industrial development by supporting 
industrialists at the expense of the masses o f the rural poor producers. The wranglings 
and conflicts between these factions plagued political practice and seriously damaged 
the government credibility and undermined the people's confidence in it as the discords 
became all too flagrant. The country was running into economic difficulties and political 
gloom. Those were the circumstances which prompted the military to seize power by the 
Free Officers Organisation led by General Nimeiri in May 1969.
4- 2 - 2 -  T h e  S e c o n d  P e r i o d :  19 7 0 s :
In the second stage, the grand hopes of the post-independence era dissipated, and 
gave way to disillusionment as the battle for independence which inspired all the 
nationalistic fervour had been completed, and the rulers and ruled came face to face with
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the realities of the internal situation. This second stage which coincided with the decade 
o f the 1970s, witnessed a true "urban bias" which in fact started since the late 1960s, 
and came to characterise political attitudes and decisions on social and economic 
development. The change can be understood in the context of the interplay between the 
national and international power relations. The decade o f the 1970s witnessed the height 
o f the neo-imperialist era and the linkages o f the weaker economies to the international 
capitalist system through a strategy o f aid and trade. During this period the capitalist 
centres o f power strongly encouraged policies o f urbanisation, since urbanisation was 
considered "good for big business", big projects, dams, electricity and power generation, 
telecommunication infrastructure, highways, the car industry, the international food 
industry, etc. As a consequence, aid has been tied to services and infrastructural projects 
favouring urbanisation and the urban elites, with the negative bias o f reinforcing the gap 
between the centre and the rural peripheries. And insofar as the leaders of political 
power are mostly from urban backgrounds, they hailed the new trends with joyous 
enthusiasm. The "urban bias" approaches which have characterised development 
policies during the period o f the 1970s are however more correctly to be understood in 
their proper context as "externally imposed" agenda of development, than a deliberate 
choice of the urban-based ruling elites. The national state development policies during 
this stage exploited the peasantry and the rural masses extortionately not for the benefit 
of the state, as in the first stage, but for the benefit of powerful urban elites; economic, 
bureaucratic, industrialist, agrarian elites, who became locked in the hot pursuit o f the 
spoils of the state coming from externally-financed and supported development projects. 
This period offered no benefits or returns for the rural masses as had characterised the 
period before it. This stage can best be described by a process o f massive drain and 
transfer o f resources from the periphery to the centre, which explains the wholesale 
impoverisation of the rural communities and the enrichment o f the urban-based elites. It 
is this impoverisation and exploitation that ultimately translated into widespread rural 
poverty and made the local populations extremely vulnerable to conditions of stress and 
famines. The Nimeiri era passed through two distinct phases: in the first phase planning 
policies followed a strict socialist orientation groomed by the Eastern Block; then 
followed by a complete reversal towards a strict capitalist market economy patroned by 
the West.
The Nimeiri government in 1969 had a new agenda and a radical vision for change 
embracing a socialist model o f change and development. A broad coalition of forces; 
workers' unions, farmers’ organisations, professional trade unions, tenants, and national 
capitalists, all came to play a vital role in the society and in the economy hailing the 
new socialist spirit and championed by the new government. The coming of the new 
government ushered a new era of centralised comprehensive planning. Under its
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socialist programme o f economic and social development, the government gave plan­
ning a prominent place in the governmental hierarchy. The government control over 
the economy increased considerably through large scale nationalisation o f private 
industrial, commercial and banking enterprises. A new full-fledged Ministry o f 
Planning was created for co-ordinating the work o f the next Five Year Plan. A team o f 
Russian experts was attached to the Ministry o f  Planning and a number o f  Sudanese 
intellectuals sympathising with the Communists, were put in prominent positions in the 
planning Organisation.
4- 2- 2- i- The Five Year Plan (1970-71 -1974-75):
The Five Year Plan (1970-71 - 1974-75) which was almost entirely the creation o f 
the Russian team o f planning experts aimed at an investment o f £S. 385 million and an 
average annual growth rate o f 7.6% in the GDP. The highest priority in the Plan was 
given to services and construction accounting for 33.3% o f the expenditure, followed 
by agriculture (27.6%), industry (15.7%), transport and communications (15.7%). 
However, the Plan did not live its full life, as dramatic political events caused a radical 
transformation in the spirit and direction o f the plan. In July 1971, the stated 
involvement o f  the Communist Party in the attempted coup against Nimeiri by Hashim 
Al Ata, put a halt to the ascendancy o f planning. The Russian planning team was 
forced to leave and a number o f senior officials associated with planning were 
"purged.", and the status o f the planning Organisation was downgraded. Although as a 
result o f  these political events, the Five Year Plan (1970/71 - 1974/75) was not 
completely abandoned, it lost its force leading to deterioration in the achievement o f 
targets. Partly to meet the new needs o f self-sufficiency and partly to demonstrate a 
break with the earlier strategy of the Five Year Plan, an Interim Action Programme 
(1973-77) consisting o f a number o f schemes to make the country self-sufficient in 
sugar, textiles, jute, etc. was superimposed on the Five Year Plan in December, 1973.
Table 1 5-Year Plan Initial & Revised Investment Allocation (£S. million)
SECTOR INITIAL PLAN REVISED PLAN
Private Public Total % Private Public Total %
Agricultural 26.5 80.0 106.5 27.6 26.5 124.5 151.0 25.0
Industrial 2 .4 .0 36.4 60.4 15.7 24.0 67.8 91.2 15.1
Transport & Communication 31 .,0 29.6 60.6 15.7 31.0 129.3 160.3 26.6
Power - 12.8 12.8 3.4 - 18.6 18.6 3.1
Services & Construction -88.6 44.1 132.6 34.4 88.5 72.2 160.7 26.7
Technical Assistance - 9.8 9.8 2.5 - 11.9 11.9 2.0
General Research & Southern - 2.3 2.3 0.7 - 9.2 9.2 1.5
Region
TOTAL 170.0 215.0 385.0 100.0 170.0 432.0 602.9 100.0
Source: Econom ic Survey 1973: 111.
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Consequently the investment o f the Plan was increased to S£ 603,000,000 and its 
period extended to terminate in December 1977. The priorities in the process have also 
changed, as is evident from the following investment allocations: On the "Rahad 
Project", against the plan allocation o f S£ 40,374,000, only 2,460,790 were spent in 
70-74; the Department o f Industry's performance was S£. 8,046,202 out o f 
S£ 107,660,000; in the Sudan Railways which are often blamed for holding up the pace 
o f development, out o f  the Five Year Plan allocation o f S£. 47,954,266, only S£ 
7,845,748 were spent in 71-74. In the financial year 74-75 an allocation o f 22,000,000 
was earmarked which meant, what the Railways spent in 4 years, they were now 
required to spend three times that amount in one year. Unless some major 
administrative and technical changes take place, this effort is considered by many as 
beyond the present capabilities o f that organisation. The story o f the Roads 
Department is also not different. Their performance was 9,037,967 out o f an allocation 
o f S£ 129,274,000. The only Ministry whose allocation and expenditure matched was 
the Ministry o f Finance. Commenting on the sectoral performance, the Economic 
Survey (1971) remarked that out o f "327 projects envisaged for construction in 1971- 
72, only 228 o f them were under execution. Only 131 projects o f the latter have 
utilised less than 30 per cent o f the annual allocations. Using less than 30 per cent 
executions as a measure.
It is necessary to examine the structure and organisation o f the Sudanese military 
establishment in order to appreciate and understand the direction o f the Five Year Plan 
o f 1970/1 - 1974/5 and whose interests it is likely to serve. The army officers who 
seized power following the coup d'etat in May 1969, as generals o f  the military 
institution- in fact were themselves members from the privileged urban strata o f the 
Sudanese society, and were therefore mostly kins o f  the dominant central riverine 
groups. This has become an established power structure characterising the Sudanese 
military institution; namely that the ranks o f officers and generals has traditionally been 
recruited from amongst the members o f the urban strata o f  central riverine Sudan, 
whereas the mass o f  the rank and file o f the army have traditionally been recruited 
from among those from peripheral marginalised regions, especially from the Western 
and Southern regions (Umbadah 1988). The military therefore can be seen as having a 
strong urban base with connection to the dominant civilian political establishment. This 
indeed explains the universal phenomenon in Sudanese political history o f the cyclical 
alternation between urban-based civilian and military rule, such that the shifts in power 
from the one to the other have never moved away from the urban-based groups, and 
has never represented the interests o f the rural masses in any true sense. This in turn
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explains why there has not been a radical departure from old power structures, but what 
can be understood as temporary transfers in the general rules of the game within the 
urban-based dominant power bloc itself This has been done in different circumstances 
either through tacit approval, connivance, and in certain cases by actual handing over of 
power to the military. The import o f such cyclical transfers within the dominant ruling 
urban class in the centre is to ensure the firm and permanent grip o f the dominant 
establishment over the reigns of power, alternatively mediated between its civilian and 
military organs. Military intervention to seize power, therefore, functions for civilian 
governments as a safety valve to maintain the status-quo when this is threatened by 
pressures and demands from below, and thereby defend precisely the interests of the 
dominant hegemonic groups of North-central Sudan. At critical times when pressures 
and demands from the marginalised groups prove too great and irreconcilable with the 
perceived hegemonic ideology; demands that nonetheless cannot be dismissed in a 
democratic environment of rule, and the status-quo is put into jeopardy, civilian leaders 
of the political establishment repeatedly resorted to the military to bring matters to a 
dramatic military conclusion.
It is in this context of the social bases of political and military power that we can 
aspire to analyse and understand the orientation of different development and economic 
policies, and in effect the interests of the social forces underpinning them. Going back to 
the early years of the Nimeiri military regime and its ostensibly proclaimed socialist 
model of development, the Five Year Plan of 1970/1- 1974/5 reflects the interests of the 
social forces that formed the new government. In broad terms, the salient features of the 
Plan emphasised a commitment to a socialist centrally-planned economy, with the 
public sector accorded a leading role in development. The private sector was seen as a 
subsidiary component and was envisaged to contribute about S£ 170,000,000 o f total 
investment over the plan period (Gad Karim 1988). The main targets o f the Plan were 
the expansion of exports and a favourable balance of trade to be achieved through 
bilateral trade agreements and capital investment loans (estimated at S£ 110,000,000) 
between Sudan and socialist states and Arab and friendly countries. The Plan also 
emphasised food self-sufficiency. These policy goals were to be achieved through 
massive horizontal expansion in agriculture, large-scale farms, agro-industries, and 
import substitution. The old biases laid since the colonial period were obvious in the 
Plan. In that the producers in the traditional sector, as in Kordofan, were again 
neglected; the bias being in favour of large-scale projects concentrated in the Central 
and Eastern regions which were already relatively advanced economically and socially. 
This had the further effect o f reinforcing the already widening regional imbalances; 
further intensifying the processes of polarisation and social differentiation. Issues such 
as equitable distribution o f incomes and spatial distribution of development projects
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were given little attention. In practice, however, none o f the spills that were to accrue 
from the Plan, was intended for the subsistence producers. The old colonial bias against 
traditional subsistence agriculture continued unchanged. Indeed, subsistence producers 
were envisaged to contribute to the fostering of the Plan by way of massive increases in 
cash crop production, especially in groundnuts. A necessary prerequisite for this to 
come about was to be through increased monetisation of social and production relations 
in the countryside. This in turn required considerable finance capital flows into the rural 
towns in order to draw the rural produce into the market. Therefore, funds from both 
public and private sources were mediated through the mercantile chain and extended to 
merchants in regional towns and from these to local village traders.
The policy of horizontal agricultural expansion (in irrigated, mechanised and 
traditional subsectors) was soon to have grave harmful environmental consequences as 
manifested in ecological degradation, soil erosion, declining yields, and a generalised 
rapid deterioration and depletion o f the natural resource base on which the rural 
communities depend for livelihood. As yields continued to fall, the tendency among 
farmers was to expand into marginal lands in quest for bigger harvests to offset the 
shortfall in yields. It is only in the Six Year Plan o f Economic and Social Development 
19777/8 - 1982/3 that the crisis of traditional agriculture and environmental degradation 
became political issues of concern. It is only in this Plan, that government planners 
recognised explicitly the importance of traditional agriculture to the development 
objectives as a whole. In practice, however, "the allocation of public funds did not 
reflect the new insight" (Wohlmuth 1991: 439).
In the first two years o f the Nimeiri rule; the traditional political establishment were 
resentful o f the socialist orientation o f the state. And they were especially anxious about 
the nationalisation and confiscations which have affected some of the factions of the 
bourgeoisie. The Mahdists staged a revolt against the regime in Aba Island in early 1971 
led by late Imam El Hadi El Mahdi. The revolt was brutally put down. This event 
largely alienated the broad bases of the Ansar of the Umma Party whose strongholds are 
in Kordofan and DarFur in Western Sudan. These considerations no doubt jaundiced 
the outlook of the Nimeiri government towards the peoples o f Kordofan (and Western 
Sudan generally) who were considered dangerous pockets of regressive sectarianism, of 
resistance and opposition to the new social forces. Such apprehensions and fears, 
overlaid with historical racial prejudice, may have influenced the decision-making 
process against the Western provinces over issues o f development, equity, and resource 
allocation. The neglect and marginalisation of Kordofan in the share of national 
resource allocation during the Nimeiri era were to be understood in this context. The 
processes o f polarisation between regions and social classes already pronounced have 
been accelerated tremendously.
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The socialist experiment did not last for long, as important political turbulence 
brought it to an abrupt end. As part of the continuing struggle for control over state 
power, a communist-led coup within the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) led 
by General Hashim El Ata seized power in 19 July 1971. But the coup lasted only for 
three days. The coup was aborted mainly due to external influences, in particular the 
crucial role played by Lonrho and its Director; Tiny Rowland who possibly caught wind 
o f the events from Western Intelligence sources, helped Nimeiri regain control (Cronje, 
Ling and Cronje 1976: 178-83). The leaders o f the coup were executed with some 
brutality. In retaliation, Nimeiri immediately expelled the Russian advisers, and 
relations with the Eastern bloc rapidly deteriorated. This event marked Nimeiri's round 
swing to the Western bloc, especially towards the United States (Barnett 1988; Gad 
Karim 1988; Hussein 1988; Gordon 1991; Brown 1991; Woodward 1991; Shaadin 
1986). From then on, Nimeiri moved Sudan progressively further into the Western orbit 
in general, and towards the US in particular. The sole political party, the Sudanese 
Socialist Union (SSU) became socialist in name only. The economic policies became 
increasingly laissez-faire, particularly in the latter years when Nimeiri copied Reagan 
and Thatcher by embarking on a sweeping programme of privatisation and selling out of 
state assets (Gurdon 1991: 18).
The defeat suffered by the socialist and communist elements paved the way for the 
complete and uncontested control over the state by elements of the urban-based petty 
bourgeoisie; merchant capitalists, factions of the bureaucracy in alliance with the 
military. The period between 1971 and 1976, following the destruction o f opposition 
forces and the weakening o f left-wing elements, was a period of continued consolidation 
and build-up of the new political hegemonic forces. Concomitant with this was a 
departure from the early socialist-oriented policies and a reorientation of state policies 
towards a more orthodox capitalist line o f development. Thus new development plans 
were reformulated to reflect the new trends; in 1972 in the forms of the Interim 
Programme of Action. This was intended to be a preparatory programme which 
eventually paved the way for a "more conducive atmosphere for foreign investment" 
(Barnett 1988: 6). The first steps taken towards creating this "conducive atmosphere" to 
attract foreign investment, involved a programme of denationalisation, suppression of 
trade unions, and the promulgation o f new investment acts. These steps were considered 
necessary prerequisites leading to the next more crucial stage o f the "open door policy" 
in which the Sudan economy and society were to be more forcefully integrated into the 
world capitalist system through the linkages of local merchant capital to be nurtured in 
order to mediate international capital flows (Gad Karim 1988). This mediation between 
national and international interests has been the function o f the state and the social 
forces controlling it. As Lawrence observes:
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it is increasingly clear that the character o f  domestic class relations and the balance o f  
political forces within the ruling strata play the key role in determining the degree to which 
external economic interests are well represented. ... Alliances between national and 
international capital and between international capital and the local state act as a vehicle for 
continued external domination (Lawrence 1986:5).
Nimeiri's pro-Western right swing marked the beginning of the marriage between 
domestic Sudanese interests and external capital interests. Initially, the move required 
the build up o f a new power base, centred around the personality of Nimeiri as national 
leader towering over the traditional sectarian leaders of both the Mahdists and the 
Khatmayia. A power base that also simultaneously counterbalanced the political weight 
and influence o f traditional sectarian parties which were considered to be inimical 
political rivals to the hegemony of the new forces. The dual objective for a new power 
base to create a new national leader and a new dominant political establishment in its 
own right that undercuts traditional power bases required investment funds to create the 
new power base politically and to foster it economically. The SSU was formed up by a 
Presidential decree and allowed to function as the sole political forum in the country. 
The SSU was a hierarchical political structure o f a plethora of feeder tributaries 
permeating at every level of the society; from village councils, district councils, farmers' 
associations, workers' unions, youth and women organisations, students’ unions, the 
regular forces, all to feed into the central structure o f the SSU which is ultimately 
accountable to and in absolute control in the hands of the President. The SSU as the sole 
political organisation of the new hegemonic forces required that it be fostered and 
sustained economically if it was to stand to its assigned role o f superseding traditional 
sectarian parties
During this period, Kordofan continued to be neglected, politically marginalised and 
economically exploited for the benefit of the urban-based forces comprising the ruling 
elites (the functionaries of the SSU). Kordofan fell out of favour with the Nimeiri 
regime since it was considered to be the stronghold of sectarian politics and to host 
dissident elements of the Ansar. This period witnessed the mushrooming of the state 
marketing boards (the Gum Arabic Company, the Oilseeds Company, the Livestock and 
Meat Marketing Corporation) which all dealt with marketing of Kordofan produce. The 
main objective for establishing these state parastatals was to appease powerful and 
dangerous urban interests whose support was vital for the political survival o f the 
leadership. It is interesting to note that this period also witnessed massive inflows of 
tied foreign aid, especially American aid to Sudan; notably in wheat and wheat flour 
intended for the satisfaction o f the "refined food taste" o f the Sudanese urban milieaux. 
Accordingly, members of the SSU gained in economic power by all means, legitimate 
and illegitimate with the active backing of the state and other external influences, 
especially the USA, the UK, Egypt and the Arab Gulf States. The SSU had a free hand
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in the running of the economy. The state's executive and the President took on the real 
powers o f the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Sudan (Ali 1982). In order to do so, 
the government took various amendments designed to dilute and overstep institutional 
procedures. An example is the various amendments to item 57 of the Bank of Sudan Act 
which regulates Central Government borrowing. Ali (1982) observes that "[i]n 1973 the 
Bank o f Sudan Act was amended ... to bring the Bank of Sudan under the umbrella of 
the Ministry of Finance and National Planning. This had the effect o f weakening the 
powerful position the Heads of the Central Bank enjoyed". And that the new appointed 
Governors of the Bank o f Sudan became part of the "general mood at the time", and 
seemed to enjoy the status of ministers with all the convenience of communicating 
directly with the Head of the Revolutionary Command Council (Ibid; 22-3).
4- 2 - 3 -  Th e  Th ir d  P e r io d : f r o m  L a  t e  1 9 7 0 s  to  P r e s e n t
In the third stage which includes the contemporary period, "urban bias" policies gave 
way to the "politics o f corruption" and "political survival" which have characterised the 
attitudes o f the Sudanese polities since the late 1970s. This is also not in complete 
isolation from external influences. The aid and trade programme which has been 
promoted by the Western powers, especially the USA's PL 840 programme, has led to a 
development fiasco, and resulted into a crippling debt burden on Sudan, estimated by 
the end of the 1980s to have amounted to US$ 13 billion. The worsening economic 
crisis that ensued, has exposed the political leaderships to enormous economic and 
political pressures from within and without. And in a realistic sense, the leaderships 
could not have survived politically without some sort o f external support, which can 
only be conditional to follow prescribed policy options. In such critical situations, the 
political leadership in Sudan, under Nimeiri at the time, completely aligned itself to its 
external supporters against the interests of the masses inside the country. The policy 
programmes which came to be implemented have been the dictates o f foreign power 
interests, which had to be negotiated behinds closed doors. Corruption became rampant 
as a result, and the numerous popular uprisings and protestations, have been duly 
suppressed with savage brutality; and the government's main concern has become its 
day-to-day survival than any concern with the issues of development or the welfare of 
the people, it is in this context that the rural masses have been most neglected and 
exploited to "death" since they posed no threats to the political power in the centre. And 
when the famine finally came, the rural masses were already too poor, too exposed, too 
vulnerable, and too weak either to forestall its effects, or make their voices heard in the 
centre o f power, the political leaders can simply ignore their plight. In the context where 
policies have become expedient measures for political survival, the rural populations in
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Kordofan have simply been neglected and left to their fate since they posed no threats to 
the political survival of those holding the reigns of power. That helps explain why when 
the news of the famine in rural Kordofan in 1983/5 finally reached Khartoum, the 
authorities simply turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to the in-coming news. Even during 
times of democratic rule, forms of representation under parliamentary democracy failed 
to articulate the local people's aspirations and translate these into realities, nor their 
voices heard in Khartoum-, since party politicians were locked in endless manoeuvres 
and rivalries, and the pursuit of day-to-day political survival rather than with the 
concerns o f long-term development and the welfare o f local communities.
From then on, the economy was run to all intents and purposes to what amounted to a 
purposeful creation o f a new capitalist class, and the period could more accurately be 
described as the "politics o f corruption and political survival". This new class was to be 
state-built quickly and be made vastly wealthy with the help o f the international donor 
community. The creation o f this new capitalist class was to act both as a potent 
countervailing and destructive force to the already weakened, yet not altogether 
eradicated, socialist and communist elements. And, simultaneously, as a leading force 
towards capitalist transformation with a faith and commitment to the free market 
ideology. It is not surprising to observe that a new ethos was emerging among members 
of the new social forces who were the guardians o f the new capitalist ideology 
assimilating a new culture o f American-styled consumerism (Sudanow 1978). The 
international donor community through the agency of the state have pushed this trend 
upwards. The social forces that were leading this process o f capitalist transformation 
were corrupted by the big spoils of money spilling by so many different ways of corrupt 
practices. The economics o f the period can more accurately be described as the 
"economics o f corruption". President Nimeiri disclosed to his intimate circle in private 
that his is a time for riches and quick wealth for those who can play their cards wittingly 
(personal communication). Khalid (1985) recounts the inside story o f the flurid details 
of the drama at the genesis of economic corruption and the emaciation o f institutions.
At the time that the Arab states agreed to channel large amounts o f money to Sudan 
as part of a pan-Arab strategy to turn the Sudan into the "breadbasket" o f the Arab world 
(see below), corruption on a large-scale and mismanagement o f funds took place. The 
actors in this "grotesque drama" of corruption included Adnan Khashoggi, the arch 
wheeler-dealer, and the top officials in the People's Palace, Dr. Idris being the master­
mind of all deals with the tacit approval of President Nimeiri. A  Salim Eisa, a journalist 
in Beirut did Sudan the disservice o f bringing in Adnan Khashoggi supposedly to 
exploit its potential for development. But Adnan is a known corrupter. He contributed to 
Nixon's Presidential campaign to the tune of US$ 50,000, and one o f Nixon's daughters 
received a bracelet worth US$ 30,000 from Soraya Khashoggi, Adnan's wife {Khalid
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1985: 94). The American Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Multinational 
Corporations investigated Adrian's handling o f military sales to Saudi Arabia (Ibid). The 
Sudanese ambassador to the United States wrote extensively to Khartoum on Adnan. 
But President Nimeiri was not impressed. Adnan won the President's confidence and 
friendship; a friendship which cost him little by way of a few trips for the President o f 
the Sudan aboard the 727 and DC9 Khashoggi's private planes, fuelled at the Sudanese 
Treasury's expenses, and some cruises in his yacht, the "Nabeela", so named after his 
daughter (Ibid). With the help of President Nimeiri and the Minister of Special affairs; 
Dr. Idris, Khashoggi opened an office for his Company TRIAD in Khartoum, 
employing a number o f lawyers and professors to compile and analyse data on Sudan’s 
potentialities for investment. TRIAD was well-placed to come up with offers for all 
government projects, planned or under construction. Adnan's first move came when in 
1972 Saudi Arabia agreed to extend to Sudan a guarantee for a US$ 200,000,000 loan. 
Adnan proposed to the "inner circle" in Khartoum that if  he is allowed to manage the 
US$ 200,000,000, he will be able to attract US$ 1000,000,000 for the Sudan. "From 
then on it was not the smaller fry but the sharks who went into business" (Ibid: 93). 
Adnan, given the go-ahead from the President, went on to negotiate a loan syndicated by 
no less than thirty-one European banks, carrying a high fluctuating rate of interest which 
reached to 16% in one year, short-term repayable over seven years with three years 
grace period. In addition, it carried a commitment charge o f o.5% on undisbursed 
amounts, and another 0.75% semi-annual interest rate. Adnan himself received a 2% 
commission which came to US$ 4,000,000. The loan could have been secured on much 
lenient terms; lower rate of interest, with longer repayment and grace periods, had it 
been handled institutionally. This is only an example to illustrate the extent of 
corruption and mismanagement o f the Sudanese affairs. During this period, the SSU, the 
single state-sponsored party became a symbol of corruption. An observer concludes that 
”[i]n short, the SSU became a symbol o f corruption and privilege; and the party was run 
by people whose interests and those o f Nimeiri were intertwined" (Al-Shahi 1991: 151). 
The SSU later incorporated elements o f the traditional parties after the National 
Reconciliation, only to make the spills more pervasive.
Coincidentally, it is during this period that Sudan was hailed as a possible bread 
basket for the Arab world, and indeed a world granary. This has animated great interest 
in the future prospects in Sudan and consequently attracted huge sums of money from 
outside. That coincided with an important trend in the international economic climate; 
namely the new ingenious strategy of recycling the accumulated petro-dollars that have 
accrued from the boom in the international oil industry. These surpluses, already 
accumulating in Western financial institutions, are to be recycled through the IMF and 
World Bank to developing countries (including Sudan) ostensibly for the purposes of
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development. The huge surpluses that were accumulating were threatening the stability 
o f the international monetary system; and which therefore called into question the 
ability of the international market system to absorb these surpluses without creating 
grave problems. A need for reassessing and restructuring the international monetary 
system was then called for. Thus the idea o f recycling was conceived, which essentially 
implies that surplus money be allowed to flow to developing countries in forms of 
Western technology transfers, capital goods and expertise to lead economic growth and 
social development in the third world in a fashion akin to that of the American Marshall 
Plan for post-war Europe. That is; the injection of massive investment capital that would 
lead economic revival and eventual take-off for third world underdeveloped economies. 
The net outcomes o f the "recycling" strategy was that it did not achieve its stated goals 
of leading to economic revival and development in the third world. On the contrary; it 
led instead to universal stagnation and economic decline and a debt burden that is 
paralysing third world economies. What the strategy did achieve, however, is help 
salvage, though temporarily, the crisis in the Western capitalist economies, especially 
that of the USA, through the massive purchases o f capital goods and technological 
inputs channelled to the third world. What the strategy did create is a deep global 
polarisation between rich and poor nations, the North/South divide, and another 
polarisation/social differentiation within the respective aid recipient states of the third 
world; thus creating rich and poor social classes. The aid flows and the resultant debt, 
have created rich capitalist classes and poor marginalised worker classes, both linked to 
the international capitalist system. In Sudan, these processes o f polarisation and 
differentiation are the more apparently evident and pronounced during the sixteen years 
of Nimeiri rule. But it is more accurately true that the origins o f these processes are to be 
located in the structural relations of the international capitalist system in its totality.
The period of the 1970s was a period when the politics o f corruption became the 
norm. The new emerging hegemonic forces in Sudan under Nimeiri, came to take 
effective control over the state following the destruction of the opposing socialist and 
Mahdist forces in 1971 (Barnett, 1988; Okoje 1983). Their control over state power was 
exercised exclusively to further their own interests and material gains. It was becoming 
commonplace the stories of corruption, o f commissions and misuse of public funds o f 
the huge amounts o f money that were flowing into the country from the international 
donor community (Khalid 1985, 1991). The new hegemonic class which was emerging 
under the tutelage of the state comprised diverse elements of the petty bourgeoisie; "of 
merchants, traders and commission men [who] took almost exclusive control of social 
and political power, and thus o f the state, for its own ends. This class focusing on its 
own needs for accumulation and conspicuous consumption, and amply encouraged by 
the United States, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom, for their own strategic and
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commercial purposes" (Barnett 1988: 3). This is the ruling class that was to lead the 
Sudanese society through the very critical and decisive years of the 1970s and 1980s; 
the years o f international upheavals of great magnitude; o f economic crises, food crises, 
oil crises and a gathering international economic recession.
4- 2- 4- Foreign Involvement:
The external influences on the character and policy choices of the modern Sudanese 
sate have been extensive. This has included the role played by the colonial power, and 
the British-style liberal attitudes towards economic development, to pro-Eastern 
socialist, then to pro-Western capitalist orientations o f the state. These external power 
influences have left their remarkable impress on the political choices and approaches to 
social and economic development throughout its modern history. The character of the 
state therefore cannot be treated in isolation from the external forces influencing it. It is 
therefore more correct to consider the policy choices with regard to questions of social 
and economic development of rural communities as a partnership between the nation 
state and its external allies who can be different at different times. The Nimeiri regime 
became an ally to both East and West who left- in turn- their indelible impress on 
politics and development. It is during Nimeiri's pro-Western overturn following the 
expulsion of Russian experts after the left-wing-led aborted coup that foreign 
involvement in domestic Sudanese affairs became an integral part in the running of the 
state.
Lonrho's role has been crucial in helping Nimeiri regain control after the communist- 
led coup. This role has given Lonrho a leading role in the reorientation of the country 
towards the capitalist bloc, especially facilitating the articulation of British and US 
businesses and firms in the country's development share. Lonrho mediated in resolving 
the sticking question o f compensation arrangements between the Government of Sudan 
and Britain for the British companies which have been nationalised in 1971. It also 
facilitated the negotiation of a £10 million credit arrangement between the Government 
o f Sudan and Britain's Export Credit Guarantee Department. For its own immediate 
business interests, Lonrho was rewarded by appointing it as the sole agent for the 
Government purchases of capital and semi capital goods in the UK. It also secured in 
1972 the position of the major European partner in the joint venture of the giant Kenana 
Sugar Scheme (Gad Karim 1988: 42-3). Following these initial arrangements, Sudan's 
relations with the Western capitalist powers were restored. Nimeiri visited the UK early 
in 1973. Diplomatic relations with the US were resumed in 1972 after having been 
severed in 1967 in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war. Relations with the Arab Gulf 
States improved as a tribute to the heavy-handedness with which the government has 
dealt with the communists, and its general new direction o f foreign policy away from
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the socialist bloc. These developments and the key role to be played by external 
influences, notably by the US, Britain and the rich Arab States, as we shall see later, is 
to have a decisive impact and to leave an indelible impression on the future shape of 
Sudan's economy and society.
No sooner had diplomatic relations with the US been restored, than the latter 
insinuated to Nimeiri the adoption of an "open door policy", on lines akin to that of the 
Egyptian Infitah policy. The "open door policy" was meant to abolish government's 
central control over the economy and to open the country to international capital 
investment. This has implied the promulgation of several acts and political moves 
designed to create a more "conducive environment" to attract foreign capital. The 
Interim Programme o f Action was promulgated to carry out the new policy objectives.
On another political plain, moreover, Western powers led by the US, Britain and to 
some extent France played an important role in mediating a peace settlement regarding 
the Southern Sudan civil war between the government and the leaders o f the Southern 
movement. The USA persuaded Nimeiri to settle the Southern problem on the 
understanding that the continuing state o f war undermines peace and stability and 
therefore is not "conducive" to the era o f international foreign investment. If the new 
redirection of the capitalist expansion were to be carried out in a more conducive 
environment, the conditions for peace and stability were to be created by ending the 
war. Thus, subtle diplomatic activity and political suasion inside Sudan between the 
Nimeiri Government and the Southern political leaders, and outside Sudan involving the 
USA, Britain, France, Egypt, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia, exerting pressures on the 
contesting sides, all in the end brought the long-awaited fruits of peace enshrined in the 
Addis Ababa Peace Accord in 1972. The USA and Britain were vigilant to see the peace 
agreement carried through, therefore have assisted no less generously in the invisible 
financial costs needed to bring in line the yet recalcitrant reluctant leaders o f the 
movement. The USA, from its part, contributed funds through its USAID programme 
channelled through a Social Fund, what has come to be known by the "Special Budget 
for the South". The funds were placed in the hands of the Sudan Government, and 
supervised over by a senior government official, the then Governor o f the Bank of 
Sudan and Minister o f Finance (Mamoun Biheiri) to make the necessary discretionary 
disbursements, ostensibly towards social development in Southern Sudan. The UK 
contributed funds through its ODA.
It is also during this period that the Nimeiri government with the active support of the 
USA, Egypt and the Arab States encouraged and supported the Muslim Brothers' 
Movement (O'Brien 1986) in Sudan to emerge as a countervailing political force to the 
communists and as a pre-emptive force for any future revival of communist politics in 
the country. This is in line with the prevailing spirit current in the day o f dismantling
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socialism and left-wing forces as a necessary precondition for its replacement with 
capitalism and right-wing politics.
4- 2- 5- The Breadbasket Strategy:
The practical conditions were thus being created, political, institutional, and legal, 
and the foundations laid for firm capitalist expansion of the Sudan economy and the 
effective integration of the Sudanese society into the wider global market system. The 
new development strategy that was formulated to embody and express the new trends; 
the "breadbasket strategy" envisaged a tripartite partnership between Arab surplus 
money, Western technology and Sudan's resource potential. In essence, the breadbasket 
strategy was conceived of as a strategically motivated plan intended, as part o f a pan- 
Arabic regional co-operation, to break the Arab world's dependency on foreign sources 
of food supply, especially from the USA, by developing Sudan's food resource 
potentials. The plan was thus hoped to provide regionally oriented more secure supplies 
of food.
The call for a pan-Arab food security programme was echoed in 1975 following the 
rejection by the USA and major surplus-food producers of the proposal advanced by the 
FAO for the creation o f internationally held food reserves. These surplus-food producers 
recognised that food was the weapon o f the 1980s, just as oil was the weapon of the 
1970s, and would in no way surrender this weapon to others. There had been calls in the 
USA for the use o f the food weapon against the Arabs in retaliation for their use of the 
oil weapon against the USA in the mid-1970s (Awad 1983). The Arab region has been 
heavily dependent on food imports, especially from the USA. In the period between 
1975 - 1985 the population o f the region was expected to grow by 33%, while food 
production was anticipated to expand by 17%. Rising incomes will widen the food gap 
even further. In 1980 more than half the food consumed in the region was imported at 
an annual cost of US$ 20,000,000,000; constituting about one fifth of the region's total 
value of imports of US$ 106,000,000,000. The Arab region envisaged a strategy 
whereby to break its dependency on external sources o f food supply by developing the 
region's internal agricultural potentials. It has been estimated that the arable land in the 
Arab region is about 132 million hectares, o f which only 35 million hectares are actually 
utilised. The region also has irrigation water capacity estimated at about 215 milliard 
cubic metres, o f which only 113 is actually used (Awad. 1983). The basic idea o f the 
Arab regional food security is to invest the vast surplus o f petro-dollars which accrued 
to the Arab states from the oil boom of the mid-1970s to develop the region's 
agricultural potential. The idea came as a defence mechanism of the fear for the use of 
the "food weapon" against the Arabs by their Western suppliers; a fear which became 
real in the aftermath of the Arab oil embargo on the USA following its stance in 1973
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Arab-Israeli War. A movement gained momentum in the USA calling for a ban of food 
exports to the Arab states, which gave rise to the slogan: "a bushel o f food for a barrel of 
crude" (Ibid). Sudan is well-placed to play a key role in this strategy; since it has 48% of 
reserve arable land in the Arab region, has 18.5 milliard cubic metres from the Nile 
waters, representing about 10% of the region's permanent water resources, has 30% of 
the region's animal wealth, its fresh waters can produce 60,000 tons o f fish annually in 
addition to fish reserves found along its 700 miles long Red Sea shores.
In this context, the concern for future food security o f the Arab world has become an 
urgent political issue. In April 1976 the Arab Summit held in Rabat approved the 
creation o f the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID) 
with an authorised capital o f about US$ 500,000,000. Khartoum was chosen to be the 
headquarters of the AAAID (Ibid). The AAAID was to start operations in Sudan, where 
the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development (AFSED) sponsored a study to 
assess Sudan's agricultural potential, which culminated in 1975 in the first o f the 
breadbasket programmes: The Basic Programme for Agricultural Development in 
Sudan. AAAID was charged with the task of helping to implement the Programme. The 
programme contained 100 projects which could be executed over a 25-year period until 
the year 2000. At this time the Arab region was importing 6,000,000 tons o f wheat 
annually, 500,000 tons of sugar, 400,000 tons o f edible oil, and 135,000 of meat (Ibid; 
12). The Programme envisaged large increases in Sudan's production o f these items, 
with a view of reaching self-sufficiency for them in Sudan, and exporting the surplus to 
other Arab states. The surplus exported from the Sudan was expected to substitute 20% 
of the region's sugar imports, 48% of its imports o f edible oil, and 58% of its imports of 
meat.
It is doubtful, however, for its own strategic purposes whether the USA would be a 
willing partner to allow such a plan, dangerous to its own immediate trade interests and 
long-term strategic goals in the region, to allow it ever to materialise. The plan, 
moreover, would set a model, if  succeeded, for other third world economies o f "de­
linking" from international economic hegemony led by the USA. In the final analysis, 
though, the breadbasket strategy was foiled or aborted. As Awad put it:
Top level contacts in 1978 with the IBRD and the IMF led to the freezing o f  the Six Year Plan 
and the introduction o f  the Programme for Economic Stabilisation and Financial Reform. This 
m ove effectively put an end to the breadbasket strategy... (Awad, M. 1983: 13).
Instead of developing Sudan's food resource potentials to achieve Sudan's food self- 
sufficiency and regional food security for the Arab world, what we see in place is an 
empty basket. Neither has Sudan been able to produce enough food to feed its 
population, nor the Arab investors been able to recoup their financial investments. The 
substantial investment funds which were earmarked for the ambitious "breadbasket"
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benefited the third partner: the Western technologists. Whether for the corruption and 
mismanagement o f an incompetent Sudanese polity, unfavourable international 
conditions, self-interested international powers, or the empty unfulfilled promises from 
the Arab partners, the fact remains that the failure o f the breadbasket strategy provides 
an interesting case o f study o f the interplay between national and international forces 
who, in the insatiable quest for capital expansion brought untold hardships to the 
unprotected rural producers who continue to bear the exorbitant costs o f a development 
package that only brought to them insecurity, vulnerability, poverty and famine.
The Breadbasket Strategy involved massive capital investment which can only come 
through external capital finance resources. This has in the end led to a huge 
accumulation of debt on Sudan now roughly estimated at about US$ 13 billion. It is all 
too obvious that the poor rural producers now bear the overwhelming burden in the 
repayment of these debts. Ironically, the rural poor are now eternally fettered to a debt 
that has been incurred ostensibly to develop their resources, but in practice only to 
exploit their resources to develop the modern sectors and to benefit the already rich and 
powerful social groups. It is no gainsaying that government officials have grabbed their 
handsome share, ministers, international agencies and consultancy firms, foreign 
experts, Western industrialists and companies producing technology; all have grabbed 
their share leaving Sudan rural poor to pay the debt. The breadbasket strategy can be 
seen as a concrete form of expression of the marriage between domestic and 
international interests.
4- 2- 5- i- Critique o f the Breadbasket Strategy:
The principles of the breadbasket strategy have been formulated and laid out in three 
investment acts; the Five Year Plan (FYP) 1977/8-1982/3, the Food Investment Strategy 
(FIS) and the Basic Programme (BP). The general emphasis of the strategy has been the 
promotion and development of the modern agricultural sub-sectors, with the irrigated 
sub-sector receiving most o f the financial allocations, and especially for export crops, 
e.g. cotton and groundnuts. The FIS and BP emphasised huge agricultural expansion- to 
be funded mainly from Arab finance capital- in mechanised grain production, livestock 
ranching and agro- industrial projects. As for the traditional subsistence subsector, the 
strategy has neither considered it seriously for development nor left it wholly 
untouched. Instead, the traditional sub-sector has been accorded a subsidiary 
subordinate role to the modern sector, to be penetrated, transformed, and exploited to 
generate the necessary foreign resources that are needed to invest in the planned 
expansion of the modern sectors. Thus, fulfilling its subsidiary subordinate role as a vast 
domain of raw resource whereby to be exploited to generate reserves to subsidise the
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modern sectors, and as a vast reservoir of labour power to be drawn into the modem 
enclaves.
The neglect and exploitation of producers in the traditional sector, which supports 
about 80% of the population reflects the marginalisation o f the vast majority of the rural 
populations. This is most manifestly evident in the ratio of allocation o f development 
funds earmarked for this sector over the strategy period. Out of the S£ 425 million 
committed to agricultural development, only between 12 -2 0 % went to the traditional 
agriculture. The balance- between 80-88% have been channelled to the modern sectors; 
mainly to the irrigated schemes producing cash crops like cotton, groundnuts and other 
exportable crops. Even the small share that have been allocated to the traditional sector 
has in fact been meant for modem schemes such as modern ranching projects in the 
savannah region, mechanisation of rain agriculture, production o f foodstuffs, etc. 
(Oesterdiekhoff and Wohlmuth 1983). Such modern enclaves within the traditional 
subsistence economy can only benefit big local merchants or absentee farmers resident 
in towns; with the consequences o f creating the incipient process o f local social 
differentiation within the traditional close-knit rural communities.
A fundamental pillar o f the breadbasket strategy is that it was premised on a 
modernisation tradition based on horizontal agricultural expansion, rather than on 
vertical expansion and intensification of production. The horizontal expansionist model 
has been underpinned by the assumption that vast reservoir o f unutilised lands and 
labour abound in the country that await to be tapped for "quick and economical increase 
in production". This expansionist drive envisaged an increase in acreage o f 5.8 million 
feddans to be carried out by private capitalist farmers. These farmers will be supported 
from public funds channelled through the Mechanised Farming Corporation in order to 
expand production along the Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan, Southern DarFur and in 
parts o f Bahr El-Ghazal (Six Year Plan, Vol. 2: p: 11). The policy amounted to almost a 
formal expropriation of land from its original claimants o f traditional tillers. The 
consequences o f this expropriation have been too ominous and far-reaching. It has 
posed immediate serious threats to the very livelihoods o f the rural populations as these 
areas represented the most fertile productive lands in the localities, providing the rural 
populations with the more assured and reliable sources of their food supply in an 
inherently risky environment. The alienation of this more reassuring resource (of the 
most productive lands) placed the rural populations in a state of vulnerability and food 
insecurity. They have thus been left in a precarious condition permanently to the 
tyrannies of both a whimsical climate and merchant greed. Most sinister still is the 
spectre posed by this appropriation o f a deepening and escalating ecological crisis. Such 
an expansion of mechanisation entailed grave environmental hazards to the delicate 
ecological balances in the fragile lands o f the savannah. Moreover, the displacement of
- 150 -
the rural populations from the more productive lands meant that they responded to the 
pressure by shifting their farming and herding activities to more marginal lands. The 
shortfall in crop yield will have to be compensated for by increasing the cropped area in 
a variety of ways: by expanding into already cultivated areas; reducing fallow period; 
clearing new land; and by increasing stocking rates. The negative consequences of these 
strategies have been: destruction of the plant cover and processes o f desertification; soil 
exhaustion and erosion; increased vulnerability to climatic stress; and - intense 
competition between farmers and herders.
The forceful promotion of modern capitalist farming enclaves to penetrate the rural 
peasant economies has triggered a chain reaction process. This process has involved the 
displacement o f the local populations from their most fertile lands thus making them 
more vulnerable and exposed to unpredictable fluctuations o f both climate and the 
market conditions; driving them to cultivate more fragile marginal lands, thus leading to 
more environmental degradation and a progressive depletion of the natural resource base 
of their economy, and thereby dangerously eroding the long-term viability o f the eco­
system as a whole. The end result is that the rural populations are placed in a state of 
permanent vulnerability, poverty and insecurity to the vicissitudes o f a precarious 
environment. Moreover, the state o f local stability and the general law and order is 
seriously undermined by the incessant conflicts and struggles arising from the 
competition over land between local farmers and herders on the one hand, and between 
these and the new capitalist farm owners, on the other. These conflicts have indeed 
erupted into bloody inter-tribal wars. The inter-tribal wars that have been going on for 
some years now between the Nuba (of the Nuba Mountains) of Southern Kordofan and 
the Baggara groups, and between these latter and camel herders to the North, are 
examples in point. More dangerous still for pushing modern capitalist agriculture in the 
semi-arid savannah have been the grave ecological consequences. Planners have paid 
little attention to the likely consequences o f such an expansion on upsetting the delicate 
ecological balances; and less so have been the farmers themselves. Planners' more 
immediate preoccupation has been to expand the base o f marketable exportable crops as 
quickly and as economically as can be drawn from rural resources- irrespective o f the 
ecological or social consequences. The general planning attitude could more accurately 
be described as one o f "rural mining", implying a reckless quest for short-term 
maximisation o f rural resource draining without due concern for the long-term damage 
such policies may have had on the long-term viability of the eco-system; nor taking the 
necessary precautionary measures to redeem the damage done. Such precautions could 
have been taken in terms o f programmes of ecological regeneration and social welfare 
through mechanisms of redistribution o f benefits accruing from the development 
projects. As for the capitalist farmers themselves, their investable inputs are composed
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only of a tractor and some cash to hire rural labour, both of which could be secured, on 
subsidised credit, from public sources- provided one has the "right connections" in the 
state decision-making circles in the centre o f power. These inputs are put to the 
maximum exploitation o f the fragile savannah with grave ecological consequences. 
Although capitalist farmers are obligated by the regulations set by Mechanised Farming 
Corporation (MFC) for conservation o f the land and proper farming practice, these 
regulations remain only on paper. For, in practice, neither do farmers abide by them, nor 
does the Corporation exercise any power to enforce their operation. Thus soils become 
exhausted and yields drop to levels that render the enterprise unprofitable. 
Consequently, farmers move on to new lands and continue the process. Short-term gain 
is the overriding force in what could be termed a " hit and run" opportunism. The end 
result of these reckless practices is land exhaustion, soil erosion, land barrenness which 
leads to the pervasive phenomenon of dust bowels, droughts and the inevitable 
ecological disaster. The recurrence o f food insecurity in Sudan, which also led to famine 
can be explained largely in terms of these human-induced mal-practices which are 
associated with the drive towards the expansion of commercial production in marginal 
lands.
The expansion o f commercial capitalist agriculture in the Sudanese context has 
created the classical conditions o f regional polarisation and social differentiation as 
inevitable outcomes that are associated with the penetration of capitalist relations, and 
subordination o f the rural economies. The process o f subordination involves drawing 
the traditional subsistence economies to the modern poles o f commercial capitalist 
production both in the forces o f production (involving the exploitation o f rural resources 
to service capitalist requirements), and in the relations of production (drawing labour 
from the countryside to meet the labour demands in capitalist enclaves). This 
relationship of subordination in the Sudanese context explains the co-existence of two 
mutually-reinforcing modes: modern and traditional; mutually-reinforcing in the sense 
that the development and expansion o f the one is a necessary condition of the 
underdevelopment and retardation o f the other. Here, the role o f the state is crucial for 
the exercise of power to maintain the status-quo and the general structures o f power, 
including the structures o f economic power by means o f which control the processes of 
asset transfer could be exercised as it is institutionally legitimised through the 
institutions of the state; e.g. the planning and finance ministries, the marketing and 
pricing systems. The various development acts and strategies, including those of the 
breadbasket, could be regarded as concrete forms of state legislatures which 
institutionally legitimises the subordination and exploitation of the rural economies (and 
the populations thereof) to the power o f the state and the urban elites, and hence of the 
activities and practices involved in the processes o f surplus appropriation and asset
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transfer from the poor to the rich. The various acts of the development strategies, to all 
practical purposes, function as codes and rules which codify the relationship that is to 
hold between the different sectors o f the economy and between different sections of the 
society in the different roles assigned to each sector or social groups. Such that, in the 
final analysis, these codes, as enacted in the various development acts benefit the urban- 
based commercial capitalist class and the agrarian bourgeoisie while simultaneously 
impoverishing the traditional rural producers by draining their resources to support the 
modern enterprises. We can understand rural poverty and associated problems of food 
insecurity, hunger and starvation among the traditional producers in Western Sudan as 
resulting from a systematic process of transfer o f resources from the poor to the rich; a 
process that is institutionally functional as state legislatures embodied in the various 
Acts of the development strategies.
The role o f the state has been crucial in maintaining this relationship of dominance 
and subordination between the two sectors and o f the processes o f regional polarisation 
and social differentiation implicit within it. The role o f the state in this regard has been 
two-pronged: the maintenance o f the structures o f dominance internally as well as in 
mediating the subordination o f these internal structures to the dominance of 
international capital. In this latter role, the state has functioned as an "agency" which 
mediates the dominance of international capital by re-organising and re-orienting the 
internal domestic structures of production and exchange along the lines o f capitalism. 
This has necessarily required the creation o f internal modern capitalist enclaves (or 
satellites) which are to develop and thrive on exploiting their orbital hinterlands.
The concrete forms through which these organisational structures have been 
expressed in development and economic strategies are complex and interlocking: the 
consideration o f one issue entails considering other related issues. The inter-circular 
chains of causalities and relationships are too complex to exhaust in a limited scope. To 
try to understand them, we need to focus on certain salient events in the development of 
the Sudanese social and political history, and to try to decipher their international and 
regional power underpinnings and the bearings these have had on the configurations of 
internal power arrangements; and how all these bear on the fortunes and fates o f the 
poor in the rural areas. Yet, such a macro-structural analysis can at the best provide only 
general indicators regarding secular trends which can be found elsewhere in the third 
world. They provide the context in which to trace the long-term processes responsible 
for the vulnerability and insecurity o f large sections of the rural populations to famine.
The problems of hunger and starvation unto death therefore can be seen as the final 
results of a long chain of causalities extending from the international power structures of 
dominance, to individual state actors within the international hegemonic structure, to 
regional political and financial power influences, international financial institutions, to
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internal power structures within the Sudanese state and the skewed exercise of state 
power geared to set in motion a systemic process of asset transfer from the poor to the 
rich and a resultant widening polarisation and social differentiation. Thus a widening 
internal divide has been created between rich social groups ever seeking to maximise 
their stakes at the expense of poor groups by virtue o f their control over state power. 
The control over state power became the crux and arena o f struggle. The poverty of the 
subordinated groups is both a condition of the others’ affluence and a cause and 
consequence of marginalisation and exclusion from participation in state power. Here, 
the latter groups' poverty and the accompanying lack thereof o f basic amenities; their 
food insecurity, their vulnerability to hunger and starvation are therefore essentially 
problems of a political nature, not environmental or simply economical, that are 
inextricably associated with their lack o f power, political, economic and organisational. 
The lack o f power o f the rural poor, admittedly, is a direct consequence o f the purposive 
exercise o f power by the dominant groups to marginalise and exclude these elements 
from participation in state power, a conscious exercise that is necessary to maintain the 
status-quo and the general structures o f dominance and hegemonic control. Conversely, 
it is true that their lack of power is also a cause for the state's neglect and 
marginalisation since these masses of the rural poor possess o f no leverage that they can 
exert to force the government to accede to their demands. It is not surprising, therefore, 
to see that while famine and starvation were raging in Kordofan In 1984, the Governor 
of Kordofan region, strongly denied any existence o f hunger in the region. Indeed, 
adding insult to injury, he entertained an audience to an expensive luncheon in the 
luxury Halls of the Grand Hotel in Khartoum to declare before his audience the Region 
to be free from hunger (Bush 1986). No doubt the Governor would have thought twice 
before he could have made such bold and utterly false statements had he been wary of a 
strong backlash from a powerful organised peasantry and a possible loss to his office. 
This being lacking, and well assured of his office and the full backing o f a dictatorial 
military regime, and possibly also aware of the backing of even a mightier international 
power (the US), the Governor was in no qualms to dismiss the existence of famine 
altogether. Such an attitude from the part of a politician reflects not just an exterior face- 
value personal disposition, but is indeed reflective o f a deeper malaise in the 
consciousness and frame of mind of the Sudanese ruling classes o f central Sudan. The 
urban-based ruling classes o f Central Sudan are conscious of their identity and 
belonging to a "core" hegemonic elite w'ho consider themselves the guardians o f the 
society. They are conscious that rule and the exercise of power are their exclusive 
privileges which they needed to defend by excluding other social, ethic and cultural 
groups in the West, South and East who are the "perceived" subjects. In this frame of 
mind, overlaid no doubt with racism, originates the subtle ways in the exercise o f state
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power; most notably in the systematic exclusion from participation of these subordinate 
groups, concurrently with the systematic recruitment for the key functionaries o f the 
state, the executive and the military from among members o f the riverine alliances of 
ethnic groups. These alliances have historically to be forged between different factions 
of the riverine ethnic groups which they recognise as a practical necessity to consolidate 
their control over state power, and in consequence over other ethnic and cultural groups 
(Hale 1988; Barnett 1988; Shepherd 1983, 1978). Shepherd describes the Sudanese 
socio-political structures of dominance:
In Sudan capitalist agriculture developed in the context o f  a class structure which clearly 
demarcates capitalist as part o f  an ethnically distinct ruling class, from peasants and 
workers. The country's senior civil servants, ministers, army officers and businessmen o f  
substance are overwhelmingly recruited from families with origins in the Northern region 
and particularly from amongst the Nubians... These groups have privileged access to and 
control over the modern state, and consequently over modem means o f  production both in 
the public and private sector. ... This position has given them advantage ... in access to 
productive capital and land, an advantage which has been extensively used (Shepherd 
1983: 298).
In the context of these structures o f dominance, we can understand how and why the 
Governors of Kordofan have traditionally been recruited from amongst the members of 
the Central riverine groups. These political appointments to higher offices reflect and 
reinforce the structures of dominance of the central groups and the subordination of 
Kordofan's people and resources to the interests o f those groups. Similar have been the 
appointments o f the Governors to the Southern regions and DarFur and the Eastern 
provinces. That is; the marginalised, subordinated peripheral regions. The dichotomy, 
differentiation and the related indicators manifested in differing living standards, levels 
of health and education, economic muscles and opportunity, between regions and social 
classes all draw an increasingly crystallising picture o f class stratification in the 
Sudanese social setting and a status in the general relations o f power no different from 
that of its colonial predecessor.
Although the role o f the state in creating the conditions of poverty and famine in the 
rural areas is crucial, the state is by no means a completely autonomous entity that 
functions independently o f the international system within which structures of 
dominance it operates. The international structures o f dominance determine for weaker 
countries such as Sudan not only the volume and direction o f financial capital inflows, 
investment and issues o f trade, but interferes with the more concrete forms of 
determining who are to ascend to power and who are not. In the case o f Sudan, Western 
power influences have been instrumental in foiling a communist-led coup against 
Nimeiri in July 1971, and thus helped him regain political control. The USA foreign 
policy towards the authoritarian military regime in Sudan consistently sought to bail 
Nimeiri out of troubled times by a flux of loans facilitated through the US control over
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the IMF and World Bank voting rights (Gurdon 1991). The US in many ways helped 
Nimeiri outlive - over the 16-year period o f his rule- no less than eleven coups, helped 
him through critical economic straits and political upheavals which otherwise would 
have brought his downfall long before the April uprising which finally overthrew him, 
but only after the US and its allies became convinced that it was no longer possible to 
patch up the regime any further. Conversely, the international powers have played an 
important role in undermining the parliamentary democratically elected government led 
by Sadiq El-Mahdi that came to power after the demise o f the Nimeiri regime. This has 
come in the adverse consequences o f withholding badly needed economic support to 
help the new government survive its first years, having to face the enormous and 
daunting realities of a collapsing economy that was sagging under the weight o f a huge 
debt burden inherited from its predecessor. Unable to cope with the big accumulated 
difficulties and especially unable to tackle the economic problem without outside help, 
the parliamentary government collapsed, and a military junta took over power once 
again; this time with an extremist right-wing Muslim fundamentalist backing; ironically 
the elements that the US and its allies once actively supported to countervail left-wing 
forces in the country..
The perceptions o f the urban-based elites who came to hold the reigns of power in 
the modern Sudanese state towards planning the development of pastoral and nomad 
communities in peripheral regions are prejudiced by notions that these communities are 
backward, and their traditional tribalistic structures and values are considered to be 
detrimental to progress and modernisation. As a result, policies o f development have 
been adopted and designed to effect permanent transformation o f rural communities so 
that they become more pliable to the direct control o f the central state authority. 
However the urban elites soon became conscious of their own interests as the dominant 
privileged groups, a consciousness fanned by external influences which in due course 
articulated itself into the pursuit of economic gain and political power o f the urban- 
based elites vis-a-vis the rural masses. Thus, they excluded the rural people from 
participation in decision-making on matters directly affecting their daily lives. It is 
important to stress that patterns of decision-making in and among territorial 
organisations o f society play critical roles in development policy and in processes of 
social change and economic transformation. Who makes decisions, and how, affects the 
planning and execution o f development programmes at any level of territorial 
organisation. Therefore, responsive planning and effective implementation of rural 
development programmes requires a high level o f social initiative and participation of 
the rural masses through their local systems and political organisations and other forms 
of organised social or economic structures (Al-Arifi 1978). The ascendancy of the 
urban-based elites to central state power and the decision-making machinery biased
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their perceptions against the rural populations which practically led to the effective 
political marginalisation of the latter and excluded them from participation in decision­
making on matters affecting their own lives. Political marginalisation is understood to 
mean:
... a process by which certain categories within a political framework, be it classes, ethnic 
minorities, or occupational strata, are gradually excluded from the making o f  decisions 
about their own affairs, and see their scope o f  autonomous action increasingly 
circumscribed by externally imposed restrictions. It does not necessarily imply 
impoverishment, though a relative reduction o f  resources, both production and for 
subsistence, is an inevitable implication (Doom bus 1993: 116).
The interests of the rural populations can be very easily overlooked and are often 
completely neglected. These tendencies are generally encountered in the process of 
state-building and political integration in Sudan, and elsewhere.
Conclusion:
This chapter has sought to construe the social bases o f political and economic power 
in the structure of the modern Sudanese State. It has shown that external interests of the 
British colonial power has laid down the foundations of modern capitalist enterprises in 
Sudan, which to a large extent determined the shape and direction of subsequent 
economic and social development planning in the country. Those who came to control 
state power in the post-independence era invariably have vested interests to continue the 
same development paradigm laid down by the colonial state. We have argued that the 
continuation and maintenance o f colonial-type structures under national rule has been 
underpinned by external influences conditioned by the changing character of 
international development agenda at different periods. However, the amalgam of 
policies and interventions, ostensibly carried in the name of national unity and political 
homogeneity, must in truth be interpreted in quite a different mood, as steps taken to 
consolidate the political power and control of the central elites over the state, 
correspondingly with an increasing political marginalisation o f the masses of rural 
populations, particularly the peasantry and pastoralists in peripheral regions, such as 
Kordofan. Even forms o f representation under parliamentary democratic rule failed to 
articulate the local peoples aspirations and translate these into realities, nor their voices 
heard in Khartoum', since party politicians are locked up in endless manoeuvres with 
their rivals, and the relentless pursuit o f day-to-day political survival than with the 
concerns of long-term rural development and the welfare o f rural local communities. 
The local populations, e.g. in Kordofan, have been rendered extremely vulnerable to 
famine through a long process o f underdevelopment, political marginalisation and 
economic exploitation over many long years, essentially through the agency of the state.
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Indeed, this strikes to the very heart o f the concept of the state, the state system, and its 
legitimacy in Sudan. The state, having failed its citizens unto famine and starvation, 
cannot be accepted as a legitimate, neutral, nationally inspired institution, but can be 
understood to be a product o f practices of political organised exploitation of its subjects. 
As Abrams holds, the state is a "palpable nexus of practice and institutional structure 
centred in government and more or less extensive, unified and dominant in any society" 
(Abrams 1988: :82). And that the concept of the state entails a "message of domination- 
an ideological artefact attributing unity, morality and independence to the disunited, 
amoral and dependent workings o f the practice o f government" (Ibid: 81). This 
conception of the state as a mask entails an understanding of the importance of the state 
as an historically constituted and contested "exercise in legitimation in moral 
regulation" (Alonso 1994: 380). The next chapter traces the concrete forms of long-term 
underdevelopment, political marginalisation and economic exploitation of Kordofan in 
the context of the modern Sudanese state.
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Chapter 5
The Political Economy of Kordofan
Introduction:
Established famine theory emphasises direct causal correlations between famine and 
natural or man-made causes. This study offers a different way of explaining famine over 
time by stressing the importance of long-term processes in creating patterns of 
vulnerabilities among rural communities. This chapter argues that the persistence of 
famine among Kordofan rural communities can be attributed to long-term processes of 
underdevelopment, marginalisation and exploitation. These processes are traced in a 
historical perspective to reveal their political, social and economic underpinnings. The 
persistence of famine in Kordofan cannot be explained in simple natural terms, for 
Kordofan is a province rich in natural resource endowments. The region covers an area 
of about 10  million feddans, of which about 6  millions are exploited annually in 
agriculture and grazing. Kordofan cultivates the biggest area with millet in the whole 
Sudan. There are about 12 different varieties of millet grown in the region. The 
proportion o f traditional agriculture generally in Sudan is three times that of the modern 
irrigated and mechanised agriculture; and Kordofan accounts for 50% of the total 
traditional farming in the country. The central zone o f Kordofan is the largest area in the 
world for gum Arabic production with an estimated area of more than one million 
feddans grown with the hashab trees (Acacia Senegal). Kordofan produces over 60% of 
Sudan's total production of gum Arabic. Gum Arabic occupies fourth place in Sudan's 
exports, after having been second only to cotton for many years. And El-Obeid is the 
largest international centre for gum Arabic sales. The region is also the largest area 
cultivated with sesame in the country, and produces about 25% of Sudan's total 
production of sesame. Sesame occupies the third rank among Sudan's exports after 
cotton and groundnuts. There are about 22 different varieties o f sesame grown in the 
region. The region consumes about 25% of its production of oilseeds, and the balance is 
exported outside, especially to Central Sudan. And the oil mills in Khartoum depend 
primarily on the region's produce o f oilseeds. The region is the largest area cultivated 
with groundnuts in the country, and Kordofan produces about 35% of Sudan's total 
output of groundnuts. There are about 10 different varieties o f groundnuts grown in the 
region. Groundnuts occupies the second place in Sudan's exports after cotton. The 
region is also a major producer of melon seeds and kerkadie (hepiscus). The water 
melons are 10 0% utilised; the kernel provides a rich source of water and food for both 
human and animal, the peel provides a rich source o f animal feed, and the seeds are sold 
for cash and are used as an important source of food, especially during famines. The
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water melons are estimated to yield about 8 million cubic metres o f water annually, 
equivalent to the yield o f 200 hafirs o f a capacity o f 40 thousand cubic metres each. 
Kordofan has a total population estimated at about 3 million people according to the 
1983 census, representing 15% of Sudan's total population, making Kordofan the third 
most populous among Sudan's regions, after the Southern and Central regions. 
Population density in the Province is about 7.5 persons per square kilometre. Kordofan 
is the largest exporter of camels in the country. The region also supports the largest 
stocks o f sheep in the country, and the Hamari lamb breed is the most desired and 
demanded for export. The total animal wealth in the region is estimated to number over 
10 million heads. In addition, the region is home to some rare species of wild-life 
animals such as buffaloes, guzzle, reel, deer, reindeer, elephants, Selima Guzzle, 
ostriches, feasts, Giraffe, etc., estimated to number about 300 thousand heads {Kordofan 
Regional Ministry for Agriculture and Natural Resources, October 1982-3; Hassan 
Mohammad Nour 1991). Kordofan is very rich in natural resources. The persistence of 
famine in Kordofan cannot be explained in terms of shortage in the "availability" of 
resources. Famine in Kordofan can only be explained in political terms in the processes 
of marginalisation and exploitation embodied in policies pursued by the central state 
over a long period o f time. Marginalisation and exploitation deepened and became 
particularly acute that famine emerges at a specific point in the history o f relationship of 
Kordofan to the central Sudanese state. The emergence of famine underlies a deepening 
crisis in the Sudanese social and political system, both as a consequence and a reflection 
of a collapsing political system.
6- 1- The Political Bases of Development Policies:
The colonial state policies aimed to transform the local Kordofan economies and 
rural relations of production along the lines of market forces. In effect, it pursued 
policies of settlement of pastoral communities, imposed new taxation system, 
transformed local rural labour relations, developed transport and communication 
infrastructure, organised the markets and set the foundation for active trade and 
commercial activities. The rural Kordofan economies have been transformed with such 
rapidity and speed that has surpassed all anticipation. In a span of a few years, the local 
communities have witnessed their lives changed fundamentally from simple production 
to increasingly complex and volatile conditions of market exchanges. Colonial policies 
for Kordofan effectively destroyed the objective conditions which had for a long time 
reproduced the pastoral system, sustained livelihoods; and instituted in place the new 
market forces
The subsequent development and economic policies that have characterised the 
colonial period remained essentially unchanged after independence. With regard to
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Kordofan, the basic tenets o f the colonial policies remained as they were and even 
enhanced. These have been an even greater concentration on cash crop production, the 
subordination of Kordofan both as a reservoir of cheap labour to be attracted to the 
Gezira cotton schemes, and cheap labour for the production of cash crops, as well as a 
market for merchandise trade, especially in grains. National development policies 
remained colonial in essence, with even far more skewed adverse consequences on 
issues of regional imbalances, income disparities, economic exploitation; and political 
marginalisation (Doornbus 1993). These tendencies are generally encountered in the 
process of state-building and political integration in Sudan, and elsewhere. The 
amalgam of policies and interventions, ostensibly carried in the name of national unity 
and political homogeneity, must in truth be interpreted in quite a different mood, as 
steps taken to consolidate the political power and control of the central elites, 
correspondingly with an increasing political marginalisation o f the masses o f rural 
populations, particularly the peasantry and pastoralists in peripheral regions. The 
inevitable consequences o f such long-term trends and tendencies in the perceptions of 
the central polity which lends the formulation o f national policies, have been the 
creation of a widening gap between regions and a steady polarisation between social 
groups, sowing the seeds o f discontent, conflict, famines and national disintegration.
The policy of "devolution to the colonies" adopted by the Colonial Office made it 
incumbent on the colonial governments to be financially independent from the centre. 
The colonial government in Sudan embarked on its development programme that would 
in due time enable her to become self-sufficient; and consequently sought the rapid 
transformation of the rural economies to bring these out for the set goals. The opening 
years of the Condominium era in Kordofan witnessed the policy o f "pacification" of 
Kordofan's turbulent tribes in a bid to bring them under the control o f the central state, 
and to blunt their Mahdist fervour. After the process of pacification had been completed, 
the government turned to establish peace, stability and social order as necessary 
prerequisites for the orderly operation o f trade and the market. Laws were issued, which 
included the prohibition o f slavery, suppression of tribal warfare, and the imposition of 
taxes. The colonial state in Sudan rapidly instituted the foundations o f a market 
economy and effected a speedy transformation of Kordofan rural economies and 
incorporated these into the wider national and international market system. However, 
the change in the political scene in the power o f the central state at independence 
favoured certain political forces from the centre of Sudan who came to assume political 
power o f the central state. The new social forces were to prove no better than the 
departing colonial masters. The peoples o f Kordofan were to find themselves 
systematically marginalised and excluded from participation in decision-making, and 
were more exploited economically.
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The underlying causes o f political marginalisation and economic exploitation of 
Kordofan communities can be sought in the political structure o f the Sudanese state and 
the social forces which have come to dominate the political scene and the economic 
domain. This central power is an agglomeration of different and diverse social and 
political interest groups, but which nonetheless is ultimately united by a common 
denomination as the main hegemonic cultural core whose socio-economic and political 
stakes can only be realised through its unity as a core privileged urban elite vis-a-vis the 
rural masses (see previous chapter). When these forces assumed political power at 
independence, they invariably continued the same economic development paradigm that 
had been laid down by the colonial administration; namely that of continued support for 
the core enclaves of economic and social development in the Centre o f Sudan, in the 
Gezira, and along the Banks of the Nile; to which core the diverse rural economies in 
the peripheral regions are subordinated to provide cheap labour and cheap resources. 
Indeed, in a national planning document, the official view was to assign to Kordofan the 
role of supplying cheap labour to the Gezira Scheme and the other cotton plantations 
along the Nile (Mamoun Behariri 1957). This pattern of unequal development continued 
until the contemporary period; the consequences o f which have been a widening 
regional gap between the developed centre and the underdeveloped peripheries, 
deepening social and economic inequalities in the distribution of wealth and political 
power, and widening social polarisation between different groups. Famine and the on­
going civil war are logical consequences.
5- 2- Restructuring Kordofan Labour Force:
In setting up the planning and development programmes for the Sudan, different 
regions of the country have been assigned different roles in the process of socio­
economic transformation. Thus, the process o f transformation of the different economies 
have proceeded in different tempos, with different goals, and with highly polarised 
results. On the one hand, there are cotton growing areas by the Blue Nile and White Nile 
where the daily rise and fall o f world cotton prices are followed and discussed by 
interested tenants and proprietors; on the other hand, there are villagers whose 
occasional sale o f some grain or an animal to pay their taxes is almost their only contact 
with money throughout the year (Barbour 1961: 263, see previous chapter).
In this context of development, Kordofan has been assigned the role of providing 
cheap labour power to the cotton schemes in the Gezira and the Nile; as well as 
producing cheap agricultural commodities for the market, and for revenue generation to 
the central state. As for the strategic goal o f supplying the required labour force to the 
cotton schemes, the Sudanese state adopted policies designed to induce the rural 
populations of Kordofan to migrate to the main production areas in central Sudan,
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especially to the Gezira Cotton Schemes, and to Gedarif area to hire their labour power 
in cotton picking or in the activities of commercial agricultural farming in the C edar// 
commercial farms. Indeed, it has been official policy since the early days o f the Gezira 
Scheme that seasonal labour requirements for cotton picking in the Scheme should come 
from Western Sudan, following the socio-economic restructuring of the Sudanese 
economy which assigned to the Western provinces (.Kordofan and DarFur) the role of 
supplying cheap labour, both for the immediate term and as potential labour reserves 
required for the future developments o f modern capitalist agricultural enterprises in 
central Sudan. This role of the Western provinces as the major source of cheap labour 
supply, has in fact been motivated by political as well as economic considerations. 
Politically, it has been aimed at containing the militant Mahdist sentiment in Western 
Sudan and to appease their symbolic leaderships in central Sudan. Thus followed the 
economic considerations which aimed to transform this militant force into an 
economically productive one producing for the market. The traditional leaderships have 
been co-opted into the new socio-economic structures o f the colonial state, and thus 
played an instrumental role in mediating the transformation of these forces from 
religious militancy into commodity labour producing for the world capitalist market 
(Abbakar 1987). As such both the state and the symbolic traditional leaderships stood in 
alliance to benefit from such a transformation. However, while the state has reorganised 
Kordofan and the Western Sudan as the main potential reservoir o f cheap labour, the 
general system which operates along these policy lines reproduces an ideology whereby 
such migrants are marginalised and denied full citizenship rights (Ibid) Accordingly, it 
has been envisaged that little organisational effort, or high incentives are necessary to 
attract this labour, since, it has been assumed, population pressure and surplus labour are 
sufficient to act as spontaneous push factors to drive rural populations from their 
villages and draw that labour to the schemes. And no doubt, the underdevelopment of 
Kordofan, its deprivation o f government allocations, and the impoverisation of the 
populations of the region, can be understood in this context to have been tacitly 
employed as insidious push mechanisms to drive labour from Kordofan countryside to 
the plantations schemes in central Sudan. Consequently, in these areas of mechanised 
and commercial schemes, the agricultural seasonal labourers from Kordofan rural 
countryside, live in labour camps on the schemes under squalid conditions. The wages 
they receive for their labour are very low and sufficient only barely to support the 
migrants. With some shrift, they can make a little cash with which to return to the 
villages. Often, this cash is so little, that some return penniless if  they attempt buying 
some clothes. Indeed, the IBRD, in a 1973 Report, calculated that total wage bill for 
hand-picking of cotton to be piasters 122  per 12 feddans at a yield of 6  kantars per 
feddan (a kantar = app. 100 lbs). This makes the wage offered to the labourer for
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picking one kantar of cotton to be about Ps 0.588 (ILO Report 1978: 18). No wonder, 
then that the IBRD appraisal report pointed out that low wages are the main cause o f the 
seasonal labour shortage for cotton picking in the Gezira; and concluded that: "[i]n fact, 
in central Sudan, it is becoming increasingly difficult to recruit farm workers owing to 
wage rates" (Ibid). Wage labour on the schemes is kept so low that it cannot reproduce 
this form of labour. Therefore, the cost of reproduction o f this labour has to be born by 
the worker and his family in the villages of Kordofan who have to produce both for 
themselves (by growing food) and for the market (by growing cash crops) to meet their 
social needs; including the needs of their migrant members to the cotton plantations who 
in the most part return to the villages with very little from their wages.
The other official policy role designated to Kordofan is to produce cheap agricultural 
commodities for the market. This required radical transformation and restructuring of 
Kordofan rural economies.
5- 3- Policies of Livestock Production:
The early years o f the Condominium witnessed rapid increases in animal numbers. 
This has been partly deliberately encouraged by the authorities with a view of restoring 
former conditions of rural animal wealth after the decimation o f animals during the 
Mahdia. Measures were taken towards restoring animal wealth. As a result, the 
outbreaks o f epidemic diseases, the feuds and inter-tribal warfare which acted as brakes 
to the growth of animals in the past were largely eliminated. These factors constrained 
the growth of animals in the past, and confined them only to certain areas. Consequently 
the effects on the environment from animal increases was limited. The Condominium 
authorities took certain administrative and regulatory measures which blunted the 
effectiveness o f these factors. As a result, animal numbers grew rapidly, and the 
authorities again resorted to measures which aimed at minimising the effects of rapid 
animal increases on the environment through reducing animal numbers by the following 
measures: The policy o f non-action; or "let perish" from epidemic diseases 
(Government of Sudan; The Report on Veterinary Services 1973); the use of 
propaganda among pastoral communities to encourage them increase off-take (Ibid). 
This step was met with little success essentially because herd owners asked the question 
where would they invest. Exports to Egypt of camels and cattle were encouraged. A 
beef canning factory was established at Kosti in 1952 designed with a meat-processing 
capacity o f about 100 thousand heads of cattle a year. However, the project was 
unsuccessful, and was finally closed up. National Sudanese governments launched a 
massive programme to dig boreholes, wells and hafirs to make water available. Besides, 
they also increased the campaigns against epidemic diseases. These measures 
contributed to the rapid growth o f animals in the sixties and seventies. More measures
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were taken to encourage animal off-take: A fence was set up in the early 1960s at Al- 
Rahad along the railway line aimed to encourage livestock exporters to expand their 
export operations, and cheap concessionary rail fares are offered to exporters as further 
incentives to boost the livestock trade (for a list o f livestock exporters, see Appendix F). 
A trekking route was opened in the mid-1970s to facilitate the transport o f animals from 
areas of production in Western Sudan to areas of consumption in Central Sudan, and 
beyond. A butchery house and Mahjar were established at El-K.ad.aru aimed to 
encourage exports. The Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation (LMMC)- a 
governmental parastatal - was established in the late 1970s to take over control and 
organisation of the livestock trade and marketing both for the domestic and export 
markets. However, all of these measures have had limited effect on stemming animal 
increases. This can be attributed to the following factors: (1) Animals are the only 
means o f investment in the local economy. (2) The herd owners consider liquid money 
undesirable and risky, since there are no channels for storing it or investing it in the 
local economy, and therefore is apt to be squandered in unnecessary consumption. It has 
to be recognised that the pastoral society is a conservative one. (3) The lack of 
alternative avenues o f reliable investment in the local economy outside animal stocking. 
(4) Livestock raising ensures the viability, unity and reproduction of the pastoral 
household unit, and the continuity o f the larger tribal unit. (5) Animals provide social 
security against risk and uncertainties by keeping large and diversified herds o f stocks. 
(6 ) Animals meet basic social functions, as dowry for marriage and other social 
demands. (7) Animals are also a symbol of social status and accord their owner 
distinguished social standing in the community. For these reasons pastoralism remains 
alive and viable in the local economy. However, this view of the pastoralists is not 
shared by the government who embarked on transforming the pastoral way o f life in 
Kordofan towards agricultural production.
5- 4- Institutionalising Market Forces:
5- 4- 1- The beginnings o f  trade:
Kordofan , like the rest o f Sudan was linked to the British economy through the 
colonial policies. British firms established branches at Khartoum, Omdurman and El- 
Obeid. These firms exercised monopolistic control over Kordofan produce as well as the 
import trade. Almost all items o f mercantile trade were imported from Britain and other 
parts of the British Empire, from machine mills, to alcohol. These firms operated 
through their agents and representatives in Khartoum and El-Obeid.
Foreigners were the first to lead the business trade in Kordofan, notably Greeks, 
Syrians, Indians, Lebanese who are mostly Christians working mainly for British firms 
or in partnerships with them. These represented the pioneers leading the market process
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towards a wider integration of Kordofan into the national and international market 
economy. They were favoured with trade and business licences and land to set up their 
premises, therefore almost all the properties in the market place were owned by 
foreigners who then leased the shops to national Sudanese mostly the Jellaba traders 
from North Central Sudan. Trade was rapidly and swiftly expanding, forcefully 
encouraged by the state. A thorough description o f the condition of trade was given in 
an intelligence report in the early years of the re-occupation:
Immediately after the re-occupation o f  the region native and Lavantine merchants flocked 
west and revived the trade in gum, ivory and ostrich feathers. The trade routes with 
Omdurman, overland from El-Obeid and by river from Dueim, and between En-Nuhud and 
El-Fasher (DarFur), were re-opened, and the commercial centres o f  En-Nuhud, El-Obeid 
and Dueim quickly recovered a measure o f  their former prosperity. Improved facilities o f  
transport and communications demanded the establishment o f  local markets which were 
visited by itinerant traders (Jellaba), and some o f  which (e.g. Um Ruaba) are developing 
into important centres. Fresh areas o f  country were exploited, new articles o f  profitable 
trade were discovered, and the export o f  cereals, sesame, earth-nuts, and cattle developed  
rapidly. The present situation affords striking testimony o f  the capacity o f  the native 
population to recover from the stagnation o f  the Dervish period and to adapt themselves to 
the new and improved conditions o f  trade. The total number o f  foreign traders- Syrian,
Greek, Armenian and Egyptian- now operating in the region falls little short o f  400, and 
native merchants- Danagla, Jaaliin, and others- penetrate everywhere. A  branch o f  the 
National Bank o f  Egypt is being opened at El-Obeid, and through rates are quoted for 
consignments by railway to Khartoum and Port Sudan (Gov. o f  Sudan Int. Report 1912:
127- 8).
During this period, El-Obeid revived its former glory as an important trade centre in 
Western Sudan. Trade expanded rapidly and markets were established and organised. 
There were three major markets established at El-Obeid at the time; a market for 
livestock, another for agricultural produce, and a third market called "Suq el-Jellaba" 
for petty trade operations. British and Egyptian banks also opened branches in El-Obeid. 
The banks played an important role in the expansion of trade in Kordofan. They 
extended financial and other facilities (e.g. storage) for their clients and companies to 
conduct big trade and business operations both in the export and import trade. The sale 
of Kordofan produce constituted the most important line of the export trade, which 
necessarily required adequate storage facilities which the banks readily provided in their 
stores. For example, a bank would extend financial and credit facilities to one of its 
clients o f about 10 thousand pounds for sales o f produce, and would then provide 
storage for the quantities bought, and also helps in transport. During this period, almost 
all o f the market operations were controlled by foreigners, and after independence 
Sudanese nationals took over.
The Sudanese engaged in the trade since the early days o f the Condominium as petty 
traders working for big merchants and firms stationed in Khartoum, Omdurman and El- 
Obeid. These were Jellaba "itinerant" traders who carried their merchandise stock on 
their backs, on donkeys and comeback. They roamed the countryside in Kordofan and
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elsewhere with their trade. They sold to the local village populations their petty trade 
which was composed o f items such as soaps, perfumes, spices, cloth, dates, cambric, 
dies, etc., and bought from the villages gum Arabic, sesame, and hides. These Jellaba or 
itinerant traders played an instrumental role in opening up the rural markets to foreign 
goods. Indeed, the colonial authorities actively encouraged and supported their 
activities. And in a famous statement, one o f the colonial administrators advised that 
these traders be encouraged and supported because they can reach the remotest 
communities and penetrate deep into the countryside to open up rural markets to foreign 
goods.
This method of itinerant trading continued until about independence, when the 
Sudanese took over the more important lines of trade, and assumed the role which was 
the prerogative o f their colonial predecessors as patrons of the market and the business 
trade. Consequently, they came to inherit the benefits accruing from the control of the 
lucrative trade over Kordofan produce. This new class o f merchants were 
preponderantly Jellaba from Northern Sudan, mostly from the Bidairiyya section of the 
Shayigiyya, and Jaaliyyin. However, they were in time rivalled and even excelled by an 
upsurge of a new wave of enterprising merchants from Central Sudan, coming from the 
Gezira, no doubt prospered by the quick wealth the cotton industry brought them. The 
Halfawiyyin and Denagla groups did not enter trade at that time, and were mostly 
employed in the houses o f the British and Egyptian colonial overlords as cooks and 
servants. The indigenous Kordofams were still Bedouins pursuing a nomadic life-style, 
disdained petty trading and looked down on petty traders and towns-life generally, thus 
kept aloof and independent from the arenas o f the market and politics. It is only 
recently, in the last ten to fifteen years that the indigenous Kordofam people started to 
enter into the market and take active part in the regional trade (personal 
communication). This new mood indeed marks a crucial shift in the traditional socio­
economic structures signalling an important phase in the continuum o f local adaptations 
in rural Kordofan to the changing socio-economic and political environment. In general 
terms, trade in Kordofan has come to be characterised by three facets: the export trade 
(mainly concentrates on Kordofan agricultural produce), an import trade (of 
manufactured finished goods), and the institution of a regional grain trade; mainly in 
dura imported to Kordofan from Central Sudan and the Gedarif area.
5- 4- 2- The import trade into Kordofan:
The import trade into Kordofan consisted of a plethora o f mercantile trade items 
coming from diverse international sources. Trade items ranged from British-made 
machine mills, to German-made automatic machines, to British-made Mineral Water 
Machines, to textiles o f British, Japanese, Egyptian and Bengali origin, to shoes, soaps,
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etc. By the 1940s, the list had become a plethora too vast to circumscribe. By the 1950s, 
following the expansion of the sterling trade zone, and concomitant arrangements for 
the transferability of the New Americas, (the USA and its dependencies), trade licences 
in Sudan were "given for the import of goods from the Scheduled Territories and from 
the countries comprising the Transferable Account Area" (Ministry o f Economics and 
Commerce 1955). Inside Kordofan, trade licences were given to applicants in all sorts of 
trade, for export, import, wholesale, and retail trade. Petty trade was also encouraged, 
and licences were given on half fees for services, street vendor shops, butchers, 
vegetable retailers, bread sellers, hairdressers' shops, cafes, tailor shops. In all, the clear 
purpose was the rapid promotion o f an active vibrant market economy for the benefit of 
trade. Interestingly, in 1950 a man applied for a licence to set up a printing press. The 
DC at El-Obeid wrote back to inform the applicant that "the Civil Secretary has 
approved in principle your application for licence under ... of the Press Ordinance 1930 
for a printing press in El-Obeid subject to the condition that the printing press is used 
solely for commercial purposes"; and th a t" [i[t was noted that you are not intending to 
print a newspaper or magazine" (District Commissioner, El-Obeid, April 1950). 
However, the government has a monopoly over the major part of the import trade to 
ensure a good revenue coming to the treasury. One such important government 
monopoly is the import, distribution and sale of sugar. The following table illustrates 
the increase in imports of major consumer goods:
Table 2 Imports of sugar, tea, coffee, and cotton fabrics in five-year-period 
averages 1904 - 1946 as % of 1907 (1907 = 100):
Period Sugar Tea Coffee Cotton Fabr
1907 100 100 100 100
1907- 11 144 284 161 124
1912 - 16 203 420 293 142
1 9 1 7 -2 1 177 622 520 129
1 9 2 2 -2 6 208 922 624 170
1927 - 31 382 1690 690 219
1932 - 36 287 1630 1065 269
1 9 3 7 -4 1 495 2219 1250 902
1942 -4 6 358 1466 1443 235
Source: Sudan Government, 1947: 57-8 (cited in Ahmed 1987).
Sugar was imported mainly from Egypt; and by 1953, " [t]wo big stores have 
recently been constructed in El-Obeid at the Central Government expenses, and will be 
operated by the Central Government too, viz. Customs will supply the store-keeper and 
Ghaffir and bear all expenses and the Mudiria will undertake the distribution o f sugar 
and collection o f the cost" (Governor, Kordofan, Nov. 1955, NRO; Vol. 2.K.I. Obeid 
21/1/15). By 1956, the Customs authorities wrote to the Governor of Kordofan 
reminding him that they " have at El-Obeid store about 828 tons o f raw sugar which
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have been remaining there for several months unsold". The Customs authorities asked 
the Governor "if something could be done to encourage its sale"; and suggested that 
"some sort o f propaganda amongst the people will bring a good result" (Director of 
Customs, Sept. 1956, NRO; Vol. 2.K .I. Obeid 21/1/1). Imported goods included all 
kinds of cloth and fabrics, sugar, all kinds o f European provisions, shoes, silver bars (for 
ornament), tobacco, tea, soaps, cosmetics, tools, and scales and measures.
5- 4- 3- The organisation o f markets and the export trade from Kordofan:
The opening years of the Condominium witnessed the organisation of markets for the 
benefit of trade. In the regional centres of Kordofan, i.e. in El-Obeid, En-Nuhud, Um 
Rwaba, markets were set up and organised as a necessary prerequisite for the opening 
up of the rural Kordofan economies to trade and their incorporation into the wider 
national and international markets. The regional market centres were to function as 
collection and distribution points to regulate both the import and export trade.
The organised produce markets, administered by government officials, were set up 
since 1936, and aimed to "ensure that cultivators and gum tappers obtain a fair price and 
were not done down by having to sell in private to small traders" (Robertson 1974: 54). 
Throughout the colonial period, the government worked diligently to control prices 
through market regulations and the institution of detailed bookkeeping of produce sales 
and prices. One colonial official explained the aim behind this policy o f control: "to 
establish the principle that trade, like any other profession, should be conducted for the 
good o f the community as well as for the profit of the trade" (Henderson 1946: 24).
In this spirit, the Local Government Ordinance on the "Regulations of Local Produce 
Markets" in 1929, set out the laws regulating the sale of produce in the market place. 
These laws postulated that: sellers, usually village merchants, collect the produce from 
the village farmers and bring it to the regional produce market for sale. The grading of 
the produce is decided by an officially appointed clerk.. Buyers may inspect the 
produce. Then the auction o f the produce takes place in the market sheds (which consist 
o f numbered seats arranged in sequence for buyers and sellers). The khabirs (expert 
inspectors) assemble in the auction shed allotted to them. The produce is then auctioned 
in numerically arranged order o f lots. The auctioning is conducted by an auctioneer who 
announces the lot and number of sacks therein. Bidding then begins, and bids shall be 
the price offered per kantar of produce. The first bid shall be a multiple of 10 mms (1 
mm. = 0.01 S£). The khabir accepts or rejects the bid. His acceptance o f a bid is binding 
to all sellers. All produce is weighted after sale, and sacked by the buyer. The clerk in 
charge of the weighting machine shall weigh the produce of each seller, and prepare a 
weight ticket showing details of: 
the date.
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the kind of produce,
the gross weight,
the name of the khabir,
the name of the buyer,
the district of origin of the produce, and
the price per kantar.
Sellers then proceed with their weight tickets to the accountant’s office where the 
accountant calculates and records the amount due to each seller. Sellers present their 
weight tickets to the buyers for immediate payment of the amounts due. In theory, 
organised produce market regulations applied to all kinds of produce, including dura, 
and that no transactions of produce should be conducted outside the organised produce 
market; with gum Arabic receiving a special emphasis. However, (as we shall see) 
although food grains were theoretically under the same set o f regulations, in practice, 
they were conducted outside the organised produce markets. The direction of the export 
trade of Kordofan produce was conducted by foreign firms working through their agents 
operating from El-Obeid. The trade is large, enterprising and very lucrative; and 
attracted big foreign firms and banks.
The process o f  trade was further facilitated by the relatively large amounts o f  trading credit 
provided by the big export firms to their local agents. Indeed, the opportunity to become a 
representative or agent o f  one o f  the big commercial enterprises provided the single most 
important source o f  trading credit which enabled traders to make enormous profits on 
amounts far exceeding their actual trading capital (Ahmed 1987).
Companies trading in Kordofan produce, were concerned with the establishment of a 
good name in outside markets for their agricultural exports. The African Trading 
Company, for example, wrote in 1956 to the authorities in Kordofan drawing their 
attention that:
... a most unsatisfactory procedure adopted by the cultivators and producers in Kordofan 
and other market stations over the produce they are bringing in from the fields for sale in 
various Zarebas, and especially to groundnuts in shell. It has been noticed that the foreign 
matters such as stones, mud, stalks, etc. is to be found in a considerable percentage in each 
bag ... the exporters o f  this country have sustained a severe loss by indemnifying buyers 
with such absurd and unjustified impurities. ... therefore, we would appreciate it if  you will 
kindly draw the attention o f  the Commissioners in the various Districts o f  the Country 
...(Sudan Chamber o f  Commerce, 1956. NRO, Kordofan', Vol.: 1 &2; Ref. No. EXP/840).
The Company was trading in the export produce, and was concerned about the quality 
and cleanliness of the produce destined for export. Cleaning the produce became a 
requirement for the advantage of the export trade. As a result, cleaning of the major 
Kordofan crops was carried through a traditional method of sifting and was a monopoly 
of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts & Co. ltd., a British firm whose contract with the Sudanese 
government continued until the close o f 1957.
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The Governor's response to the Company's worries concerning impurities, issued a 
letter to all DCs to the effect that:
It is very important to get good prices for our crops and that a good name in the 
international market should be established for it. If the good name is lost, then it means low 
prices for the cultivators. To prevent this ... Councils should take a great interest in produce 
and its cleaning and improved quality. Would you put this correspondence before your 
Council to explore ways and means o f  avoiding unclean produce com ing into the markets.
This can be done by various ways, viz.;
(a) W ide-scale propaganda at markets, court sittings, meetings etc. to encourage cultivators 
to clean their produce ...
(b) A llow ing merchants to inspect produce ...
(c) Thinking out other ways and means o f  achieving the purpose 
(Governor O f Kordofan 1956. NRO; Kordofan Vol. 2. K -l-O beid 21/1/2).
5- 4- 4- The export trade o f  Kordofan agricultural produce:
A characteristic feature o f the export trade o f Kordofan produce is that it is 
exclusively controlled by economic elites from the centre o f Sudan, merchants and 
businesses mostly based in Khartoum and Omdurman; to the total exclusion of 
Kordofan indigenous participants. These elements were privileged with export and 
import trade licences essentially as a result of their influence over the state decision­
making machinery. By far, gum Arabic is the most significant of Kordofan produce, and 
is given special importance in terms o f organisation and conduction of its trade. Market 
regulations were devised to monitor the gum trade.
5- 4- 4- i- The gum Arabic trade and exports:
In a "Legislature on Commission Agents in Produce Markets", on Traders' Licences 
and Taxation of Business Profits Regulations o f 1929 Laws, El-Obeid District 
Commissioner wrote to the town clerk to see to enforce the laws applying to the produce 
markets, especially the gum auction market; instructing him that: (a) every person 
entering the gum auction market must have permission to do so; that (b) no such person 
should be permitted to enter the gum auction unless he has either a valid trader's licence 
in own name, a valid certificate for branch from H.Q. merkaz o f firm employing him, or 
a valid certificate o f agent without premises from H. Q. merkaz o f firm employing him. 
And (c) If  any person admitted to gum auction do not have the above; the local Council 
should write to the H.Q. merkaz of the firm employing him stating that H.Q. firm has 
failed to give all information required regarding agents when taking out their trader's 
Licence, that agent or branch is agreed by Council and approved by District 
Commissioner. H.Q. merkaz must write necessary particulars on H.Q. Traders Licence 
and issue necessary certificate to agent or branch concerned (District Commissioner; 
Central District, El-Obeid, Aug. 1949. NRO. Vol. 1&2: No. CD/25, A .l).
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Gum became the chief export of the Sudan in the first half o f the Condominium 
period until about the late 1920s of this century when it was superseded by cotton 
(Beshai 1976). Average market prices rose steadily; and in Omdurman, the principal 
gum market at the time, the price of high quality hashab or Kordofan gum increased 
from 122 pilasters per 100 Kilos in 1904 to 234 piasters in 1910 (Ibid). The 
development of the transport and communication system, the Khartoum-Sennar-Kosti 
railway line reached El-Obeid by 1912, the Port Sudan-Kassala-Gedarif line connected 
the main area o f gum production in Kordofan with the main Port, as also it linked the 
main food surplus areas in Central-Eastern Sudan with the main consumption area of 
Kordofan. The officially cheapened fares on rail transport greatly stimulated both the 
export o f gum and other Kordofan produce and animals, as well as boosted imports into 
Kordofan, especially of dura, from other Sudan regions. El-Obeid Gum Market was 
established and organised in 1912. Strict regulations were observed to ensure good 
returns for the producers. Consequently, prices rose between four to five times their
averages in 1903 (Daly 1986).
Table 3 Quantities of gum exported from Sudan in ten-year periods between 1900 -
1986 (in kantars)
Year 1900-09 1910-19 1920-29 1930-39 1940-49 1950-59 I960- 69 1970-79 1980-86
Prodton 7841.5 14994.7 16272.4 17001.7 22580.3 38252.4 50586.1 33599.9 26580.5
Source: calculated from Ahmed 1987.
Table 4 Gum Arabic production 1960 - 1986; Hashab Gum (in 000 M. tons)
Year Production Year Production
1961/61 42956 1973/74 23464
1961/62 45647 1974/75 46500
1962/63 42713 1975/76 43000
1963/64 43480 1976/77 32141
1964/65 44794 1977/78 23200
1965/66 47959 1978/79 26207
1966.67 42713 1979/80 20699
1967/68 58896 1980/81 24757
1968/69 42851 1981/82 31984
1969/70 35068 1982/83 22555
1970/71 38616 1983/84 34000
1971/72 31468 1984/85 11313
1972/73 25940 1985/86 18047
Source: Gum Arabic Company Records. Khartoum.
The remarkable increases in the volume and value in the gum trade from Kordofan 
brought its benefits for the Central Government revenue from the royalty imposed on 
gum. In 1901, this royalty on gum was assessed at 90 piastres per kantar o f hashab 
gum. Although adjustments to this rate continued to be made upwards and downwards, 
the net returns for the Central Government's exchequer were substantial.
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Table 5 Gum Arabic auction price at En-Nuhud and export price at 
Port Sudan 1971/2 - 1981/2.
Year Auction price Export price Auction % o f  Expt.
1971/2 4.05 9.77 41
1972/3 4.15 10.20 41
1973/4 5.85 33.60 17
1874/5 1642 23.28 70
1975/6 8.10 22.43 36
1976/7 8.10 21.32 38
1977/8 8.10 21.90 37
1978/9 10.12 26.90 38
199/80 10.12 36.09 28
1980/1 14.40 50.45 28
1981/2 17.10 58.00 29
Source: Gum Arabic Company; Khartoum.
This earned the Sudan Central Government 20% of its total revenue, from royalties 
and export duties; and in 1902, gum accounted for no less than 75% of the country's 
total export earnings. Although cotton was soon to become the backbone of the 
Sudanese economy from the end o f 1920s onwards, gum regularly accounted for 
between 20 - 30% of the total value o f Sudan's exports, averaging 43% in 1912; 39.3% 
in 1923; and 34.8% in 1931 when the cotton crop failed (Beshai 1976; Ahmed 1987). In 
1931, out o f a total export volume o f 20,086 tons, Kordofan's share came to 17,736 9; or 
8 8 % of the total; (Ahmed 1987). There is little evidence to suggest that, prior to the 
Condominium (1899), the ordinary Hamar had been a significant producer and exporter 
of gum Arabic. According to Mr. Willis, Inspector o f Western Kordofan "the production 
of gum from Dar Hamar in the pre-Dervish (pve-Mahdiyya) days was negligible (Ibid).
Table 6 Government revenue from the Gum Arabic Company's sales




Govnmt. Rv.as % o f  
Sales
1970 8968258 2347059 26
1971 8769118 2498797 28
1972 9743519 2950070 30
1973 8117830 2601646 32
1974 15382180 8308496 54
1975 8113948 3434771 42
1976 12916627 5935354 46
1977 16122022 4308850 26
1978 16053384 4608122 27
1979 25246649 9825192 39
1980 26431120 12138926 46
1981 39449000 20555286 52
1982 39903176 16299332 41
1983 80657665 33030211 41
1984 64466070 16144360 25
1985 39410958 12727910 32
Source: Gum Arabic Company Report 1986, Khartoum.
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A critical question which remains to be asked: is why the state and the market 
functionaries who organise, control and benefit from the gum trade allowed the 
invaluable Hashab forests to become unproductive? Why has there been a conspicuous 
absence of efforts, in form of services, credit, research or conservation efforts to check 
the decline of the Hashab forests? The answer seems to be that Hashab forests are 
mined as a natural resource, together with the human labour involved in its production, 
and are treated by the state and the merchant class as a "mine" to be tapped. It is a mine, 
moreover, that seems to require neither inputs nor reinvestment aimed for long-term 
sustainable production. Once the "mine" is exhausted, it is abandoned; its exploiters 
reaped their profits; hit and run.
In the post-colonial era, the official policy that all gum transactions should take place 
in the auction produce market remained unchanged. However, in the 1970s, the 
government introduced even greater control measures on the gum trade by the 
establishment of the Gum Arabic Company (GAC). The Company espouses a 
responsibility to ensure that a minimum auction price is received by the producer, and 
that this minimum price is to be maintained, such that the company has to intervene as a 
buyer to maintain the declared minimum price from falling, and in case where excess 
quantities of produce is left unpurchased by traders. However, most of the gum produce; 
(of about 70%) is transacted outside the proper produce market, therefore, the actual 
price realised by the producer is less than the minimum auction price declared by the 
Company. On the other hand, the profits realised by the GAC, and the gum big 
businesses and exporters amounts to a huge margin o f no less than 70% of the value of 
export (Oesterdiekhoff 1983). The GAC is a state parastatal which controls the gum 
trade, running the auctions markets, setting minimum prices, allowing even less to reach 
the farmer. Merchant cartels at the auctions ensure that prices remain low, while the 
government, despite its professed policy of "fairness" to the farmer, manages at various 
stages to extract no less than seven separate taxes or dividends out of the price, and to 
manipulate the foreign exchange rate used in gum transactions to its advantage (Cater 
1986). Thus, the state receives a large share of the proceeds from the gum trade, as taxes 
on gum in addition to its dividends as a shareholder in the GAC profits. At a time when 
the returns for the actual producers dwindle, simultaneously the central Government's 
earnings from the Gum export trade continued to increase, steadily from 25% in 1970 
to 52% in 1981, with an average annual increase o f 37% (Ahmed 1987).
Although the GAC has made some efforts at least to maintain a semblance of 
"fairness" by trying to give the producer a "good" price in order to stimulate production, 
these efforts have been frustrated by the merchant class, and not least by the state itself. 
Favourable conditions in the international gum trade resulted in a temporary boom in 
1974/5 and prices picked up. The GAC wanted to transfer a small part of this price rise
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to the producers; and in effect raised the price to S£ 14.30 to the Kantar. The big 
merchants in their turn transmitted only 12% of this increase to the producer. The export 
price rose to S£ 23.40 to the Kantar. 63% of which was pocketed by the big merchants 
(Ahmed 1987).
5- 4- 4- ii- The export o f sesame and other oilseeds:
Sesame constituted one o f the major exports to outside markets. Licensed exporters 
can export the crop to any destination. In a letter concerning the export o f sesame, the 
Director of the Ministry of Economics and Commerce, issued the following 
memorandum:
The open general licence for the export o f  sesame seed from the Sudan to any destination ... 
is hereby further extended ....
Exporters are reminded o f  the rail transport congestion which is usual later in the season 
when the cotton crop begins to m ove and are strongly advised in their own interests to 
m ove as much o f  their export grains as possible to Port Sudan during the next two months.
The export o f  sesame OIL is NOT permitted (Director, Ministry o f  Economics and 
Commerce; Oct. 1954. Press Notice No. 725: Export o f  Sesame).
During the colonial period, the concentration on oilseeds production was rather on 
sesame which was traditionally more important in the domestic market, groundnuts 
production was less important than sesame. But owing to the shortage o f vegetable oils 
created by World War 2 caused a sudden shift in oilseeds production, and groundnuts 
witnessed dramatic increases in production stimulated by the newly created demand. As 
a result, on the eve o f independence, the area of groundnuts under rainfed cultivation 
increased from 68,912 feddans in 1946 to 296,857 feddans by 1954/5 (Saad el Din 
Fawzi 1958; Ahmed 1987). Cash crop production has been encouraged generally, but 
especially oilseeds which witnessed enormous increases during the decade of the sixties 
and seventies, in the context of the policy o f "diversification" o f exports in the sixties, 
and under the "open door policy" in the seventies imposed upon the Nimeiri regime by 
its international lenders like the World Bank and the IMF, and the tying up of foreign 
aid to the production of exportable agricultural produce, i.e. oilseeds. Thus the area 
cultivated with groundnuts increased from about 140000 feddans in the mid-1950s to 
935000 in 1965/6. The national development policies under Nimeiri, under international 
strictures, a demand for vegetable oils in the Middle Eastern Arab states, coupled with 
favourable international market prices for oilseeds, all combined to stimulate production 
in the 1970s, and the area committed to groundnuts increased dramatically, averaging 
1556000 feddans in the mid-1970s period. Thus groundnuts swallowed most of the best 
lands previously cultivated with millet and other food crops. The area cultivated with 
groundnuts exceeded by a wide margin the total area cultivated with all other crops 
combined. Moreover, farmers devoted most of their labour time to the production of
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groundnuts and other cash crops. It is also that competition between cash crops and food 
crops in critical farming operations for household labour demands, favoured cash crops 
and leaving food-crop farms virtually unattended for the most critical periods, thus 
critically exacerbating the households food situation. The most significant and long- 
lasting effect of the development o f cash cropping is that it has permanently instituted a 
local agricultural wage labour market in which the merchants class stand to be the prime 
beneficiaries of this development, and the poorer households are disadvantaged. They 
can hire local labour to till their farms, especially from poorer households, who in effect 
lose almost all of their labour power to the benefit of those with a little cash, like the 
village merchants who can afford to pay the small wages.
National governments in the post-colonial era pursued policies o f modernisation 
financed by public, private and foreign investment capital. During this period, we 
witness the proliferation of the state corporate enterprises in the shape o f government 
parastatals which have greatly helped to consolidate the state’s centralised political 
power to such a considerable extent, and gave it legal rights to control the production, 
marketing and pricing of key commodities and sectors in the economy, in effect were to 
determine the fortunes and indeed the fates of many agricultural producers.
The declared objectives of the state parastatals are ostensibly expressed to be aimed 
to work towards self-sufficiency in food production, rationalisation o f the agricultural 
sector, and the implementation o f the strategy of agro-based industrialisation. In order to 
achieve these objectives, It is envisaged that mercantilism and commercialisation of 
both the agricultural and the livestock sectors are to bee encouraged and supported 
through efficient marketing and price control policies. A fundamental pillar o f the 
policy is to increase exportable surpluses of cash crops. Although these were in 
principle the main objectives espoused by the state parastatals, it is interesting to note 
that the stated objective of food self-sufficiency and agro-based industrialisation hardly 
got off the ground, and remained only on paper. Instead, the state parastatals 
concentrated the whole of their operations on the secondary less important, though 
much more lucrative business o f pricing and marketing the rural agricultural produce, 
much to the benefit of the shareholders, the state, and the managerial class o f these 
corporations.. Through their control over the marketing and pricing policies of the key 
commodities, these interest groups, including the state as a beneficiary agent, were able 
to reap enormous profits, basically appropriations of rural surplus labour. These big 
interests in fact underpin the policies o f the state for the wholesale transformation o f the 
rural economies from subsistence to cash crop production.
In 1974, the government established the Oilseeds Company, a joint venture between 
the public and private sectors. Obviously, the Company is a joint enterprise whose role 
is to service the interests of both the central Government for revenue generation and also
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to guard the interests of big exporters and businesses involved in the oilseeds trade. The 
Company has been granted monopoly rights for the purchase, disposal, transport, 
marketing, pricing and export of oilseeds. The Company's statutes declare a 
commitment to maintaining "fair" prices for producers. However, this is more easily 
said than done. The Company's actual practices and prices do not in fact adhere to the 
stated goals. The government is the biggest shareholder in the Oilseeds Company, its 
share standing to 58%, therefore, is practically the single most powerful agent in the 
monopoly o f the trade, and the arch appropriator of the proceeds accruing from the 
trade. The government appropriates 65% of the OSC gross profits as business tax, 5% of 
the sales as development tax, and 58% of the Company's net profits as dividends on its 
shares (Ahmed 1987).
Oilseeds are taxed less heavily than gum Arabic. The official justification is cast in 
terms of the export nature of gum Arabic which is exclusively an export crop, while a 
large part o f oilseeds production is consumed domestically. This is a justiification which 
disguises the true fact behind the discrepancy in the official pricing policies; one 
essentially political in nature. The very extortionate taxing and taxes on gum can be 
more creditably explained by the fact that gum is produced mainly in Western Sudan, 
particularly in Kordofan, where there is little political leverages to bear on the state for 
more equitable prices. As for oilseeds, the major part of the crop is produced in areas of 
political pressure, in Central Sudan, the Gezira and the Gedarif areas where powerful 
interest groups influence the decision-making for lower taxes. One such important 
interest group is the lobby of oil-pressing mills who can be enabled to purchase their 
requirements of oilseeds at lower prices, and whatever benefits accruing from the stage 
of processing passes completely to the mill-owners. The finished processed oil product, 
together with the oil cake can indeed yield enormous profits. One oil-mill owner in El- 
Obeid commented that the sale value o f the cake can recover the entire purchase costs of 
raw sesame, leaving the value o f the finished processed oil as net profit. However, the 
massive increase in groundnuts production has had negative effects on the land. The 
harvesting of the crop causes loosening of the earth, making it susceptible to winds; and 
the extensive lands which become bare after harvesting, and the weeding results in a 
serious removal o f grass cover vital to keep the soil intact. All of these processes 
involved in groundnuts production, ultimately contributed to erosion and deepening 
ecological disturbances o f the local environment. Naturally, yields started to decline 
towards the end o f the 1970s, which decline needed to be offset by further increases in 
the cultivable area. Things were made even worst by a correspondingly falling 
international prices for oilseeds as the world recession set in. As a result o f these 
adversities, with declining yields and falling prices, the local producers suffered a 
serious blow to their incomes. More critically still, is that their dependence on cash
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earnings from the sale of groundnuts and other cash crops for their food consumption 
needs is now severely undermined by a combination of internal and external conditions 
over which they have little control.
5- 4- 4- iii- Export o f Dura and Dukltn:
Following the result o f recommendation of the Board o f Economics and Trade 
endorsed and agreed upon by the Council o f Ministers, the Director o f the Ministry of 
Economics and Commerce issued a press notice. The letter is addressed to the Governor 
o f Kordofan in which the Central Government instructed the authorities in Kordofan to 
extend the export licences on dura and dukhn. The letter reads as follows:
That the open general licence for the export o f  dura and dukhn to any destination be 
extended to October 31st, 1955 and that as much publicity as possible be given through the 
Province Authorities and by press notice to the desirability o f  m oving grain intended for 
export as soon as possible to Port Sudan since, as happened last season, the capacity o f  the 
railways will be severely taxed as soon as the cotton is ready for transport.
And in view of the transport congestion the export of dura is bound to create which 
coincides with the season of cotton transport, the letter went on to advise that:
...in accordance with the recommendations ... you will give the maximum publicity to the 
advice to m ove as much grain as possible to Port Sudan ... . In particular, we hope that it 
will be impressed on the Gedarif exporters that the best way to prevent a recurrence o f  last 
season's anxieties is to move what they can now. ... there is no reason why old crop dura 
and new fatarita should not be m oved early (Director; Ministry o f  Econom ics & 
Commerce. Oct. 1954. NRO; Kordofan, Vol. 1& 2: No. MEC/SP/62-1-9).
The response of Kordofan Council to the central government's policy on the 
continuation of dura and dukhn exports is that the Council expressed fears that the 
policy will have negative consequences on the general local food security; and wrote to 
the Governor:
1/. I have received with thanks your letter N o ...... regarding the export o f  dura, dukhn
and sesame.
21. The letter shall have its normal channel, and the maximum possible publicity; but I 
thought, it may be interesting to bring to your notice, without prejudice to the Council 
o f  Ministers' decision that these essential commodities have disappeared altogether 
from the Market, and the prices have arisen madly.
3/. The prevailing market prices for a Mid o f  7 Rottles are:-
(1) Fetarita from P.T. 5 TO P.T. 10
(2) Zinari " P.T. 6 TO P. T. 12
(3) Dukhn " P.T. 6 TO P.T. 10
4/. To be more realistic, I feel that if  this state o f  export shall take a wider scope, local 
conditions shall be more serious, and it may lead to a general famine.
(Town Clerk; El-Obeid Municipal Council, Nov. 1954. NRO; Kordofan; Vol. 1 & 2:
Obeid. No. MC/E1- d /28-B -l).
The Governor's response to the Municipal Council's fears about the likely negative 
food security effects of food exports were that the export policy should continue, and
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that food can be imported from outside the region, notably from areas o f surplus such as 
Sennar and Kosti. As for the sharp price rises, the Governor saw the issue in a moral 
light in which merchants were to be persuaded not to push prices too high, and wrote to 
the municipality:
I am afraid the question o f  banning the export o f  Dura cannot be considered at present. Nor 
am I prepared to recommend that price control as far as Dura is concerned should be 
imposed in El-Obeid. ...
I wonder whether the present rise in Dura prices is not due to the seasonal shortage which 
normally obtains just before the new harvest is gathered. There is enough Dura in other 
parts o f  the country, e.g. Sennar, and Kosti Districts and you should impress upon local 
merchants the necessity o f  importing dura, i f  needed.
As regards the price I think the Municipal Council should bring moral pressure to bear on 
merchants not to raise the prices too high.
(Governor, Kordofan, N ov. 1954. NRO. Kordofan; Vol. 1 & 2: No. kn. p/15.A. 2/12)
The municipal authorities in a meeting at El-Obeid considered the government's 
instructions to continue the exports o f dura and dukhn. The Council agreed on certain 
resolutions which were passed to the Governor o f the Province to pass them on to the 
Central Government in Khartoum. Their resolutions are expressed in the following 
letter;
That in view o f  the acute shortage o f  Dura in Kordofan and the neighbouring DarFur 
Province, and the bad harvest o f  this year, (according to reports o f  Experts, Traders and 
Omdas) that you be approached with a request to contact the Higher Authorities to 
reconsider and cancel this Open Licence for the export o f  Dura, and Dukhn from Sudan to 
abroad, and to impose restrictions on the export o f  these essential commodities, the 
necessity or lack o f  which may lead to a famine, in these Western Provinces, which can not 
in any way be se lf contained. It has been the drill during the last years that both Provinces 
were partly dependent on their Dura and Dukhn resources on the Gezira and Gedarif 
Areas; the reason being that the local cultivators were attracted by the high prices o f  cash 
crops as Cotton, Sesame, and Ful Sudani; a fact that made farmers abandon the cultivation 
o f  Dura and Dukhn to a serious extent. (Town Clerk, El-Obeid Municipal Council, Nov.
1954. NRO. Kordofan, Vol. 1 & 2: No. MC/OBEID/28. B. 1.).
The Governor's response to the general Municipal meeting which included 
representatives from all the districts o f Kordofan is that he had discussed the question of 
dura shortage in Kordofan with the Director of Trade and Commerce, and the Central 
Government policy stipulated that the export o f grains should continue. And wrote back 
saying that "before the decision to export grain was made, careful consideration was 
given to Dura production in all Provinces including Kordofan and I am still not 
convinced that that decision was a bad one and for that matter it should be revoked" 
(Governor's Office, El-Obeid; Nov. 1954. NRO., Vol. 1&2: No. Kn. P/15.A.2/12).
As the Municipal authorities in their general meeting have exhorted, the official 
policy o f food export resulted in an acute and widespread food shortage in Kordofan 
which impelled the authorities to seek importing grain from other parts o f Sudan, 
especially from Sennar, Kosti, Singa, Wad Medani, Jebel Mawya in Gezira Province.
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And from the Red Sea Province, Dura was imported to Kordofan from Kassala, 
Gedarif Dinder, El-Suki, El-Hawata, and even from as far as Port Sudan; as well as 
from Khartoum Province, and Karima facilitated by rail transport. Indeed, the policy of 
food export and the commercialisation of food crops into the market made the food 
situation inside Kordofan particularly acute that the regional government under the 
urgency o f the situation, encouraged merchants to import grain from Kosti where there 
was plenty of stock kept by the grain merchants at Kosti. A circular was issued by the 
Governor directed to the grain merchants in El-Obeid to the effect that a "Hassan 
Karkab, the merchant in Kosti informed that he can provide you with your requirements 
of Dura, if you can let him know of the quantities needed and prices. You are kindly 
requested to contact him" (The Mudier, 23rd Nov. 1954; translation mine). However, 
the Governor imparted that the grain merchants have a moral responsibility towards the 
public and it is their duty to help bring grain prices down and to ease the hardship on the 
population. A co-ordinated official effort was being mounted to move food grains into 
Kordofan. The Governor o f the Blue Nile Province issued a corresponding circular to 
the grain merchants in his Province imparting to them the good market prospects for 
Dura in Kordofan, and made that widely known to merchants. In his circular, the 
Governor wrote to the District Commissioners of Sennar, Northern Fung, Kosti, Dueim 
in his Province instructing them that:
Would you please make it w idely known among merchants in your districts that there is a
good market for Dura in Kordofan" (Governor's Office, Blue N ile Province, Wad Medani,
Nov. 1954. NRO. Vol. 1&2; Kordofan-, No. BNP/2.F.5).
The letter was received by the Governor's Office in El-Obeid, and, for wider 
publicity, the letter was sent to the editor o f Kordofan Newspaper, for immediate 
publication, and was also speedily dispatched to the District Commissioners 
administering the various districts in the Province; i.e. Tegale, Jebels, Messeriyya, Um 
Rwaba, Bara, En-Nuhud and Kadugli to take effective action by alerting the merchants 
in their areas to import grain from Kosti and Gezira. Under the circumstances o f the 
food shortage, and in order to make a decision with regard to exporting grains, the 
regional government authorities were compelled to know the precise quantities o f grain 
available and the level o f shortfall and prices prevailing. The authorities instructed the 
regional produce market clerks to provide them with these vital information which is 
required by the Central Government to decide on the question of grain exports. In a 
rather curious situation, food grains although they have become an important 
commodity of trade in the domestic and export markets, nonetheless remained absent 
from actual delivery into the official produce market. This stands in contrast to the other 
agricultural commodities such as gum Arabic, sesame, groundnuts, melon seed, whose 
sales and transactions was to be conducted only through the regular organised produce
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market, and outlawed outside the organised market. Indeed, the organised market 
transactions follow a set o f injunctions to regulate the market operations. In theory, 
however, the organised produce market regulations apply to all kinds of produce, 
including dura, and that no transactions should be conducted outside the organised 
produce market. Notwithstanding, dura sales were conducted outside the proper produce 
market. The Town's Clerk in response to the Governor’s request to provide him with 
exact quantities and prices of dura sold in the market replied that "we have no accurate 
record o f Dura imported from other main Kordofan Districts as most of the quantities 
arriving into this Municipality are being sold outside the market". And that "Dukhn and 
Fetarita are not included in the Statistical Return ... that they are sold in open markets 
and that they are not amongst commodities to be auctioned in the produce market" 
(Town Clerk's Office, El-Obeid 18th May 1955. NRO. Vol. 1&2: Nos. 
MC/OBIED/28.B. 1; and MC/24. B .l- XR/28 B .l). The letter pointed out that "the 
merchants are still importing dura from other Provinces, and the following are the 
quantities imported into El-Obeid by rail [in] 1954 together with their average prices . 
This return also includes an approximate estimate o f the quantities arriving from other 
main Kordofan sources":
Place Feterita Zinari Dukhn Mugud Wadakar Mayo Total
Kordofan Prov. - 8392860 61446 - - - 9007320
Khartoum Prov. 744660 302610 114660 - - 14070 1176000
Red Sea & Kassala 214410 400470 850920 401730 641130 - 2508660
Gezira Prov. 9325050 2700600 2057370 6300 - - 14089320
Total 10284120 11796450 3084396 408030 641130 14070 26781300
*Average price / mid 60m 70m 75m 65m 55m 70m mm/mid
Source: Town Clerk Office, based on statistics, Produce Market; El-Obeid Dec. 1954.
* Average price: mm /mid ( mm = 0.1% S£; mid = 3.2 Kgs.)/
The Produce Markets' Superintendent, wrote to the Supervisor o f the Municipality in 
response to the Governor's directives that "no quantities of dura arrived for sale in the 
Produce Market since 1951, and that small quantities arrived and sold in the street 
vendor's open market, in small quarter shops and in front of grinding mills following a 
decision from the Council". And added that " the traders import quantities of dura from 
the Provinces o f the Gezira and Kassala "Gedarif', chiefly Fetarita and Mugud and it is 
not precisely known the quantities imported and types" (Produce Markets' Office, El- 
Obeid 1954).
However, by 1958, the regional food security situation deteriorated to such an extent 
that it urgently demanded the institution o f a regional grain reserve under the Local Act 
"Province Dura Reserve, 1985". The Act stipulated that a special account to be known 
as "Province Durra Reserve Account" was opened to control the whole operation by the 
regional government. The regional Government would undertake purchase of dura from
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contractors (grain merchants), kept it in public stores; and when need arose to issue 
these to District Commissioners for resale to public in cases of need - which issue will 
be made to at a price to be approved by the Governor's Office. The Act stipulated that 
contractors, i.e. accepted tenders, deliver dura ex Railways Stations. On receipt of dura 
from contractors, all contract conditions should strictly be observed. And that the dura 
allotted and sent to each District should be under the direct control o f the District 
Commissioner concerned, and it should be taken over by a Board, where storage 
accommodation permits, this dura Reserve should be stored separately and apart as 
distinct from the ordinary Shuna Dura. Delivery of Dura to various Districts, and dates 
of despatches and arrivals should as far as possible be notified well in advance. All 
receipts should be acknowledged by wire immediately the Dura was received. Any 
expenses duly incurred by Districts would be debited to Province Dura Reserve 
Account for payment. The initial purchase price payable to the accepted contractors to 
supply Dura would be paid by this Office as and when the Dura was duly received. 
Government Transport Contractors were informed to be ready for the transport of Dura 
from El-Obeid and from other Railway Stations to the various District Headquarters 
(Governor, Kordofan Province, El-Obeid 27th April 1958).
It was thought that transport bottle-necks was the main reason behind grain shortage 
in Kordofan. As a result, a recommendation was approved by the Municipal Council 
that the Governor should intervene with the Railways Authorities to facilitate the 
transport of Dura from areas of surplus production to Kordofan. The Council resolved 
that dura is available in the areas of production such as Gedarif Sennar, El Haddad, El 
Suki and Medani, but that the "present conditions o f the railway transport, and the 
shortage in rail trucking capacity sufficient for grain shipment is the most detrimental 
factor in this regard which has caused and will continue to cause acute shortages in the 
quantities o f dura arriving to El-Obeid. It becomes clear that if  the grain merchants were 
to find greater facilities in rail transport from the Railway Authorities by way of 
increasing the rail trucking capacity in a systematic manner, provided that they give first 
priority in shipping, this grain shortage will certainly disappear". The letter imparted to 
the Governor that "the meeting has recommended writing to your Excellence to kindly 
contact the Railway Authorities to do the following: (1) To give first priority in shipping 
and transport from Gedarif and Sennar areas to El-Obeid to the following merchants 
who have the quantities o f dura shown below, and which is ready for transport, and not 
yet shipped:
Name o f  Merchant Name o f  Seller and Port o f  Shipping Quantity ready for 
Shipment
Osman Ismail Fadlallah Mohammad Y ousif algham & Kuku Ali - Gedarif 280
Sheikh El Kamil El Kurdi & Brothers - Gedarif 300
Awad Mohammad Ahmad Jaafar El Khalifa Hassan - Sennar 160
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2) To give first priority in shipping and transport by increasing the number of rail 
carriage to transport all quantities o f dura required for import to El-Obeid, or to any 
other destination in the Province through El-Obeid grain importers whose names are 
shown below, or any other merchant either from El-Obeid or from any other area of 
Kordofan:-
1) Mohammad Ismail Musa,
2) Osman Ismail Fadlallah,
3) Mustafa Salim,
4) Osman Abbakar,
5) Muddathir Hamid (Agent; Abu el-I'la Co.),
6 ) Dafaalla el-Zailaai,
7) Awad Mohammad Ahmad,
8 ) Ahmad Abd el-Majid,
9) El-Sheikh El-Kamil (Agent; Osman Salih),
10) Ahmad Musa el-Hidirbi,
11) Shukri AArghatanji;
to transport from the following areas of production:- 
1) Gedarif 2) Sennar 3) El-Suki 4) El-Haddad 5) Medani
3) That the Railway Authorities should observe to carry out these recommendations in 
the nearest possible future and in a systematic manner before the start of the rainy 
season" (El-Obeid Municipal Council, El-Obeid; May 1958. NRO. Vol. 1&2: No. 
MB/EL-OBEID/ 28-B-l; translation mine). The government policy of continued food 
exports from Kordofan has effectively instituted the commercialisation of food in the 
region for both production and consumption. Food grains no longer were produced for 
home consumption, nor surplus production in good years were reserved for the 
household food security. Instead, food crops have entered into the market also as cash 
crops; with the inevitable consequences o f dangerously precipitating the local food 
security, creating the conditions of food shortages and famines.
5- 5- Government Revenue from Kordofan Produce:
Kordofan continued to be a major source o f government revenue. The taxes that were 
imposed on Kordofan and levied by the central government included tulba, qutaan 
(animal tax), ushur (tithe), and gibana (royalty). Tidba, introduced in the Tribute 
Ordinance of 1901, was a tribute imposed on nomad groups based on an approximate 
assessment of the group's herds, and the tax is apportioned among them according to the 
relative wealth of the group's members by the head of the tribe (Daly 1985: 188). Ushur: 
was based on the Muslim Zakat of one tenth (tithe) of the land produce. It was imposed 
on all lands under rain cultivation. Qutaan: was a herds tax introduced in 1899. It 
consisted o f 3% levied on camels and cattle; and 8% on sheep and goats payable in cash 
or kind. This was replaced in 1901 under the terms of the taxation o f Animal Ordinance
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by the Animal Tax. Gibana: was a royalty exclusively levied on gum Arabic. In a 1899 
Ordinance, the Gibana royalty on gum was fixed at 20% ad valorem. The Central 
Government revenue from taxes in 1903 came to 24.7% of total revenue.
From the above account, colonial and post-colonial policies have sought to transform 
Kordofan production and exchange relations along the lines o f the market. Market 
forces have been state institutionalised which had negative bearings on regional and 
local food security. A number o f important observations emerge concerning Kordofan 
food grain situation. The first is that cash income from gum Arabic and other cash 
crops, i.e. sesame and groundnuts, stimulated both increased levels of production for 
cash incomes and a wide and varied consumption for manufactured goods. In addition, 
food grains have become an important item of trade in both the domestic and export 
markets. Effectively, this has meant increased dependency on the market for both 
production and consumption. The most critical aspect o f this market dependency was 
the shift in Kordofan agricultural activity from the production o f food to the cash crops 
production. Cumulatively, this had caused a serious shortfall in food production in 
Kordofan, which made it a food deficit region. Consequently, the region has since 
become an important trade zone for the grains merchants and their collusive practices 
for the benefits the grain trade can bring., especially from the Gezira and then Gedarif 
On the other hand, the national policy o f grain exports, and the shift in focus in 
Kordofan's agricultural production from food to cash crops led to a continuing inverse 
ratio between the region's production and consumption needs o f food grains, which in 
turn translated into consistently rising food prices. This has become one of the most 
negative aspects of the impact o f the market on the rural economies of Kordofan. The 
argument that cash returns from cash crop production would buy the food the people 
need did not occur. While food prices have risen continuously, earnings from cash crops 
have fallen. In effect, local producers are placed in an unenviable situation o f precarious 
and insecure food needs since the food grains have ushered into the market. Kordofan 
has become a food deficit region and, in effect an important trade zone serving the 
interests of the grain merchants and the powerful national agrarian lobby. It is also a 
region of vast cash crop resources which contribute the major part to the government 
revenue. The Central Government aware o f the strategic importance o f Kordofan 
agricultural and animal produce to generate the foreign exchange earnings, needed to 
control the produce of the region through the pricing and marketing mechanisms. As a 
result, marketing state parastatals were established to control the pricing and marketing 
of the region's produce of Gum Arabic, oilseeds, and livestock which represent the vital 
sources of the region. Consequently, corporate companies have been set up, jointly by 
public and private sector capital, evidently to serve the intertwined interests of both the 
Central Government and the merchant class interests. These major parastatals are the
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Gum Arabic Company, the Oilseeds Company and the Livestock and Meat Marketing 
Corporation (LMMC) which were established during national rule, especially during the 
Nimeiri years at the behest of the honeymoon with USA relations and the economy was 
oriented to a strict American-styled market economy under the "open door policy". 
Under this period, Kordofan resources are virtually pillaged, the food situation grew 
ever more disparate and acute shortages occurred. Cash crop prices declined, the local 
economy suffered from the massive drain and exploitation, which in turn translated into 
wide scale environmental degradation. These trends rendered the local populations 
extremely vulnerable, such that when droughts hit in the 1980s and 1990s, the local 
populations were already too impoverished and weakened to withstand the shock, and 
the drought triggered these long-term trends into famine. Indeed, the succession o f three 
large-scale famines in less than two decades between the seventies and nineties can not 
be blamed on natural phenomena alone, but have to be explained in the context of the 
"politics o f famine": the state of utter exhaustion and extreme vulnerability to the 
vagaries o f nature to which the local populations have been rendered through a long 
process of underdevelopment, political marginalisation and economic exploitation over 
many long years, essentially through the agency o f the state.
5- 6 -  P o l i c i e s  O f T r a n s f o r m a t i o n :
The developments which have been taking place in the centre of economic and 
political power aimed towards restructuring Kordofan economies and their final 
incorporation into the wider national and international market system, necessitated 
certain policy programmes to bring about the transformation of the rural economies of 
Kordofan. We identify the following policies promoted by the central state to effect the 
requisite changes.
5- 6- 1- Development o f rural water supplies and resettlement programmes:
In 1946, a Rural Water Supplies and Soil Conservation Board was set up within the 
Ministry o f Agriculture to provide water supply to rural areas in order to encourage 
resettlement of pastoral and nomad communities; and to administer the execution of the 
programme. Thus in the first fifteen years o f its existence, the Board has been concerned 
with excavating hafirs (surface water reservoirs) using modern earth moving machinery. 
The aims of the programme were to develop water supplies in new areas where people 
can move and settle permanently for cultivation o f lands around the new water points. 
Without a fairly good distribution o f water points, many areas could only be occupied 
during the rainy season, or immediately after it, while ephemeral rain pools lasted. As 
the season progressed, people could make only the occasional forays to their farms; and 
after the harvest, such areas were completely abandoned (Davies 1962). The main 
policy concern o f the programme of the Rural Water Supplies was to encourage
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settlement for cultivation, although pastoralists could benefit from improved water 
supplies too.
During the first five years, the Rural Water Supplies and Soil Conservation Board 
excavated 138 hafirs in Kordofan. The policy has ever since been pursued more 
vigorously and even extended to more fragile ecological zones, especially throughout 
the 1960s and early 1970s by the department, now under the name o f the National Water 
Administration. At this time, the focus has been shifted to the digging of more 
motorised boreholes, than on the excavation of hafirs. Thus, between 1966 and 1972, 
about 900 boreholes have been drilled in Kordofan, and consequently the historically 
waterless sandy Goz plains o f Kordofan have been opened up for cultivation. Water 
supply which has previously been available only as a natural resource from the seasonal 
rains, and which largely determined the mode of economic practice and patterns of land 
use, is no longer a condition of natural availability. The big increases in the availability 
of water made possible by mechanical means has greatly encouraged sedentarisation, 
cultivation and stocking in and around the permanent water points and settlements.
5- 6- 2- Land tenure system and reform
Various land reform legislatures have been set up since the first days of the colonial 
administration in Sudan. Thus, in 1899, a Land Commission was established and a Land 
Act was made enabling the government to claim rights to any lands in the country. This 
act was superseded in early 1903 by another act; the Title to Lands Ordinance enabling 
the government to acquire land by expropriating all rights "for public interest". The 
Land Settlement and Registration Ordinance was promulgated in 1925, superseding all 
previous legislatures. According to the terms of this law, all unregistered land is deemed 
to belong to the government, but in practice, the government exercises its ownership as 
a trust for people who have habitually exercised rights over it. This applies to land 
which is cultivated at irregular intervals, or is superabundant. In this case, land is held as 
communal, and administered by the authorities of the tribe, village or other communal 
unit, and individual rights obtain to all members o f that unit to use the land and its 
resources according to the set norms o f practice, or as the authorities o f the communal 
unit direct. This law was in time replaced by another legislature, this time in the Land 
Acquisition Ordinance, 1930, which enabled the Governor-General to acquire land for 
public purpose on payment o f compensation (Bolton 1948). These various land 
legislatures in Sudan have not significantly altered communal ownership o f land in 
central and Northern Kordofan districts. However, the legal status o f land remains to be 
state property, and allocation of land has been vested on the native authorities who act 
on behalf o f the government.
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In the rural areas, the village farmers cultivate the land around their village. The legal 
status of land in the rural areas o f Sudan all belong to the state. This obviously entails a 
serious alienation o f the land resource as the main factor o f production from its 
traditional legitimate owners to the state as the legal appropriator of the land. Although, 
this is the official legal status, the real powers are vested in the hands o f the village 
Sheikhs who are lawfully authorised as guardians and delegates acting on behalf of the 
government for control over and allocation of the land and range resources. There is no 
formal registration of farm lands by individual farmers, although individual persons 
have the absolute rights to the lands granted to them by the Sheikh; provided that they 
keep it in use, and can dispense with it accordingly. It should be stressed, though, that 
the underlying general principle governing the utilisation of land resources is communal 
ownership. Land is regarded as a common property, and the resources and range are 
managed communally according to set rules o f practice for the benefit of all members of 
the village community. In practice, neither the Sheikh, nor the government on whose 
behalf he acts can in truth alienate the land from its traditional users without causing 
much trouble and tension. Nonetheless, the official legal status o f land is that it remains 
the property of the state.
In areas of the hashab, the government ruled that priority for cultivation be given to 
land where hashab trees ceased to be productive and the tapping of gum gardens which 
sprang up in abandoned cultivated plots. This is considered to be the most economically 
and ecologically sound method of agricultural practice to ensure the survival of the 
hashab trees in the agricultural cycle. The hashab gardens and the gum obtained from 
them became the backbone o f the Hamar economy, and in effect, encouraged large 
sedentary settlements around the hashab forests, while previous to that, settlements in 
Dar Hamar had been mainly around sufficient numbers o f Tebeldi trees to ensure 
permanent water supply, and such settlements were smaller in size. The effects o f these 
policies have been rapid sedentarisation concomitantly with an alienation of land from 
the original users. Official statements as early as 1910 confirmed that land ownership is 
being systematically moving from communal to private ownership. The effects o f this 
change has been the replacement o f the revitalising regenerative fertility-enhancing 
longer fallow cycles by a more degenerating fertility exhausting intensive cultivation of 
short fallow cycles. As such, land quality and fertility degenerates, yields fall, and need 
is pressing to bring ever more land under cultivation each year. The inevitable 
consequences are wind-blown erosion, loss of grass cover, degraded ranges, shortages 
of wood for fuel and building, and ultimately large-scale environmental degradation.
The Sudanese governments' straight-jacket answer to these problems has invariably 
been to promote the mechanisation o f agricultural schemes, and the resettlement of 
pastoral communities. As a result o f these strategies, mechanisation of agriculture was
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vigorously encouraged in the relatively better endowed areas of Southern Kordofan; 
which have more fertile clay soils and better rainfall. Indeed, the contrast in natural 
resource endowment between this Southern part o f the region and the central part which 
is more densely populated but relatively less endowed in terms of rainfall and soils, has 
set the scene for a major planning issue for Kordofan: should priority be given to 
improving conditions for the vast majority o f rural producers in the middle belt, or 
should priority be given to maximising agricultural output on the Southern clay soils by 
introducing mechanised traction and establishing large-scale commercial enterprises. 
Against this background, it is understandable where the central state planning 
sympathies lie. Accordingly, planning thinking emphasised the potential role of 
Kordofan (and Western Sudan generally) as a major food supplier for the country as a 
whole, and even for the Middle East. Other views have drawn attention to problems of 
environmental degradation, as well as to the inevitable consequences towards emerging 
polarisation between the large number o f small-scale agricultural and pastoral producers 
in the small farm units, and the large-scale mechanised enterprises in the mechanised 
commercial farms (Haaland 1991). Consequently, the area under mechanised farming 
has expanded dramatically during the past twenty years or so, while there has been 
virtually no efforts towards solving the problems of the small family farms. In this 
context of development planning, and in 1968, a decision was made to develop 
mechanised agriculture in Habila in Southern Kordofan, no doubt reflecting the 
influence o f powerful interests over central state decision-making and planning 
processes. And the espoused aim o f providing food security for the region and for the 
whole of the country, the opposite is in fact true. The commercial farmers join the grain 
merchants lobby, forming a powerful regional and national cartel who among 
themselves control the regional grain trade and manipulate prices to their own gains; 
especially during times of food scarcity, thus contributing directly to the development of 
famine in the region. Ironically, far from achieving regional food security, the 
development of mechanised agriculture has indeed curtailed pastoral grazing lands, 
controlled the best lands in the region, caused progressive environmental degradation 
and soil exhaustion, and contributed to increased polarisation in which the vast majority 
of the rural populations are drawn to the mechanised commercial farms as seasonal farm 
labourers.
The Sudanese governments have invariably concentrated their efforts in terms of 
development allocations, of finance and man-power onto the mechanised modern 
agricultural sector to the total neglect o f traditional agriculture. Nor has this orientation 
in official government policy been a random purposeless choice, but has been motivated 
by powerful interests. Indeed, agricultural policy reforms in Sudan reflected the balance 
of forces o f power and the structural political and social arrangements which make up
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the Sudanese state. These forces have consistently sought to hold the reigns of political 
power for the furtherance o f their own economic ends. In this context it is easy to 
understand the relationship that has been officially created in the dual agricultural 
policies of development wherein traditional agriculture has been not only deprived from 
necessary development allocations, finance and other inputs all o f which have been 
channelled to support the modern agricultural sector, but worst still has been very 
heavily taxed and squeezed to yield badly needed hard currency which can be directed 
to subsidise the modern mechanised agricultural sector. This paradoxical bias can only 
be understood in its political context, in the character o f the Sudanese state and the 
forces of political power who manipulate the nature and direction o f state policies for 
their own economic advantage.
The deprivation of traditional agriculture from necessary inputs, has led to a most 
critical outcome for the long run; namely environmental degradation. This has come as a 
logical consequence o f the type o f exploitative policies with regard to the traditional 
agriculture, which treated this sector as a "mine" to be tapped, without the least regard 
to the necessity o f sustainability o f the natural resources in these inherently fragile eco­
systems. The lack of policies in any forms directed to sustain the natural resource base 
of Kordofan rural environments, and the treatment o f Kordofan resources as a wealth to 
be mined for the benefit of the modern sectors, underlies the fact that there has never 
been any efforts on vertical development of Kordofan's traditional agriculture in forms 
of improved yields, research or extension facilities and other supportive services. This 
naturally implied that for the natural economic resource base of Kordofan to yield the 
level of production necessary to generate the foreign currency to subsidise the modern 
sector, has to come from increased horizontal expansion. Understandably, the 
development of natural resources in Kordofan has systematically followed the trend of 
horizontal expansion into more and more marginal fragile lands, with the inevitable 
consequences of declining yields, degraded soils and ultimately the wide environmental 
disaster in recent decades.
The policy of settlement around water points, and the concomitant land reforms, has 
also created problems. On the one hand, on the national political level, it facilitated the 
control and exploitation o f Kordofan rural labour for the benefit of the state and its 
hegemonic interest groups. On the other hand, on the local level, it encouraged 
excessive exploitation of the natural resource base by overcultivation and overgrazing, 
with the consequences o f rapid deterioration of land quality, soil exhaustion and a 
process of desertification around the new water sites. Ultimately, the ecological balance 
which was formerly maintained by a parity between social needs and available natural 
resources has been upset by increasing pressures and demands imposed by the new 
forces o f change.
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The shift ushered in a new era in the socio-economic and political history of the 
region. It marked deeper fundamental changes in the local production systems and 
resource management and control, shifting resources away from their traditional uses of 
pastoral production towards regimes of agricultural labour production for the market, 
and from immediate local communal management and control to more centralised state 
control. The processes o f change have transformed not only the traditional systems of 
management and control of rural resources, but more critically they have involved 
structural alterations in the production system itself by the introduction of new products 
in the form of cash crops; and in basic human labour relations. It thus became 
imperative under the new conditions that people produce for the market, as well as to 
fend for their families. This leads us to consider the conditions under which the structure 
o f rural resources has been altered to bring about lasting socio-economic transformation 
in the regions o f Kordofan.
5- 6- 3- Changes in the regime o f rural resources:
The local production system has traditionally been geared primarily for household 
consumption. Small surplus production is exchanged locally for other household needs. 
Both animal and farm products are directed to meet basic subsistence needs of the 
household. Under the new conditions, this subsistence production has undergone 
fundamental change in which traditional products are no longer confined to meet 
subsistence needs, but surplus production is vigorously sought in its own right to be 
channelled to the market for cash earnings. Consequently, marketable surpluses have 
been sought both in traditional crops such as sesame, and in newly introduced crops 
such as groundnuts, while other traditional crops have been demoted and discouraged 
such as cotton. Most significant o f all, is the transformed status of food crops which 
under the new forces o f change assumed a dual role o f being both food crops and cash 
crops that are bought and sold in the market. In this context, surplus production of food 
grains such as millet and dura, in the past are stored in Matmuras to serve vital food 
security function as reserve food stocks. This is no longer the case, since under the 
present conditions o f the market, surplus production of food grains immediately finds its 
way to the market for cash, than be stored for local food security. Thus, the whole 
structure o f the traditional rural resources have been altered, by the introduction of new 
cash crops, marketable surplus production of traditional crops, discouragement of cotton 
production, and by the incorporation o f food crops in the market.
6- 6- 3- i- Official ban on local cotton production:
Some agricultural products received active encouragement by the state official policy 
intended for increased production o f cash crops such as sesame and gum Arabic, for the
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realisation o f marketable surpluses, (with negative implications for resource 
management and control and future security). Other crops o f important value, such as 
cotton, has been discouraged, indeed banned from local production. In about the early 
1930s, the colonial government in Sudan, encouraged by the marvellous success o f the 
cotton schemes in the Gezira in central Sudan along the Nile, wanted to boost the 
British cotton textile industry by opening up the Sudanese colonial market for the 
British cotton manufactures. However, the local Sudanese cloth market needs at the 
time have been largely met by the local cloth industry, variously called Damur, ganj or 
gazzaziyya. Cotton was grown by the villagers in small area reserves on the clay soils, 
and it grows sufficiently well to produce enough quantities o f raw cotton to enable the 
village populations weave their own cloth needs. Indeed, it has been suggested that 
cotton is an indigenous plant to Sudan. The earliest evidence o f cotton in Sudan, 
provided by fabrics found in the Meroitic tombs dates from about 50 BC (Bacon 1948: 
324; Tothill 1948). The entire cotton production is consumed locally, and woven on 
hand looms into coarse native cloth called Damur or ganj. It was reputed for its 
hardiness and durability. More importantly is that it satisfied the local cloth needs, and 
provided the local weaver specialists with lucrative income earnings. A measure o f the 
widespread significance and popularity o f the Damur can be attested to by the fact that 
it even assumed the status o f currency throughout Sudan since about the sixteenth 
century and was involved in all forms o f local transactions. And in the eighteenth 
century when Bruce travelled through Sudan, he recorded that the manufacture o f 
cotton homespun Damur was the chief source o f livelihood among the inhabitants, and 
that such cloth was extensively used as currency (Bruce 1805). This tells us a great 
deal about the capacity o f the local populations to adapt their social needs to the 
physical resource availability o f  their local environment. Adaptability is thus a measure 
o f balanced relationships between the physical available resources, managed under 
local norms and by local technology and expertise to satisfy human social needs, and 
the balanced relationships maintain the ecosystem in a state o f  permanent equilibrium. 
The traditional cloth industry was thus deeply entrenched and long established in the 
local economy. It follows that for the Sudanese colonial state's policy o f opening up 
the Sudanese market for the foreign textile industry will meet with strong competition 
from the local cloth industry. A pre-requisite for the policy to succeed and capture the 
market is to dismantle the local industry in order to pave the way for imports o f 
foreign textiles. The policy o f dismantling the local cloth industry took a three-pronged 
programme carried out in concert: ( 1) official banning on local cotton growing, (2 ) 
initial free distributions o f finished textile fabrics to the local village populations, and 
(3) subsequent flooding o f the local market with fine-finished textiles from outside 
markets.
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5- 6- 3- ii- Official ban on Damur and local cotton growing:
The traditional cottage industry o f the handloom weaving o f coarse unbleached 
cotton cloth Damur from locally grown cotton was widespread. The Damur was 
coarse and hard-rearing, but was in great demand, especially among nomads, for whom 
hardiness and durability was more important than fineness. The Damur weavers 
wanted to expand production and were evidently capable o f doing so. However, the 
Director o f Agriculture pointed out that the Damur weavers' raw cotton was stored as 
unginned seed cotton, and that "the storage o f this seed cotton [represented] a grave 
danger to the growing o f cotton [in the Gezira and along the Nile banks] because o f 
the risk o f carry-over o f the pink boll worm from one season to another" (Sanderson 
1985: 105). Following the Director's recommendation, the Board o f Economic and 
Trade, at its meeting in February 1936, came out with a resolution to ban the 
production o f Damur as a means o f discouraging the use o f  unginned cotton lint (Ibid). 
This effectively put an official ban on the production of local cotton and the 
manufacture o f Damur.
5- 6- 3- iii- Free distributions o f foreign-made textiles:
This policy was carried out through Omdas and Sheikhs, who were entrusted to 
undertake the free distributions o f cloth to the village populations, while 
simultaneously oversee that no cotton is grown in the areas under their juridical 
authority. It is related by some o f the elderly informants who witnessed the scenes and 
were then young, that the Omda o f the area came to the villages loaded with bales o f 
finished cloth, accompanied by some police guards, and from the residence o f the 
Sheikh o f  the village, called upon the village populations to come and have their free 
ration o f cloth to clothe their families. They called in a rhyming tune: "ya ahali ya 
masakin — ta 'alu iksu al awlad wa 7 a 'awin meaning "Oh, you poor natives, come 
along and clothe your women and children".
5- 6- 3- iv- Flooding the market with foreign textiles:
These initial free distributions o f cloth continued for a while, concurrently pushed with 
a promotion o f a new cultural ethos centred around the appreciation o f fine, exquisite 
and colourful clothes; and a new taste for fineness and exquisiteness took the hitherto 
rough rural rustics with contagion. And from that time on, the rural taste for clothes is 
altered, and the village populations sought the satisfaction o f their cloth needs not from 
the local Damur weavers, but from the British, Egyptian, Indian and Japanese refined 
textiles o f all sorts: cotton, silks and wool which flooded the market and became 
readily available for whoever can afford their prices. And with this deluge o f fine 
clothes came complementary items such as soaps, perfumes, shoes etc. and other 
consumer products. In effect, the traditional cloth-making industry based on local 
cotton production, and adapted to local conditions and technology
- 192-
for the satisfaction of social needs, has thus been sadly eradicated. The satisfaction o f 
social needs for clothing is no longer a matter of local conditions and local resources, 
but came under the effective control o f the import/export trade, the foreign textile 
industries and the prices dictated by the market. In the final analysis, the local 
populations have been turned from being producers of their own needs into consumers 
o f imported goods.
The relevance of the changed conditions of the traditional cloth-making industry to 
our present concern on local food security, is that the village populations and 
households have to earn cash money in order to pay for their clothes, which need had 
formerly been satisfied by their own labour and from their own cotton production. 
Under the new conditions, clothing the household members has come to claim a 
substantial share of the household income, especially that the prices of manufactured 
goods have been steadily rising vis-a-vis their incomes from agricultural labour. In order 
to earn the cash money necessary to clothe the household, they have to increase their 
saleable cash crops and to increase their labour input. As a result, increasing the 
capacity for cash crops production became the only viable option for cash earnings 
needed to buy clothes. The implication of this to the household food security is that 
households will have less labour time and less land to devote to producing food, and 
less cash for buying it. Moreover, the massive increase in the area o f land cropped with 
cash crops, especially groundnuts, has greatly reduced the quality of land, exerted 
pressure on the land by intensive farming, and exposed the land surface to the eroding 
process of wind. In turn, wind-blown erosion adds to the process o f desertification, and 
ultimately environmental degradation
C o n c l u s i o n :
This chapter has argued that the persistence o f famine in Kordofan can be explained 
in political terms associated with the integration o f Kordofan into the modern Sudanese 
state and the policies pursued by the state to transform Kordofan economies. Colonial 
and post-colonial policies have sought to transform Kordofan production and exchange 
relations and integrate them into wider national and international systems. The 
transformation o f Kordofan rural economies have been carried out ostensibly to bring 
out the social emergence of rural communities to engage in the benefits o f trade, and for 
state building and national integration. In truth, however, the policies of the state have 
institutionalised market forces to exploit Kordofan natural resources for the benefit of 
the state's political and economic elites. Kordofan is endowed with great natural wealth 
which invalidates explaining famine in the region in natural terms. That wealth had been 
appropriated by the state and contributed significantly to the exports o f the country as a 
whole. The boom or recession in the national Sudanese economy can be easily
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correlated to the up and down fluctuations in Kordofan's agricultural production levels. 
Ironically, in spite of all that, the producers in rural Kordofan suffer the worst effects of 
impoverishment, hunger and famines. The catalogue of ills which befell Kordofan can 
be located in the rise of the modern Sudanese state, the emergence of central social 
forces who came to dominate the state and the economy. These emerging political and 
economic forces wielded virtual control over Kordofan resources. The crux of the 
problem lies in the issue o f resource control and management. The state and the 
economic elite allied to it both manage Kordofan resources for their own advantage. The 
state's policies caused drastic shifts in the established patterns of local resource 
management. The state's development policies entailed shifts in production patterns, 
which encouraged producers to concentrate more on cash crops. On the other hand, this 
has shifted the control over rural resources away from the actual producers (who in the 
process become mere labourers) and placed them in the hands of the more economically 
powerful groups (mostly the Jellaba from Central Sudan) who are allied to the state 
central functionaries. Both interest groups have vested interests and high stakes to 
exercise effective control over Kordofan resources. But for this control to be effective, 
needed that the people of Kordofan be excluded from decision-making both on the 
central and regional levels, such that Kordofan interests can not be articulated. This 
indeed explains the systemic efforts from the part o f the central interest groups to 
marginalise the region politically in order to exercise the systematic exploitation and 
mining o f Kordofan resources. The control over Kordofan resources ultimately bred the 
pervasive poverty and vulnerability to famine.
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Chapter 6
Transformation of the Village Economy
Introduction:
This chapter assesses the impact o f change on the village economy. It argues that the 
processes of change which have been taking place since the turn of the century have 
been the outcome of official state policies. These have been embodied in concrete policy 
programmes such as the encouragement o f cash crop production, the discouragement of 
local cotton production, commercialisation o f food crops, the organisation of markets 
and trade, and the commercialisation of rural labour relations. These have cumulatively 
transformed the rural social and economic systems rapidly and profoundly. The 
composite o f policies o f the Sudanese state to transform the rural economies of 
Kordofan, have brought short-term gains, but long-term and enduring losses for the 
local populations. On the one hand, the forces o f change have initially created new 
opportunities and new avenues for income generation. The local populations responded 
in the early stages enthusiastically to seize on the new opportunities offered. Cash 
returns from their agricultural labour, however small and declining in real value, have 
been expended to acquire a wide array of foreign-made consumer goods, made readily 
available in the markets. Thus, the whole scale o f their material needs and demands has 
been thrown upwards by the increased circulation o f liquid money and the simultaneous 
availability of consumer goods. The expansion of trade vastly increased consumable 
goods in volume and variety, and profoundly altered consumption patterns. Thus, 
fabrics of all sorts and makes, and items such as soaps, perfumes, shoes, beverages, 
sugar, coffee and tea, metalwork, cigarettes, tobacco became common consumption 
items in the village shops. On the other hand, the impact of change on the local systems 
created deep-reaching and profound long-term negative effects. They have altered 
traditional resource structures, management and control systems. They have caused 
profound changes in the allocation of land and labour resources, with a reallocation of 
the major part of these resources to cash crops, and away from food production. 
Households' sources of income generation, consumption regimes, and patterns of 
expenditure have also changed. Rural labour markets developed, concurrently with the 
rise of a new class of rural traders, taking advantage o f the new developments, hiring the 
labour of poorer households to till their farms, buying the village produce, and making 
gain and profits. Production expanded dramatically, especially that of cash crops; e.g. 
groundnuts; and cultivation expanded into more fragile lands with grave ecological 
consequences. In the process, certain groups among the village community benefited, 
while others lost. The losers in this process suffered from famine, since they had already
- 195 -
been fully exposed to the vagaries o f nature; their fall-back options severely curtailed. 
This chapter traces the processes of rural transformation in Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar. 
It assesses the impact of change on local production and resource management systems, 
and ultimately how this bears on local food security in the two communities.
6- 1- Adaptations and Response to the Forces of Change:
In the previous chapters, we have seen that the Hamar and Dar Hamid before the 
nineteenth century were largely pastoralists moving with their herds in the North-central 
zone o f Kordofan. The policies which have been adopted by the state to bring about the 
rapid settlement of the pastoral communities, like the Hamar and Dar Hamid, quickly 
bore fruit. That was especially so because these groups had already lost most of their 
herds during the turbulent years o f the Mahdiyyia and the Condominium invasion. The 
Hamar and Dar Hamid settled in the thousands of villages dotting the central sandy 
plain of Kordofan, the homeland of the Acacia tree. A rapid re-organisation o f their 
economies has been set in motion centred around agricultural labour production and 
gum collection.
The transformation of the Hamar and Dar Hamid economies from the pastoral to the 
agricultural mode of production entailed a loss o f employment; that while pastoral 
production ensured that participants were fully engaged in an all year-round activity, 
agricultural labour, on the other hand, provided only seasonal employment for a 
maximum of 4 - 6 months a year. For the rest of the year, the rural farmers engaged in a 
range of non-productive activities. And due to the lack o f alternative job opportunities 
in the local economy, they have little to supplement their incomes which derives 
primarily from agricultural labour in the main season. This is the time when many of the 
village able men migrate to other places in search of work. This is an important factor to 
explain the lack o f capital accumulation for the majority o f people in the rural economy. 
It is indeed, instructive to see that those who have relatively large herds o f animals fare 
generally better, wealthier, more secure and fully busy with their animals throughout the 
year. On the other hand, peasant commodity producers become increasingly dependent 
on the domestic and international market as producers and consumers. The village 
communities seized on the new opportunities offered to them and the avenues of income 
generation opened by the re-orientation of the local production systems. The majority of 
the Hamar and Dar Hamid now settled as sedentary cultivators; and quickly acquired 
the techniques and knowledge of agriculture, aided in this by a diffusion and infusion of 
agrarian and botanical culture from their neighbouring traditionally agrarian 
communities; i.e. the Fur, the Gawama'a and the Bidariyyia; and to a lesser extent from 
the Nuba. The Hamar and Dar Hamid responded enthusiastically to the forces of 
change, and adapted their way of life from pastoralism to sedentary cultivation in a
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record short period of time. They quickly adapted and acquired a thorough knowledge 
of the farming culture. Farming techniques have been developed to suit the ecological 
conditions. Different crops have been found to be suited to different micro­
environments; soil types, altitudes, temperature and water requirements. The range of 
knowledge and skills which they have evolved and adapted can not be exhausted; but 
the following are a few areas o f knowledge to illustrate the capacity o f the local people 
to adapt to the forces of change brought to bear on them by external forces.
6- 2- Farmers' Knowledge:
It is difficult to provide an exhaustive description o f the variety and richness of the 
farmers' agrarian knowledge The information in this section has been collected from the 
local people during the field-work, and from my own personal observations. Farmers 
have become extremely knowledgeable about the characteristics o f the micro­
environment. They distinguish between different types o f soils and suitability o f certain 
soils to particular crops. They distinguish between four sub-group soil types of the two 
main ones: the sandy (Goz), and the clayish soils. Within the first soil type (the Goz), 
two sub-groups are distinguished each suitable for particular crops. The reddish sandy 
soils of the Goz (known as the Hamraya) are suited for millet cultivation; whereas the 
loose sand soils are reserved for groundnuts. The second main soil type is the clay soils, 
which has two sub-groups; the sandy clay (Known as Juraba), and the alluvial clay soil 
(known as Taynd). These are suited for the cultivation o f sorghum, sesame, and okra.
Farmers also know about the level of soil fertility and ability to sustain crops. They 
employ crop rotation to maintain soil fertility. For example, farmers usually switch, 
after one harvest or two of cultivation with groundnuts, to sow the cropped area with 
millet. This crop-rotation technique is intended to maintain soil fertility. After several 
years of cultivation the soil is exhausted, then the land will be left fallow to rest for a 
couple of years to regenerate. In this way there are two mechanisms of soil conservation 
practice: a short "maintenance" technique based on crop rotation within the prime span 
o f the soil fertility, and a longer "regenerative" technique of the fallow cycle. Certain 
crops are inter-cropped on the same plot, others are cropped alternatingly in rotation. 
Such farming and cropping practices are intended for the optimum exploitation of the 
available water (moisture), soil nutrients and land resources.
Farmers also have plant indicators to judge the conditions and fertility of soils. The 
appearance o f certain weeds, such as the strega weed, indicates declining soil fertility 
on which strategic decisions o f land use are to be made. The appearance of such weeds 
would necessitate leaving the land to lie fallow for a couple of years to regenerate. 
Another technique is shifting cultivation which "was less a device o f barbarism and 
more a concession to the nature of the African soils" (Lord Haley 1938; cited in
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Richards 1985). Other forms of soil conservation and regeneration include forms of 
organic fertilisation, such as animal and green manuring, the planting o f cover crops and 
forage and mixed cropping.
6- 2 - 1 -  S e e d s  S e l e c t io n  a n d  M ix e d -C r o p p in g :
The village farmers look for certain desired qualities in the seeds o f crops they want 
to sow. They select seeds which are drought-resistant, quick-maturing, and high- 
yielding. Seeds of grains that have the best qualities are carefully selected at harvest 
time and put aside to be planted the next season. Inter-cropping and mixed-cropping 
have a long history in Kordofan farming traditions. The merits o f this have been widely 
recognised (Norman 1968; Howes 1979; Richards 1979, 1985; Mortimore 1989; 
Belshaw 1979). In contrast with the science-based mono-cultural cropping regimes 
which seek to impose uniformity and control o f high-yielding crop varieties that flourish 
under artificially created and highly simplified ecosystems and supported by non- 
biological inputs (Howes 1979), mixed-cropping regimes seeks to make the best of the 
ecological diversity, capitalising on the multifarious opportunities offered by the natural 
environment. Mixed-cropping is more sound environmentally. It accords more naturally 
with the biotic diversity in the eco-system, and is more in harmony with ecological 
balance, with the biotic and genetic diversity, and long-term sustainability and 
conservation. It emphasises complexity and species diversity rather than simplicity and 
uniformity.
Inter- and mixed cropping increases productivity per unit of land. The planting of 
different crops in the same unit o f land yields higher cumulative output than if sown 
with pure stands of one crop (Howes 1979). Mixed-cropping affords intensive farming; 
i.e. the co-existence o f different plant species, having different stem lengths "serves to 
optimise the intensity with which a given unit of land may be exploited" (Ibid). It also 
optimises labour input. The different crops simultaneously sown in a unit of land would 
demand different labour requirements spread over the different farming operations 
serves to "smooth out" peaks of labour demand (Igbozurike 1971). It allows optimum 
exploitation of soil nutrients. The different rooting systems o f the various inter-cropped 
plants ensure that they do not compete with one another for soil nutrients and moisture 
at any one level, but exploit different levels o f the soil profile. Mixed cropping also 
allows symbiosis or mutual benefits. Mixed crops often provide a favourable micro­
climate for one another. And it permits biological complementarity. Inter-cropped and 
mixed cropped plants can complement one another in different ways, as for example, in 
the case o f nitrogen-fixing plants grown with non-nitrogen-fixing ones, e.g. groundnuts 
grown with water melons. Mixed-cropping is used as a measure of pest and disease 
control. Seeds of plants scattered among another species often serves to ,protect the 
minority plants from diseases and pests which may otherwise destroy them if grown
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solo. An example of this in central Kordofan is gourds inter-scattered through the fields 
so that at least a proportion o f the crop escapes the attacks of the melon fly. It also 
serves as weed control (Howes 1979). Mixed-cropping is an important soil conservation 
technique. It protects the soil from erosion by providing dense vegetation cover, and 
also conserves on the water resources and reduces loss o f soil moisture through 
evaporation since the rain-watered soil surface is protected by the vegetation and shade 
from direct sun heat. The different crops to be harvested from the mixed-crop farm 
diversify and enhance the household food security and dietary balance. Farmers gave the 
additional reason that mixing of food crops produced a wider variety of foods over an 
extended harvesting period, therefore adding variety to the diet regimes and enhancing 
household food security. It serves to minimise risks. Avoidance of risk, or minimisation 
thereof is an important factor in adaptation o f the mixed-cropping farming technique. 
Farmers pointed out that single or pure stands crops may fail to germinate, or may get 
damaged by bad weather conditions or pests. Mixtures provide a good chance that at 
least part o f the crop would survive if such adverse conditions occurred. Like other 
indigenous stock and adaptive skills, mixed-cropping, as an indigenous farming 
practice, illustrates the sophistication and complexity of the local farmer's agronomic 
skill and knowledge
Different harvesting times are used to increase the harvest. An important harvesting 
strategy used by Kordofan local farmers is early harvesting of millet which is carried 
out in early Winter. This early first "main" harvesting called "Ain" allows the millet to 
take advantage of the soil moisture in the cool Winter season in order to allow for re­
growth; and a second millet harvest called "kusheib” to come up in late Winter.
6- 2 -  2 -  P e s t  C o n t r o l  .
Pest-control mechanisms include, besides mixed-cropping and rotational farming, 
other more concrete strategies, such as bird scaring and the physical liquidation o f pests, 
e.g. locusts are eaten in many farming communities in the Sahel belt, including 
Kordofan. Besides directly contributing to supplement local diet by providing a source 
of protein, eating locusts can also be seen as an indirect pest-control measure. When 
locust swarms invade a farming locality, an almost ritualistic campaign is mounted: 
men, women, and children, all flock to the farms, setting the whole o f the countryside 
ablaze with big fires to attract the locust swarms (for a vivid description see Achebe 
1965).
6- 2 - 3 - I n d ig e n o u s  C l im a t o l o g y :
A rich stock of knowledge, a special preserve of older men and women pertains to 
the conditions o f the local climate. Some individuals may lay claim to the status of local 
climatologists who can forecast the weather conditions by observing the sky, the
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positions and movements o f the moon and stars. They can forecast a variety o f 
climatological phenomena, as regards the rains and timing, heat, winds, and the 
associated level of water shortage and thirst, and the likelihood of pest invasion, such as 
locusts. Indigenous climatological knowledge functions not only as a form of socio­
cultural adaptation to the conditions of the local environment, but also serves vital 
practical purposes. Knowledge, especially about the approximate start of rains is vital 
for local farmers to begin planting their crops even before the rains actually fall. This 
pre-planting, spurred by predictions that early rains are immanent, is intended to take 
advantage of the general air humidity and soil moisture that are made available by the 
cool dewy air pushing from the humid tropics at this time of year. Crops that are thus 
pre-planted, can remain in the ground for some time aided by the general coolness. If 
pre-planting has been successfully carried out, and coincided with the early rains as 
predicted, bountiful harvests may occur. That is because it will then allow crops to take 
the full length of the rainy season to allow for maximum growth. There are signs which 
the local communities identify as heralds to the start of rains. These include (1) the 
leafing of particular trees, such as the Tebeldi (baobab Adaonsonia digitata); (2) skies 
turning colour, from reddish to cloudy indicating that rains are near; (3) shifts in wind 
direction and cloud formation, heat and rumbling o f distant thunder; (4) birds songs 
indicators. Such harbingers signal that rains are near and planting should begin.
6- 2 - 4 - G r a in  S t o r a g e :
Farmers in the local communities have developed a very successful and highly 
efficient and reliable storage system. Grain storage as a socio-economic institution could 
be seen as a long-established adaptive response to the uncertainty and fluctuations in 
food supply in the semi-arid savannahs. Surplus grains are stored in pits to function as 
food reserves for households and the local community. Matmura (grain store pit) can 
have a capacity from 10 up to 150 Ardebs. The common size Matmura has a capacity o f 
15 - 20 Ardebs. Certain types of soil are more suitable than others for the construction of 
a Matmura. The best type of soil is one of fairly close texture with good natural 
drainage. Matmuras are so dextrously dug and lined with straw and stalks that keep at 
bay the termites and other harmful earth worms. The grains thus stored can remain fresh 
up to ten years. A few unearthings are undertaken occasionally to allow for "fresh 
breathing", and to clean off the top layer if  it turned colour. Such occasional unearthings 
are undertaken when quantities o f grain are required by the household or by the 
community at any one time. The technical side o f the traditional grain storage proves 
most efficient, reliable, and cost-effective. It relies entirely on local skills and materials, 
and demands no chemical inputs, traditional grain store pits provide a cheap method of 
storage, compared with the expensive and costly operation required by modern silos.
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The shift from pastoralism towards the dominance of sedentary agricultural labour 
marked a long-term communal adaptation of the Hamar and Dar Hamid in response to 
the opportunities and constraints imposed by external forces. However, adaptation to 
sedentary agricultural production were to prove ill-fated in the long-run. The Hamar and 
Dar Hamid became more pliable to state political control, and more easily manipulable 
economically, their resources more easily managed and controlled by the state and other 
forces allied to it, than if otherwise they were still pastoralists. In a short time, the 
Hamar and Dar Hamid adapted their economic system to suit the demands o f sedentary 
life. They diversified their economic activity in order to attain better security. The 
pursuit o f diversified economic activities has become one important adaptive strategy 
directed to exploit a wide range o f possibilities, potentialities and options that are open 
to participants in the local economy. Rarely do households rely on a sole activity, such 
as farming or animal husbandry. The norm has become to combine different economic 
options, involving farming, animal herding, local trading and crafts, income from labour 
(either local or distant), collection of forest products, including gum. The totality of sets 
of combinations thus offered can best be said to form a highly diversified market 
economy, which remains predominantly agrarian. The speed with which the Hamar and 
Dar Hamid responded to the forces of change has been surprisingly rapid. Ahmed 
describes the change:
Thus the speed with which a m oney econom y developed in Dar Hamar exceeded even the 
dreams o f  the Condominium government. Expansion in the area under cultivation, the 
proliferation o f  gum tapping, the growth in trade, and the general monetisation o f  the 
econom y were preludes to new social relationships ... these new social relationships find 
expression in the development o f  various forms o f  agricultural com m odity production, o f  
allocation and distribution o f  land, and o f  organisation o f  agricultural labour (Ahmed 1987:
238).
6- 3- Indigenous Production and Resource Management Systems:
This section draws the link between the survival o f the village populations and the 
resource availability and management in the rural economy. It argues that the survival of 
villagers has been a condition of their ability to adapt their way o f life to the available 
natural resources. It also is shaped by their ability to pursue production and resource 
management systems carefully adapted to these available resources and managed 
judiciously to satisfy social needs. The relationship between the management of 
resources and the satisfaction o f local needs is thus maintained in a sustainable manner, 
and in effect, the relationship between the physical natural resources, and the human 
needs, is maintained in a balanced ecological equilibrium. The character of the 
production system geared primarily towards household and communal security, has 
precluded the development o f mass famines in the locality for the most part. However, 
the impact of change has effectively thrown this ecological equation into disarray. The
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winds o f change have transformed the local production and exchange relations, 
reallocated labour and land resources to regimes of production directed for the market. 
The management and control over rural resources have shifted from local uses to 
external commercial demand; and from local hands to outside control o f the state and 
the allied merchant class. It would be difficult to try to examine exhaustively the 
multifarious aspects o f rural socio-economic change in the villages o f Dar Hamid and 
Dar Hamar. However, some of the most important areas o f change can be identified 
which can provide useful indicators o f the impact of change in Dar Hamid and Dar 
Hamar in particular, but can also apply more generally to other rural areas in Kordofan 
and elsewhere. In the following pages we examine the processes of rural change in such 
important areas as the changes occurring in production regimes, reallocation o f labour 
and land resources, the development of rural wage labour markets and the effects on the 
environment. Finally we assess the negative impact such changes have had on strategies 
of coping with conditions o f stress.
6- 3- 1- Changes in the regimes o f  farm crops:
The regime of farm crops has been changed under the forces o f market relations. 
Marketable surpluses have been sought both in traditional crops such as sesame, and in 
newly introduced crops such as groundnuts, while other traditional crops have been 
discouraged such as cotton. Moreover, the status of food crops assumed a dual role of 
being both food crops and cash crops at the same time. Formerly, surplus production of 
food grains such as dukhn and dura, was stored in Matmuras to serve vital food security 
function as reserve stocks. This is no longer the case, since under the present conditions, 
surplus food immediately finds its way into the market, than be stored for local food 
security. The whole structure of the traditional farm crops has been altered, by the 
introduction of new cash crops, marketable surplus production of traditional crops, 
discouragement of cotton production, and by the incorporation of food crops into the 
market as both food crops and cash crops.
Sesame, for example, was originally produced for home consumption. It was pressed 
in locally-made wooden mills (called 'Assarahj operated by camels to obtain oil and 
cake. The oil was consumed for home cooking and hair-dressing, and the cake (um 
baaz) as animal feed. With the re-organisation o f the rural economies, sesame became 
the second important local product entering the market after gum. There are about 22 
different varieties o f sesame that have been locally evolved and adapted to suit the local 
environmental conditions. The market demand on sesame was stimulated by exports to 
Egypt and the beginnings o f a domestic oil industry in the form of modern pressing 
mills and soap manufacture. However, since the early days of the colonial state, sesame 
has been increasingly drawn into the market as an important cash crop. Its production
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has been encouraged through price incentives and the simultaneous organisation of 
markets. Accordingly, village cultivators have increased their production in order to 
achieve marketable surpluses. As a result, the cropped area increased substantially and 
the labour input too in order to maximise production. The area cropped with sesame 
increased from 28,000 feddans in 1912, to 385,000 in the 1950s, and to 1,976,000 in the 
1970s. The impact on land use has been increased pressure on the land by intensive 
farming.
Groundnuts were traditionally cultivated in small quantities for home consumption as 
cooking oil and as food supplement, and for hair-dressing. The traditional crop had been 
the creeping variety o f groundnuts. Commercial farming of the crop on large scale on 
large tracts o f land did not start until about the 1940s when the American variety known 
as the (Berbete) was introduced from Nigeria where it had registered wide success in 
West Africa. Gradually, however, groundnuts, especially after being introduced as a 
cash crop on a large scale from the 1930s onwards, that the crop became the most 
important agricultural cash crop in the region superseding both gum and sesame. The 
varieties of groundnuts that have been locally adapted to suit the local environmental 
conditions numbered about 10 different varieties. The area cropped with groundnuts 
thus increased substantially, and production reached unprecedented levels; from an area 
o f only 5 thousand feddans in 1912, to 141 in the 1950s and to 1987 in the 1970s. The 
increase in cropped area has been particularly spectacular during the 1970s and 1980s 
following the official policy under Nimeiri for an emphasis on cash crop production 
imposed on the Sudan by its donor countries and carried out through the World Bank 
and IMF. The story of groundnut cultivation as a cash crop on such a large scale in this 
semi-arid fragile savannah region has much to account for the problems of 
environmental degradation that in later years were to assume catastrophic proportions.
Food crops included Dukhn and several dura (sorghum) varieties, mainly faterita, 
safra, and fine grain. Millet is still the staple food in North and central Kordofan, as it is 
a crop exclusively sown in the sandy soils o f this region. There are about 12 different 
varieties of millet which have been locally adapted to the local conditions. Because it is 
the main staple food amongst Kordofan rural communities, millet accounts for a 
considerable share in the local exchange trade. The major part of the crop is produced 
and consumed at the household level, the remainder is stored in Matmura; and small 
quantities are exchanged locally in the villages, or between the village households and 
pastoralists. And since local production frequently falls short o f local consumption 
requirements, grains were usually procured from local exchanges, especially from 
surplus areas in the region, or from afar; e.g. from Dar Fur or the Nuba Mountains. In 
good years supplies can be considerably augmented from outside the region. In normal 
years the most productive areas were Dar Hamid; Sheg El-Hafza, En-Nuhud, and Abu
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Zabad in Dar Hamar, and Sungikai, Rahad, and Sherkeila in the Eastern District. The 
Homur usually keep a store o f grain at Muglad or Odaiya. further south in Dar Dinka, 
there is usually plenty o f grain. And in Dar Nuba many o f the hills like Kadaro, Miri, 
Gulfan, Kadugli, and Dagu can sometimes sell large quantities o f grain. The other 
cereals comprising several dura (sorghum) varieties are mainly cultivated on the clay 
soils o f the Southern parts o f Kordofan, especially in the Nuba Hills as well as in the 
alluvial deposits that are found in the beds o f the Wadis in the sandy soils o f  central 
Kordofan. The benign climate and the suitable soils provide ideal micro-environment 
for its growth and the crop gave good yields . Surplus production had traditionally 
constituted a significant part o f local trade and exchange between farmers and herders. 
Under the present conditions o f the commercialisation o f food crops, traditional 
storage o f food grains in Matmurs has been abandoned as households brought their 
surplus production to the market for sale to obtain cash to buy other needs. This 
market orientation o f surplus food production has rendered local-level food exchanges 
untenable since all surplus production finds its way to the market for cash; which has 
become the single most important means through which to acquire other needs.
Cotton was another important crop. Cotton cultivation in Kordofan had existed for 
a long time prior to the colonial occupation. Cotton was formerly grown locally in 
considerable quantities in the villages, sown on the alluvial clay deposits. It was used 
locally primarily for local cloth making. It was woven on hand looms into coarse native 
cloth called dammur. This type o f cotton was from a local seed variety. However, the 
policy o f the colonial administration, as we have seen, discouraged local cotton 
production, and practically forbade its cultivation in central Kordofan. These measures 
effectively destroyed the local cottage industry to give way to imported cotton fabrics. 
The demise o f the local cottage industry meant loss o f employment and loss o f income 
for many individuals and households who depended on it. It also signified a strategic 
loss to the local economy which turned it from self-sufficiency in cloth-making to 
dependency on imported textiles (for more details see Ch. 5).
The impact o f change on the management and control over rural resources is far 
more enduring and overwhelming as far as long-term local food security is concerned. 
The orientation o f local crop production away from self-pro visioning to the dominance 
o f the market eroded immediate household food security. And the comparative 
advantage to be gained from the cash earnings from the sale o f the produce, offers no 
guarantees that such earnings will meet household basic security needs. Indeed, the 
evidence (as we shall see in chapter 7) confirms that cash earnings from cash crops 
sales are consistently loosing vis-a-vis household basic security needs, especially food.
6- 4- C h a n g e s  in  F a r m  M a n a g e m e n t  S y s t e m s
6 -4 -1 - Reallocation o f  Labour:
The expansion o f market forces from international level, to national and regional 
levels have rapidly transformed the rural production relations, and resulted in the
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reallocation o f labour and land resources to fundamentally different patterns o f 
production relations. One important area in which changes have occurred is the 
management o f labour allocation to the family farm. The farm management system in 
Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar has been and still is a family enterprise, which is a 
partnership between the adult members o f  the household, mainly the man and his wife 
and the grown up children. The management o f  the family farm unit as a partnership 
follows a pattern o f  responsibilities and rights, where the family, under the leadership 
o f  the man, have a collective responsibility to the food farm (sown mainly with millet 
or dura) to secure food for the family. Food is the property and responsibility o f the 
man. I f  the harvest fails, the man has a responsibility to procure food from his own 
resources, either by sale o f animals or cash obtained from gum sales. The woman, on 
the other hand, has a responsibility to grow additional crops, such as okra, beans, 
sweet com and to take care o f the house orchard sown with light grain (see later). 
After having satisfied the family requirements from these crops, women can dispense 
with the remainder according to their will, i.e. her property which she can sell or 
exchange for other needs o f her desire. In woman-headed households, the woman 
takes both responsibilities o f securing food for the family and for growing additional 
necessary crops, such as okra. The grown-up children participate in the family farm 
unit in slightly different roles for the sexes; the young males take more active part in 
the family food farm, and tending the animals, if they have some. The young females 
take less part in the food farm, but help their mother more in the other activities. 
Young females also spend much time at home preparing food for members working in 
the fields, and carrying out the daily household chores. For both, they have no rights o f 
possession to the crops grown, although they are entitled to clothing and other basic 
needs. Occasionally, the family is entitled to a work party to be rendered from other 
members of the village community.
This division o f labour in the management o f the family farm, has been greatly 
complicated by the introduction o f cash crops, and by the dramatic increase in social 
demands created by the influx o f goods. The introduction o f cash crops has entailed 
more division o f labour, put more strains on the family labour, curtailed the labour time 
to be devoted to the food farm, and caused further differentiation between members o f 
the village community. The social patterns o f responsibilities and rights are altered 
significantly. The most significant change has occurred in the area o f  rights where 
every member o f the household now has a right to grow his or her own cash crop 
farm. The male-head o f the family has responsibilities not only towards the family food 
farm. He also grows cash crops (groundnuts, sesame, hepiscus) in sufficiently large 
quantities in
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order to gain the cash necessary to satisfy the household's increasingly diversified and 
expensive demands, o f clothes, sugar, tea, beddings, medicines, transport, schooling, 
and other social obligations which increasingly require the use of money to satisfy. As 
the responsibilities of the man have changed, so have his rights to the crops produced. 
The man has still the right to demand the collective participation of the family members 
in the family food farm. However, he has no right to demand such labour for his cash 
crop farm operations, which he will have to carry out either single-handedly, or can hire 
outside labour. The family members may help him sparingly, and at will, but not 
obligatorily. Consequently, the man's cash crop farm takes most o f his labour time, and 
most o f his resources (if labour is hired). Another important aspect in the labour 
allocation is that the man (or any member o f the family or the village) is entitled to a 
work party in the cash crop farm, which will need to be reciprocated. The harvested cash 
crop from the man's farm is entirely his with which he can dispense according to his 
personal and family needs. But, considering that most of the family resources are in the 
hands o f the man, especially o f animals and gum gardens, the man is better placed to 
invest more of these resources on his own cash crops farm, thus gaining advantage over 
the woman, which makes intra-family income variations between man and woman.
The other members of the household each can grow his or her own cash crop farm. 
The woman would in most cases have a smaller cash crop farm, and may not have one 
at all. This can be explained by reference to two factors. The first is the limited 
resources the woman has anyway to afford to invest in a cash crop farm. The other is 
that because the cash crop farm takes most of the man's labour time, the responsibility 
of operating the family food farm has been shifted more and more to the woman, 
leaving her with little time to devote to grow a cash crop farm. Additionally, the woman 
has still the responsibility to produce such crops like okra and light grain in the house 
orchard, besides other domestic responsibilities. The most important change has 
occurred in the allocation of labour o f the grown-up children (males and females) in the 
household, where under the forces o f cash cropping, each works his or her own farm, 
entirely independently of the family, and primarily for their own personal use and needs. 
The significance of the change is that it has caused important dislocations in two 
directions as far as the family food security is concerned. On the one hand, it deprived 
the family food farm from a significant share of labour o f the subordinate grown-up 
members. On the other hand, it directed the proceeds accruing from the value of the cash 
crops more towards increased consumption o f needs and less on food; which effectively 
means that most of the family labour has now being directed to more consumption than 
to the household food security. Increasingly, however, family farms are satisfying their 
consumption needs with income derived from increased cash cropping and labour 
migration, as well as from livestock sales and commercial charcoal production.
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6- 4- 2- Reallocation of Land:
Under the force o f the state policies, land is increasingly moving from communal to 
private ownership. Indeed, official statements as early as 1910 confirmed that land 
ownership is being systematically moving from communal to private ownership. One 
official stated that:
It appears to me that the transitory stage between communal and individual ownership is 
being passed through. It is possible that the ownership o f  land is tending to pass from 
communal to individual ... It is true that the incubus o f  landlordism is felt. So-called 
landowners take every tenth head o f  grain from Sudanese blacks who are simple enough to 
pay (cited in Ahmed 1987:).
In early 1930, the government ruled that priority for cultivation be given to land 
where hashab trees ceased to be productive. This is considered to be the most 
economically and ecologically sound method o f agricultural practice to integrate gum 
tapping as part of the agricultural cycle to ensure the survival o f the hashab trees.
The state development policies have the major impact on the utilisation and 
allocation o f land, and competition on land has become more pronounced between food 
crops and cash crops, on the one hand, and between farmers and herders on the other. 
Although the legal status of land in the rural areas of Sudan stipulates that all land 
belongs to the state (Simpson 1991; Barbour 1961; Awad (undated); Bolton 1948) The 
real powers are vested in the hands o f the village Sheikhs who are lawfully authorised as 
guardians and delegates acting on behalf o f the government for control over and 
allocation o f the land and range resources. There is no formal registration o f farm lands 
by individual farmers, although individual persons have the absolute rights to the lands 
granted to them by the Sheikh; provided that they keep it in use, and can dispense with it 
accordingly.
The policies o f settlement around water points, and the concomitant land reforms, 
have also created problems. These policies have practically divided the local 
communities into two competing groups following differing production practices; 
namely farming and herding. Competition and problems between sedentary farmers and 
pastoralists have become increasingly frequent, especially worsened in the past years by 
the on-going war in the Nuba Mountains of Southern Kordofan which provided 
excellent Summer grazing for pastoralists from the North who used to exploit the 
abundant grazing resources here. The war in the South has drastically curtailed the areas 
of pastoral movements, forced these movements to be confined to the limited lands of 
the central zone o f Kordofan, thus intensifying competition and problems between 
farmers and herders. Another important dimension to the reallocation of land, concerns 
the complications and constraints imposed on the local production relations by the 
development o f large-scale commercial farming in Southern Kordofan. This
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development, has affected the people in Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar in at least two 
respects. On the one hand, it has created problems of passage to the pastoral groups at 
the onset of the dry season where shortage of pasture and water in the North force them 
to migrate South passing through the mechanised farms on their way to Bahr el Arab. 
On the other hand, it has led to pressures and tensions between pastoralists and 
cultivators over land resources.
Farmers cultivate the land around their villages. Each individual or household has a 
plot(s) o f land as their farm(s). They do not apply fertilisers, but the animal dung 
scattered in the farm lands during animals' grazing in the after harvest season, serves as 
organic manure to enhance soil fertility. In addition to the organic manuring from 
animals dung, another mechanism has been used with a view of maintaining soil 
fertility, i.e. fallow-cycling. Local farmers have long learnt the advantages of fallowing 
where the cropped land is cultivated for a number o f years, then rested for a couple of 
years and allowed to regenerate its lost vitality. In the past, cropping period was shorter 
and fallowing longer. Elderly local informants told that they used to crop the farm land 
(bilad) for between 5-7 consecutive years, and then rested it for 15 years or more, and 
allowed until the land fully regenerated and restored its vitality. Today, they regret that 
the reverse is true; where cropping periods are getting longer, between 5-6 years, and 
fallowing intervals shorter o f 4- 6  years. The effects of this change has been the 
replacement of the regenerative fertility-enhancing longer fallow cycles by a more 
degenerating fertility exhausting intensive cultivation o f short fallow cycles. 
Understandably, the development of natural resources in Kordofan has systematically 
followed the trend of horizontal expansion into more and more marginal fragile lands, 
with the inevitable consequences o f recurrent environmental disasters in recent decades
6- 5- Impact of Change:
6- 5- 1- Effects on the Environment:
In the period before the Hamar and Dar Hamid permanently settled towards the turn 
of the century, the dispersion of humans and animals over a wide area and the resultant 
low population densities relieved the pressure on the land. However, large human 
settlements around water points initiated by central governments since the turn o f the 
century, and the consequent concentration o f humans and animals in limited areas, 
resulted in overgrazing and overcultivation and in effect accelerated the processes of 
environmental degradation. The state policies for socio-economic transformation have 
induced the rural village farmers to expand production into marginal lands and more 
fragile ecologies; led to insensitive use and exploitation o f the land which contributed to 
environmental degradation.
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6- 5- 1- i- The Impact on the Hashab "Acacia Senegal" Forests:
A most grave effect has been on the hashab "Acacia Senegal" which led to a critically 
serious deforestation o f the hashab forests. The urgency of the problem stems not only 
for considerations o f the economic utility of the hashab as the gum tree, but most 
importantly for its vital ecological value. This role is made possible because the tree 
keeps intact the land surface on which it grows, and protects it from wind-blown 
erosion. It has the added advantage o f being a nitrogen-fixing tree, therefore, has the 
capacity to aid the growth o f supportive land-surface grass which can form protective 
grass cover against wind-blown erosion and desertification. The Hashab tree is the 
single most important and valuable tree in the region for considerations o f ecological 
balance and long-term environmental sustainability, urgently calls for protection and 
conservation..
Until about the 1950s, the hashab bush formed dense thickets almost impenetrable at 
places. Every individual adult male owns at least one garden o f hashab. Strangers who 
happened to settle with the village people would also be allocated a garden as the social 
norms obligated, as a means o f self-provisioning. The average hashab garden until then 
ranged approximately between 20000 -25000 trees. Larger gardens could number 
between 30 - 50 thousands. This needed about 15 to 20 strong men to tap over a period 
of a month, each man (locally referred to by a figurative term; axe), each axe tapping 
between 70 to 100 trees a day. At the time of the study, about 90% of the hashab 
gardens have already fallen. Now the average Hashab garden is about 3000 trees, and a 
small number of work force of about 3 to 4 men (axes) would tap the garden, each 
tapping about 60 trees a day for 10 to 15 days' work. In the past yields were high, 
averaging about two sackfuls o f gum per collection, collected on a fortnightly intervals 
for the whole harvest. One garden would yield between 7 - 8  kantars per collection, and 
between 25-30 kantars for the whole harvest. At present, one collection yields only 
about 30 pounds. Collection time intervals are shortened to 10 days between. The best 
time for tapping is October, if  there is no locusts which are the constant nightmare o f the 
gum collectors, and if the trees are not green. Greenness of the leaves indicates the tree 
is not yet ripe for tapping. When the trees are tapped about the end of October, they take 
about a month before they start producing gum. Collection starts in December. The first 
collection is usually small in quantity, but rapidly picks up in the second and third 
collections, only to start falling again from the 5th and 6 th collections. Harvest time 
continues from December till about May or June, only to be stopped by the coming of 
the rains. At this time the gardens are at their lowest yield, and many farmers consider 
them not worthy the trouble, are abandoned as public property for small boys to make a 
little cash. Animals are also let to browse on the trees.
- 209 -
As a leguminous plant, "fixing" nitrogen from the air into the soil as fertiliser, the 
gum Arabic tree is a vital part o f a carefully balanced rotation system. The ageing trees 
on uncultivated land are fell to clear the land for the cultivation o f crops, mainly millet 
and sorghum which will be grown for about five to six years, after which time the soil 
fertility starts to decline. Then the land is rested, and the hashab trees are allowed to 
grow for fifteen to sixteen years during which period the hashab nitrogenous fixing 
restores lost soil fertility and regenerates the land, while simultaneously gum is 
collected. Young shoots are allowed to grow in the newly cleared land for three to four 
years to reach maturity, and when they age and their yields decline will be fell to clear 
the land for cultivation and a new cycle begins.
Gum production was greatly encouraged by the state through price incentives and the 
regulation of local markets. Indeed, the whole o f the Kordofan rural economy in the 
central belt was completely re-organised around the gum production and trade. The 
various formerly pastoral groups such as the Hamar and Dar Hamid were encouraged to 
settle in villages throughout the Acacia belt as gum collectors. Prices offered to the gum 
were improved as a further incentive to encourage production. Sudan controls most o f 
the world supply used by the chemical, brewing, textile and food industries, and 
Kordofan contributes about 80% of Sudan's total output of gum. Unfortunately, the 
government is doing its inadvertent best to accelerate the already enormous 
deforestation o f a plant that must be a part o f any attempt to limit desertification (Cater 
1986). The enormous deforestation of the hashab, which formed the backbone of the 
Hamar (and to a lesser extent Dar Hamid) economy, immediately results in loss o f 
incomes for the majority of households, and translates into loss of "food exchange 
entitlement" as a consequence ( Sen 1980).
6- 5- 2- The Development o f Rural Wage Labour Markets:
Under the pressures of change, the rural populations naturally responded by 
exploiting new ways and means o f livelihoods for income generation. Such responses 
took new forms of adaptations, hitherto little known in the rural economy. Migration, 
commoditisation of labour and the development of rural wage labour markets, collection 
o f forest products, and trading activities are some of the new forms of adaptations. 
Commoditisation of labour has been both a response to and a consequence of the 
changed rural socio-economic relations. The village populations have become 
increasingly dependent on hiring their labour power in increasing numbers in a quest for 
cash earnings. As a principal means of production, labour is no longer a matter o f 
individual choice, but has become a commodity subject to the up and down swings of 
the labour market. This qualitative shift in the utilisation of labour from the producer's 
own production to hire their labour for cash followed the changed rural social relations
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of production from one of predominantly self-provisioning to one o f market exchange. 
The differentials in access to the market and in income disparities have created 
differentiated social relations in the village economy in which some people (like village 
traders) have become relatively rich while others become poorer. The situation in the 
context of depleted natural resources and increasing social demands left the poorer 
village members no choice but to hire their own labour power to the more financially 
able o f the village members. Commoditisation of labour, therefore, came as a rational 
choice as a form of adaptation to the pressures and demands brought to bear on poorer 
village households. But it also signalled a dangerous shift in the orientation of labour 
from local decision and control for purposes of producing for home consumption to the 
wage market for purposes of commercial production. The danger resides in the fact that, 
as a principal means o f production, rural labour is being alienated from the legitimate 
owners for household security to producing for the market. The alienation o f rural 
labour, adds to the other forms of alienation of resources, namely that of natural rural 
resources. It is not surprising that the degree of commoditisation of labour, and the 
extent of expansion of the rural wage labour markets is reflected in the percentage share 
which wage labour contributes to the incomes of many village households (as will be 
shown in the next chapter). Wage labour now contributes between 25% to 100% of the 
incomes of many households, depending on the degree of poverty o f the household.
Table 7 Source and share o f income in 2 types of household
Source o f  Income High Income Low Income 
V
% %
1- agriculture 10 25
2- livestock 30 -
3- gum Arabic 10 -
4- wage labour - 50
5- trade 10 -
6- salaried employment 20 -
7- handicrafts - -
8- collected products 10 20-5
9- remittances and transfers 10 -
Field-Work Data 1993.
The development o f wage labour markets in the village economy has other serious 
implications as far as food security is concerned. In the traditional subsistence economy, 
the allocation of labour serves a vital food security function, in that it is distributed in 
such a way that each member of the village community is guaranteed of labour in forms 
o f help and work parties to ensure that (s)he gets the minimum security o f food 
production. Especially weaker members o f the village community who, for illness, age 
or other ailments are short of necessary family labour, get the most help. This, o f course,
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demands no economic edge or leverage, but follows the ethics of the egalitarian 
economy. These forms o f labour allocations for communal food security are now 
seriously weakened under the commoditisation o f labour. And in as much as the 
allocation of hired labour follows the dictates o f economic power, weaker members of 
the village community, and those households short of family labour who do not have the 
economic means to hire needed labour, would certainly be more food insecure and most 
vulnerable to conditions o f stress.
In the last four decades, wage labour markets have become increasingly prevalent in 
the villages in Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar and dominant over traditional labour 
institutions such as work parties, family labour and other forms of patron-client 
relationships. It is instructive to examine how labour markets have developed in Dar 
Hamid and Dar Hamar, and how their development has affected local production 
relations, allocation and control over rural resources, how this contributed to accentuate 
rural/village differentiation, and how ultimately these developments have affected the 
food security of certain households in ways that render poorer (labouring) households 
more vulnerable to natural shocks.
Historically, no forms of hired labour existed in the local economy in which one 
party exploits the labour power of another party for maximisation o f benefit. The only 
remote possible exception to this rule was probably the labour o f shepherds hired by 
herd owners to tend the herd(s), and conducted through a well-established tradition of 
the "shepherding contract" (see Chapter 3). Even here, it is hardly possible to designate 
this type of labour as wage labour, since it involved no fixed rates nor paid in money. It 
is by all considerations a unique type of labour which gives generous terms of 
employment. Indeed, many of the contracted shepherds can accumulate enough animals 
that in a few years they can hire shepherds in their own capacity. This represented the 
only form of hired labour that had existed in this area for centuries, essentially because 
the Hamar and Dar Hamid, like the other communities in North Kordofan were 
pursuing a pastoral mode of economic practice, and took to sedentary cultivation only 
since the turn o f the century which marked the beginnings o f agricultural labour 
production and the subsequent development o f rural wage labour markets. Rural/village 
labour markets did not develop automatically or instantaneously since the Hamar and 
Dar Hamid began to settle down as sedentary cultivators in villages in their present 
homelands in the central zone of Kordofan. The process has since been rather incipient, 
and followed broader and more complex patterns o f social relations, conflicts, and 
trends towards rural differentiation in which certain groups were gaining in wealth (to 
form the employing party) while others were loosing (to form the working party).
Since the Hamar and Dar Hamid settled and became sedentary cultivators, and 
especially since the introduction of the cash crop production, mobilisation o f the village
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labour was no longer confined to meet basic subsistence needs, but surplus production 
was sought in its own right in order to maximise individual economic returns. 
Consequently, competition for labour for maximisation of economic rewards was set in 
motion. Competition for labour, however, entailed mobilisation of labour in various 
forms; work parties, communal labour (as for example the village community rendering 
labour to the farm of the village Sheikh). family labour, patronage. Competition for 
labour through these various forms of labour mobilisation has been more dramatically 
complicated by the recent development o f the rural wage labour markets. The 
relationship between those earlier forms of labour mobilisation and the wage labour 
markets is complex. Some definitive remarks can be made; first that the two forms now 
co-exist side by side; but the wage labour markets are getting more prevalent and 
dominant, while the earlier non-market institutions (such as work parties) are 
progressively receding.
The domains in which rural labour engages range from agricultural farm operations 
(clearing, sowing, weeding (first and second), harvesting and threshing; gum tapping 
and collection, building, and building material, gathering fodder, and domestic work. 
Labour transactions for agricultural farm activities vary from one operation to the other. 
The cleaning operations engage relatively less hired wage labour since many o f the 
households- (the male-head) of the family and the adult males- clean their farm lands. 
Where hired labour is required this is transacted on a "piece" basis; i.e. wage is agreed 
on on cleaning a fixed piece of land, normally measured in makhammas (1 makhammas 
= 1.7 acres; appr. = 1 hectare). Sowing, on the other hand,, engages more hired labour, 
owing to the short planting season for the different crops all at the same time, hence 
pressure is intense and competition high; and the labour is transacted on a two-shift 
half-daily basis; one longer morning shift from morning to noon, and a shorter afternoon 
shift from afternoon to sunset. Wage rates are higher for the morning shift, almost 
double those of the afternoon one. In the sowing operations, for the various crops, 
especially groundnuts and dukhn, the employers o f labour hire as many people as 
possible. This is meant for the employer to plant his/her crops as quickly as possible and 
at the most opportune time for optimal exploitation o f rainwater and moisture. Timely 
planting can to a large extent determine the success or otherwise o f the harvest. 
Weeding is carried out in two operations, first weeding (begins shortly after the crop 
tendrils are out competing with grass). The operation is intended to rid the crop from the 
competition from weeds and grasses over nutrients. A second weeding is needed at a 
later stage when another sprout o f weeds and grasses compete with the crop. This is less 
demanding than first weeding. First weeding is naturally very strenuous, demanding and 
exacting. It is also critical for the success of the harvest. Therefore it engages the most 
hired labour and gets the highest wage rates. Second weeding is less demanding and
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gets less wage rates. Weeding is transacted on a "task" basis; an agreed rate for a fixed 
piece o f land/labour. First weeding comes at a critical time in the farming season when 
the different crops require weeding at the same time. Therefore competition for labour 
is very high, and at peak times hired labour shortages occur frequently, because either 
people are engaged in their own farms, or the available labour is being attracted to 
some better paying group. Consequently, wage rates for weeding operations increase 
in the peak o f  the weeding season due to pressure and competition. The wage rates can 
indeed be so tempting for poorer households that some neglect their own farms in 
pursuit o f  better and luring wages. This is one o f the reasons why some poor 
households get poorer and more food-insecure as a consequence o f the conditions o f 
the wage labour market.
Table 8 Farm operations, season and bases of payment in rural wage labour.
OPERATION PEAK SEASON BASIS OF WAGE
cleaning M ay - June piece, or task basis
sowing June - early July time basis
1st weeding July task basis
2nd weeding August task basis
harvesting December unit (/no. sacks) cash crops
threshing ( extended time) task basis
Source: Field-work data 1993.
Labour allocated to harvesting differs between food crops and cash crops, engaging 
traditional labour and wage labour respectively. Flarvesting o f dukhn and dura is still 
carried through traditional labour institutions; mostly through women work parties, 
and short-term contracts for a fixed share in the crop. It involves no money payments. 
Cash crops, on the other hand, especially groundnuts, are mostly harvested through 
wage labour. The wage is either on a time basis (dahawa, or day time), or on a task 
basis (a piece o f land, or a bulk o f the crop; number o f sacks). Threshing o f the grains 
has traditionally been worked by work parties until recently. Wage labour is 
increasingly employed, but work parties and extended-family labour are important in 
threshing operations.
Table 9 Division of rural wage labour between food and cash crops.
OPERATION FOOD CROPS CASH CROPS
market combn. non-mrkt market combn. non-mrkt
cleaning * *
sowing * *
1st weeding * *
2nd weeding * *
harvesting * *
threshing * *
Source: Field-work data 1993.
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From table (9), it is obvious that the introduction o f cash crops to the rural 
economy is the single most important factor in the development o f the wage labour 
markets in the villages. This is illustrated by the fact that all the farming operations 
involved in cash crop production require additional labour which can only be mobilised 
through the wage labour market.
Farm labour is not the only form o f labour that has been increasingly commoditised 
in the village labour relations. Other activities in which wage labour has become 
increasingly dominant include building houses and fences which were previously all 
conducted through work parties. Wage labour has also become more important in 
Gum tapping. Wages for domestic work, especially for women, such as cleaning are 
also found in the villages. The clear evidence to emerge from these instances o f the 
development o f the wage labour markets in the villages is that there is clearly a process 
o f  social differentiation in which certain individuals and households are identified as 
"working class" ready to sell their labour, while others are "wealthy" who can afford to 
pay the costs o f hired labour. We need to say why some households start better off 
than others, and what makes some wealthier and others poorer. One factor is that the 
weakening o f many o f the traditional arrangements for labour mobilisation which were 
evolved centrally around the guaranteeing o f security to all members left some 
members who have little labour or insufficient resources to deploy, left them behind. 
Additionally, the increasing importance o f trading in the village economy has given 
some members, who have a little saving to start trade, gave them easy access to credit 
and other facilities from towns merchants with whom they have come in partnership or 
become clients. Little savings and access to limited credit and other trading facilities 
determined a households ability to cultivate their farm without having to resort to sell 
their labour. Households with little food or animals, and without access to credit, and 
diminishing resource-sharing arrangements with other households, have to earn income 
from selling their labour in the market. The income they expect to earn from selling 
their labour determines how much they cultivate, rather than the other way round 
(Kevane 1994).
The relationship between the wage labour markets and traditional labour institutions is 
a complex phenomenon which calls for more investigation since it lends itself as an 
interesting case for the study o f rural change. In all traditional labour institutions; i.e. 
work parties, communal labour, family labour, besides the utility function, there is an 
equally, or more important social functions for the mobilisation o f  labour; to reinforce 
solidarity, prestige and group membership. The relationship between the utility role 
and the social role o f labour are mutually reinforcing. Wage labour, on the other hand, 
serves exclusive utility roles; for maximisation of economic returns from the
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exploitation of the labour power o f poorer members. The social role of labour is absent. 
Wage labour negates the social function found in traditional labour institutions; i.e. 
while the latter reinforces solidarity and membership, the former works in the opposite 
direction; i.e. reinforces individual wealth, power and social differentiation. While the 
one diffuses differences, the other accentuates them.
Another difference between the two labour institutions pertains to their respective 
roles for household security. The utility role of traditional labour institutions is to ensure 
minimum security for the household. And since this form o f labour is reciprocal in 
many respects (work parties), its role is to ensure security to all members. Traditional 
labour institutions serve social functions (solidarity) and utility functions (security); and 
the two functions are mutually reinforcing. Wage labour, on the other hand, negates 
solidarity, and while it may considerably contribute to the security o f certain households 
(those hiring labour), it also creates conditions of insecurity for the majority o f poorer 
households (those selling labour). The relative good security o f some of the wealthier 
village households, and the insecurity of poorer ones, can be a direct consequence of the 
divergence of interests involved in the reallocation of labour in the wage markets. These 
institutional changes and the resulting variations in the village food security patterns 
explain why even in the same village some households are able to escape famine 
virtually unscathed, while others suffer to the extent of starvation.
6- 5- 3- Internal Wage Labour Markets:
Migration for work from Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar in the past was confined to 
occasional group movements from one locality to another induced by conditions of 
stress, and was thus mainly directed for food security. Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar 
communities did not know the wage institutions until about the 1920s or 1930s when 
they started to migrate for work in the main production areas in central Sudan, 
especially to the Gezira Cotton Schemes, and to Gedarif area to hire their labour power 
in cotton picking or in the activities o f commercial agricultural farming in the Gedarif 
commercial dura farms. This was a direct consequence o f the state planning policies 
which -since the early days o f the Gezira Scheme - stipulated that seasonal labour 
requirements for cotton picking in the Scheme should come from Western Sudan, 
following the socio-economic restructuring of the Sudanese economy which assigned to 
the Western provinces the role o f supplying cheap labour, both for the immediate term 
and as potential labour reserves required for the future developments of modern 
capitalist agriculture in central Sudan (see previous chapter). Consequently, seasonal 
migrant workers from rural Kordofan participated significantly in the labour force 
required in the cotton Schemes. This migration from the villages o f Kordofan to Mukuar 
was greatly facilitated by the opening o f the bridge at Kosti and the extension of the
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railway to El-Obeid in 1912. Wage workers are particularly drawn from Eastern 
Kordofan districts, including Dar Hamid, in view of their close proximity to these areas 
o f mechanised and commercial schemes in Gezira and the Nile. An organised system of 
seasonal labour mobilisation has been permanently instituted. Labour recruitment teams 
o f brokers continue in the contemporary period to inundate districts of Kordofan, 
including Dar Hamid, in convoys of trucks and lorries in about November and 
December; and a whole-scale mobilisation o f rural labour takes place every year, 
involving individuals, families and entire village communities. They are loaded and 
packed on trucks and lorries to the schemes, to spend the Winter and early Summer 
months picking cotton and other menial jobs. The return time for the migrants is shortly 
before the start of the rainy season, so that they can till their own plots with their 
families. The whole process is not unsimilar to the summary forced labour for the 
colonial plantation schemes in many parts of Africa which characterised the colonial 
period (Rotberg 1983; Brett 1973; Iliffe 1987, 1983:). The seasonal agricultural 
labourers receive very low, barely sufficient to support them (for more details see 
discussion on page 158). Wage labour on the schemes, offered no salvage to the 
direness o f the seasonal migrant workers from Kordofan. Alternatively, many young 
males are attracted to the towns and main urban centres looking for wage employment. 
But these migrants to the urban wage labour markets have little skills to help them in the 
towns, and have no options but to engage in poor-paying manual work such as building, 
brick-laying, and other petty jobs such as waiters, porters etc. Such migrants to the wage 
labour in towns ultimately face a dilemma: they become uprooted from their rural 
communal bases, disenchanted with farm labour in the villages, and have no prospects 
o f success or place in the towns. In the end, they either return to the villages after having 
spent many "empty" years in the towns, or else they often end up joining the slum 
dwellers in the shanty towns living on the fringes o f the urban milieaux.
Another wage labour market has developed since the 1950s following the 
introduction of mechanised farming to Habila in the clay soils of Southern Kordofan. 
An important effect of the development of the mechanised farming schemes in 
Kordofan is the attraction o f labour from the rural areas, which greatly contributed to 
the development o f the wage labour market where increasing numbers o f the village 
populations go to Habila for cash or food grains. Workers who are attracted to this wage 
labour market come from poor households, and in many instances involve whole 
families (e.g.from Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar). There are two systems o f payment in 
Habila commercial mechanised farms: cash wages and in kind (paid in dura). Cash 
wages are generally low, and the majority of workers, who are impelled primarily by the 
need to secure their household food requirements, prefer to receive their wages in kind 
o f the crop; calculated in number o f sacks. The dura they receive for their labour can
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often provide good security for such poorer households. The timing o f agricultural 
activities in the traditional and modern sectors is different. The following table shows 
the different times which is a factor in the development of the seasonal wage labour 
market.
Table 10 Timing of agricultural activities for cotton and sorghum in the traditional 
and modern sectors
Activity Traditional sector Modern sector
Cotton Sorghum Cotton Sorghum
Planting May/June May/June July July
1st weeding June Early June July July
2nd weeding June/July Late June Early August July/August
3rd weeding End July July
4th weeding August
Harvesting/picking January Dec./Jan. Jan./Feb. January
Source: from Haaland 1991: 233.
The differences in farm activities allow for a certain amount of symbiosis where 
family farm members work as seasonal agricultural labourers in the mechanised farms 
for short periods between the peaks o f labour demands on their own farms. In spite of 
this rather harmonious picture, the exploitation of the clay areas through large-scale 
farming may prevent the development of intermediate technologies which would make 
it economic for family farms to establish medium-sized enterprises on the clay soils, 
thus reducing pressure in the over-exploited, more densely populated middle belt. But 
this would depend on the Government's ability and will to tackle a multitude of difficult 
politico-administrative problems. These are very difficult decisions to make by a 
Sudanese Government faced with the formidable problem of not alienating important 
sections o f powerful political support bases of the economic and agrarian urban elites 
(Haaland 1991: 233-4)
The national labour market in the other sectors o f the Sudanese economy offers little 
prospects for employment for labourers coming from rural Kordofan. This can be 
explained in the light o f three factors: (1) that such migrant labourers from Kordofan are 
mostly unskilled workers with little experience of work outside farming and animal 
husbandry; (2 ) the employment opportunities that can be found in the other sectors of 
the national economy are manned by people from the centre o f Sudan who are favoured 
in jobs, as relatives or acquaintances o f executive personnel, and (3) the capacity of 
these sectors to absorb labour is low any way. This is reflected in the very low 
percentage share these sectors contribute to employment compared to agriculture which 
absorbs over 70% o f the Sudan's work force.
The evidence of a growing regional and national wage labour markets suggests the 
existence o f huge regional disparities in the distribution o f incomes, and nationally in 
the distribution of wealth and opportunities, and growing social differentiation and
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regional polarisation can be inevitable. Within Kordofan, indeed inside the villages, 
merchants and clients have been enabled by the state to own commercial mechanised 
farms, while the majority o f poor households provide the necessary labour power to 
work the village farms and the commercial farms for wealthy merchants. The 
relationship between employers and workers suggests widening income disparities 
within the villages and inside the region. On the national level, the state has unfailingly 
supported the modem agricultural sector, channelled the development funds to this 
sector in central Sudan, while it consistently deprived the traditional farm sector in 
Kordofan from such funds, essentially as a political tactic to serve as push factor to 
drive workers from their villages and force them into the wage labour market in central 
Sudan. This dual policy o f concentration and deprivation can explain the dualism in 
development which characterised unequal development planning in Sudan, and which 
ultimately created the huge regional inequalities in the distribution o f wealth and 
opportunities, creating a widening regional gap which threatens the country's very 
existence. It is in this context o f regional polarity, the policies o f concentration and 
deprivation that we can understand and explain the exploitation and impoverisation of 
the rural village populations in Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar, and their ultimate 
vulnerability to the conditions o f famines. In the final analysis, cash earnings from wage 
labour markets inside Kordofan, and in central Sudan offer no relief to the stresses of 
migrants from rural Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar. And the opportunities o f employment 
in the other sectors of the Sudanese economy are very limited, confined to central Sudan 
and controlled by certain groups. People turned their attention to the lucrative and 
expanding labour market in the rich Arab States; and external migration to the Arab 
World has evolved into one of the most important forms o f wage labour since the early 
1970s.
6- 5- 3— External Wage Labour Markets:
From the early 1970s, external migration from rural Kordofan to the Arab Gulf States 
has been on steady increase, and in recent years, especially in the aftermath of the recent 
droughts, has assumed the proportions o f a large-scale exodus, reflecting the scale of 
gravity of the conditions in the rural countryside of Kordofan. No regional statistics are 
available to quantify the volume o f external migration from Kordofan to the Arab states, 
but the general trends of this migration can be understood from the scale of external 
migration from Sudan as a whole. The pattern o f this migration from Dar Hamid and 
Dar Hamar shows a distinct trend in the volume and direction o f this migration. 
Throughout the 1970s and until the mid-1980s, the destination of Kordofan migrants 
from Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar has been mainly to the Arab Gulf States; e.g. Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, The United Arab Emirates and Iraq. Whereas since the late 1980s to the
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present, increasing numbers o f Kordofan migrants have been drawn to Libya. In those 
earlier years migrants from Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar have been attracted to the 
Middle Eastern labour markets, under the pressures o f their internal problems, and in 
response to the opportunities offered by the expanding labour market created by the 
Middle Eastern oil industry in the boom years of the 1970s and early 1980s. The wage 
earnings such migrants receive are sufficiently rewarding, and the remittances o f money 
transfers which they make to their families have been one o f the major lifelines in 
supporting households during these years. However, the crash of the oil boom, coupled 
with the saturation of the Gulf labour markets with migrant Asian labour made wages to 
collapse even further with a corresponding contraction of job opportunities. These 
developments in the Gulf labour markets, forced Kordofan rural migrants to seek 
opportunities elsewhere. Thus, still responding to the pressures of their internal 
conditions, increasing numbers directed their attention to Libya's labour market, which, 
though less enterprising than the Gulf, yet is far better than staying in Sudan, eking a 
precarious livelihood out from exhausted lands and with no prospects of employment in 
the national labour market. Here, too, remittances and transfers play a vital life- 
supporting role for families and households in the villages behind.
It is evident that external migration by the Hamar and Dar Hamid to the rich Arab 
States has been in response to pressures bearing on them, political, economic and 
environmental pressures all acting in concert. It also reflects the structural weakness of 
the internal Sudanese labour market, which offered the migrant labourers no security, 
either in towns or in the modern mechanised capitalist agricultural sector. The resilience 
o f the rural populations, their adaptability for survival, however, has not stopped short 
in the face o f formidable adversities and challenges surrounding their local conditions, 
the weakness o f the national labour market, or the impotence and incapacity of the 
Sudanese state to provide opportunities of employment or other means o f security. But 
they sought livelihood in the opportunities offered in the regional labour markets o f the 
oil industry in the Arab world. Indeed, the scale and significance of the participation of 
workers from rural Kordofan to the Middle Eastern labour markets can be appreciated 
from the scale o f the rural exodus. The service which these migrants render to the 
lucrative international oil industry, to the Arab States, and to the international 
community as a whole can be unmistakable.. In return, this migration offers better 
chances o f security for the many thousands families and households who continue to 
receive remittances and transfers from their migrant members in the Diaspora. In 1993, 
in the village of Omdofais, there were 21 migrants in Libya, 20 in Saudi Arabia, and 23 
returnees who had spent some years working abroad in the oil Arab states. The return 
time for these migrants can vary considerably from one year to ten or more. Migrants on 
their return invest their money in livestock and trading, since there are few investment
- 2 2 0 -
opportunities open in the rural economy. Many of the migrants who are exclusively 
males, come and go routinely in a fashion that has become an established feature o f life 
in rural Kordofan and in Sudan generally (for details, see next chapter).
However, it has become increasingly evident the social problems that the migration 
to external markets creates in village life; such problems as the acceleration o f social 
differentiation. The migrants to the Arab States form a distinct social group in the 
village social set-up. Migrants tend to stay for longer periods of time, and other have 
good jobs, such that the amounts o f money they transfer to their families are large 
enough by village standards. Accordingly, the standard of living o f households with 
migrant members to the Arab world is higher than ordinary village households, in which 
the egalitarian village community is being differentiated in terms o f income and 
standard o f living (see chapter 7). It has been related that a girl in the village school 
whose father works abroad, looks down on her school mates and insulted one of them 
for her ragged clothes. It is true that many o f the village households have at least one 
migrant member to the Arab labour markets. And those households who do not have 
one, constitute some of the very poor households in the village
6- 6- The Development of Rural Trade
6- 6- 1- Trade, traders and rural social differentiation:
Trading represents another form o f adaptation to the forces o f change, as an avenue 
of income generation Some individuals engage in petty trade, buying small quantities of 
goods from town merchants, and selling these to the village populations, making small 
profits from their trade. Over the years, such individuals are able to accumulate 
sufficient capital to enable them widen their trading activities, buying more or less of 
the village agricultural produce as their capital outlays can permit. In due course, they 
grow into a distinct social group o f village traders. They can extend some limited credit 
to the village people, thereby wielding important social and economic power in the 
village politics. Accordingly, the standard of living for merchant households is higher 
than ordinary households, and the village community is being somehow differentiated in 
terms of income and standard o f living. Indeed, a process of nascent social 
differentiation is emerging in the village economy. This is evident in the contemporary 
village social relationships, and captured in more concrete terms in people's expressions 
when the ordinary village people relate how the rich no longer heed to the poor, 
implying a social rift between rich and poor, and a rupture to old village life of mutual 
help and support. Such verbal expressions about social differentiation in fact lack true 
class consciousness.
Traders were itinerant who came from Omdurman and el-Dueim in Central Sudan. 
Their stock o f trade included such items as sugar, tea, perfumes, Damour, and spices.
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They bought from the village people Gum Arabic, sesame, and a little groundnuts. 
Groundnuts were previously grown solely as a food crop for household consumption as 
part of the diet and for women oiling, but not for the market. Groundnuts were not 
grown as a cash crop for the market until about 1940s. The itinerant traders who came 
from Central Sudan, get their stock o f trade from wholesale white merchants (Khawajat) 
based in the main cities of Omdurman, Khartoum and El-Obeid. Their means of 
transport were camels and donkeys hired from the local people, and frequently they 
travelled on foot carrying their bundles o f trade from village to village. They would 
usually stay between two to three days in the village and then move on to the next. 
Besides gum, which was the most important item of trade, the itinerant (Jellaba) traders 
also bought from the villages locally made wooden bowels, wooden flails, and saddles. 
Large wooden bowels (Gudaha) were common household utensils in use among the 
rural populations until more recently to serve food. These have now been largely 
superseded by imported manufactured items; first of china, then metal and later of 
plastic-based substitutes. Another type o f this local wood craft was a type o f oblong 
bowel-shaped dish used for watering animals. The itinerant traders (Gellabah, the word 
literally means itinerant traders) bought these wooden utensils from local craftsmen in 
bulk (of 2 0 s) which they then carried on camel back to market elsewhere where there 
was need for them in other areas.
These items were common household utensils which were used for various purposes 
from serving food and water to serving guests. Other local industries included beds 
locally made from slender branches o f certain shrubs, woven in close-knit grids to make 
flat wooden beds known as (Sarrir Saddad). Rope making was a thriving local industry 
too. Ropes were manufactured from the fibrous bark of the Tabaldi trees (Baobab), and 
were used as the preferred strong ropes in bed nettings and animal roping.
The transformation o f the rural economies and the concomitant expansion of 
markets have changed the patterns o f production and consumption of the villages in 
fundamental ways. The village populations found in their hands an increasing amount of 
money from the sales o f their cash crops with which they acquired a wide array of 
foreign-made consumer goods, made readily available in the markets. Thus, the whole 
scale of their material needs and demands has been thrown upwards by the increased 
circulation o f liquid money and the simultaneous availability of consumer goods. The 
expansion of trade vastly increased consumable goods in volume and variety, and 
profoundly altered consumption patterns. Thus, fabrics o f all sorts and makes, items 
such as soaps, perfumes, shoes, beverages, sugar, coffee and tea, metalwork, cigarettes, 
tobacco became common consumption items in village shops. Indeed, the variety and 
diversity o f goods and items became a plethora too vast to circumscribe. The following
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table gives a general picture of the state of production and trade in Kordofan in the 
height o f the colonial period:
T a b le  11 Items of trade in Kordofan in 1910s
ITEM Averaae
1932/6 1937 1938
Gum 13,427 12,967 14,644
Grain 18,214 20,629 17,599
Groundnuts 2,155 3,017 3,588
Sesame 4,209 8,752 7,855
Melon seed 5,463 5,264 6,215
Cotton seed-oil - - 206
Cotton (ginned) 3,865 4,580
Hides and skins = 500 465
Semn (clarified butter) 1,000 1,000
Sesame oil I 1,500 3,500
Source: March 1948: 828.
The development o f trade brought increased circulation o f money. Since the turn of 
the century, there was a steady and increasing circulation of English gold money in the 
towns of Kordofan. Egyptian silver and notes were also readily accepted in the villages 
in the central districts, local transactions which were formerly performed through 
various media including barter exchanges, cloth, silver, salt, and the like, were now 
abandoned and replaced by the use o f money. The involvement o f the local populations 
in the market brought them into contact with the towns-people where they were more 
and more exposed to the consumer culture. The array o f consumer goods that have 
become available in the markets lured the local people to acquire them; thus developed 
new tastes which contributed to an evolving consumer culture. Ultimately, money as a 
means of acquiring new products and of fulfilling social needs, became the symbol of 
the new form of power and wealth in the rural economy. The on-going processes of 
rural transformation took not only the economic forms o f production and exchange, but 
also involved deep-reaching cultural changes affecting the whole range of cultural 
values, communal traditions and customs, and social-economic relations.
6- 7- T he  d e m is e  o f  L o c a l  M a n u f a c t u r e s  a n d  C r a f t s ::
A plethora o f indigenously developed crafts and manufactures existed in the local 
economy to add to the diversity o f socio-economic activity. A few examples of these 
include crafts such as pottery; an exclusive privilege o f women. Other women crafts 
included tanning, wool-knitting, basket-weaving, mats-making, leather works, all of 
which afford significant contribution towards the female well-being and economic 
independence. There was also local carpentry, saddle-making and other wood crafts, 
which is a domain exclusive to men in view o f the heavy manual labour demand
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required for felling trees needed for the craft. Other male crafts included shoe-making. 
More significantly, however, are some well developed local manufactures, such as 
cloth-making and leather, iron-smelting, and rope-making. Cloth-making reached 
advanced stages of development at the time of the caravan foreign trade that carried the 
mercantile trade across the Sahara and linked the Sudan to the Mediterranean coast and 
Europe and international trade. Local dcimmour weavers were found in the villages, 
some of whom were famed for their beautiful, fme-textured dammours. The dammour 
cottage industry was a skill that was passed from father to sun, and acquired through 
long practice. The local cloth-making industry developed to such an extent and assumed 
such a high significance that at one stage cloth even assumed the status o f medium of 
exchange through which people exchanged goods and services, and were thus able to 
engage in local transactions. The indigenous cloth-making industry was aided by the 
fact that people used to grow quantities o f cotton locally to meet their "cloth" demands. 
Local cotton that was grown in the villages gave good yields, sufficient to meet local 
and household cloth needs. Unfortunately, the colonial state policies resulted in the 
virtual persecution of the local cloth-making industry. The colonial state carried out a 
sustained assault on the industry which has eventually completely phased out the local 
cottage (dammour) industry (for more details see previous chapter). The influx of 
imported finished fabrics from foreign sources displaced the local cottage industry, and 
it finally ceased to exist altogether.
Another local manufacture was iron-smelting. Iron-smelting had been an old 
manufacture in these regions. In Kordofan, traces o f iron-smelting are still evident from 
the remains of ancient furnaces and churns which can be found scattered throughout 
ancient sites, locally called "Abu n Kana'an" which may refer to an ancient culture in 
this area, o f Anag, Berber or Egyptian origin. Although the indigenous local iron- 
smelting industry produced only simple tools, these were vital technological aids given 
the context in which they had developed. It is possible to assume that such simple 
technology could have developed into more complex forms, and with continued 
refinement and improvement, could have in the course o f time evolved into a fully- 
fledged industry. Like the fate suffered by the local cloth-industry, the flood of 
manufactured iron and steel imported from outside markets, smothered the evolutionary 
development of the local iron-smelting manufacture, when finally it ceased to exist 
altogether.
Another local manufacture is rope-making. This manufacture depends entirely on 
local resources o f fibre obtained from the barks and leaves of certain trees (e.g. baobab 
and palm trees). The barks o f such trees are stripped into fibres and woven into ropes. 
Rope-making as a local manufacture has also been greatly affected by synthetic 
manufactured fibres imported from outside markets, though the local rope-making
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manufacture has not been altogether superseded. Rope-making still meets a sizeable 
portion of local market needs. Besides using traditional fibres obtained from trees, 
people's innovative abilities has recently discovered the potential of using synthetic 
fibres that can be obtained from stripping used sacks and bags which brought sugar, tea 
and other packed items of trade to the local market. This latter synthetic substitute did in 
fact relieved the pressure on trees for demand o f natural fibres, and in effect is a blessing 
for the trees and the environment.
The case for the promotion o f local manufacture and crafts rests on several arguments, 
which can be summarised in the following points
- efficiency; more efficient in their use o f locally available resources,
- employment; are labour-intensive, and provide the major part o f rural employment,
- domestic savings; provide an outlet for personal savings at low income levels,
- provision of commodities; low-cost commodities, especially for low-income groups.
- equitable income distribution; both by providing income, and supplying the needs,
- promotion of indigenous entrepreneurs; by providing more extensive training,
- conserving scarce management skills; through a less complex organisation of 
production,
- adapted technology; use more appropriate methods adapted to local conditions,
- skill diffusion; through labour-intensity and direct informal training,
- regional development; more geographically dispersed sites o f development,
- minimising rural-urban migration; by creating income generation in rural areas,
- domestic inputs; rely largely on local inputs and expertise,
- linkages effects; have stronger linkages with the agricultural sector, by processing 
agricultural products, the supply of agricultural inputs and the supply o f goods for the 
agro populations (Hansohm 1991; Hansohm and Wohlmuth 1987, Page and Steel 
1984)..
The replacement of local manufactures for foreign imported goods adversely affected 
village social and economic life in at least four important respects: loss of employment 
and loss of incomes for many of the village households; gain and profits realised by the 
village traders who trade in imported items; the divergence between the loosing and the 
gaining parties directly feed into the process o f rural social differentiation. A fourth 
dimension implies a long-term change which transforms the rural village economy from 
autonomy to dependency. Local manufacture contributes to increased internal exchange 
and circulation which allows for the possibilities o f internal growth. The demise o f local 
manufactures inhibits internal exchanges, circulation and growth; since the value of 
rural labour instead of being circulated between different sectors o f the economy 
according to local supply and demand factors, is being transferred through the village 
traders to outside markets. The change implies an economic transformation in which the
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rural village economy becomes an economy of "drain". Capital which could have 
otherwise accumulated locally, to lead to secondary or tertiary phases of development of 
indigenous manufactures, is transferred in the economy o f "drain" to the regional (El- 
Obeid) markets and beyond. Local internal economic growth would not be possible, 
economic stagnation and bankruptcy is more likely to be the outcome.
6- 8- Impact of Change on Coping Strategies
Food shortage is a recurrent problem affecting the rural communities inhabiting these 
Northern regions o f Kordofan. However, the local populations have evolved survival 
strategies and responses to cope with occurrences o f food shortage. The problem of food 
shortage and associated hunger varies both in intensity and frequency. Its intensity and 
magnitude varies from the regular mild hunger season, to the more acute form of 
famines; and in frequency from seasonal to annual outbreaks of famines. The rural 
communities, however, conscious of the hazards of an uncertain environment, have 
adapted their way of life and evolved strategies o f coping with the perceived risks 
attendant on food shortage. These strategies include short-term responses that can be 
enacted during transient stresses, and long-term adaptations to more secular pressures 
and constraints. It has been noted that people's strategies of coping with hunger take a 
hierarchical form in that some are responses that can be enacted in periods o f mild stress 
conditions, while others are employed only at times o f serious hunger. The latter group 
o f responses comprise the coping strategies and adaptations which can be more 
vigorous, but less attractive since they typically involve taking tough decisions such as 
migration or liquidation of household assets. It has yet to be established the stages of 
progression in which mild forms of food shortage develop into acute hunger unto full­
blown famines. What exactly determines the "threshold" demarcating the boundaries of 
a regular hunger period from that o f a famine condition. Indeed, it has to be recognised 
the difficulty of establishing "thresholds" for the different stages of hunger, since the 
boundaries between phases are blurred and not so clear as the stages of development 
merge into one another. Therefore it is only possible to expect a great degree of overlap 
both in the characterisation and identification of the different stages of hunger, as well 
as in people's responses to them.
The local populations employ different strategies to cope with hunger stress. It is 
possible to identify different phases in the development o f a hunger situation (Sen 1981; 
Dreze and Sen 1989; Campbell and Trecher 1982), and different strategies deployed at 
different stages. These authors tend to agree to a broad hierarchy of three stages of 
hunger. Sen (1981), for example, distinguishes between three levels of food shortage: 
( 1) lowness o f  the typical level food consumption; (2 ) declining trends of food 
consumption; and (3) sudden collapse o f the level o f food consumption. Campbell and
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Trecher (1982) also distinguish three stages: (1) an annual hungry season; (2) shortage 
o f food due to economic factors characterised by a breakdown o f co-operative efforts; 
and (3) a food consumption deficit corresponding to the word famine. These are 
broadly: (a) a first stage o f a mild regular "hunger season", (b) a second stage of 
"normal" hunger; and (c) a stage o f intense acute outbursts o f famines. Variations in 
people's responses and strategies of coping can be observed. Variations of responses 
from normal transactions and exchanges to less attractive choices o f migration and 
liquidation of assets closely correspond to the intensity of the food situation as it 
worsens.
6- 8- 1- Responses to Seasonal Hunger:
The village communities in rural Kordofan face a seasonal hunger period each year 
with which they have developed certain mechanisms o f coping. This seasonal hunger 
period develops annually towards the end o f the rainy season at which time the grain 
stock reserves from the previous harvest will by this time be almost completely 
depleted, and the grains of the new harvest are not yet ready. The hunger season extends 
roughly between July and end of September. It is a hard time o f acute hunger when 
grains are short everywhere. Indeed, the local lore is replete with names and anecdotes 
describing the exigencies of hunger stress. This seasonal hunger is euphemistically 
denoted by the phrase "Mefraq el-Habitein", literally meaning "the divide between the 
two grains"; implying a period o f falling grain stores between the depleted stocks o f the 
previous harvest and the next one just ahead. This is a time of pervasive hardship for all, 
of general weakness when everything is in short supply. The local populations are just 
emerging from the taxing labour and toil o f the planting and weeding operations, 
exhausted and weak, grains are everywhere short or non-existent, and with no money 
income to relieve their dire need. Animal prices are low as a result of the general lack o f 
money locally. It is at this period that the trough is at its lowest and the local 
communities are most vulnerable. At this critical time of year, those o f the village 
members who have grains in store resort to unearthing their stored grains and lend it to 
deficit households; or the latter borrow small quantities o f grains from kins and 
relatives. However, while thus extremely vulnerable and awaiting the maturity of the 
new harvest grains just ahead, the local populations employ a number of strategic 
responses to cope with this transient hunger period.
6- 8- 1- i- Planting (Jubrakas) House Orchards with Quick-Maturing Grains:
Being always conscious o f the inevitable hunger period, village households respond 
by sowing the house orchards with some carefully selected grain varieties o f quick- 
maturing qualities. This is a domain exclusive to women. From the previous harvest,
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women take great care to select several heads o f quick-maturing grains and set them 
aside as seeds for the next planting season. Immediately at the onset o f the first rains, 
these are sown around the house (hence house orchards). This early planting is intended 
to allow for their optimum growth period so that they mature up early enough to stave 
off the inevitable hunger period and relieve the household at the most critical and 
vulnerable time. Women play the key role in this important food security mechanism. 
Households still sow the Jubrakas (house orchards) with quick maturing grains. This is 
one o f the strategies which still remains intact. Other responses to cope with the hunger 
season include exploiting the local fauna and flora. A range of edible plants, roots, 
leaves, berries, fruits are collected and prepared as foods and salads. Some hunting is 
also undertaken for some birds and wildlife animals. Unfortunately, the environmental 
problems attendant on the development policies and the consequent loss o f many local 
faunal and floral species has curtailed the options offered by this important strategy (for 
details on lost species, see appendices H, I, and J).
Another set o f responses involve local reciprocal obligations between communities 
and among households. It is an established feature o f village communal life that grain 
reserves that could still be available in some of the neighbouring villages, or kept in the 
granaries o f some notable men, should be distributed and loaned out to people, who 
would almost all be short of grain at this time. The loaned grains will be paid back after 
the harvest in the same quantities borrowed, without interest. Lending grains to relieve 
the need o f community members is regarded as an obligation o f high social moral value 
which earns one the society's respect and esteem, and indeed a great deal of social and 
political influence. Reciprocity has been seriously weakened, especially inter-village 
borrowing of grains. Reciprocity within the village households still holds, but in a 
somewhat diluted form. Loans o f small quantities o f grains are reciprocated between 
households, Fortunately though, that the hunger period coincides with the time when 
animals are at their best o f yields o f milk and milk products which largely mitigate the 
diereses of the situation. Households rely heavily during this period on milk and milk 
products to supplement their diet of the remaining meagre grains.
An understanding o f the association between vulnerability and seasonality in the 
hunger period could better inform intervention efforts and can go a long way to relieve 
the hungry by targeting this particular state o f generalised food shortage and physical 
and economic weakness during this season. The hunger season is a more definitive and 
predictable occurrence which can be easily targeted by intervention relief action. It is 
also more predictable in the way it merges into the second phase of a more serious 
hunger situation. Since the hunger season is time-limited to the period between July to 
end September, a protraction o f the stress condition beyond that time limit can usually 
index the seriousness of the situation to have passed the "threshold" of the regular
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hunger season. This is because many o f the strategies of coping are short-term responses 
designed to meet the transient condition o f stress within a perceived time period. A 
protraction of the stress beyond that time limit, would imply the stretching o f these 
responses and render them in-effective. Another important time factor is the maturing of 
the house orchards crop which is usually calculated as to ripen at exactly the time to 
relieve households in the hunger season at about September. A progression o f the 
hunger situation beyond September, would typically imply a complete or partial failure 
of the house orchards food crop, which may portend of a more generalised failure of the 
whole food harvest, though the relationship between the two does not necessarily 
follow.
6- 8- 1- Grain Food Stores (Matmura):
As we have seen, food grain stores are a well established tradition in rural Kordofan, 
that in good years people store those quantities o f  grains in excess of their immediate 
consumption needs in pits called Matmurah. Grains can remain in excellent condition 
for up to fifteen years. Each household have their own grain store, Matmurah. Melon 
seeds can also be stored in such pits. Grain stores are replenished each good successive 
harvest. In bad years, people use their food grain reserves thus stored during good years. 
Under the market forces and the commercialisation of food crops, this food security 
strategy has been seriously undermined, since surplus production instead of being stored 
for future security, immediately finds its way to the market for cash. Need for cash to 
satisfy other consumer needs impels the majority o f households to sell part of their food 
grains as early as the beginning of the harvest season.; since food grains have become a 
cash earner under the commercialisation of food. It is indeed interesting to note that 
even when the food harvest falls short o f meeting the household's food requirements for 
the year, i.e. there is no surplus food, still a considerable part of the crop is sold in the 
market for cash. This is particularly so for poorer households who make the major 
sellers o f food to the village merchants, only to buy them again at very high prices at a 
later time. The pressing need for cash is the main factor behind the collapse o f the 
traditional food storage strategy for better food security.
6- 8- 1- Hi- Communal sharing:
Communal sharing of food and other resources is another form o f social response to 
the hunger stress. In good years, households store their grain surpluses in pits. When 
harvests are bountiful, such grain reserves may last a household from between two to 
five years. When the years turn bad and harvests poor, those members of the community 
who retain quantities o f grain in their stores, open these up to relatives and kins who are 
in need, or the head or notable(s) of the community open their grain stores at the time of
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the first rains. Loans o f grain among households is a common social reciprocal practice. 
Such loans will be repaid the following harvest(s) in the same quantity borrowed, 
without interest. The freshness o f the new grain is considered a good enough interest. 
The distribution of the Zakat (Muslim tithe) from the wealthy to the poor is another 
distributive device. Borrowing o f grains, animals for milk, and money from kins, friends 
and acquaintances is another established communal sharing strategy used to offset 
stress. However, in recent times, communal sharing has much diminished, as people 
rather take their surplus resources; of food and animas to the market for cash. The social 
rewards of respect and prestige which motivate redistribution in the past gave way to the 
pursuit of personal gains and the maximisation of money returns which can be realised 
by sale of such surpluses in the market.
6- 8- 1- iv- Sharing the Available Food:
In the past it is customary that people generally (in normal and stress times) share 
food by eating collectively in groups in a specified meeting place called dhara, where 
neighbours and relatives gather at meal times in a specified rendezvous, usually the 
abode o f the elder o f the family. This is usually a Rakuba attached to a Khalwa forming 
a thatched shelter in which the dhara meets. The group forming the dhara gather in 
such a meeting place, each bringing his food with him. Those who come early wait for 
the other members until all or most are present, and then eat their food collectively. The 
women meet in a similar fashion in a separate quarter. After and during the meal, they 
exchange information on local affairs, and chat, while after the meal they 
simultaneously carry on some o f the chores, such as rope-making, wood-crafts, or cloth- 
making. Sharing food in this way provides a socially sanctioned entitlement to the right 
o f food for all members, and surely for those members who may be short of food for any 
reason, are quite at home to share food with the other members. The remaining food 
after the diners take their fill, is carefully covered and put aside for any late comers or 
guests who may drop by at any time. The tradition o f sharing food in the Dharah has 
virtually disappeared in recent times, not for want of food, but because members of the 
community have become too individually pre-occupied with their own worries and 
concerns to afford to spare time to come together for sharing food and other concerns. It 
is indeed one of the most telling examples o f the process o f individualisation as a social 
phenomenon associated with the effects of pressures and demands imposed by market 
forces on individuals.
6- 8- 2- Response to Endemic Hunger:
This stage is distinct from the hunger season, but can more closely be associated with 
it, and can readily develop and merge into a famine situation. Normal or endemic
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hunger is a common feature o f life in many poor rural communities throughout the 
world, which is more a condition o f endemic poverty than of food availability. This type 
of hunger is more a condition of economic stringency in poor people's purchasing ability 
and market power than one of seasonality or dearth. It can be seen as a result o f food 
entitlement failure (Sen 1980), affecting those segment o f the society who, due to their 
economic weakness and general lack of power, have neither the financial means nor the 
necessary social-security arrangements to alleviate their want. A characteristic feature o f 
endemic hunger is that it typically and consistently affects particular vulnerable groups 
in the society. A general classification would identify such vulnerable groups to include 
asset-poor households, women-headed households, households short of adult labour, 
households predominantly composed of sick or aged members.
However, regular endemic hunger as affecting particularly vulnerable groups in the 
society, is usually contained within the community. Foremost among the strategies of 
coping with this type of hunger are borrowing, reciprocity, redistribution, kinship and 
patron-client relationships, labour and the collection o f forest products. Reciprocity 
involves household-level exchanges o f quantities of grains or money. Redistribution 
takes several forms, including direct charity endowments, especially to poorer kin 
families or friends, in forms of gifts of grains or money. Other forms of redistribution is 
collective sharing o f meals, the giving to the poor o f the religious tithe. Better able 
households have a social responsibility towards their poorer relatives, therefore, it is an 
obligation to assist poorer kins and relatives by supporting them when in need. Income 
from selling out one's labour either in the village or locally in the surrounding villages. 
This type o f hunger may sometimes induce limited migration to urban centres, but 
migration to cities is usually a strategy characteristic of a more serious famine situation. 
Also poorer households resort to the collection of forest products notably charcoal, 
wood poles and firewood. The liquidation o f assets such as animals and valuables is 
necessary to keep the household maintained. However, liquidation o f such assets may 
reserve the more important productive assets for future security to guard against 
complete destitution. Hunting used to be one of the strategies o f coping with this type of 
hunger. Unfortunately, the disappearance of many wildlife species rendered this strategy 
rather ineffective in recent times.
6- 8- 2- i- Borrowing Grains (Gurdah):
Borrowing grains is another very important strategy which the local populations 
employ to cope with frequent food deficits. Borrowing grains is a firmly established 
practice among the rural populations and is executed in two forms: inter-village and 
intra-village borrowing. A basic principle for grain borrowing to be viable is, of course, 
some grain reserves somehow have to be available in the village or in neighbouring
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villages. This is guaranteed by some notable individuals in the locality who are famed 
for their meticulousness and attention to growing and storing grains. Such men keep 
large quantities of grain reserves in large Matmurals (grain pits) for most years, aware 
o f the vicissitudes o f the environment and the inevitable local needs for food, thus they 
serve as the final resort to which people turn when need arises, and borrow these grain 
reserves to repay them at harvest time without increment or interest.
6- 8- 2- ii- Inter-Village Grain Borrowing:
This form of grain borrowing takes place inside the village between excess and 
deficit village members. The needy village households who are short of food grain come 
to those men and borrow the grains and repay it at a later time in the same quantities 
borrowed. This form of grain borrowing takes an established social institution o f rights 
and obligations. The social institution obligates those individuals who have stores of 
food grains in reserve, to distribute the food by lending it to needy households without 
interest. At the same time it confers social status, dignity, respect and esteem on such 
men, implying the attainment of social and political authority. Occasionally, a lender is 
entitled to a day's work from the borrowers in a form of a work party in his farm, after 
which the grain store is unearthed for distribution. The village households in need, have 
a right to borrow the food, on an individual basis in the case o f inter-village borrowing, 
and collectively in intra-village relations. Individually, the man heading the household 
borrows the grains, and undertakes that he will repay the borrowed amounts at a 
specified time, usually after the harvest. This individual personal contract between 
lender and borrower takes place mostly in inter-village relations since both parties know 
one another personally, therefore, eliminates the need for any form of guarantees.
6- 8- 2- iii- Intra-village Borrowing:
This form of grain borrowing takes place between neighbouring villages, and is 
conducted collectively in a form o f representation. Here, a man or a group of men from 
a deficit village undertake the borrowing on behalf o f the larger group, e.g. a village. 
This implies that there may not be a direct relationship between lender and borrower. 
Thus, when the whole village is under stress, the Sheikh, possibly with two or three men 
from the village members, go out to borrow grains from a man whom is known to have 
grain reserves, undertake the borrowing on behalf of the whole village, come back with 
the grains, distribute it among the needy village households according to size, need and 
the ability to repay. After the harvest, they collect the grains from each borrower and 
repay back to the lender. No interest is involved in this borrowing. The only benefit the 
lender gets is a social moral one o f gratitude and respect. But also, and perhaps more
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importantly, is an entitlement to help or service in any form the lender may demand; and 
certainly when he may one day fall victim to adversities.
An instance of collective grain borrowing occurred in Omdofais village in around 
1914. Sheikh Salim Ajab al-habib, Sheikh of the village, related that in that year there 
was a poor harvest, and there was no sufficient food to carry the village population 
through to the following harvest. By the mid-rainy season, the village grain stocks had 
been completely depleted and the majority of the village households ran out of food. 
The Sheikh knew that other neighbouring villages were not as bad. Moreover, the Sheikh 
of the neighbouring village o f al-Rigaiba, Sheikh Gaddal, had sufficiently large grain 
stocks in his Matamir. Sheikh Salim o f Omdofais, together with two others rode to 
Sheikh Gaddal and borrowed grains on behalf of the village population. That year was 
named Sanat al Ilaiba in view of a small measure used for measuring grains. Both 
forms o f grain borrowing represent mechanisms o f redistribution and are called Gurdah 
meaning grain borrowing which involves no interest and the grains borrowed are repaid 
in the same quantities borrowed.
Borrowing grains was a common feature o f rural social life in the past , and 
important men normally keep sizeable quantities o f grains stored in pits called 
Matmura, or Shuna. The fact that the borrowing involved no interest was conditioned by 
a socio-religious ethic. It is consideres religiously unsanctimonious and socially 
ethically unacceptable to seek profit or exploit the need o f other people for material 
gains and profit maximisation. This is considered mean. The local village informants at 
Al-Saata, related that the people in the past considered excessive profits to be haram\ 
forbidden or immoral from a religious point of view. For that reason, many of them who 
had the means and capabilities to become wealthy merchants refrained conscientiously 
from engaging in trade from moral and religious compulsions. And instead of engaging 
in trade themselves, they preferred, nonetheless, to help others who had the guts and no 
qualms about the immorality of trade. Many of the local people helped the Jellaba 
traders by giving them the necessary capital, entirely interest-free, to enable them carry 
out their trading activities. Understandably, grain- least of all- should enter into trade 
and profitability. Should that happened, would have been the meanest o f all practices of 
men to seek profit from exploiting people's basic necessity of life; food. Therefore, food 
remained outside the market arena, until about the second quarter of this century. In 
short, food resources had remained entirely within the control of local people for the 
satisfaction o f local food needs. The intensification o f market relations ushered in a new 
era in the domain o f the food resources, its availability and control. But when grains are 
not available either in the village stores or in other villages in the neighbourhood, this 
usually implies a more acute food situation on a large scale affecting wider communities 
verging on a famine. Other strategies are deployed to cope with such a food deficit.
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6- 8- 2- iv- Movements and Travelling to Other areas:
When faced with a large scale harvest failure, people move to better food secured 
areas. Households or individual persons move to live with relatives or friends in the 
more food-secure areas. They may also live temporarily in such areas as guests , or work 
in the fields for a share of the crop. They may employ their animals, mainly by hiring 
their camels for transport. By such means o f work, hiring camels, or from contributions 
of grains from relatives and friends, people from distressed areas can collect reasonable 
quantities of grains from the food-surplus hosting areas. And having spent the 
harvesting season, and most o f the summer months in the temporary hosting area, those 
amounts of grains which they had been able to collect, would suffice for their food 
requirements for the planting season when they return to their villages for plantation for 
the new season. Their food needs are thus secured to carry them through to the next 
harvest. Better able households send some o f their male members to procure food grains 
either by sale or work from areas further afield. This option would require some assets 
such as money with which to buy food and camels since it involves a good deal of 
travelling to better food-producing areas. Such travelling has mostly been directed to the 
Nuba Mountains where food grain production is more reliable, and also to DarFur. 
Quantities o f grain can thus be procured and transported back to the households left 
behind in the villages.
6- 8- 3- Response to Acute Widespread Hunger (or Famine):
The threshold that may demarcate the transition of a situation o f normal hunger to 
more acute widespread famine is more fuzzy than that of the hunger season. Since 
normal hunger could be said to be confined to particular vulnerable social groups, a 
situation o f a widespread hunger is therefore indicative of a pervasive vulnerability 
engulfing the wider community or the majority o f its population. The immediate 
implications of this is that a severe widespread hunger necessarily implies a breakdown 
of the normal ways of coping with transient stresses since the majority of the 
community are in the same boat. Therefore, the more obvious indicators of a serious 
hunger situation would be the disintegration or atrophying o f the usual coping 
mechanisms such as reciprocity and kins relationships. This would also be reflected in 
the social environment in terms o f strained social relations. The situation o f such 
engulfing stress would usually trigger massive exodus o f people from the rural areas to 
the urban centres. Another very salient indicator for the onset o f a serious hunger 
situation is dramatic upheavals in the state of internal markets, either for foodstuffs or 
animals' sales and prices. It is characteristic o f a severe hunger situation the observation 
o f the rocketing high food prices and the plummeting of animal prices. While the 
situation can look grim, people can tenaciously cling to whatever may save their lives.
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The patterns and strategies o f coping with a severe hunger situation, are understandably 
less attractive and more disheartening. The less attractive choices that have to be made 
include the liquidation o f more valuable productive assets such as breeding animals; 
valuables such as gold and silver possessions; and strategic reserves such as seeds of 
crops that have been reserved for plantation. The liquidation o f such valuable assets 
implies that the tough decision of liquidating productive and strategic assets has to be 
taken even though it means risking future security and the looming indignity o f penury, 
poverty and destitution through assetlessness. Other more disheartening measures 
include reduction of meals in quantity and quality, going hungry, the resort to the use of 
wild fruits and berries which can be unpalatable and sometimes toxic, beggary, 
prostitution and theft are also part o f the scenario to add to the unsavoury picture. Large- 
scale out migration is one important strategy and indicator o f a widespread catastrophic 
hunger. The occurrence of such a wrenching disaster, if not contained speedily and 
effectively, can lead in many respects to dramatic social and political upheavals, of 
social disintegration and political unrest with deep-reaching fissures to national socio­
political cohesion.
The tenor of this account is that conditions of stress associated with fluctuations of 
the climate and harvests were frequent in the past among the Hamar and Dar Hamid of 
Kordofan, but that the occurrence o f mass famines had largely been averted by various 
forms of adaptations and responses available to the rural populations within the limits o f 
the resource endowments available in their local environment. Adaptations, can be 
understood to entail harmonious relationships between the natural resources available in 
the eco-system, their systems of management, control and optimal utilisation of such 
resources for the sustainable satisfaction of social needs. The balanced relationships o f 
the eco-systemic components informs our understanding of local food security and 
livelihood which become conditional on maintaining the relationships between the 
physically available natural resources, and the human social needs permanently in 
balance through wise management systems whose paramouncy is sustainable use of 
resource utilisation for long-term security. This harmony has been upset by the policies 
o f transformation, which ultimately affected local food security in serious ways.
C o n c l u s i o n :
The discussion in this chapter is to contend that local production which was formerly 
meant for local security, has undergone radical restructuring towards commercialisation 
under the central state development planning. Many of the local agricultural products 
such as sesame, groundnuts and even the food staples such as millet and dura were now 
increasingly drawn into the market for both local and export trade. Crops used for local 
utility such as cotton formerly used for local cloth making industry were discouraged
-235  -
and even forbidden. New crops, such as groundnuts were introduced solely for 
commercial purposes. Under the state's development policies, Kordofan rural economies 
were, for the first time, undergoing profound transformation and restructuring around 
the new forces of the market exchange relations, in which the local producers found 
themselves engaging not only as producers for national and international markets, but 
also as consumers of the vast array o f manufactured consumer goods now flooding the 
regional markets and village shops. The transformation of the rural economies was 
pursued and commercialisation of rural production and exchange was permanently set in 
motion. The direction of production to the market ultimately linked the rural economies 
to the wider national and international markets. This has disturbed established structures 
of production and exchange, and caused their subsequent subsumption, subordination 
and eventual replacement with the new structures o f the market mediated mainly 
through the machinery of the state. Local producers find themselves engaging in 
exchange system over which they have no control, and only as the outer fringes loosely 
and precariously linked to an international market system. As they have become 
dependent on the market, they have also become more insecure and more vulnerable to 
natural and market fluctuations, their established strategies o f coping severely curtailed..
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Chapter 7
The Famine Crisis and Household Responses
Introduction:
Conventional famine theory views natural phenomena such as droughts as the main 
cause of famine. Another view treats such short-term shocks as "trigger" or 
"precipitating" factors which set in motion a chain reaction o f events whose origins lie 
in long-term processes of socio-economic and political nature which render rural 
populations vulnerable to famine. This chapter supports this second view, and argues 
that drought occupies a terminal point in the chain of causality of famine. In this chapter 
I follow the process o f famine as it actually affected the lives o f the people in two 
villages, assess the real causes and effects, and peoples adaptive responses to the 
conditions of stress in the course o f its development into famine.
7- 1- The Two Villages:
7- 1- 1- Method o f  data collection:
Two villages have been studied. The method employed for the study has been open- 
ended discussion interviews and statistical estimates on the household economy 
obtained from the respondents to elicit approximate quantitative data. No formal 
questionnaire has been used. Statistical information is difficult and much o f it 
unreliable. No records o f any kind were available, and the people rely on memory which 
itself is rather unreliable and can only offer scanty evidence. Lack of resources is 
another limiting factor, and I had to rely entirely on my own limited resources to collect 
the data. I resorted to the use o f official documents in the Regional Government 
Departments in El-Obeid to get some information. Even here suspicion and official 
reluctance to co-operate made the quest o f obtaining the required data more difficult. I 
did use other sources of statistical information; particularly two survey reports: one 
unpublished report prepared for CARE-Sudan Relief Response Unit on North Kordofan 
between 1991/92 (see El Amin 1992); the other a published survey report by IFPRI in 
1988 (see Tesfaye et al 1991). Other sources also included two Dissertations on famine 
in Kordofan in 1985 (Adeel 1985, and Ibrahim, M. 1985).
7- 1- 2- Location:
The sample o f the study is taken from two villages in North Kordofan: Al-Saata in 
Dar Hamid, and Omdofais in Dar Hamar. Al-Saata lies approximately 60 kilometres 
North of El-Obeid and about 40 kilometres West of Bara, within the 14° and 12° N 
latitudes semi-arid zone. It is linked to both El-Obeid and Omdurman by road, and 
lorries leave every day to these two market centres. Omdofais, represents Dar Hamar,
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and it lies approximately 140 kilometres mid-way between El-Obeid to the East and En- 
Nuhud to the West, within the 13° and 12° N latitudes savannah (Goz) zone.
7- 1- 3- Population and Demographic Structure:
The village o f Omdofais is one of 438 village Councils comprising En-Nuhud 
District {En-Nuhud is the centre of the Hamar Nazirate). The population o f Omdofais 
are entirely o f Hamar origin. It is a small village of about 1200 inhabitants, making 
some 185 households. More recently since the early 1980s, small numbers from other 
groups, such as Beni Jerrar, Shenabla, and Kababish came to live in the vicinity o f the 
village in smaller settlements occupying part o f the village land. Al-Saata, on the other 
hand, is one of 198 Village Councils comprising Bara District {Bara is the centre of 
Dar Hamid Nazirate). Its population comprises various sections of Dar Hamid (for 
more details see chapter 3). Al-Saata has a population o f about 6,000 inhabitants divided 
between three residential sub-villages. One of the three smaller villages has been 
selected for the study, with a population of about 2000 people, making some 285 
households. Smaller settlements o f other tribes, especially Kababish, Beni Jerrar and 
Kawahla also occurred in the vicinity of the village since the drought years of the early 
1980s.
The demographic structure o f the population reveals slight variations between the 
two villages, reflecting perhaps minor differences in natural resource endowment and 
economic activity. The majority o f households are composed of the family unit, with the 
husband, wife and their children. Average family size is approximately the same in the 
two villages, averaging between 5 to 7 members per household. El Amin in Care's 
programme area (North Kordofan) estimated average household size to be about 10 
persons per household; and added that "this average size o f the household might seem to 
be relatively high when compared with the usually estimated one o f 5 to 7 persons per 
household for the state of Kordofan" (El Amin 1992: 5). The high family size is 
attributed to the incidence of compounded families which characterise agrarian 
societies. This estimate is too high. In my study of the population in the two villages, 
my computations included both independent and compounded families, giving an 
average size of 5 - 7 persons per household. The composition o f households in terms of 
age and sex structure shows the number o f women to be higher proportionate to men, 
coupled with a conspicuous absence o f adult males in the age groups between 20 to 45 
years o f age; reflecting no doubt the high levels o f out-migration from the villages to 
outside labour markets. This is more evident in Al-Saata than in Omdofais, indicating 
that out-migration is relatively higher in these northern parts than in the southern parts 
o f the region. The proportion o f children is also high relative to adult age groups. This 
means that there are more households dependent on women for their livelihood, and 
more children to care for. Women-headed households are relatively smaller in size 4- 5,
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and they represent one o f the most vulnerable groups worst affected by the famines. The 
number and ratio of women-headed households to those headed by men is as follows:
T a b le  12 Number and ratio o f women-headed to man-headed households.
Type of Household no. of 
Household




% to total Aura Size
Omdofais:
man-headed 150 80 1003 89.4 6
woman-headed 35 20 119 10.6 4-5
Al-Saata
man-headed 225 79 1700 85 6.5
women-headed 60 21 300 15 5
Field-Work Data 1993.
The number of women-headed households represents about a fifth (20%) of the total 
number o f the village households in Omdofais; and relatively higher in Al-Saata (21%). 
The causes that led to the absence o f a male partner in sharing the responsibilities for 
providing for the family vary from death, divorce, abandonment of the family, and 
weakness of the man either by old age or sickness, and other causes. A close look at 
these causes of the absence of the male reveals that the major cause is death, suggesting 
perhaps a high death rate concurrent with shorter life expectancy among the village 
population. The third cause is abandonment of the family, which suggests that the man, 
as provider, fails to provide for the family, therefore just leaves. Many women find 
themselves in the position as main providers of families where children especially are in 
a dire situation of basic food needs. The burden on such women can be unmistakable, 
and the households who depend for their basic livelihood on women as main providers, 
are the most vulnerable and food insecure.
Another characteristic feature o f the households is the low ratio o f adult males 
relative to other age groups. This is mostly attributable to migration either internally or 
externally (see below). The households are mostly composed of older men, women and 
children, and the smaller number of adult males are those who are either engaged in 
trade, livestock, or other activity, or else awaiting the opportunity to migrate for work 
outside the country. The implication o f this unbalanced ratio is that the responsibility of 
the household reproduction has been divided between the household members staying in 
the village doing the farm work, which is insufficient for the purpose of reproduction, 
therefore has to be supplemented by income from the labour of migrant members to 
outside centres of the labour market.
7- 1- 4- Land Resources and Household Allocations:
According to the Sudan Land Laws, all land in the rural areas belong to the state. 
However, this legal state ownership o f land is vested in the hands of the village Sheikhs, 
who allocate land to the village members. There are no restrictions or limits to land
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allocations to individual households or persons. And until now, there is no scarcity of 
land, and individual persons and households have absolute right to the lands granted to 
them by the village Sheikh. The only condition is that they keep the land in continuous 
use. And although there is no formal registration of lands in the rural areas, holders of 
land can use it themselves, grant it to others, or pass it as inheritance to children. The 
general norms governing utilisation of land is that land is considered a communal 
property, and land resources, especially grazing is a common resource for all. The land






This classification is not strict, and considerable overlap of use occurs in the same 
area of land. Forest lands are also grazing lands at one and the same time. Grazing lands 
and forest lands also constitute land reserves for future farming, reserved as fallow in 
the general cycle o f land use intended for regeneration of soil fertility.
7- 1- 4- i- Farm Lands:
Farm lands are generally closer to the village, and form the numerous small farm 
plots o f the village households. Because farm lands vary according to the type o f soil 
and the level o f soil fertility, better and more suitable lands are relatively scarce, and 
frequently subject to increasing sub-divisions among the family members. On average, 
the family farm size is about 30 makhamas (52.5 feddans) for the average household 
(one makhamas = 1.75 feddan, = 1.81 acre). With an average family size of a 
maximum of 7 persons, this allows for a per capita land allocation o f no less than 7 
feddans (for family average farm size and production, see table below.). All farm lands 
are under traditional rainfed farming. Evidently, there is no problem of shortage of land. 
There is however, a problem of land quality, since the quality of land has deteriorated 
mainly due to the massive expansion in cash crop production, especially groundnuts in 
Dar Hamar during the 1960s and 1970s (Ahmed 1988). The relatively large size of 
family farms can be seen as a reflection of low yields which impel the village farmers to 
cultivate more lands, therefore have to put in more labour.
7 - 1- 4- ii- Grazing Lands:
All lands that are not under cultivation are considered as grazing lands. Farm lands, 
moreover, revert to grazing after the gathering o f the harvest. Forest lands, which are 
farther away from the villages also provide additional grazing reserves for the village 
animals. There is no allocations of grazing lands, and grazing is considered to be a 
common resource for both the village animals and animals coming from other areas.
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However, individual animal owners graze their animals on the stalks and fodder 
remaining in their fields immediately after the harvest. Because of the common 
ownership of the grazing rights, and the individual ownership of farm lands, clashes 
frequently occur between farmers and herd owners using the common grazing when 
their animals trespass and invade the farms since there are no demarcations separating 
the farms from the grazing lands. These clashes have become more intense and more 
frequent as a result o f the expansion of farming causing a contraction in grazing lands. 
The competition between the two is one o f the major causes of tension and disputes in 
the rural areas. The botanical character o f grazing in Dar Hamiid and Dar Hamar has 
the following three grass structures with minor variations from one locality to the other: 
(1) grasses and herbs; (2) bushes and shrubs, and (3) scattered tress (SRAAD 1992). 
These three categories are thoroughly interspersed with one another, with more grasses, 
herbs and scattered tress predominate in Dar Hamiid, and more grasses, shrubs and 
bushes characterising Dar Hamar grazing lands.
7-1- 4- iii- Forest Lands:
Forest lands are those areas which are currently supporting forests, especially gum 
forests, but which also provide grazing and form land reserves for future use. Forest 
lands form extended expanses of lands that surround the villages in all directions, which 
are legally under the authority of the village Sheikh to dispose o f on behalf of the state. 
There are no allocations of forest lands, with the exception o f gum gardens, which are 
individually owned to particular members o f the village population. Forest lands support 
a variety o f tree species, unfortunately many of which have already disappeared, and 
many fast disappearing. SRAAD resource inventory identifies some 14 different tree 
classification types found in forest lands in the locality o f Omdofais.
7-1- 4- iv- Populated Lands:
Populated lands are those lands which are occupied by the village population in the 
form of sedentary villages. The main village (in this case Al-Saata and Omdofais) may 
be surrounded by smaller settlements of a few families from among the semi-settled 
groups, who have relatively bigger herds o f animals than the sedentary villagers 
therefore prefer not to settle permanently in villages. These are temporary settlements 
who spend some years in one locality, then move on to another. Only the Sheikh o f the 
village has the power to grant or refuse to grant a request for such temporary settlements 
from other groups not ordinarily resident in the Dar.
7-1- 4- v- Water Bodies:
Water bodies are those lands which support water, e.g. running water courses, pools, 
lagoons, or lakes. Both Al-Saata and Omdofais villages are located in sandy Goz lands
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where the runoff does not permit for water to collect, and the rain water saps into the 
ground where it falls. There are a few water collecting points at the foot o f Wadi; which 
form Rahads or Fulas (collecting water pools), or shallow underground water. These 
lands supporting water sources are common property for all, are not to be cultivated, 
fenced or terraced for individual private use.
7- 2- Production:
Production systems in Kordofan generally fall in one or the other of two main 
dominant activities: sedentary farming and livestock production. However, this broad 
classification is only a rough generalisation, for there is hardly any groups in the area of 
study who fall unambiguously in one or the other of the two domains. Rather, the two 
systems of production are combined in varying degrees, and the terms sedentary 
farming and pastoral production can be understood to refer to which of the two systems 
is more dominant over the other. In sedentary farming, agriculture predominates as the 
main production activity, but farmers, who are mainly settled, also raise animals and 
some families migrate with the animals for a few months o f the year. Likewise, in 
pastoral production, animal husbandry predominates, but pastoralists, who are semi­
settled also engage in agricultural production for a considerable part of their labour time. 
Gum collection is another form of production activity in the area o f study, which, for a 
lack of an appropriate designation, we include under agricultural production.
7- 2- 1- Livestock Production:
Livestock production is considered as an investment activity which is undertaken 
with a view o f giving the owning household better chances o f security. As such, 
maximisation and diversification of production are undertaken for that concern of 
security and reproduction. The bigger and the more diversified the herd, the more secure 
the family unit. The management system o f animal production is basically sedentary in 
nature, where animals exploit the relatively unrestricted grazing lands around the village 
during most of the year. However, a few families of the village members who own 
sufficiently large herds of sheep or camels, undertake seasonal migrations with the 
herds. These seasonal movements are undertaken mainly by adult males, in which they 
migrate northwards during the rainy season, and southwards during the dry season; but 
settle during most of the year around the villages. Most of the village households own 
an average o f 4 goats, 2 sheep and one cow or camel. These averages are very low 
suggesting that there has been a long term process of decapitalisation and 
impoverishment of the households who were once wealthy pastoralists owning large 
numbers o f livestock. The following table shows household average ownership of 
assets o f the different animals:
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Table 13 Average number of animal assets & value per household for the 
___________ different animals in Al-Saata and Omdofais in 1991/92: (in heads):
Village (Area) Goats Sheep Camels Cattle Value (£S)
Al-Saata (Bara Area): 3.2 1.3 0.6 0.0 16610
Omdofais (En-Nuhud Area): 3.7 1.7 0.2 0.2 10965
Sources: El Amin ( Care's Survey Area) 1992: 29.
However, a trend of decapitalisation seems to have been in process since about the mid- 
1970s. These two trends of decimation and decapitalisation can be understood by 
comparing current figures of the household livestock assets with long term averages, as 
the table below may indicate.
Table 14 Decline in household average herd size of the different animals in North 
____________ Kordofan in three periods between 1975 - 1992 ( in heads))______
Year Sheep Camels Cattle Goats Donkeys
1975 700 600 50 200 6
1985 40 40 28 3 1
1992 1.5 0.4 0.1 3.5 0
Sources: Regional Ministry o f Agriculture, El-Obeid 1985.
The figures for 1992 calculated from El Amin 1992.
Although the figures in the table represent average herd sizes for North Kordofan as a 
whole, they may need to be slightly adjusted in order that they be more representative for 
Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar. Dar Hamid generally own bigger camel herds than the 
Hamar, whereas the Hamar own bigger cattle herds than Dar Hamiid. Therefore, these 
figures in order to be more representative, need to be adjusted downwards for cattle in 
Dar Hamiid, and upwards for camels. The decline in average herd size can be shown 
graphically in the following:
Figure 5 : Decline in household average herd size in North 
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Nonetheless, the figures clearly indicate a huge loss and decapitalisation for the 
households over the long term, especially if it is recognised that livestock represents a
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major asset, and possibly the sole investment avenue open to the local producers. The 
dimensions of impoverishment are indeed staggering.
7- 2- 2- Agricultural Production:
Farmers in the two villages produce a variety o f cash and food crops. Farming in Dar 
Hamid and Dar Hamar is primarily rainfed, and farmers have small holdings o f farm 
plots which they cultivate with cash and food crops, and harvest gradually over a period 
of 4 months between October and January. Food crops are produced mainly for home 
consumption, but surplus production is also sold in the market; while cash crops are 
produced mainly for the market, but also small quantities are consumed at home, such 
as sesame. Cash crops include especially: groundnuts and sesame; and two minor crops: 
hibiscus and melon seed. Another important cash product is gum Arabic. In the village 
of Al-Saata, the main cash crop is sesame, and there are different varieties grown in the 
locality. Groundnuts do not produce well in this area, possibly as a condition of soil 
characteristics, and/or the climate. Unlike Al-Saata, in the village of Omdofais, the main 
cash crop is groundnuts, although sesame is also grown in relatively small quantities for 
home consumption and for the market. Hibiscus and melon seed grow equally well in 
both villages as secondary cash crops. The marketing of these cash crops vary somewhat 
with regard to the market destination. Sesame is either traded locally to be sold to the 
local press mill owners, or shipped to El-Obeid, Bara, En-Nuhud, then beyond to 
Omdurman and other centres, either to be pressed for oil and cake, or exported. 
Groundnuts and gum Arabic are produced primarily as exportable crops. Hibiscus and 
melon seed are produced mainly as export crops, although small quantities are 
consumed at home. In both villages the main food crop grown is millet which is the 
main staple food crop. Dura is grown in small quantities in the very limited alluvial and 
loam soils which are suitable for its cultivation.
Household farm size averages between 3 0 - 3 1  makhamas for all crops. There are 
some differences between the two villages in the allocation o f the farm area to the 
different crops, as the table indicates:
Table 15 Household average farm size and production o f the various crops in Al 
Saata and Omdofais villages 1991/92
Type of Household Millet Dura Sesame Groundnuts Hibiscus MnSeed
Al-Saata:
area (MKH) 15 - 10 - 2 3
production 505 (KG) - 11.9 (MLW) - - 160.6
(MLW)
Omdofais:
area (MKH) 10 - 5 15 1 -
production 210 (KG) - 33.2 (MLW) 446.6 (MLW) 90.4 (MLW) 67.5 (MLW)
Avr. Market Price (£S) - - 80.0 22.0 45.0 24.0
Sources: Field-Work Data 1993;
Production and prices figures are obtainedfrom Care's Survey Report; El Amin 1992; pp: 30 - 1.
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In Al-Saata, the farm area is roughly equally divided between food crops and cash 
crops, while in Omdofais, more land is devoted to cash crop production (6 8 %), and less 
land for food crops (32%). This reflects that the farmer in Dar Hamar is generally more 
oriented towards cash production than his neighbouring farmer in Dar Hamid who is 
more disposed towards food production. An explanation for this divergence in emphasis 
in production may be that most of the cash crops are inter-cropped with the hashab 
trees; and considering that most o f the productive hashab gardens are found in Dar 
Hamar, there is more scope for cash crop production in Dar Hamar than in Dar 
Hamiid. Another related factor is that farmers believe that the hashab trees attract birds 
which damage the grains at the most critical stages of their growth, therefore it is safer 
to grow cash crops with hashab trees than food crops..
Productivity: There is no conclusive evidence of a steady secular decline in the 
productivity of the farm land over the years; as the table below may illustrate. There are, 
however, marked fluctuations in productivity per unit o f land from year to year. These 
marked annual fluctuations are particularly evident in Omdofais (representing En-Nuhud 
area). Productivity for millet for the harvest year 1986/7 is highest, and higher than all 
preceding and succeeding harvests; the harvest season o f 1990/1 recording the lowest 
productivity. Likewise, productivity of sesame for 1985/6 is higher than the three 
preceding harvests, but lower than the following one of 1986/7 which recorded the 
highest productivity, with 1989.90 the lowest for sesame.
Table 16 Productivity for four major crops (food and cash crops) in Bara and En
En-Nuhud area, in the period between 1982/3 - 1990/1 (Kgs/Feddan)
Year 1982/3 83/4 84/5 85/6 86/7 87/8 88/9 89/90 90/1
Al-Saata 
(Bara Area)
millet 57.9 25.4 8.1 10.2 38.6 9.1 na 45.7 -
dura - - - - - - - - -
sesame 18.3 26.4 5.1 10.2 12.2 - - 2.0 -
groundnuts - - - - - - - - -
Omdofais 
(En-Nuhud Area)
millet 52.8 72.1 14.2 81.3 97.5 76.2 na 18.3 8.1
dura 44.7 35.6 20.3 121.9 152.4 86.4 - 5.1 11.2
sesame 29.5 45.7 12.2 73.2 152.4 na na 3.0 12.2
groundnuts 113.8 90.4 30.5 304.8 270.3 - - 110.7 37.6
Source: calculatedfrom Agricidtural Statistics, Regional Ministry o f Agriculture, El-Obeid 1993.
The productivity o f groundnuts shows very marked fluctuations in the harvest years of 
1985/6 and 1986/7 record high levels o f productivity, 304.8 Kg and 270.3 Kg per 
feddan respectively; with the year 1984/5 recording the lowest productivity level. On 
general, there is no clear evidence of a steady secular decline o f productivity in
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Omdofais {.En-Nuhud area). In Al-Saata area, on the other hand, a somewhat different 
picture emerges, which suggests - inconclusively - a trend of declining productivity. 
Productivity for millet for the harvest year 1989/90 is higher than all other harvests 
except that of 1982/3. Similarly, productivity for sesame for the harvest of 1986/7 is 
higher than the two previous harvests; and that of 1983/4 is higher than that of 1982/3, 
even though 1983/4 is a drought year. Productivity can be more clearly shown 
graphically in the following illustration:
Figure 6 Fluctuating productivity per Makhamas for four major crops in Al-Saata
The picture for the two crops (millet and sesame) does not provide a firm evidence of 
regular declining productivity. However, with regard to dura and groundnuts in Al-Saata 
area of Dar Hamid, the area recorded no production, and these two crops seem to have 
ceased to produce in this area; perhaps reflecting that productivity for these two crops 
has declined to such low levels that farmers ceased to grow them any longer. This 
conclusion can only be ascertained by comparing current productivity levels with long 
term averages; as the table below may illustrate. The figures in the table indicate a steady 
secular decline in productivity in Al-Saata area of Dar Hamid for all crops over the long
- 246 -
term. Unfortunately no statistics are available for groundnuts. The following table 
illustrates these fluctuations in productivity.
Table 17 Average yield per Makhamas for the various crops in Al-Saata area in
three periods between 1975 - 85: (sack/mkh))
Type of Household Millet & Dura Sesame Groundnuts Hibiscus MnSeed
1975-78 10 8 na 3 10
1978-82 4 3 na 2 5
1982 - 85 - - na - -
Sources: Regional Ministry o f  Agriculture, El-Obeid 1985.
*N B . no statistics available for Omdofais area.
This regular decline in productivity can be shown graphically in the following:
Figure 7
Declining Productivity per makhamas for the various crops in Al-Saata 
area between 1975 - 1985.
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There are no fertilisers used to enhance productivity; and the inability of the village 
farmers to use fertilisers is a political and economic issue which has little to do with the 
climate, land or labour. The concern of the state is to provide subsidised fertilisers and 
pesticides for the wealthy capitalists farmers in the big commercial farms in the Gedaref 
area and along the Nile, but none for the small rural farmer. If this trend of declining 
productivity in Al-Saata is true, it may partly explain the drive towards more horizontal 
expansion of farm lands as the only alternative open to farmers to increase their 
agricultural output.
7- 3- Income Sources:
The majority of households derive their incomes from the main activities of 
agricultural farm labour and animals, which are combined, where many have some 
animals besides the farm. Trading and government employment come in second place in 
the village economy for a few members of the village. Many of the village households 
receive remittances and transfers from migrant members to internal or external labour
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markets. Other sources of income include the collection of forest products in the form of 
charcoal and wood, building poles, forest fruits, ropes made from the barks o f certain 
tress, fencing wood, stalks and straw as building materials, dry fodder. Those members 
o f the village who have camels hire their animals for transport; once a very important 
means of income generation before the advent of the lorry. Many o f the village 
members earn income from hiring their labour in the village, in fencing, building, farm 
clearing, collecting dry fodder. Crafts is another source of income. It is clear that the 
village households derive their incomes from diverse sources; both farm and non-farm. 
It is misleading to assume that farm work is the sole source o f household income in the 
village. It is difficult to quantify precisely the share these diverse sources contribute to 
the household income, particularly that most o f these activities are performed by the 
relatively poorer households. El Amin in Care's Programme Area, calculated, in 
1991/92, average annual household income to be about S£ 28852 for Kordofan as a 
whole; about S£ 25,546 for Dar Hamiid (Bara) area, and about S£ 26,208 for Dar 
Hamar (En-Nuhud) area; o f which 82% have been expended on purchasing basic 
necessities. The Report estimates that on average cash crops contributed about 77% to 
the household income; 31% for Bara area, and as high as 93% in En-Nuhud area (El 
Amin 1992: 6 ). These figures should be taken with care. In another study (IFPRI 1988) 
annual per capita income for North Kordofan has been found to be about S£ 1100: of 
which S£ 500 for low-income, and S£ 1866 for high-income groups. With an average 
household size o f about 5 to 7 persons, it is possible to calculate households average 
annual income to be between S£ 5500 and S£ 7700; o f which farm sources contributed 
about 28% (Tesfaye et al 1988: 47). Average income for low-income households would 
be between S£ 2500 - S£ 3500; and between S£ 9330 - 13062 for high-income 
households. El Amin's (Care's) estimates o f average household income is almost five 
times higher than that produced by the IFPRI study. The difficulty o f obtaining precise 
figures for incomes stems partly from the rapidly changing rates in the value of the 
Sudanese pound as a reflection of spiralling inflation. My calculations in percentage 
terms according to respondents' assessments in the field-work survey, show different 
results from the ones just quoted. My results show that the contribution o f farm work 
has declined, and has become the pursuit o f the poorer households. That the activities 
which generate the household income are diverse, and mainly geared towards the labour 
market. My respondents strongly affirmed that they expend more than they earn, and 
their expenditure is mainly directed to meet basic subsistence needs o f food; between 
70% - 90% of the household income goes to purchasing food. They affirm that most of 
the households are in constant deficit between their income and expenditure which they 
have to cover by liquidating their productive assets, such as animals and reserves, or sell
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out valuables. An unforeseen asset that is also liquidated is the excessive exploitation of 
forest resources.
7- 3- 1- HOUSEHOLD INCOME CA TEGOR/ES:
The households in the two villages fall roughly in four categories: merchants, 
government employees, high-income households and low-income households. The 
categorisation is based on a rough criteria based on the value and structure of the 
sources which make up the household income, assets and investment, and on the general 
standard o f living of the household as perceived by themselves and by the village 
members. The following table shows the source and share of income for the 4 types of 
households:
Table 18 Household categories sources & % share of different sources of income
% Share of Income / Type of Household








% % % % M F
1- Farming - 10 10 25 25 40
2- livestock 40 20 30 - -
3- gum Arabic 10 - 10 -
4- wage labour - - - 50 -50 20
5- trade 50 45 10 - -
6- salaried 
employment
" 25 20 “
7- handicrafts - - - -
8- collected 
products
“ “ 10 20-5 25 30





The two categories (high- and low-income) comprise ordinary village members, but 
who are nonetheless differentiated according to their incomes and general standard of 
living. Income is the main criteria for differentiation for the village households as the 
villagers themselves regard money to be the most important factor in the village life. 
The income of each category comes from different sources and activities available in the 
village economy. There are some nine different avenues, not open to all members 
equally. Some are traditional sources of income such as animals and gum Arabic, others 
are new forms not formerly known in the village. Consumption and expenditure patterns 
have also changed, as also the household labour relations.
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From table (18) one observation is the very high percentage share livestock 
contributes to the income of the first three categories: 40% for merchants, 20% for 
Government employees, and 30% for the high income category o f village households; 
compared with a low percentage share o f farming, which contributes 0 %, 1 0 % and 1 0% 
respectively. Farming contributes relatively high in the incomes of the category of low- 
income households (25%). Farming contributes higher to the income of women in this 
category (40%), than men (25%); making the farming activity the pursuit o f the poor 
and women. Formal government employment (e.g. school teachers) for government 
employees provides only a quarter of their income, 25%.
7- 4- Vulnerability as a Condition of Economic D ifferentiation:
Vulnerability is the main cause o f famine. Chambers (1989) argues that vulnerability 
is often used as synonymous with poverty; and defines it in the following terms:
V ulnerability,... is not the same as poverty. It means not lack or want, but defencelessness, 
insecurity, and exposure to risk, shocks and stress ... and difficulty in coping with them. 
Vulnerability has two sides: an external side o f  risks, shocks, and stress to which an 
individual or household is subject; and an internal side which is defencelessness, meaning a 
lack o f  means to cope without damaging loss (Chambers 1989: 1).
In the light o f understanding vulnerability to mean "defencelessness", agriculture, 
which supposedly is the front line o f defence for security o f the village households, 
contributes very low to the incomes of almost all four household categories; with the 
low income household category recording the highest dependency on agriculture 25% of 
their income. Perhaps this reflects the unreliability of agriculture and the precarious 
livelihood situation of households dependent on it. This explains why those households 
more dependent on agricultural labour are the most poor (low-income) among the 
village population, and most vulnerable to conditions o f stress and droughts. The 
income of the low-income category derives from three sources, agriculture 25%, wage 
labour 50% and the balance of 20-25% from collecting products (mostly forest products, 
i.e. firewood, charcoal, wooden poles, etc.). Their sources of income -reflecting a 
disadvantaged economic situation- are limited, precarious and environmentally 
hazardous. They reflect a limited scope of economic opportunities (3 compared to 7 for 
the high income category) lacking a diversified income resource base, the limits of 
endowments of the labour power (50%) and the natural resource endowment 45-50%. 
Their increased reliance on collecting forest products no doubt has serious long-term 
environmental implications, both for the physical environment and for the viability and 
sustainability of the natural resource base on which they depend for livelihood. Half of 
their income derives from hiring their labour power, with the implications that most of 
their time, effort and labour is hired to work for others in return o f cash, which they 
badly need to pay for daily household basic needs of food, obviously at the expense of
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the long-term food security of the household. This clearly makes the low-income 
category permanently vulnerable, since they have virtually nothing in reserve. They 
often try and hire their entire labour power for cash to pay off instant needs, leaving 
them no effort to devote to their own farms, and thus remain in permanent risk and 
vulnerability. Another view is that even if  they reserved some o f their labour power to 
their own farms, the chances o f getting a successful harvest are not always promising. 
There is also a risk involved in agricultural labour, and because of this unreliability and 
precariousness of agriculture it constituted only 25% of their incomes, although this did 
also represent the highest share of this group's income. The low-income category o f 
households have fewer sources o f income making up their economic resource base. This 
indexes their degree o f poverty. They have no livestock, no gum gardens, no trading, 
have no skills or crafts, and receive no remittances or transfers from migrant family 
members. These indicators make the low-income households the least secure, the most 
vulnerable among the village households. A further distinction can be made within this 
category between male and female income, with the latter being more towards the 
bottom line, although receiving more assistance from kin, relatives and fellow women in 
the village.
For other categories agriculture accounts for only 10% of their incomes, and none at 
all in the case o f the merchant income category, perhaps a reflection o f the realisation 
that agriculture involves much effort and little returns. It has become an unrewarding 
enterprise, and only the unavoidable choice o f the helpless who have no other 
alternative of livelihood. The first three categories of merchants, government employees 
and high-income households have their highest stakes in livestock and other enterprises, 
and engage in agriculture only as a gamble, well aware o f its risks. Indeed, the fourth 
category, rely twice as much on hiring their labour power as on agriculture.
The other three groups are relatively secure, but by no means absolutely secure. 
Indeed, their degree of security varies from one category to the other. The merchants 
category is by far the most secure among the village households. In fact, no merchant 
households have suffered from the recurrent famines. Their security is a condition of the 
fact that they are the group, who by and large, have relatively large capital outlays 
which they invest chiefly in livestock and trade. They are thus able to live off the profits 
they make from the sale o f animals and trading activities securely and more comfortably 
than the rest of the village households. The very high percentage share which livestock 
contributes to merchant households incomes underlies the fact that as a general rule, 
merchants own relatively large herds o f animals, besides they engage in livestock trade 
from the available capital outlays. They are the most affluent and secure among the 
village population. Their security is a condition o f their better incomes and relative 
wealth. The 10% share which gum Arabic contributes to the incomes of merchant
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households comes mostly from profits realised from gum Arabic trading, although some 
merchants do have some gum gardens. It is possible therefore to subsume the gum 
Arabic under trade, though with a difference, which makes their trading activities 
account for 60% of their total incomes. The major source o f income for the category o f 
government employees derives from trading mainly in animals which contribute a high 
of 45%, and another 10% share coming from agriculture. Interestingly, government 
salaries which this category- like the village school teachers- get contribute only 25% to 
their incomes, far below any security threshold. This share is in fact steadily declining 
in real value with rising inflation. Government employment provides no security for 
households who are entirely dependent on it. However, salaried employment have the 
advantage o f contributing a regular source o f income, however small. Government 
employees often forsake their jobs if they find better alternatives of income generation, 
either in livestock trade or migration, especially to the Arab world. The low and 
declining share o f government employment to this category o f households makes this 
group the second most vulnerable group of households. To a large extent, their 
perceived security lies in their ability to own relatively good numbers o f animals. This is 
not a general rule, since not all government employees own animals as the most 
significant component of their income. The high percentage share of 65% may well 
have been a case in the village where Government employees (in this case village school 
teachers) have been investigated, and may be relevant to a certain proportion o f such 
employees.
The third category of households, that of the high-income village households, is more 
secure than Government employees. This group's security is a reflection of their ability 
to rely on a diversified economic base as manifested in the highest number of sources of 
income composed o f a set o f seven different sources out o f the total nine avenues. 
However, an important qualification needs to be made here o f the term ‘high-income’ 
used to designate this category o f households. The term should be understood in 
''relative'’ terms in comparison with the other category of ordinary village households 
excluding merchants. The absence from this group's economic basket o f wage income 
indicates their relative advantaged economic position in that they not only preserve their 
labour power for their own enterprise, but are themselves frequent employers o f hired 
labour. This clearly suggests that they have both the enterprise large enough to demand 
additional labour power, and the means sufficient to meet the additional labour demand. 
This puts them on a par with the category of merchants in terms of enterprise and 
financial means. This position also explains why, in terms o f economic ability, members 
o f this category can easily switch to invest their means in trade as petty village traders if  
they so wished under favourable conditions.
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This category is perhaps better placed than that of the merchant households in two 
important respects. The first and most obvious relates to the higher number of sources of 
their economic base, seven compared to three for merchants. The second relates to the 
contribution livestock makes to this category’s income. Livestock contributes 30% to 
the incomes of this category o f households, apparently less than half that o f merchant 
households. However, this discrepancy in the share of livestock contribution can be 
better understood if it is recognised that merchants invest a considerable part o f their 
capital in livestock trade, and therefore, the relatively high share o f livestock to their 
incomes accrues partly from the profits they realise from this trade. In other words, for 
the merchant group, livestock contribution to their incomes involves a necessary 
recycling o f investable capital. For the other category, livestock contribution to their 
incomes does not involve such recycling o f capital, but that this share comes exclusively 
from their own herds of animals involving no trade activities. They thus become 
insulated from the uncertainties of the livestock trade, either domestic or foreign, such 
as makes their incomes relatively more stable and more secure.
The second important indicator is that this group also engages in some trading, 
signifying that they have some capital outlays to invest in trade, though less than 
merchants, but an added advantage over the other two category’s o f employees and 
other villagers. Another important indicator which they share with government 
employees is that some of them have a small proportion o f regular income from salaried 
employment, though this source, which is mostly a government payment, is usually very 
small and is confined to only a few individuals, as for example market guards, local 
clerks and workers in the village schools. Another indicator for this group’s income and 
of particular significance is that they have 1 0 % or more of their income coming from 
gum Arabic collection, indicating that this is the group who own the major part of the 
hashab gardens. However, this category o f household have about 10% of their incomes 
coming from remittances and transfers from migrant family members, mostly as 
immigrants in the rich Arab States, or from members working in Central Sudan, either 
as government employees or as wage labourers. By far the most important are those 
remittances and transfers coming from immigrants to the Arab States. This outer 
migration has assumed a social phenomenon of significant importance and impact on 
the socio-economic situation o f the local economy. To a large extent this migration has 
become vital for the livelihood o f many households. Many households in the village 
have had at least one member who immigrated to the Arab States at one stage or 
another; and that those households who have not had a migrant member are among the 
vulnerable o f all village households.
The high-income households have a good share of their incomes coming from 
remittances. This may also indicate that they also have better education among its
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members, that enables them to migrate and find better jobs and better incomes inside 
and outside the country, away from agricultural labour. This implies that better 
education for members of village households would have not only the immediate 
benefits contributing to the household income and better livelihood, but has the added 
long-term advantage o f relieving the pressure on the land as increasingly educated 
members o f the population seek better opportunities outside the local economy.
There is a preponderance of new sources o f income previously unknown in the local 
economy. These more conspicuously, are the emergence o f the increasing dependence 
on wage labour as a source of income, the expansion of trade, salaried employment, 
increasing resort to the collection o f products (mainly forest products) and the 
increasingly significant role o f remittances and transfers from migrant labour, reflecting 
the volume and significance o f out migration. These new avenues of income are 
assuming an increasingly significant role in the rural economy. All of these new avenues 
of income involve forms o f monetised labour relations enmeshed more or less in the 
labour market relations, e.g. in wage labour, trade, collected products, remittances and 
transfers from migrant labour. The totality of these sources reflects a differentiated 
market economy that is emerging in the rural production relations. This has relevance to 
issues o f resource management and control.
The significance o f the observations made above and their relevance to security as far 
as it is a condition of resource management and control, is that these new avenues and 
sources o f income represent forms of alienation of resources, especially in labour, away 
from the immediate control o f the local users and away from its traditional uses towards 
more monetised market relations. Consequently, the local people lose as a result of the 
extraction from their labour power to the benefit of employers, including the state as an 
active agent. The alienation o f resources in forms o f labour and manifested in these new 
sources o f income stand in contrast to the traditional sources o f income, in agriculture, 
livestock, and gum Arabic collection; control over which resources remained in the 
hands of their local users, although increasingly subject to the imperatives o f the market 
forces in terms o f prices. The conclusion that can be drawn as far as resource 
management and security are concerned is that rural resources used to be under the 
direct control o f their legitimate owners and users. Recently, the increased dependency 
on the market, has changed the consumption patterns and caused shifts in the 
satisfaction of needs from local to outside sources. This has entailed lasting changes in 
the household expenditure regimes.
7- 5- The Household Expenditure:
We roughly identify about ten fields o f expenditure. Expenditure on food has 
recently become the single most important need claiming over 70% of the household
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budget. Table (19) below illustrates the changes that have occurred over the years in the 
composition and share of household expenditure, and shows that household expenditure 
has increased on five fields, remained the same on two, and decreased on three. Food 
and other consumer goods claim the major part o f the household budget. The other 
remaining household needs are either to cut down on the expenditure of food in terms o f 
quality and quantity in order to satisfy such needs, or do without them altogether. The 
wide unbridgeable gap between needs and means can be explained in terms of the 
extremely low returns from rural labour, the value o f which is far less than the basic 
needs o f its reproduction requirements.
Table 19 Changes in the household expenditure
Field of Expenditure Share in Expenditure
more same less
1- on food s
2- reproductive capital = investment s
3- on weddings V
4- on clothes v
5- on other consumer goods V
6- gifts and social occasions V
1- on schooling s
8- on recreation V
9- on housing y
10- on medicines
Field-Work Data 1993.
The result is extremely low stanDards o f living, and poverty which makes the rural 
populations extremely vulnerable to shocks, either of the environment or the market 
conditions which precipitate famine.
The generally low standards of living can be gleaned from the table. Weddings have 
become prohibitively expensive since the entire preparations o f the wedding have to be 
purchased from the market, while in the past the entire lot of such preparations are met 
from within the household with very little from outside. At present, prospective adult 
males in the age of marriage can spend several years work, or may need to migrate in 
order to prepare for their weddings. The real problem is how to fend for the new family. 
As can be expected more often households o f newly married couples end up worse than 
when they started. Expenditure on clothing increased dramatically over the years, and 
more recently clothes have become prohibitively expensive, and because, anyway, 
people have very little to spare for clothing, many poorer households find it very
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difficult to clothe their members decently. Had it not been for social values which 
obligate migrant members and kins to support poorer relatives, and the positive 
contribution of such migration in offsetting their dire need of the poorer members of the 
village community, many would not have been able to clothe decently.
Expenditure on housing and schooling remain the same. This reflects neither 
improvement nor worsening since there has been no expenditure involved in these 
needs. Each household has their own house built from local materials. Education has 
been catered for by the state as a public service. However, more recently since the late 
1980’s schooling for children has become another strain on the meagre household 
budget in terms o f children’s school needs, contributions of money to the school, and of 
food since in these last years the state has been unable to provide free food for the 
school boarding pupils, and parents have to provide for their children’s food. Under 
such circumstances, children from poorer households have been withdrawn from school 
to help the family with agriculture or livestock. For the poorer households it is economic 
causes which impel them to withdraw their children from schools, for some of the able 
households it is to do with what they regard as the "futility o f education": that it 
provides neither security nor a living for the growing person. Living experience in 
Sudan has taught parents that education provides no security o f life, as they can see that 
many educated people end up joining the ranks of the poor (as with the village teachers), 
the unemployed, or migrate to outside countries. They argue that it is safe for 
considerations of future security to train the young person from an early age in a certain 
trade or skill, and to enable him/her to adapt to the local conditions than to seek security 
of employment in education and expectations which may never be fulfilled. In the final 
analysis, the rural populations have become part o f a larger proletariat with very little 
prospects o f life even with good education, they cannot hope for permanent security.
Expenditure on recreation and social occasions became far less than it used to be in 
the past. Social events are much reduced in length and frequency, have worn out of 
warmth and cheer, and become mere forms of social obligations, with nothing of the 
past happiness and joy invested in them. Prolonged wedding days of friends and 
relatives, merry drinking parties, female gathering occasions have all become stories of 
the past. Many people, when asked how they see social life today, complained that the 
people have become more busy with their own affairs, have no time to care for others, 
have become more distracted such as a friend you may not have seen for a long time 
would pass you hurriedly without greeting ‘el- Salamu Alykum’ as if  you have been with 
him the other night. People have become greedy and selfish. Times have changed and 
people have changed too. These ‘honest’ words tell a lot about the stresses and the 
marks that are tainting rural social relations. Not surprisingly, many of the old social 
obligations and the ties that bound the social fabric are laxing under the stresses of the
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new conditions. The hardships of life under the new conditions are creating a new 
pattern of survival which can be termed ‘individual survival’ as opposed to the old 
''communal survival’ when stronger social ties favoured communal sharing of 
opportunities and needs. A pattern of individualism is emerging in rural social life as 
against the old one of communalism. However, a marked difference in the ‘quality o f  
life’ can be seen. Present day social life is much harder and offers far less happiness than 
it used to be with older generations. People are now becoming primarily preoccupied 
with their basic survival, and the major part of their time is devoted to the attainment of 
the more basic means o f survival; food.
From the foregoing discussion, it is possible to infer some important conclusions 
about the causes o f the famine which has hit Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar in 1983/5 and 
again in 1990/91. Considering the natural resource base o f the village communities, 
there is no shortage of resources in terms of land, animals or labour power. Indeed, there 
is abundance of land for every person to farm; and there is plenty of grazing for the 
animals to graze. The majority of households own at least a few animals. There are 
considerable gum forests to collect gum. There is no lack o f production and, although 
productivity is low, there is no conclusive evidence of a steady decline in productivity 
as we have seen from the foregoing discussion. The village population put their labour 
power not only to produce for themselves, but also to produce for the market by 
engaging in the local and external wage markets. In terms o f natural resource 
endowments, therefore, the local village communities have enough resources to support 
them. In spite of the availability o f resources, the village communities in Dar Hamid 
and Dar Hamar suffered repeated famines in 1983/5 and in 1990/91. Why famine 
persists in this region in spite of availability o f resources, is the result of complex 
factors. Before considering these factors, it is important to establish a conceptual 
understanding o f what famine really means.
7- 6- The Famine Crisis:
Famine is only the ultimate manifestation of acute vulnerability, caused not so much 
by lack of resources as by long term processes of marginalisation, exploitation and 
underdevelopment o f the rural village communities in the context of the socio-political 
set-up o f the Sudanese state and the structures o f power within it. Famine is a crisis in 
society. It marks the breakdown of normal relationships and livelihoods in society. 
Famine is final and terminal; and has its roots in the long-term processes which brought 
about the economic and environmental disaster. As a crisis, it can be defined that:
It has connotations o f  systemic breakdown, but more generally it can refer to a moment or a 
specific time period in the history o f  a systemic which various developments o f  a negative 
character combine to generate a serious threat to its survival (Lawrence 1988: 2).
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Famine therefore has to be understood as a crisis o f long process that is firmly rooted in 
the politics of the state. One of the best definitions of famine describing its processual 
long-term socio-economic character is provided by Walkers (1989):
famine is a socio-econom ic process which causes the accelerated destitution o f  the most 
vulnerable , marginal and least powerful groups in a community, to a point where they can 
no longer, as a group, maintain a sustainable livelihood (cited in Devereux 1993: 181).
The local people see famine as a problem of destitution and incapacity, not just one of 
physical hunger and starvation. And that famine is a continuation of normal processes of 
lack and want leading to vulnerability, not a u unique singular event. In the light o f such 
an understanding, it is not possible to isolate the causes from the processes. Nor is it 
possible to isolate the famine as an "event" and locate it in a specific time and space. As 
a process, famine builds up over a long period of time, in a wide enough area involving 
many communities simultaneously. The reader of this study will not find an account of a 
"famine event" that is specific in time and space. The following account will follow the 
processual build up of the famine crisis.
7- 6- 1- The Genesis o f the Crisis:
The severe droughts that have devastated Kordofan countryside (including Dar Hamiid 
and Dar Hamar) in the mid-1980s and in early 1990s, have only brought long-term 
processes o f impoverishment and vulnerability to their logical conclusion (George 1991; 
Bush 1986, 1988; Arnold 1988; Shepherd 1988; Watts 1983, 1987, 1991; Cater 1986). 
These processes (as described in chapters 3-6); involved long-term political 
marginalisation and economic exploitation which have ultimately rendered the rural 
communities extremely vulnerable to natural shocks. The natural resource base on 
which the local population depend for livelihood, have been unwisely mined and the 
proceeds of rural labour therefrom appropriated by the extortionate policies of the state; 
and by the collusive practices of a greedy exploitative merchant class. Behind them all, 
stand the mighty power of international interests relentlessly pushing the expansion o f 
the market forces. Shepherd identifies the problem as having two facets: one is the 
inability of most farmers or livestock owners to retain a surplus - due to market 
conditions, low farm gate prices, and high interest rates, due to the prevailing low level 
o f technology, and due to the absence of an effective transport infrastructure. The other 
face is the absence o f tried-and-tested technologies of land improvement in which 
farmers could invest if  they had a surplus. The implication of the lack o f savings and 
surplus accumulation for local food security is that the balance is tilted towards selling 
out and away from storing what was not needed for consumption. Shepherd concludes 
that "this is the core o f the underdevelopment o f peasant areas" (Shepherd 1988: 61). 
This indeed is the core of the problems of poverty and famine in Kordofan rural areas.
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7- 6- 2- The Process o f  Famine:
7- 6- 2- i- The Drought:
The signs of a gathering crisis have been clearly evident in Kordofan countryside 
many years before the drought.; portending of an imminent disaster in the making. The 
local communities relate that they have started feeling the stress conditions since about 
1979/80 followed by a succession of poor harvests since 1980 onwards. And when the 
drought year of 1983/4 finally came, they were already stripped off o f almost all means 
of protection to cushion them from the shock. They were already fully exposed. It is 
instructive to explore what actually happened during the drought, and how it turned the 
long-standing rural vulnerability into a human disaster o f biblical proportions. The 
droughts o f 1983 -85, and of 1990/91 have been particularly intense (Hulme 1991a, 
1991b). There has been a crisis building up in the rural areas for many years before the 
drought, which when it finally came, turned the already long-standing vulnerability of 
the rural populations into a disaster o f colossal proportions. Droughts are part of the 
climatic fluctuations characteristic of the semi-arid environment in this region, which 
the local people have adapted to and coped with for centuries aided by various 
mechanisms of adaptations (see Chapters. 3-5). However, the fact that the local 
inhabitants have not been able to cope with recent droughts has less to do with the 
natural phenomenon itself, and more to do with long-term social and economic trends. 
These weakened long-established indigenous mechanisms o f coping with droughts, thus 
rendering the local inhabitants more vulnerable to conditions o f stress.
It is also true that the 1983/5 and 1990/91 droughts have been exceptionally intense 
and affected the entire rural communities in wide areas all simultaneously. Dry 
conditions set in in the region since about 1979, manifested in declining rainfall trends 
which translated in poor harvests during these years. Hulme (1984) concludes on the 
bases of observed rainfall data in Sudan's arid zones during this century that the years 
from 1979 - 83 were as dry as the years 1969 - 73, and that the year 1984 remains the 
driest on record. Yet the fact that the local people managed to escape the 1970s drought 
without the development of a famine corroborates to the view that a drought by itself is 
not a sufficient cause for famine. But the drought lowered crop production.
7- 6- 2- ii- Poor Harvests:
Local people have indicated that the years since 1980 have been of poor harvests 
associated with declining rainfall trends. Agricultural production has been on the decline 
during the drought years since 1980. The harvests o f 1984/5 and of 1990/91 have been 
the lowest on record. The two main food crops, i.e. millet and sorghum and the major 
cash crops i.e. sesame and groundnuts were at their lowest. The poor harvests were 
mainly attributed to the occurrence o f prolonged dry spells (sabnah), and fewer rainy
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days in the main rainy season in June to September.The low levels of food production 
during the drought years forced people to liquidate their basic assets, namely animals, 
and valuables, in order to procure food from the market. For those households who had 
neither, migration remained their only option. Food grains became the single most 
important item of trade in the local economy. Flere the market forces were turned 
against them. The following table shows the levels of production in En-Nuhud and Bara 
area for the major crops.
Table 20 Production of the different crops in En-Nuhud and Bara area 1982/3 
1990/91 (in Kgs).
Crop/ Area 1982/3 1983/4 1984/5 1985/6 1986/7 1987/8 1988/9 1989/90 1990/1
En-Nuhud Area
millet 33604 54062 24957 91891 79078 33684 - 24045 2440
sorghum 11688 8563 2986 9217 11870 1978 - 500 57
groundnuts 59283 41328 10980 41848 49100 + + 5344 4849
sesame 3410 4415 1586 9110 11870 + + 434 398
B a ra  Area
millet 16830 6720 1960 3316 9122 1550 - 28498 -
sorghum - - - . - - - -
groundnuts - - - - + + + - -
sesame 3230 4748 750 1468 1065 - - 295 -
Source: Regional Ministry o f  Agriculture, El-Obeid, Statistics Office 1993.
7- 6- 2- iii- Market Failure:
Long before the drought, signs o f stress on a large scale were already evident in the 
villages (Cater 1986; Bush 1985, 1986; Dreze and Sen 1989; Cutler 1991). A general 
collapse of people's purchasing power has come about as the final culmination o f a long 
process o f impoverisation due to consistently dwindling returns from the sale of 
agricultural produce, and the very low prices offered. Households have been 
experiencing continuing hardships in their daily living conditions. Resort to the 
collection of forest products has intensified particularly dramatically during this period 
in an attempt to recoup part of the loss from the main economic activities i.e. 
agricultural labour, and animal husbandry. As Shepherd has observed, extraction of 
value "from the soil" can become their only option short of migration, or combined with 
it, in order to maintain customary standards o f living (Shepherd 1988).
The village households became permanently trapped in a vicious circle of 
exploitation and poverty such that they were not able to accumulate. The only form of 
assets some of them had, was in the form of animals, and these proved to offer poor 
protection against famines during times o f crises. Otherwise, they have the land and 
their labour power to exploit. But these in turn proved to be o f little value to them in the 
drought years when the land yielded very little and there were no alternative
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employment avenues to utilise their labour power in the shrinking rural labour market. 
The returns from the land were poor, and even here, the major part o f the value of their 
agricultural labour is being appropriated by the state and the merchant class through the 
mechanisms of the market; leaving them with less than 30% o f the actual cost involved 
in their labour reproduction (Oesterdichoff 1980). On the other hand, employment 
opportunities other than tilling the land were negligible, or non-existent, either in the 
local economy or in the weak national labour market. But the rapidly deteriorating rural 
terms of trade was the worst aspect o f the market failure during the crisis. Other 
indicators as the stress worsened included the reverse ratio between falling animal prices 
vis-a-vis rising food prices. The prices o f animals plummeted decimally as the prices of 
food rose very rapidly. The need for food grains forced the populations to sell out in 
distress more and more o f their animals. The large supply of animals caused a glut in the 
market and prices collapse, falling to less than a tenth the normal. Intervention from the 
state to support the peoples' purchasing power by stabilising prices, could have gone a 
long way towards sustaining their livelihoods and reserved part of their assets.
7- 6- 2- iv- Rural Terms o f  Trade:
Rural terms o f trade steadily deteriorated during the crisis which precipitated the 
already long-existing poverty and vulnerability o f households. While the prices the local 
producers receive for their agricultural produce and livestock were steadily declining in 
real value, prices that they had to pay for their consumption needs, including food, were 
steadily rising over the years. The prices o f the major cash-crops apparently show a 
steady increase during the period except for a few fluctuations in the prices of 
groundnuts and hibiscus. However, this seemingly regular price increase disguises the 
fact that the prices of these products declined in real value over the years; such that 
farmers receive far less than the minimum market price. The following table shows the 
market prices o f the major agricultural produce at El-Obeid produce market.
Table 21 Prices of Major Cash Crops in 1984/5-1991/2 ( in S£s/kantar)
Product P r ic e
1984/5 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92
Sesame 617 839 697 907 2074 2692 7051 16630
Groundnuts 401 640 533 734 890 203 5820 10221
Melon Seed 708 652 468 454 718 1230 3382 7337
Hepiscus 599 2508 1829 1605 2060 5410 4112 8070
Gum Arabic 632 1032 2743 3889 4075 4421 4572 9427
Source: Regional Agricultural Statistics, El-Obeid Produce Market; El-Obeid 1993.
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. As local supplies of food became exhausted food grains had to be procured from the 
regional markets, which were controlled by a cartel of grain merchants linked in the 
business o f the grain trade to powerful national interests of the commercial capitalist 
farmers. The dependency o f the local populations on external sources of food supply 
through the market renders them extremely vulnerable to price fluctuations, such that 
they are placed in a very disadvantaged position, and during years of droughts, food 
prices reach up to ten or 30 times their normal levels; and become totally inaccessible to 
the majority of the local consumers and practically beyond the reach of their economic 
means. The following table shows the prices of the main food staples {Dura and Millet) 
over the same period:
Table  22 Prices o f the Two Main Staple Food Crops Over Same Period (in S£s/ Ardeb)
Years 1984/5 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92
Sorghum 2365 1364 1086 1523 2449 4398 27239 23467
Millet 2640 1407 1199 2903 2668 5709 349559 28750
Source: Regional Agricultural Statistics, El-Obeid Produce Market; El-Obeid 1993.
The following table illustrates the adverse terms o f trade between cash crops and food 
grains in the market.
Table 23 Prices of Groundnuts and Gum Arabic as % of Sorghum and Millet Prices
Cash crop % 
Food crop
(PRICE)
Years 1984/5 1985/6 1986/7 1987/88 1988/9 1989/90 1990/91 1991/2
Groundnuts % of 
Sorghum
17 46.9 49.1 48.2 36.3 4.6 21.4 43.6
Gum Arabic % of 
Millet
23.9 73.3 228.8 134 152.7 77.4 01.3 32.9
Source: Regional Agricultural Statistics, El-Obeid Produce Market; El-Obeid 1993.
Terms of trade are dismally lagging in pace with the rocketing inflation rates of the 
national economy which shows inflation rates estimated at 3000% between the 1970’s 
and 1990’s. The apparent increase is only nominal disguising the huge decrease in real 
value o f rural produce. The negative terms of trade, as a consequence o f low returns 
from agricultural produce vis-a-vis the highly inflated market prices o f consumer goods, 
is the single most important factor underlying rural poverty. It is not surprising 
therefore, to find that an average village household would require one Kantar of 
groundnuts to pay for the price of only about one kilogram of sugar, sufficient to meet 
the households sugar consumption for only two days in 1990. In 1992, a gum collector
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would require at least half a Kantar o f gum, about a fifth of his entire harvest to buy a 
single garment o f manufactured cloth fabric.
Bad terms of trade between cash crop prices and food prices is another critical factor 
in determining household food security situation. Food grains have become a market 
commodity o f strategic importance since it has entered the market also as a cash crop in 
its own right. Kordofan, especially the northern semi-desert parts, has been a food 
deficit region, in nearly six out of ten harvests these semi-arid regions would experience 
food deficit. Therefore, grain has entered the market, exclusively in the control of 
powerful regional grain traders (as we have seen earlier) who have the capital, the 
storage and transport facilities to import and horde large quantities o f grain mostly from 
the Central Sudan and from Habila mechanised schemes. These regional grain 
merchants, mostly stationed at El-Obeid grain market centre, form a powerful cartel, 
and among themselves manipulate the grain prices in the whole region entirely for their 
own gains enabling them to horde grains and increase prices, especially in famine years.
The negative terms of trade between cash crop and food worsens particularly badly 
during famine years. As can be seen from the table, in 1984/5, the price o f groundnuts 
was S£ 401 for the Kantar, while the price o f one Ardeb (2 sacks) of sorghum is 2365 
and 2640 for millet. Thus an average village household would require about six Kantars 
o f groundnuts (possibly the whole years harvest) to procure only one Ardeb o f sorghum 
(or six and a half Kantars for one Ardeb o f millet) sufficient to meet the households 
grain requirements for about forty days. The deterioration between the rural terms of 
trade is far worse in the second famine of 1989-91. In 1989/90 the average village 
household needed as much as 21.5 Kantar o f groundnuts to buy only one Ardeb o f 
sorghum, and as much as 28 Kantar for the same quantity o f millet. The negative terms 
of trade can be more clearly shown graphically in the following illustration:
Table 22 Prices o f the Two Main Staple Food Crops Over Same Period (in S£s/Ardeb)
Years 1984/5 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92
Sorghum 2365 1364 1086 1523 2449 4398 27239 23467
Millet 2640 1407 1199 2903 2668 5709 349559 28750
Sesame 617 839 697 907 2074 2692 7051 16630
Groundnuts 401 640 533 734 890 203 5820 10221
Source: Field-work Data 1993.
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Not only that the rural populations are being disadvantaged in terms of trade between 
the prices they receive on their agricultural cash produce and the prices they will have to 
pay for their consumption needs, including food, but also terms of trade for livestock 
show similar negative trends. The following table shows the prices of livestock at El- 
Obeid livestock market in the years 1984-92.
T a b le  24 Livestock Prices at El-Obeid Livestock Market 1984/5-199112
Type of Animal P r ic e s
Years 1984/5 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92
Cattle 106 485 482 604 1097 1453 1703 1705
Sheep 43 148 167 185 296 338 564 426
Goats 15 72 70 125 133 182 282 269
Camels 346 725 840 1621 2169 3575 4602 4351
C alculated fro m  Kordofan Regional M inistry o f  Agriculture, S tatistics Office  -  E l-O beid  1993.
The prices of animals show precipitous decline and utter collapse in famine years in 
relation to food prices. A quick look at animal prices in relation to food prices reveals the 
extent of collapse of the rural terms of trade and the concomitant collapse of purchasing 
power of the village households. The prices quoted above are those prevailing at El- 
Obeid main regional market (for lack of statistical records in the villages), which 
suggests that actual producer prices in the villages are lower still. Therefore, while the 
actual producers receive lower prices for their animals, they pay damagingly higher 
prices for the food grains that reach the villages. A pastoral family would need over six 
heads of sheep to obtain only one Melwa of dura: or a complete herd of about 196 heads 
of sheep to buy one sack (thirty Melwas) of dura. This can be more clearly shown 
graphically in the following illustration:
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Prices of livestock & cash crops against food prices at El-O beid  market
1982 /3  - 1990/91
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Famine represents an instance of dispossession of the poor. It is a paradoxical 
situation in which occurs a transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich. Accordingly, in 
the famine of 1983/5, the average price of cattle was S£106, S£43 for sheep and £15 for 
goats. In comparison the prices for one Ardeb (2 sacks) of Sorghum was S£2365, and 
Millet S£2640. Evidently the terms of trade were far beyond any comparison, and as a 
result, a village household would require a complete herd of 25 cattle or of 61 sheep to 
buy only one Ardeb of Millet. And in the famine year of 1990/91, the animals needed to 
procure the same amount of Millet were 21 heads of cattle or 62 heads of sheep. 
Obviously this is one of the most glaring examples of the market distortion and failure. 
The lot of the rural poor is that they have been brought under the power of the market 
machine; a complex market machine for which the local people are totally unequipped to 
cope with its unequal exchange mechanisms. This particular context provides us with a 
most illuminating example in which the market forces bear overwhelmingly over a rural 
system of production, with deep-reaching, and in this context, disastrous effects.
Formerly, before food had been incorporated into the market system, food grains used 
to be secured collectively for the whole village, brought on camels from neighbouring 
areas, either by sale or borrowing. Local food security was very much a matter of food 
resource control, entirely within the hands of the village people. With the 
commercialisation of food into the market, trade has now developed peculiar and 
exploitative forms, entirely in the hands of outsiders, such as the Jellaba and other 
merchants. Grain has become an important item of trade in its own right, conducted in a 
separate circuit of monopolistic trade, entirely in the control of the grain merchants. 
These grain merchants import food grains from other parts, especially from Kosti on the 
White Nile and from Habila commercial mechanised farms in Southern Kordofan. The 
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monopolistic control over the transport, marketing and distribution of food grains 
region-wide through to village traders. The village traders represent the last knob in the 
mercantile chain, collecting the village produce for the market, and distributing 
merchant goods to the village people, including food.
The merchants monopolistic control over the grain trade as suppliers of food, and 
over other aspects of the commodity market breed exorbitantly taxing pricing systems 
for all commodities, especially in a situation o f permanent scarcity as in the case of 
Sudan’s weak economy. And in such a situation, it is not infrequent that scarcities can 
be artificially created by certain powerful interest lobbies and by some illicit practices 
such as hoarding. Consequently prices soar sky high in a spiralling manner which 
systematically depletes rural people's economic resources, reserves and assets. 
Ultimately the rural populations are rendered to absolute poverty, vulnerability and 
famine. The great irony about famine is that it provides an instance o f great upheaval 
and shaking, whilst at the same time it is a time of feast for the merchants when they 
reap vast wealth. It has been reported in Bara that a merchant of the town (an example 
o f many others) was able to accumulate pounds o f gold during the famine in 1990/91 
which he collected from the stressed pastoralists and villagers, which represented their 
last store of valuables in exchange for small sums o f cash or grain in the famine years.
It remains to be answered whether the development of the 1980’s famine in Kordofan 
and Western Sudan was an artificial creation of powerful lobbies, including the grain 
merchants lobby. Allegations have repeatedly been made pointing the guilt to the 
Islamic banking system, especially the Faisal Islamic Bank (FIB) that it had bought and 
hoarded the entire grain harvest in 1984/5, caused prices to soar and contributed to the 
famine, but reaped enormous profits. Indeed, Nimeiri was in alliance with the 
Islamicists at the time in a bid to promote Islamic laws.When they fell out o f favour, 
Nimeiri accused them o f having exploited the Islamic banking system to enrich their 
members and to undermine the economy. Thus, the Islamicists fell from President 
Nimeiri's favour and some of their members were put in prison, including their leader, 
Hassan El Turabi. However the end result is the damaging effects on the food situation 
in Kordofan and Western Sudan, exacerbated an already bad food shortage and 
ultimately led to the famine. One of the consequences of the 1983/85 famine was that it 
fed into the general popular protest and the popular uprising which finality overthrew 
Nimeiri in April 1985, at the height o f the famine.
The process of famine involves the gradual build-up o f its causes over a long period 
o f time. From the above account, we can identify two kinds o f causality: long-term 
tendencies which render the rural populations vulnerable to famine, and short-term 
adversities which act as trigger factors and bring long-term tendencies into famine. This 
latter group of trigger causes include the drought, which in turn leads to poor harvests,
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market failure and associated bad rural terms of trade in which the rural populations fail 
in the market to have effective command for food. The list o f adversities against the 
rural people is overwhelming, extending from long-term processes of political 
marginalisation and economic exploitation creating patterns o f chronic impoverishment 
and vulnerability; to natural shocks and market failure. The rural people, however, did 
not capitulate fatefully to the adversities against them. Instead, they coped with these 
adversities in many different ways, aided by long-established survival strategies and 
adjustments which helped them survive the disaster.
7- 7- Patterns o f Movements Induced by the Stress:
The people responded to the prolonged conditions o f stress by large scale 
movements. Two distinct patterns o f stress-induced movements can be discerned. One 
occurring among the pastoralists from the Northern parts o f the region towards the 
South. Population densities increased among the settled village communities and around 
permanent sources o f water, as increasing numbers of the pastoral communities moved 
south and many of them settled among the village populations or set up their own 
villages in the areas where they moved to. Another movement occurred among the 
settled village communities who in turn migrated to the urban centres and abroad; 
mainly to the labour markets in the Arab States.
The pastoral communities in Kordofan represent about 24% of the total number of 
Kordofan population which is estimated to be about 3,240,700 people according to the 
1983 census. Among the pastoralists literacy rate is only 3%, and apart from their main 
economic preoccupation i.e. animal husbandry, have very little skills to help them find 
alternative avenues of employment in the regional or national economy. Under the 
conditions o f acute prolonged stress, the only option available to them is to move 
Southwards and settle among the sedentary village communities; especially in Dar 
Hamar and parts of Dar Hamiid. Such settlements among the neighbouring 
communities have the adverse consequence o f increasing the population and animal 
densities, therefore exerting more pressure on the already exhausted land. The 
pastoralists who have been forced into this Southernly movement are preponderantly 
composed of women, children, and the elderly, together with what have survived the 
drought of the small stock of animals. The young adult males migrated to other places 
seeking work; especially to the cities o f Omdurman, Kosti, and El-Obeid, where, 
unfortunately, owing to their lack of skills and unfamiliarity with urban life, they end up 
joining the ranks o f the urban poor congregating in the shanty towns and slums 
surrounding the cities. Another large movement occurred amongst the village settled 
communities who in turn migrated towards the towns and urban centres. This type of 
movement has a pattern o f some distinct demographic characteristics. It engage the
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young adult males o f the villages who see no prospects o f staying in the villages. They 
migrate to the regional towns of El-Obeid, En-Nuhud, Um-Ruwaba in Kordofan; and 
many more find their way to the Capital, to Omdurman, and others to the schemes in 
central Sudan. They leave behind the women, the children and the old. The resultant 
imbalance in the demographic structure can be clearly noticed in the villages during 
such times of stress.
Although rural population movements from areas o f dearth to better food-secure 
areas is an established feature of life in Kordofan countryside, what is new in the present 
circumstances is that such movements have turned into forced displacement involving 
whole families, instead of being voluntarily undertaken by young adult males which 
characterised movements in the past. Under the present conditions, we find that whole 
families are forced to flee their villages and seek refuge in the relief camps, or else join 
the slums in the shanty towns in the main cities under squalid conditions. In El-Obeid 
camp in 1984/5. displaced family size averaged between 4 - 7  persons. They are 
provided with 11/2 Melwa o f dura (one Melwa = approx. 7 pounds; or 3.2 Kg), 1/2 a 
pound of cooking oil. and 1/2 a pound of onions. This is a three-day ration (Ibrahim M. 
1985). The poor diet led to malnutrition, which in turn led to poor health conditions and 
the spread of diseases in the camps, which are largely responsible for the elevated 
mortality rates, especially among children. The trends o f rural movements during the 
famine can be illustrated as follows:
Figure 10 Trends o f movements induced by the stress
Source. Ihraltim. M B. 1985, quoted in IF PR! Report H8; Tcsfaye et a I 1991; p: 37.
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However, the most clear manifestation o f the stress, is the large-scale exodus of 
rural/external migration to the Arab States. As we have shown in the previous chapters, 
this external migration to the Arab labour markets came as a response to the realisation 
that the domestic national labour market offered the stressed migrants neither 
opportunities for work, nor reward on their labour in order to induce them to work 
inside the country. :
7- 8- Migration:
Migration remains the single most important indicator, both of the conditions of 
stress and as an adjustment adaptive mechanism to such conditions. As will be shown 
here below, a large-scale out migration has occurred since the early 1980’s, evidently in 
response to the conditions of stress that prevailed during these years, coinciding with the 
drought and famine o f the 1980’s. In the past migration was rare, short, and occurred in 
contexts which involved travelling from one area to other neighbouring areas, especially 
for the procurement of food grains. Such migration occurred in Dar Hamid and Dar 
Hamiar in the past to better food producing areas: e.g. the Nuba Mountains and DarFur, 
when the food situation in the Dar was bad. Since the colonial period and in subsequent 
periods migration from Kordofan (as we have seen) has been officially encouraged, 
intended to provide cheap labour for the cotton producing areas along the Nile in the 
Gezira Scheme in Central Sudan. This official policy has occasioned migration from 
local Kordofan regions on a large scale. However, this type of migration has generally 
been characterised by certain features which were fundamentally different from recent 
migration. That earlier forms o f migration occurred in normal years under no 
environmentally induced conditions of stress, but came as a response to certain social 
pressures and demands for the need for cash or for preparation for marriage or clothing 
for the family, therefore only undertaken by adult males. And mostly it took place in the 
off-farm dry season when there was little work to do in the villages. This migration 
therefore was voluntary, seasonal, involving adult males and was small in scale o f only 
a few individuals. In the past, people had been home-bound and did not want to part 
from their homelands to ‘foreign’ lands. Migrating away from the Dar was an anomaly, 
and to migrate in search o f wage and hired labour was a bit of a stigma. The recent 
phenomenal migration both indicates the precipitous conditions to which local 
conditions have degenerated, manifested in formidable stresses on the environment and 
on the local populations. In this context o f the conditions o f stress migration also 
becomes an adjustment and adaptive mechanism to the conditions of stress. This 
migration has evidently taken the proportions o f a mass exodus from the countryside to 
the towns, to the centre and to outside labour markets, especially to the rich Arab States.
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From table (25) below, it can be seen that migration has abruptly increased to 
unprecedented proportions in the early 1980’s.
Table 25 Breakdown of Migrant Numbers as % of Village Population & Households in 1983-5,1990-
present
Village/Year Total Population Breakdown of Households











1- Omdofais 1122 185
1983-85 26 2.3 26 14
1990-present 45 4.0 38 20.5
Total 71 6.3 64 34.5





Obviously this signifies that migration has emerged exclusively as a social 
phenomena in response to socio-economic pressures exacerbated by the drought of the 
1980s. Indeed, the trends o f out-migration have occurred earlier, as early as the late 
1970’s in a much attenuated form. But it increased with the gripping stress conditions 
on the local populations. Migration nearly doubled during the period between the years 
o f 1980s and 1990/91. This suggests that it is not the periodic outbursts o f drought 
leading to conditions o f stress and famine that drive people out from their homes, but 
that a more pervasive poverty lie at the root o f the problem. Had it been for the transient 
conditions of stress associated with a periodic drought and famine episode, it would 
have been that people, must have returned to their home villages and resumed their 
normal lives after the incident has passed. But this is not being the case, as return time is 
getting longer, and that those who have migrated have stayed away either temporarily or 
permanently, and those behind are seeking to leave their homes in ever greater numbers. 
All of these facts attest to the conclusion that the root cause of the problem is not 
droughts and famine stress, but a more deep seated poverty which forces village 
populations to leave their homes and families in search for livelihood.
Migration, while prompted by strong socio-economic pressure, is also an adaptive 
adjustment mechanism of vital significance to the livelihood and survival for many of 
the village households. From Omdofais with a population o f 1122 persons, about 71 
adult males (representing 6.3% of the total) have migrated to the Arab States; mostly to
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Saudi Arabia and Libya in the 1983-85 famine period. The majority of these migrants 
have stayed in the host country either on a temporary or permanent basis. This migration 
contributes significantly and positively to the livelihood and survival of many rural 
households. From the 185 total village households, those having at least one migrant 
member away or returned, came to 64 households, making 34.5% (over one third) of the 
total village households. This is a significant percentage. But this also reveals that the 
small number of village migrants (6.3% of the village population) support over one third 
(34.5%) o f the village households. If added to these families those kins and relatives 
whom migrants also support, the proportion o f population who receive support from 
such immigrants greatly increases. On balance, it could be approximated that out 
migration contributes between 40-50% of the livelihoods of the village households. The 
nature o f such vitally significant contribution o f migration comes in the form of 
remittances and transfers o f money which are generally expended in the purchase of the 
household food needs, other needs, and on investing part of it in buying some animals as 
necessary assets for future security. This is naturally the one viable investment avenue 
available in the local economy in the absence of other investment opportunities. Another 
important factor is that migrants contribution comes as clothes to family members, kins 
and relatives.
In summary, migration has become the single most important adaptive adjustment 
mechanism for the livelihood and survival o f many village households. Households who 
have migrant members are better secured from those who do not. Such households are 
assured at least that they will have food available in the household. On the other hand, it 
is among those households who are not fortunate enough to have a migrant member, 
that we find the most vulnerable and most food insecure households. Among this latter 
most vulnerable category of the village households are those who are headed by women 
(see below).
7- 9- SEQUENCE OF LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN THE FACE OF THE CRISIS:
7- 9- 1- Sale o f  Animals:
Animals represent the main source o f assets for many village households. Therefore, 
sale o f animals has to be selective and carefully considered, in order to preserve the 
household assets. Sale starts with the males and non-productive animals in normal 
times. However, during the drought years, animals have to be sold anyway, lest they die 
for lack of fodder. The massive liquidation o f animals causes a glut in the market, and 
animal prices crash as a consequence. The irony of famine for the herd owner is that 
during famine animal prices and food prices go in reverse ratios: while food prices 
rocket very high, animal prices plummet decimally low (see terms o f trade above). The 
famine years represented an enormous loss o f assets for the local village populations,
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especially for animal owning households, reducing many o f them, and indeed, entire 
communities to absolute poverty and assetlessness (Curtis et al 1988). Entire 
communities lost their herds of animals either by sale or death, amounting almost to 
complete decapitalisation. The following table shows the rates o f animal loss through 
sale, disease and death;
Table (26): Rates of animal loss by death, sale and disease:
year cattle % Loss Sheep % Loss Goats % Loss camels % Loss
sale diss dth sale diss dth sale diss dth sale diss dth
1981/2 - 25 05 7.5 2.4 2.4 25 16 07 31 - -
1982/3 11.4 8.6 14.3 17.4 8.2 14.8 27 18 21 08 16 13
1983/4 15.4 20 50,8 22.2 2.1 15.8 30 03 12 28 - 13
1984/5 31.5 - 68.6 54.1 7.2 36 71 04 14 48 12 29
Source^ Regional Ministry o f  Agriculture; Kordofan, 1986.
The estimated rates of animal loss ranged from between 85 to 96% the total animal 
population in Dar Hamar and Dar Hamid respectively. The emaciation and weakness 
of the animals due to lack o f fodder forced herd owners into massive distress sale at 
abysmally low prices. A large part o f the animals simply died. The sale of animals 
during the famine years becomes indiscriminate, and extends from the males, and non­
productive animals to include females and productive animals in the breeding age which 
form the household's basic capital assets. The loss to the herd-owning households has 
been severe, rendering many households virtually assetless; as can be seen from the 
table:
Table 27 Average size o f ownership of herd stocks and loss between 1975 - 1985 
{Dar Hamid Area)
Year sheep camels cattle goats donkeys
1975 700 600 50 200 6
1985 40 40 2 3 1
Source: Regional Agricultural Statistics Office; El-Obeid 1993 (field-work data).
7- 9- 2- Sale o f Valuables:
The local people under the weight o f the stress are forced to sell out their valuables of 
gold, silver and jewellery, mainly the possessions of women. These represent the "last 
issue of resort" reserved for the most critical need o f the family, against hunger, 
sickness, and other calamities. Women hold such possessions which they are able to 
reserve in good years from their own labour, or came as gifts in marriage. Such 
valuables serve a vital security function for women to be relied upon against all forms of
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adversity, including the event of the husband getting another wife. During the famine, 
women had to part with their valuables, in the more dire need for food, thus incurring 
not only a depletion o f valuable assets, but perhaps more critically undermining the 
long-term security o f the household, especially depriving the women from their main 
source o f security. Unfortunately, the prices offered for such valuables are extremely 
low during the famine years to such an extent that they can not pay even for the value of 
a small quantity o f dura. The poor households become even poorer, having thus lost 
their last resort o f assets, without having gained any short-term security of food. Indeed, 
one o f the ironies o f famine is that while it represents a massive drain of resources of the 
poor, it shifts such resources to the rich (Keen 1994). Local traders can buy the 
valuables o f the poor very cheaply, while selling them food grains and other trade items 
very dearly. The terms of trade are heavily turned against them. One merchant in Al- 
Saata confessed that in the 1990/91 famine year, he bought 12 grams of gold for S£ 
2100 Sudanese pounds from another merchant who bought the gold from the affected 
local people in distress sale. The local merchants bought gold from the distressed 
population for only S£ 75 per 1/4 ounce of gold, while selling them a Melwa (a Melwa = 
3.2 Kg.) of dura for S£ 85, and for a S£ 100 that o f millet. At the same time, a sheep 
fetched only S£ 13. Therefore, a pastorralist or villager would have to part from their 
last assets of valuables, and would need an ounce of gold to procure less than four 
Melwas of sorghum, and only three of millet. Ironically, while the poor desperately try 
to procure food by selling out their valuables and animals, becoming poorer in the 
process, the local traders can make wealth during the famine. Regional merchants and 
exporters too can accumulate colossal profits to their existing wealth derived from the 
proceeds o f the grain trade and the livestock export business during the famine years. 
The majority of the village households failed to secure the food they need, either from 
their own production, or through the market (by exchange o f the value). As a result of 
the food entitlement failure, the village households had to resort to other less attractive 
strategies as the stress continued. These included strategies of local self help and then 
dietary adjustments.
7- 9- 3- Local se lf Help:
Local self help included various forms of adjustment strategies. These follow a long­
standing tradition of reciprocal obligations o f socio-cultural and religious import. It is 
possible to discern those that involve kins help, those of reciprocal self help, and those 
that involve charity.
7- 9- 3- i- Kins Help:
This type of local self help involves forms o f redistribution between kins and 
relatives, such that resources of food, money and animals move from relatively better-
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off members to their poorer kins who are in more dire need. This form of help, 
especially during famine, is considered rather obligatory to the extent that relatively 
better-off o f the village members will have to support their needy kins and relatives. 
This form of help can continue during famine time until the stress is over, or until the 
giving party has nothing more to give. Fortunately, remittances and transfers from 
migrant members to their families and relatives constitute an important form of this type 
of help during the famine in 1983/85 and 1990/91. Another form of this type o f kins 
help involves providing free meals for relatives. During the famine, many of the 
relatively better households who had some food stocks, provided free meals for their 
kins and relatives who had not, thus mitigating the severity o f the hunger effect.
7- 9- 3- ii- Reciprocal S e lf Help:
This form of local self help involves giving out and receiving food and money 
reciprocated between households on an ad hoc short-term loan basis according to 
availability of resources. During the famine years when the majority o f the village 
households are in need and resources are in short supply, some o f the households may 
have something coming which they can share part of it with another family on a short­
term loan basis. This will be repaid a few days later when the borrowing household in 
turn have something coming . This form of reciprocal help is vital during famine and it 
essentially ensures that the members o f the community share the available resources 
during times of dearth. This form of reciprocal help can also be employed in normal 
times, but it assumes especial significance during the famine times, and becomes more 
frequent. It greatly helps to mitigate the effects o f famine, although in the course of the 
prolonged dearth and scarcity of food, quantities o f food or sums of money that can be 
reciprocated on short-term loans get steadily smaller. At this stage, defaulting may also 
occur as in-coming resources dry up in the process.
7- 9- 3- iii Charitable Forms o f Local S e lf Help:
This type of local help during times o f hardship and famine involves giving as 
charity, especially of food, animals, or money from the wealthy to the needy. It does not 
necessarily occur among kins, and is not repayable . The wealthier among the village 
community such as traders and other better-off members give out quantities of food or 
sums of money to the most needy among the village households. It is known in the 
village community who is most in need. Also those who can afford, may provide free 
meals to be shared collectively at homes or in the shops in the market place. Another 
form of this type o f charitable help involved contributions from the village members 
who can afford it to be collected and given to those most in need in the village, or to 
those immigrants from the more destitute pastoral groups who need help most urgently.
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This form of help is summoned as an emergency rescue operation with implications that 
the target members are at imminent risk if help is not forthcoming.
These various forms o f local self help have been the most effective strategies to 
mitigate the worst effects o f famine, and kept at bay the menace o f mass starvation. 
Admittedly, it is for the effectiveness of such strategies that mortality rates during the 
recent famines have been strikingly low among the village populations. Indeed, the 
people in the village o f Omdofais in Dar Hamar reported no incidents of death during 
the famines in 1983/5 and 1990/91 that are directly associated with shortage o f food. 
However, they reported the death of a child under five in El-Obeid relief camp where 
the mother took refuge with her children in the 1990/91 famine. In the village of Al- 
Saata in Dar Hamid, the village inhabitants reported no incidents of death among their 
members, but reported that there were several deaths from among the pastoral groups 
who settled in and around the village. But even here, the death cases are attributed more 
to infectious diseases such as diarrhoea and other diseases associated with malnutrition 
than with actual starvation.
An important lesson for policy-making can be drawn from the local self help 
institution. It points to the fact that the famine affects the village populations unevenly; 
that is; there are some o f the village households who are relatively better-off than others; 
and that these better-off segment are obligated to help those weaker members o f the 
community. As can be inferred, during times of protracted famine, this form of help can 
render both the giving and receiving ends vulnerable. Therefore, early intervention 
targeting the weaker end o f the village households can go along way in halting the slide 
of the entire community from slipping into a state o f complete exposure to famine.
7- 9- 4- Dietary Adjustments:
As the stress continued, the village households adjusted their food consumption 
strategies in various ways to stretch the capacity of the meagre food resources still 
available to them. Such adjustments included cutting down on the quality and quantity 
of food, by mixing grains, and reducing the number of meals per day; and also priorities 
for who is more entitled to the food that is available.
7- 9- 4 - 1- Cutting down on the Quality o f Food:
Quality goes first; as households put up with the better quality food grains; i.e. 
dukhn, and shifted to the consumption of less preferred grains e.g. dura. Other more 
nutrient components such as dried meat (sharmout) followed. Most of the village 
households ate poor quality diet derived from dura, made in the form of asida or kisra, 
and poor quality (mulah) or gravy with which to eat the food.
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7- 9- 4- ii- Cutting down on the Quantity o f F ood:
As the stress continued and the food reserves become more and more exhausted, the 
households resort to the more stringent strategy of reducing the quantity of food to be 
consumed. Thus, a household who in normal times consumes a Melwa of grains per day, 
cut down their food consumption level to half of that, and continue reducing that 
gradually. The village people reported that it is rare during the famine to find a 
household who ground a Melwa or two, and only the affluent can afford it. Most of the 
village households ground only about half to a quarter of a Melwa at a time to carry 
them for a day or two. Although food grains are available in the village shops, the 
people lacked the means to buy the available food. Only after the household managed 
by some means to obtain some cash, were they able to buy a small quantity of dura, 
mostly not exceeding half a Melwa.
7- 9- 4- Hi- Mixing Dura with Melon Seed:
This is an important food adjustment strategy during famine. As reserves o f dura 
became rapidly depleted, households resorted to mixing the remaining meagre stocks 
with melon seed. Usually, the mixture is about two melwas of melon seed crushed and 
chaffed and mixed with half a Melwa o f dura flour. This is then cooked in a form of a 
porridge, reputed to be more nutritious than asida prepared from plain dura flour. This 
food adjustment strategy is intended to stretch the available food to the maximum 
capacity limit possible. Unfortunately, one o f the causes o f acute hardship in the 
1990/91 famine is that this strategy has been rendered ineffective by commercial 
hoarding o f the melon seed harvest. It has been reported by the village informants that 
the Faisal Islamic Bank has bought massively almost the entire melon seed crop in 
1989/90 harvest in Western Sudan. The Bank's agents offered a price of S£110 - 120 per 
sack of melon seed until they have bought effectively the entire harvest causing an 
artificial scarcity and consequently the prices rose sharply. Later they sold the crop at 
the price of S£1000 - 1200 a sack, realising a profit margin o f %1000.
7- 9- 4- iv- Reducing the Number o f Meals per Day:
Households reduced the number o f meals per day from three to two, and then to one. 
Reducing the number of meals is a clear index that the food situation reached a very 
critical stage. It is at this stage that some members o f the household will have to forego 
food altogether for a day or two, sparing the available food for those members of the 
family who cannot withstand the pangs o f hunger; namely children. Children have 
priority entitlement to the available food, then the rest o f the family. Children also 
shared food with relatives and neighbours, if  they had not have food at home.
7- 9- 4- v- Tapping Forest Food Resources:
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This is an important strategy during famine. It involved resort to foods not normally 
used. Foremost, such foods included the collection of wild forest berries, mainly the 
mukheit (Boscia Senegalensis) and the haskaneit seed. Resort to the mukheit berries on a 
wide scale in the recent famines has been reported to be the life support for many 
families in the villages. Many of the poorer village households collected these berries 
and brought them to home in big quantities. These berries in order to be edible, were 
first crushed and the bulb extracted from the shell, then soaked in water for three to four 
days, putting fresh water repeatedly until the bitter toxic taste is removed. They were 
then dried under the heat of the sun for about two to three days until they are completely 
dry. Then they were ground into flour and cooked. This somewhat lengthy processing 
may not always be thoroughly carried through, and the final food product may be toxic, 
causing diarrhoea, and many of such instances of toxic poisoning were frequent during 
the famine and are largely attributable to eating unusual foods.
The combined effect of all such diverse strategies o f coping is to stretch out the 
capacity of the meagre available food resources to the maximum limits in the face o f the 
famine. They have been effectively deployed and managed to keep at bay the most 
ravaging effects of the famine and averted the occurrence of death among the village 
populations. But evidently, these strategies although have been vital in keeping people 
alive, indeed underline in striking colours the degree o f hardships and the amount of 
suffering the local populations have been experiencing for the many years in the build 
up o f the famine. Although people managed to save their lives, the depth of their trauma 
can never be fathomed. To be sure there is a deep sense o f betrayal felt by the peoples in 
rural Kordofan, which in time will ripe in great dynamic force for change.
7 - 1 0 -  T h e  E f f e c t s  o f  F a m i n e :
One of the obvious effects o f the famine is that it represented an enormous drain on 
the household assets. The massive decimation of animals rendered many households 
virtually assetless during the famine years. A survey study in rural North Kordofan 
revealed that herd size which averaged about 2.0 livestock units per capita by the end Of 
1983, dropped to 0.26 units by the end of 1985- a drop of 8 6  per cent. The largest drop 
occurred in cattle and sheep (IFPRI 1991). Animals were sold in distress sale in large 
numbers, and fetched very low prices, or else they died. Moreover, the drought 
conditions, poor grazing and diseases have also taken their toll in reducing animals 
fertility and retarding subsequent restocking rates, thus slowing households chances of 
recovery. Households also lost their assets o f valuables during the famine years in the 
quest for food. The valuables fetched very low prices in the market. The famine thus 
represented a dangerous depletion of the household asset base, rendering many 
households to absolute poverty and making them extremely vulnerable to the slightest
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future shocks. This underlies the fact that once famine has stricken the local population, 
the consequent critical asset depletion it caused, renders its victims extremely vulnerable 
to future shocks, and this can explain the succession o f consecutive famine disasters 
affecting the same vulnerable groups again and again. Indeed, the development o f three 
big famines affecting the local populations in Kordofan (and other vulnerable groups in 
Sudan), one after the other in a short period of less than two decades, can only be 
explained in the light of the extreme vulnerability caused by loss of assets over long 
years of stress. The important lesson to be drawn from this is that once the conditions o f 
rural poverty are allowed to slide precipitously and famine occurs, the local populations 
thus affected will be permanently caught in a state of chronic vulnerability and endemic 
famine, which will take a long time and costly efforts to regenerate livelihoods and 
restore former conditions o f security. This conclusion can be confirmed by the fact that 
since the 1983/5 famine disaster which so ravaged the local economy, and until today, 
the local populations in Kordofan can be said to be caught in a state of endemic famine 
which needed everlasting presence o f relief efforts. This could have been altogether 
avoided with far less effort and resources had there been timely intervention to arrest the 
slide in the first instance. But official neglect, corruption, grotesque failure, 
mismanagement and abuse o f power prevented that from happening. The famine has to 
a large extent been the result of negligence on the part o f the governments and the 
country's ruling and middle classes. It is the result of a failure to care for the food 
security of the people; failure to organise and encourage production, failure to store, and 
failure to distribute to the destitute (Shepherd 1988). The colossal failure on the part of 
the authorities allowed the famine to develop in the first instance, caused this dangerous 
massive depletion o f rural resources and assets, crippled the chances o f rural recovery, 
and ultimately placed the rural populations in a state o f permanent vulnerability to 
famines. The most sinister effect of the famine is perhaps that it makes its victims ever 
more vulnerable and exposed to future shocks.
7- 10- 1- Economic Effects: Loss o f  incomes and employment:
The immediate effect of the famine is that it set in motion a host o f adversaries that 
have been in process for many years. One immediate effect is that it precipitated a 
decline in economic activity, caused a critical erosion in the natural resource base which 
in turn impelled the local populations to sell out their productive assets. Eventually a 
wide-spread collapse o f purchasing power translated into market failure to lay effective 
market demand to food, although food is physically available in the market (Sen 1980). 
The ultimate effect of the famine is that it triggered into motion the state of adversaries 
which for so long have been weakening the local system, exposing it to natural shocks.
The massive asset depletion during the famine resulted in a big loss in farm 
employment, and a consequent loss o f incomes derived from farm labour estimated to
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be between 70 - 75 per cent that of normal years (IFPRI 1991). Many of the poorer 
village households have for many years depended on off-farm agricultural wage labour 
as an essential part of their incomes. This source o f income has been severely curtailed 
by the famine, and the percentage of families who worked as local agricultural labourers 
dropped from 18% in 1983/4 to 3.1% in 1984/5 (Ibid). But this drop does not mean that 
people had shunned agricultural labour. On the contrary, this drop occurred at the same 
time that there has been a glut o f people seeking work. The ultimate result is that 
depletion of assets, coupled with loss of incomes from agricultural farm labour, 
combined to drive more people in the wage labour market, causing a glut. Increased 
participation of women in the wage labour force is particularly notable. Women became 
more fully engaged in the wage labour market both at the local level as agricultural farm 
labourers and in the towns in housekeeping jobs and petty employment. Wage rates 
consequently dropped as a result of the glut in the labour market, such that a day of 
labour could buy only 2 Kilograms of millet in 1984, compared to 6  kilograms in 1983.
7- 10- 2- Demographic Effects:
The direct demographic effect o f the famine is that it caused a drop in population 
numbers and growth. The drop in population numbers is particularly significant in the 
short- term owing to the massive out migration from the villages. Population growth 
rates dropped by about 0.4%; from 2.7% to 2.3% between 1983/4 and 1984/5 (Ibid). No 
excess mortality rate was evident in the villages during the famine. The crude mortality 
rate increased only very slightly, but not as high as expected in a year o f low and poor 
food intake and high incidence of disease. There is no evidence of low fertility among 
women. It should be noted that significant demographic changes did occur in the more 
Northern areas o f Kordofan. Here, the famine mortality was much higher, and there is 
evidence o f permanent out-migrating to the central region o f Kordofan, especially to 
Dar Hamar, and to Central and Eastern parts o f Sudan. This massive out-migration is 
the crucial factor in demographic change in the hard-hit areas.
7- 10- 3- Health Effects:
It is important to recognise that the famine has brought types o f diseases hitherto 
unknown among the local communities. It is generally regarded that this area of the 
semi-arid environment is one of the healthiest due to its immunity from many infectious 
and bacterial diseases associated with humid climates. Also that traditionally people 
relied in their diet on milk and millet which provided high nutritious food, therefore, 
people general health was good. The famine has brought diseases associated with 
malnutrition such as stunting among children, various bacterial diseases such as 
diarrhoea and conjunctivitis. One particular disease that was unknown in the local 
environment previous to the famine is yellow fever (typhoid). Typhoid is reported to
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have claimed twenty deaths at Um Badir in 1984/5 (Oxfam 1985; Shepherd 1988). The 
disease is thought to have been brought to the villages by those members who have been 
displaced to the cities, and returned to their home villages at a later stage carrying the 
infection with them.
7-10- 4- Social effects:
There is evidence to suggest that there has occurred some fissures in the social fabric 
which bound the local social milieus. The relaxed generous atmosphere, hospitality and 
support which characterised local social relations in the past, is shaken; and in place 
there is unease, anxiety associated with feelings o f insecurity, and preoccupation with 
personal affairs which are more characteristic o f a differentiated individualistic style of 
life. Social relations are becoming increasingly personalised, family ties are weakened,, 
especially among the poorer groups, reflected in prolonged periods of separation of 
family members, and sometimes o f abandonment. People are more in a hurry to earn a 
living, little time is spared for socialisation and to considering other members' problems, 
money is becoming more and more the stamp o f life, which has to be gained by all 
means. This has led to the phenomena of begging and prostitution in the towns, 
especially from amongst the displaced populations. The feeling among the ordinary 
villagers is that they regard themselves to be "not the same" with the merchants, for 
example, and that generally, people have become less sympathetic, less compassionate 
and less considerate as they were. A sense o f being "better/secured" prevail among the 
better-off groups, such as the village merchants which engender competition and 
sometimes feelings of bitterness among the less fortunate ones: There is indeed signs 
which suggest that a mood of nascent class formation is emerging among the village 
populations, in which the merchant groups clearly occupy the upper hand while the 
poorer groups fall in the lower grades in the social scale.
7-10- 5- Effect on Education, and long-term political consequences:
One of the most important effects o f the famine is that it led to a high rate o f school 
desertion. Many of the families either abandoned their villages taking the children with 
them, and thus abandoned schooling, or they simply cannot afford the extra expenses 
involved in schooling, or needed the children's work to earn an extra income. Two 
studies which were carried out in Eastern Kordofan at the height of the famine in 1985, 
revealed that the famine had indeed have a significant negative effect on education in 
Kordofan countryside. The studies found that in five villages, the number of school 
children numbered about 760 pupils at the beginning of the 1984/5 school year, and by 
January 1985, the number dropped to about 330, indicating a 50% rate o f school 
desertion among the village school children (Ibrahim 1985, Adeel 1985). The 
implication o f this is a two-fold political effects, with long-term negative ideological
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and political bearings on Kordofan local communities. On the one hand, loss of 
education opportunities necessarily entails that these younger generations instead of 
finding other avenues of livelihood generation through education away from eking a 
living from the land, they are thus tied even more to the land as agricultural producers, 
evidently adding more pressure to the already exhausted land. On the other hand, these 
younger generations are hoped through education to lead the process o f rural social 
liberation from the bondages of exploitation and marginalisation, to form the nuclei for 
rural political consciousness in order that the central authorities are forced to concede 
the hitherto neglected rural communities a measure o f political power and economic 
share. The loss o f education means that the local rural masses are thus being deprived 
from this liberalising dynamic force o f rural social change, and the status-quo is thus 
permanently maintained against them and in favour o f more powerful central groups. In 
the context of social class formation, loss of education which provides the only ladder to 
social mobility, means that the loosing poor groups are placed in the unenviable position 
o f being fixed to the disadvantaged status o f a working class culture in a peripheral 
economy.
7 - 1 1 -  T h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  t h e  F a m i n e :
It is possible to assume that timely and effective intervention from the part of a 
responsible government and a humane international system, aimed to avert the 
development of famine in the first place, would have rendered all o f the waste and 
subsequent suffering unnecessary. After all, as Keen (1994) has rightly suggested, for 
some groups, not all is waste. Indeed, for some, famine represented an ample 
opportunity for gain, wealth and power, and the human suffering involved is immaterial 
and inevitable. Keen suggests that as there are losers for the famine, there are 
beneficiaries; too, and the two are enmeshed in a dialectical relationship of loss and 
gain: while one end loses, the other gains. This implies that resources do not recycle in a 
vacuum, but are transferred from the weak and poor to the powerful and rich. No doubt 
this is an illuminating insight, and informs and directs us to look into the other 
direction; i.e. there are important interests to be served by the famine both inside and 
outside Sudan. Even more, the conditions o f famine may be actively sought and 
deliberately created (Keen 1994). The grain merchants, the commercial farm owners and 
the national agrarian lobby, the livestock dealers, the export/import businesses are some 
o f the national interest groups who benefited from the famine. Other beneficiaries 
include international firms and industries supplying provisions for the relief efforts, 
powerful international agrarian interests, the transport industry, employment, are some 
o f the international interests served by the famine. In sum, a cursory look at these 
interests who stand to gain from the famine reveals that all of these have a common
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denominator, as functionaries o f the market forces, either in Sudan or outside. In short, 
famine can be "good for business".
The famine years were fat years for the organised grain trade lobby, who control the 
national and regional markets. The famine provided the long-awaited opportunity for the 
organised and officially condoned looting o f rural resources. A handful o f regional grain 
merchants were able to control the grain trade all over the region, fixing prices, and 
making enormous profits in the process. These regional merchants are allied to the more 
powerful national agrarian lobby who in turn have close connections and interests with 
the ruling political establishment at the top echelons of decision-making. Both co­
ordinate the operation o f the grain trade; in transport, distribution and sale. They have 
the ability and means to transport the grains from areas o f surplus production in the 
commercial mechanised farms in the central rain lands o f Sudan (in Gedaref Kosti and 
Habila), to areas of consumption, e.g. Kordofan. The regional grain merchants act as a 
cartel, and their collusive practices involve hoarding the grains, aided in the storage 
capacity by big banks such as Faisal Islamic Bank and other market beneficiaries, who 
enter the lucrative trade as speculators actively involved in buying, hoarding and selling 
the grains through their agents. They store the grains for any length of time assured of 
demand in a state of general scarcity, and allying the government officialdom to their 
side against the interests o f the general public, they were able to demand and fix 
extortionate prices on the grains, making them practically out o f reach for many local 
consumers. While famine rages in Kordofan countryside, the merchant class gets fatter 
in body and pocket, while the government authorities silently watch the loot, indeed 
themselves effective beneficiaries.
Conclusion:
This chapter has sought to establish that famine is a crisis in society. It is a crisis 
caused not so much by natural phenomenon such as drought, but by long-term political 
and socio-economic factors which are responsible for creating the state of vulnerability 
o f the rural populations to conditions o f famine. The drought and the associated harvest 
failure cannot alone explain the state of utter weakness and vulnerability o f the village 
populations. We have seen that the people in the two villages do not suffer from lack o f 
resources in terms of land, animals or labour power. But that these resources have been 
subjected to vicious exploitation by merchants through market forces. Indeed, while 
some people suffer from famine, others benefit by accumulating wealth and power. 
Nonetheless, in spite o f all adversities, people adaptability enabled them to survive the 
worst effects of famine.
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Conclusion
This study has aimed to explain the persistence of famine in Kordofan of Western 
Sudan. The contribution of the study has been to offer a better understanding of famine 
in Sudan for effective policy making to control or eliminate famine. The argument has 
been that conventional explanations o f famine have been conceived hastily at the time 
o f "crisis", and therefore tended to offer only partial, and sometimes conflicting 
explanations. These explanations, moreover, have sometimes been fanned by distorted 
media representations and o f images o f famine in Africa. Conventional famine theorists 
have marshalled a variety o f causes o f famine which have been confusing and offered 
poor guidelines for effective policy-making. The result of deficient theory has been that 
after all the "well-intentioned" efforts, famine still persists in Sudan and elsewhere. 
There are naturalist explanations which locate the problem in natural phenomena such 
as droughts, floods, earthquakes which translate into acute shortage o f food (Food 
availability Decline FAD). These immediate factors are taken to be the main causes of 
famine by proponents of FAD and which the media has depicted. But these precipitating 
factors trigger deep-rooted vulnerability into famine only when the affected population 
become critically exposed to immediate shocks. Population theorists, on the other hand, 
deplore what they perceive to be overpopulation, overstocking and overcultivation 
which they regard to exceed the land's carrying capacity and cause a breakdown of 
normal livelihoods for large numbers o f populations. Economic explanations such as the 
Entitlements Theory pose the problem in economic terms as an issue of "entitlements 
failure" in which the victims of famine are those who fail to lay "effective market 
demand" to the food they need even though the food may be physically available in the 
market. This study has reviewed five major approaches advanced in the literature as 
explanations of famine. These are: the Naturalist thesis, the Population thesis, the 
Holistic approach, and the FAD (Food Availability Decline) and Entitlements 
approaches. The review gives a reappraisal o f these five perspectives, highlighting the 
core of arguments, followed by a critique or counter-arguments.
The Naturalist thesis attributes the causes o f famine to natural phenomena; such as 
drought, rainfall patterns, desertification, etc. According to the naturalist school, the 
persistence of famine in the Sudan/Sahel zone is understood to be a direct result of 
prolonged drought conditions that persisted since the early 1970s, leading to widespread 
or localised famines as occurred in the early 1970s, the mid-1980s and early 1990s.
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The Naturalist thesis, however, has been the target of intense criticism. Critics have 
pointed out that evidence from many past as well as recent famines suggests that there is 
no direct logical correlation between drought and famine. And concluded that famines 
do not necessarily follow from droughts, and that droughts themselves may originate 
from adverse human actions. The causes o f drought are a subject of controversy and 
debate. Those of the Naturalist school explain the origins of drought - as the prime cause 
o f famine - in purely natural terms: i.e.; climatic characteristics, rainfall patterns, wind 
movements, oceanic sea-surface temperatures, etc., all or some of which are responsible 
for creating the conditions o f drought. Proponents of the Holistic approach dismiss this 
naturalist explanation as simplistic, uni-dimensional, and one that is basically non- 
critical ignoring the complex interaction between natural, human and biotic elements 
that make up a biological habitat. Ecologists have pointed out that a balanced 
relationship between the natural environment, the human society, and the animal and 
plant species in a given habitat determines the degree o f sustainability or otherwise of 
that particular environmental system. That states, planners, and commercialists have 
paid little attention to these interconnections indeed contributed to create environmental 
problems. Explanations o f famine in natural terms that translate into "Food Availability 
Decline = FAD" in fact tolerate such environmentally-insensitive approaches to 
development planning, indeed perpetuate such approaches since they make no claims 
against state policies or human actions which negatively affect the environmental 
systems. Explanations such as FAD can even encourage state "smugness" about food 
availability, perceived to be a condition of natural factors, and not o f state responsibility 
in terms o f production, distribution, and entitlements (Sen 1981).
The causes o f drought are a subject of wide controversy and debate. Critics o f the 
Naturalist thesis marshalled a chain o f arguments pointing to the human agency (or 
anthropogenic) factors that create the conditions of drought. While not categorically 
rejecting the role of drought in the chain of causality of famine, critics place drought in 
a terminal stage, as the final trigger or catalyst that brings a whole chain o f causes into 
their final conclusion of a famine disaster. But that drought itself can be seen to result 
from human actions begs question as to how valid and defensible is the naturalist thesis 
in explaining drought and famine in purely natural terms in isolation from their 
anthropogenic determinants. The Holistic view of drought which adheres to a 
structuralist paradigm, points to the responsibility of both individuals and states to have 
adopted ecologically damaging farming and stocking practices and development 
policies, as well as the functioning o f a distorted market system. This view invokes a 
notion of drought as an "environmental problem", i.e. a product of people's relationship 
with nature (Redclift and Sage 1994).
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The Population thesis is another theory advanced to explain the occurrence of 
famine. The Population thesis owes its origins to the 18th century Malthusian debate on 
the menace o f ocer-population. Writing in 1798, in his famous "Essay on the Principle 
o f Population", Malthus warned that the earth had limited resources to feed its ever- 
increasing populations. He argued that while food supply increased on arithmetic ratios, 
the earth's population increased on geometric proportions. Malthus concluded that as a 
result o f the imbalance between the two variables, a situation would inevitably arise 
where the ever-increasing population numbers outstrip the available food supplies, and 
large numbers o f people would perish for lack o f food (Malthus 1798). According to 
Malthus, famine represents a necessary check to harness population growth within the 
limits of available resources.
Various contemporary versions o f the old Malthusian concept continued to echo the 
basic tenets of the argument over a limited capacity o f natural resources vis-a-vis ever- 
increasing population densities of both humans and animals. Thus, the "Tragedy o f the 
Commons" is another modern variant of the old Malthusian concept which blames 
environmental degradation and associated food problems to overstocking of animals. It 
has been argued that overstocking exceeds the land's carrying capacity to sustain excess 
herd populations, therefore, the range deteriorates causing loss of grass cover which 
leads to droughts and environmental degradation. Consequently, drought causes famine, 
and results in elevated death rates among humans and animals, therefore reducing the 
charge, and the balance between resources and population is maintained.
The Population thesis has been attacked on a number o f fronts. First, the basic 
argument of the Malthusian concept that the earth has limited resources to support the 
ever-increasing population densities has been shown to be lacking. A major counter­
argument is one that recognises the overwhelming potential for agricultural growth. 
Agriculture is seen to be capable of carrying infinitely greater population numbers. An 
elastic "carrying capacity" o f agriculture has been estimated to support between 5 - 1 7  
times the present charge o f world's population (Boserup 1981, 1965; George 1976; 
Gribben 1979, Simon 1981). And that increased populations rather than being a 
negative factor, can indeed be an added impetus to enhance agricultural growth in terms 
of labour and for providing extensive markets for agricultural commodities.
Another important argument against the Population thesis is the one that emphasises 
the importance of levels o f consumption o f global resources rather than the numerical 
force of population per se. This recent argument contends that although population 
numbers in poor countries are far greater than those in rich countries, the key issue is 
that it is the population in the richer countries who consume by far the overwhelming 
share o f global resources. Notwithstanding the fact that the richer countries o f the world
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host only 24% of the world's population, they consume on aggregate about 85% of 
global resources. This argument recognises that the occurrence o f famine among the 
poor cannot be blamed on population increases, but that it is a matter o f mal-functioning 
in the utilisation and distribution o f resources on both national and international levels. 
If  resources are equitably distributed and shared among people between and within 
states, there would be enough for every person on earth to be fed adequately. Food, or 
lack of it has become an issue o f power and ability, and the occurrence of famine among 
the poor is a clear reflection o f their inability to command that power. It is not a matter 
o f population increase vis-a-vis limited resources.
Another approach to explaining famine is one that advocates a broad holistic 
framework which encompasses diverse factors: internal, external, and historical. This 
approach adheres to a structuuralist paradigm of reasoning which sees the causes of 
famine to be interactive and inextricably linked to one another, therefore, cannot be 
separated theoretically for analytical purposes. Rather, the causes of a given famine 
situation would have to be understood in totality in the specific context of that situation. 
As can be expected, the Holistic approach encompasses diverse and widely divergent 
themes. Internalist explanations, for example, focus attention on the specific internal 
situation in poor third world countries where famines frequently occur. Internal factors 
include issues relating to domestic economic and development policies, that foster class 
formation and create inequalities, biased agricultural policies favouring cash crops 
production destined for outside markets and against food production directed to the 
internal market. The character o f states is an important theme which draws attention to 
the nature of political structures and the forms o f social political organisation in poor 
countries, which are characterised by the dominance of urban-based elites, and their 
control over rural resources, ostensibly for the national good, but in practice only to 
consolidate their own political power and economic stakes. In all o f these domains, the 
rural peasantry loses in the processes o f internal politics.
Ecologists within this school argue that historically, the adaptability o f people living 
in semi-arid environments had insulated them from the vagaries o f the natural 
environment. That these peoples learnt to adapt their way of life and levels of 
production and consumption to the opportunities and constraints o f their physical 
environment. That the human social demands have been synchronised within the limits 
o f natural resources, such that human, animal and plant lived in harmony in their 
physical surroundings, thus keeping the eco-system in equilibrium (Scott 1984; Prothero 
1974; Watts 1987; Hasewell 1953; Swift 1973). The mechanisms o f adaptability of 
populations to their natural environment have for millennia enabled the maintenance 
and reproduction of the system on fairly stable bases. It is only recently, at certain 
historical conjunctures, through the inroads of colonialism, individualism, and capitalist
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penetration that those old systems of survival have been weakened and rendered 
incapable of supporting their populations.
Externalist proponents, list a catalogue of external forces which bear negatively on 
the economies and societies o f poor third world countries. In particular, they have cast 
considerable blame on the legacy o f colonialism; that it had had debilitating effects on 
those countries which inherited a huge colonial baggage that crippled the capacity of 
recovery of these countries until today. Colonialism has crafted arbitrary national 
frontiers which divided ethnic communities o f common ancestral descent across 
different state boundaries that in due course became unstable and a subject of disputes 
and conflicts. As a result, the numerous protracted conflicts and wars such as the on­
going civil war in Southern Sudan and other countries throughout the third world, are a 
legacy of the colonial carving of arbitrary frontiers. Such conflicts and warfare 
precipitated the internal food situation directly by disrupting food production, and 
indirectly by channelling the bulk of national resources to the cost o f wars. Colonialism 
has also initiated the forces of capitalist penetration in these hitherto traditional 
communities, organised markets that have become highly dependent on the international 
market economy, and keyed to the export o f commodities of interest to external markets 
(Glantz 1987). At the eve o f independence, the colonial administration carefully 
bequeathed political and economic power to those elements o f society who were 
perceived to be potential partners in the benefit of trade. Therefore, the post­
independence era witnessed the emergence o f political and economic national elites 
dedicated to the pursuit of policies laid down by the colonial state in perpetuating the 
processes of extraction o f surplus labour in the context o f the dependent weaker 
economies tied to the international capitalist market. This state o f dependency 
progressively eroded any chances o f emergence from stagnation.
The colonial structures for extraction o f surplus labour through direct intervention in 
the re-organisation of forces o f production has in recent history been replaced by a "neo­
colonialist" indirect strategy of what has come to be known by the "comparative 
advantage" theory o f economic growth. This implies that the comparative advantage of 
many poor third world countries lies in the continuation of exportable primary 
production directed to the needs o f external markets (Raikes 1988; Glantz 1987). This 
strategy has been forcefully pushed by international development agencies such as the 
World Bank and the IMF to such an extent that it is often imposed on third world 
countries. As we have seen in the case of Sudan, that the Sudanese government - in 
order to receive loans - has been forced to forsake its programme for increased food 
production in favour o f expanding the production o f export crops such as cotton and 
groundnuts. This imposition on the part of the World Bank - often justified in terms of 
comparative advantage - coincided with the prevalence o f internal food insecurity so
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widespread that it frequently led to widespread famines. Comparative advantage theory 
assumes that cash earnings from sales o f cash crop exports would be used to purchase 
food from big food producers such as the USA. There is no evidence, however, from 
famine situations to support this argument. On the contrary, encouraging cash crops 
production, could contribute to increased food insecurity, since the small producers may 
be inticed by various mechanisms of the market (e.g. through price incentives) to 
concentrate more on producing cash crops, and may neglect food production.
Comparative advantage strategy of export-led growth has brought a host of problems 
to poor developing countries such as Sudan. On the one hand, proceeds from cash crops 
dwindled over the years, both as a result o f steadily declining prices of primary 
commodities in the international market, as well as declining production and 
productivity in the local economy. On the other hand, the dwindling returns have to be 
stretched to the limit to pay for essential imports: capital goods, energy, as well as food 
imports; the price of which have increased steadily. The imbalance between steadily 
dwindling returns from cash crops export sales and steadily increasing value of imports 
has strained the meagre foreign reserves to breaking point, and created chronic balance 
of payments deficits which has to be rectified by borrowing from international financing 
institutions. Inevitably, debt has emerged as a big problem facing poor countries, which 
effectively crippled the economic performance of these countries, limited their scope for 
emergence, and slimmed their chances o f recovery. By the mid-1980s, for example, 
Sudan's total debt stood at about US$ 13 billion, with annual service charges claiming 
over 85% o f Sudan's total value of exports (Ali 1985). This is a debt burden that is 
totally impossible for the Sudan economy to sustain without incurring lasting damage to 
the economy and considerable hardships on the Sudanese people. Indeed, the frequent 
occurrences of famines is a testimony to the extent o f hardships, which could have been 
much mitigated had the country been able to direct its meagre financial resources to 
purchasing food, than committing these resources to meet its debt obligations.
Other themes in the Holistic approach include the activities o f agribusiness multi­
national corporations, and the way they manipulate the international food trade in 
production, distribution and consumption. The activities of giant multi-national firms 
dealing in foodstuffs on a global scale exercise oligopolistic control over much of the 
food stuffs entering the world market. The power o f these giant firms is immense, and 
backed up by their respective governments, food has become in the hands o f these 
multi-nationals an issue not just of trade relations, but a potent political and strategic 
weapon. The USA, for example, under its PL 480 uses food aid as an important aide to 
the US diplomacy and foreign policy. These multi-national corporations have been 
criticised that they set the pace for and determine levels of production, control the 
channels of distribution, and manipulate international market prices in ways that
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damage the prospects of small peasant producers and throw them out o f the market. The 
policy of disposal o f massive quantities o f food aid on grants or on low-priced 
concessional terms lures governments in poor countries to neglect food production and 
concentrate more on cash crops production.
Although the Holistic approach covers a wide range of issues in the famine debate, 
the main contention against it is precisely its merit; that is, the multiplicity of factors it 
raises in the discussion on famine. The eclectic character o f this approach, we argue, 
raises a rather heterogeneous mix of factors that are seemingly unrelated to one another 
as to form a logical coherence to qualify for a theoretical framework. Internalist 
explanations, for example, raise issues that differ fundamentally from those raised by 
externalists, while both also differ from those advocated by ecologists and 
anthropologists. However, a common denominator among these diverse arguments, 
which paradoxically is at the same the real challenge facing this approach, is the 
relevance of all factors to the discussion on famine. How to resolve this paradox of 
heterogeneity and relevance o f factors is what this study has sought to contribute.
The last two approaches examined in this study are the Entitlements and the FAD 
(Food Availability Decline) approaches. These are discussed together in conjunction 
with one another in view of the numerous aspects of similarities and differences 
between them. The FAD approach holds that famine arises from a significant decline in 
the volume of food available in relation to population demand, a fall caused by a natural 
or a human disaster, such as a drought or war. Critics o f FAD have questioned the basic 
criteria used to measure food decline. That, there is no specific criteria to determine a 
threshold at which food can be said to have declined or otherwise. Again, they have 
pointed out that evidence suggests that famine may develop even under normal 
conditions of food availability. Conversely, famine may be averted even under 
precipitous levels of food production. Evidence from famine situations invalidates the 
argument that famine is caused by a decline in food availability. FAD uses an 
aggergative method, and assumes that since adequate supplies o f food are available to 
meet aggregate per capita food demand, there is no reason why some people should go 
hungry. Critics have pointed out that this simple aggregation fails to take into account 
neither the distribution side o f food, nor the differential abilities o f different social 
groups to satisfy their food demand. It is not enough that food is available in the market. 
What is at issue is whether people are able to buy that food to satisfy their need for food. 
If people cannot lay effective market demand by being able to buy the available food, 
famine can develop even under abundance of food supply.
The Entitlements approach, on the other hand, stresses the importance of distribution 
(not availability) in food supply, and differentiation in access to it among different
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social groups. Entitlements emphasises that different social groups have different 
commanding abilities over the food they need commensurate with their economic 
power. In the market place, command over food follows economic power that can 
translate into effective market demand, and tends accordingly to be unevenly distributed 
among different social groups. Economically weaker groups will fail to establish 
command over food even though it may be available in the market. This is a major 
dividing line between the FAD and the ET. While FAD remains broadly aggergative, 
focusing on the overall availability o f food, the ET is essentially disaggregative 
acknowledging the differential commanding powers and the resultant distribution 
constraints that befall various segments of society. FAD treats famine as a food 
problem. It locates famine in the natural and normal, and thus implies uniformity and 
neutrality. The ET, on the other hand, views famine as an economic disaster, created by 
a ruinous collapse in the purchasing power of some social groups, and a consequent 
collapse in their entitlements to food.
The ET logically raises issues of power and social differentiation. It recognises the 
importance o f how people establish or fail to establish their entitlements to food. The 
ET ascribes the vulnerability o f some groups to famine such as farmers and pastoralists 
to inexorable laws that prevail in economic systems which endorse legally sanctioned 
rights o f private property and ownership, and delineate social/economic orders that go 
hand in hand with some people failing to acquire enough food for survival (Dreze and 
Sen 1989). The failure of food entitlements among some groups underlies a 
malfunctioning of the whole system of the legality o f rights operative in society. The 
critical question for the ET is to say why is it that some people or some groups fail to 
establish the legal rights to the most basic of all needs: the entitlement to food? Why 
such people remain so vulnerable in relation to the laws of ownership and exchange?
Evidently, the legal rights o f ownership and exchange are mediated daily through the 
market. The ET does not question the processes o f social power at work underpinning 
the apparently standard rules operating in the market place. The market is a socially 
created nexus whose rules have been normalised and legitimised in ways to serve the 
interests of powerful groups. The ET does not question the apparently normal socio­
economic relations governing entitlements and market relations. The Et does not go far 
enough to construe the socially differentiated power in the struggle over food and over 
resources. The ET does not take us far inside the arena of the market; it brings us to its 
threshold, notwithstanding.
The various theoretical approaches discussed above have been advanced in the 
literature as explanations o f famine. The reappraisal of these theories which is presented 
in chapter two of this study exposes the inadequacy of these approaches in offering a
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comprehensive framework o f analysis for the phenomenon of famine. The inadequacy 
o f the different theories resides in the improportionality between the complexity o f the 
phenomenon and the simplicity and partiality o f the explanations offered. That is; while 
famine is a complex phenomenon which results from a complex multiplicity o f factors, 
the different theories, on the other hand, each tackles only one or a few o f these factors; 
therefore, tend to offer at best only partial explanations. The naturalist thesis, for 
example, focuses attention on natural causes, such as drought, leaving unanswered the 
whole ensemble of human, social, political, ecological and historical factors that are at 
work in generating famine. The Population thesis, on its part, gives primacy to the 
effects of unproportionate growth of human populations in relation to available food 
resources, paying little attention to the politics of resource availability, management and 
control. The ET, from a different angle, gives an economic explanation; but fails to 
account for how and under what conditions some groups become economically weak to 
such an extent that they suffer a complete collapse in their food entitlements. These 
various approaches to explaining famine offer, to the best, only partial explanations, 
which, nonetheless, give us useful insights in the way of understanding the tangled 
complexity of the phenomenon. The real challenge for famine theory is to advance a 
theoretical framework that is sufficiently brood to accommodate, in a comprehensive 
way, the complexity and multiplicity o f factors that generate famine.
In this regard, the Holistic approach presents itself as the more appropriate frame of 
analysis, precisely because it addresses a wide range o f issues that are relevant to the 
discussion on famine. The major shortcoming of this approach is that it raises an 
eclectic diversity o f heterogeneous factors that seem to have little in common as to form 
a coherent theoretical framework. The Holistic approach, as we have seen, encompasses 
a wide diversity o f causes: i.e. internalist, externalist, ecological, anthropological, social 
and political. Moreover, it does not altogether deny the role o f natural or human agency, 
but places these into their proper contexts. The real challenge for the Holistic approach 
to stand as a useful comprehensive theoretical framework is how to bring the multitude 
o f factors into coherence as to form a unified whole. This is what this study has sought 
to contribute to the debate on famine.
This study has sought to put the diversity of factors of famine in context by placing 
them into a broad historical perspective. This has been applied to the context o f Sudan. 
It has studied two rural communities in Kordofan, o f Western Sudan who have been 
affected by recurrent famines in recent history. The study traces the developments in the 
social and political history of these two communities, and examines the processes of 
change over time, which we consider to be responsible for creating the conditions of 
vulnerability among these communities, and their susceptibility to famine. These 
processes have been accounted for on three levels: on a macro level, involving the state,
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state policies, the national and international underpinnings o f such policies. On a 
regional level, the study explores the policies of transformation and the processes of 
change on the local level, particularly taking place at the regional centre o f power at El- 
Obeid. At a micro-level, this focuses on the processes taking place at the grass roots 
level in the villages, and the concrete forms of household responses to the process of 
famine as it unfolds. Here, a case study o f two villages has been conducted, and the 
results shown in the final chapter o f the study.
In Chapter three, we have constructed a picture life o f old Kordofan before the 19th 
century. The purpose of this historical reconstruction is to ascertain the validity of the 
thesis that people who live in arid and semi-arid environments adapt their way o f life to 
the opportunities and constraints of their physical/natural environment. We have seen 
that the two local communities o f Dar Hamid and Dar Hamar living in the semi-arid 
savannah o f North Kordofan indeed pursued a way of life centred around pastoral 
production that was ideally suited to the conditions o f their environment. They were 
autonomous independent communities who managed and controlled their productive 
resources entirely for the purposes of social reproduction of their system, independently 
from state authority and control. They forged political and trade alliances with two old 
indigenous Kingdoms that flourished in this part o f Sudanic Africa: the Fur and the 
Fung Sultanates, and benefited, indeed prospered from a lucrative trans-Saharan trade 
that linked them with Mediterranean, Egyptian and Eastern markets. Accounts of 
travellers at that period confirmed that these communities were of the wealthiest groups 
in this part of Africa. There was no mention o f widespread famines to be found in these 
accounts.
However, that prosperity and wealth vanished in subsequent histories of the region, 
owing largely to the gradual incorporation and assimilation o f these communities into 
the fabric of the modern state since the beginnings o f the 19th century onwards. The rise 
of modem state structures since 1821, the time of the Turko-Egyptian rule in Sudan, 
ushered in a new era in the history of Kordofan and its relation to the central Sudanese 
state. The rural communities in Kordofan gradually lost their former autonomy and 
political independence to the authority of the state, and the former control over their 
productive resources gradually shifted from their own hands to the state and other forces 
allied to it; particularly traders and commercialists. Although the tempo of these shifts 
of power has been somewhat low-keyed during the Turko-Egyptian rule and during the 
Mahdiyyia, the pace accelerated to such rapidity and force hitherto unprecedented 
during the British colonial administration since 1898, the year the British colonial rule 
over Sudan was formal established under the Condominium.
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The Condominium administration in Sudan set up the structures of the modern 
Sudanese state in its own image to be subservient to the demands of the British market. 
From its inception, the modem Sudanese state has been moulded in the dependent 
capitalist economy, precariously connected to the British and international markets. The 
Sudan economy and society have been developed along these lines. The Gezira Scheme, 
a major development project, was primarily a colonial construct intended to satisfy the 
needs of the powerful lobby of the British textile industrialists (E.C.G.A. = the Empire 
Cotton Growers Association) for raw cotton. To this major colonial project set along the 
Banks o f the Nile in Central Sudan were linked the diverse rural economies in the 
hinterland of Kordofan and other regions, as peripheral feeder economies to provide 
cheap labour and cheap resources. Along these lines o f capitalist expansion, the whole 
of Kordofan rural economies have been re-organised and transformed from their former 
state o f autonomy to ones that are increasingly opened up to market forces in both 
production and consumption. We have documented that the re-organisation and 
transformation of Kordofan rural economies necessarily required a corresponding 
restructuring o f forces in which Kordofan be politically marginalised in the internal 
balances of power; as a necessary pre-requisite to pave the way for the economic 
exploitation o f the region's vast resources of wealth in agriculture and livestock. 
Accordingly, the processes of political marginalisation and economic exploitation of 
Kordofan have historically gonee hand in hand.
The policies of transformation of Kordofan local economies rested on a fundamental 
policy of development thinking; a policy that advocated a shift from pastoralism - 
regarded as an outmoded practice - to agricultural labour production for the market. In 
essence, this key policy aimed to transform the rural Kordofan communities from 
autonomous independent pastoralists into a vast pool o f agricultural labourers who are 
easily manipulable by the state, to produce for both the internal as well as to the outside 
market. Thus, cash crops production came to assume supremacy over pastoral and food 
production. In consequence, the rural populations became increasingly dependent on the 
market for both production and consumption; their margin for autonomous action 
severely curtailed. The forces of the market became the most important determinants in 
many aspects affecting peoples lives, especially with regard to food. Moreover, the 
market in Kordofan has become a monopoly largely in the hands o f the Jellabah and 
other traders from North/Central Sudan who exercise exploitative control over all 
aspects of trade in the region. As a result, at times of natural disasters such as a drought, 
and short-fall in food production, the grain merchants manipulate the market and 
precipitate an already dangerous food situation into a famine. The policies of 
development and transformation, the succession of shifts in power and resultant changes 
in Kordofan rural economies since the turn o f the century, have combined to create
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patterns of vulnerability among the local communities never witnessed before. We have 
seen that, some centuries earlier, these communities were prosperous, independent and 
largely insulated from the vagaries of nature through their own indigenous systems of 
adaptability and survival. Today, these same communities witnessed their 
independence shattered, their resources pillaged, and their own survival threatened 
through the agency of the state and its policies.
The usefulness of the Holistic framework put in a historical perspective for the study 
o f famine is that it provides the logical context within which the eclectic diversity of 
factors become more coherent and meaningful. Applying this framework to the study of 
famine in Kordofan o f Western Sudan, the diverse factors come out clearly in their 
proper historical, political and environmental contexts. We have argued that historically, 
the rise of the modern state in Sudan, and the gradual assimilation of Kordofan in its 
fabric, the advent of the colonial powers, the incorporation o f the traditional local 
economies in modern economic structures, and the rapid transformation of Sudan and 
Kordofan economies along the lines o f capitalist market, the dependency o f these 
economies on the international market system and subservience to it, the ascendancy to 
power in the post-colonial Sudanese state by urban-based forces whose interests are 
intertwined with those o f the colonial powers, development of local markets that are 
weak and distorted; all are some of the important factors that generate famine.
What has come out clearly from this analysis is the paramount preponderance o f the 
role of the state in the genesis o f famine. We have argued that the rise of the modem 
Sudanese state went hand in hand and parallel to a corresponding gradual yet steady 
weakening of the autonomy and security formerly enjoyed by the local Kordofan 
communities. The rural communities progressively lost control over their own resources 
to the state and the forces of the market that have been set in place by alien colonial 
powers; first by the Turks and Egyptians, then by the British. The colonial states set up 
political, economic and administrative structures whose function was to regulate the 
exploitation o f rural resources to service the needs of the colonial markets. The Sudan as 
a whole has become a dependent economy in the international economic system. 
Resources from the rural areas, e.g. Kordofan, flow to the regional, national market 
centres, and to international markets beyond. This system o f economic relations dictated 
a pattern of production and consumption among the rural populations that is heavily 
skewed in the market mechanisms as its most weak and peripheral participants; and 
hence have no control over its mechanisms, which nonetheless, determine to a large 
extent what they produce and consume, and consequently directly affect their daily 
lives. As a result o f these long-term tendencies which have been a direct result of state 
policies created patterns of vulnerability among large segments o f the society, patterns 
of social differentiation, and differentials in access to resources.
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These long-term negative tendencies were hoped to be reversed during national rule. 
National Sudanese governments in the post-independence period could have been more 
prudent to have initiated policies designed to redress the imbalances and inequalities 
that inhered in the colonial state era. However, this has not been the case, and national 
Sudanese governments far from departing from those structures of dependency set by 
the colonial state, adopted policies that fostered, indeed perpetuated and enhanced those 
structures even further. Successive national Sudanese governments accentuated the 
patterns of dependency, o f differentiation and imbalances to levels that have created 
conflicts, and widespread poverty and vulnerability to famine among large social 
groups. These effects indeed threaten the cohesion, stability and the very viability of the 
Sudanese state. These tendencies in the case o f Kordofan have been a result o f state 
policies which effectively relegated the whole of the region to a back-garden, as a vast 
reserve of cheap labour and cheap resources to be tapped for the benefit of the state and 
the forces o f political and economic power allied to it. The region has suffered under the 
banner of the national state from political marginalisation and economic exploitation. 
These processes have become so acute that in the recent history the rural communities 
virtually lost control over their productive means, lost their security and livelihoods to 
such extent that they have become vulnerable to famine. Essentially, these negative 
effects have all been a direct result of long-term trends created by state policies. A field­
work study has been carried out in two villages in rural Kordofan to assess the impact o f 
change on the livelihoods of ordinary village populations. The field-work study shows 
that there are some groups among the village households who have become more 
vulnerable to famine than others, suggesting a process o f nascent socio-economic 
differentiation is emerging among the village populations. Some groups have benefited 
from the processes o f contemporary change, while the majority have lost.
Some broad conclusions could be drawn from this study. Foremost, any efforts 
directed to restore lost food security among the rural populations would have necessarily 
to redress the imbalances in the state power, and the structures of dominance and 
subordination within it. The basic issue here is power which we reckon is by far the 
most important factor in explaining famine. The study o f the state brings out the social 
forces and socio-political arrangements that make up the balances o f state power. Any 
attempt to alleviate the conditions o f poverty and vulnerability o f the rural populations 
to famine would have to recognise the basic question of power, and seek to "empower" 
those vulnerable groups and enhance their channels o f representation and presence 
within the active functionaries of the state. "Empowerment", we argue, is the key issue 
to stem hunger and famine in Kordofan and elsewhere. But, as we have also seen, the 
Sudanese state is not an autonomous entity that is wholly independent of the forces of 
international power. We have seen that the Sudanese state is not totally free to pursue
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development policies aimed to expand food production to achieve food security of the 
Sudanese people. International interests have been the prime movers in determining the 
shape and direction o f the Sudan's agricultural and economic policies. Powerful 
international interests press ever more strongly on Sudan to remain an exporter of cash 
crops such as cotton and groundnuts, committing its most fertile and productive lands to 
this type of agriculture, at the expense of food production. Such mightier international 
power leaves fewer options to a weaker country such as Sudan to pursue strategies 
designed to achieve internal food security. It follows that, under such international 
pressures, policies aimed to empower the local populations within the functional 
machinery o f the state would be o f little benefits unless the international system 
becomes more benign and conducive to the welfare and food needs o f the vast majority 
o f people in poor countries.
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Appendix A:
Refugee Population in Sudan until December 1991
State Assisted Refs. Spontaneously Settled Total
Eastern 353317 457000 810317
Central 010060 020000 030060
DarFur 021141 097000 118141
Equatoria - 050000 050000
Khartoum - 040000 040000
TOTAL 384518 664000 1048518
Source; High Commission for Refugees, Khartoum, in EWS Bulletin, Jan. 1992.
- 3 4 0 -
Appendix B:
Estimated Displaced Population in Sudan till mid-October 1991.













































Bahr El Ghazal Wao 47596
Aweil/ Rural Council 35000
Rumbek/ Tonj 39000
Raga/ Rural Council 35000
Gogrial 27500 184096
Upper Nile Malakal 84000
S. Malakal, Sobat 17000
Wad Shilluk 15000
El Rank 85000






S U D A N 2690630 2690630
Source; High Commission for Refugees, Khartoum, in EWS Bulletin, Jan. 1992
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Appendix C:
Total Sorghum Production in Sudan and per Capita Food Availability (1960/1 - 
1984/5)
Year Production Production Production Production 5-year Avr
( 000s tons) - Export 
(000s tons)
(kg/person) - Export 
(kg/person)
peoduction /  
capita-Ex (kg)
1960/1 1051 n.a. 95 n.a.
1961/2 1434 n.a. 130 n.a.
1962/3 1267 n.a. 115 n.a.
1963/4 1349 n.a. 122 n.a.
1964/5 1137 n.a. 103 n.a. 113
1965/6 1095 n.a. 99 n.a.
1966/7 851 n.a. 60 n.a.
1967/8 1980 n.a. 141 n.a.
1968/9 869 n.a. 62 n.a.
1969/70 1451 n.a. 103 n.a. 93
1970/1 1534 1502 109 107
1971/2 1590 1535 99 99
1972/3 1300 1206 81 75
1973/4 1692 1603 94 89
1974/5 1681 1636 93 90 95 (91)
1975/6 2160 2086 120 115
1976/7 1789 1685 99 93
1977/8 2062 2015 115 112
1978/9 2193 2021 122 112
1979/80 1462 1176 81 65 197 (99)
1980/1 2068 1827 115 101
1981/2 3272 2859 181 158
1982/3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1983/4 1829 1573 102 87
1984/5 1110 n.a. 61 61 114 (101)
Source: Shep ierd 1988; (p: 62).
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Appendix D:
The Economic Results from the Gezira Scheme to the Companies from 1926 - 1950 
(in E£)
1 2 3 4 5
Crop Year Co. 's Share o f Co's Share Companies' Balance
Net Divis. Retn. lnclu. Intr. 
Char, to Jt. Acc. 
& Tenant
Expenses
E£ E£ E3 E£
1925 - 6 582,281 622,008 215,763 406245
1927 759,319 821,487 278,888 542,599
1928 573,954 632,979 223,557 409,422
1929 699,630 771,666 237,226 334,440
1930 192,702 293,779 188,060 105,719
1931 85,552 211,653 226,237 14,584 (Lss)
1932 495,807 647,178 190,348 456,830
1933 193,299 309,867 214,288 95,579
1934 226,841 329,317 220,407 108,910
1935 470,425 574,742 250,355 324,387
1936 451,386 556,506 280,524 275,982
1937 618,832 715,201 311,647 403,554
1938 451,104 527,148 290,667 236,481
1939 485,285 568,195 274,878 293,317
1940 581,958 659,806 240,528 419,278
1941 621,993 709,871 217,809 492,062
1942 616,261 693,687 214,870 478,817
1943 776,878 847,266 221,545 625,721
1944 533,584 608,303 237,131 371,172
1945 837,611 912,602 260,047 652,555
1946 516,938 584,692 270,189 314,503
10,771,640 12,597,953 5,064,964 7,532,989
1947 1,372,042 1,465,512 301,716 1,163,796
1948 2,339,120 2, 447,716 336,423 2,111,293
1949 2,741,206 2,861,206 401,243 2,459,963
1950 3,189,374 3,319,374 541,108 2,778,266
20,413,382 22,691,761 6,645,454 16,046,307
Source: Gaitskell 1959: 171.
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Appendix E:
List No. 1: North Sudan Consultative Council
Babu Osman Nimir Chief Nazir of the Missieriyya
Yahya Ahmad Omar Deputy Nazir of the Gawam'a
Abdalla Bakur Nazir Dar Bakur
Mohammad Mohammad el Amin Turuk Cief Nazir of the Hadandawa
Mohammad Ahmad Abu Sinn Nazir of the Shukriyya (el Butana)
Ibrahim Musa Madibu Nazir of the Rizeigat
Mohammad Bahr el Din Sultan o f the Masaliit
Abdel Rahman Adam Rijal Maqdoum of Niyala
Ayubiyya Abdel Majid Head of the Local Government at Berber
El Zibeir Hamad el Malik Head of the local Government at
Dungula
Hassan 'Adlan Mek o f the Funj Section
Fahal Ibrahim Shiekh of Haj Abdalla District
Ahmad Y ousif'A lqam Sheikh of the Middle Section (Merkaz
of Southern Gezira)
Idris Abdel Gadir Salih Nazir of the Hassaniyya Administration
Sarour Mohammad Ramli Shiekh of the Northern District
Khalil 'Akasha Merchant; El-Obeid
Psman Abdel Gadir Sirr (rep.) o f Merchant; Haifa
Hassan Shieklawai Government Employee
Hamid el Sayid Chief Clerk; DarFur Province
Mekki 'Abbas Adult Education Inspector
Merghani Hamza Engineer; Public Works Department
Mohammad ' Ali Shawqi Assistant Registrar; Lands Department
List No. 2: The Legislative Council: Representatives of Northern Sudan
Zubair Hamad el Malik Head of the local Government at
Dungula
mohammad Taha Sourij Head of the Shaiqiyya Court
Mohammad Ibrahim Farah Nazir o f Shindi District
Sarour Mohammad Ramli Nazir o f the North District
Abdalla Ayoubi Member o f Berber Court
Mohammad Nassir Shiekh of the Western District
Mohammad Ahmad Abu Sinn Shiekh o f the Shukriyya 3rd District
Mhammad Mussa'ad Nazir o f the Mussalamiyya
Ahmad elHaj Yousif el Tam Nazir o f the Central District
Ahmad Abdel Bagi Mohammad Agent o f the Managil station
Osman Ali Shiekh of Sinnar District
Yousil el 'Ajab Rufa'a el Sharaf
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Hssan Adlan 
Yousif Idris Habbani 
Mustafa Ahmad OuNour 
Ja'afar Ali Shieklai
Mohammad Mohammad el Amin Turuk 






Amir A l i ' Isa
Sa' eed Ali Matar
Mirghani zaki el Din
El Melik Rahamt Allah Mahmoud
Ibrahim Musa Madibbu
Abu Abdel Rahman Moh. Bahr el Din
Ibrahim Dau el Biet
Mohammad Moh. Nour Abu el-Kull 
Mohammad Abdel Gadir Idris 
Mohammad el Haj el Amin 
Mohammad Salih Dhirgham 
Ahmad el Hashim
Abdalla Adam




Mohammad salih el Shinqiti
Al-Sayid Abdalla el Fadil
Mohammad Abdel Rehman Nugd Allah
Mohammad Hamad el Birrir
Omar Agabein
El Zein Ibeid Ahmad
El Haj Mohammad Abdalla
Ahmad el Jid elShiekh Al 'Abbass
Mohammad el Khalifa Sharief
Nawal Mohammad Rijal
El Tayib Adam Jelli
Abu el Qasim Ali Dinar
Abdel Hamid Abbakar Ibrahim
Mohammad Adham
Zein e l ' Abdeen Abdel Tam
Fadul Bashir
Mek o f the Funj Section
Deputy Nazir of the Habbaniyya
Deputy Nazir o f the Hadandawa
Nazir o f the Halanga
Nazir o f the Hadandawa
Depity Nazir of the Shukriyya
Nazir o f Dar Bakur
Nazir of Dar Hamid
Deputy Nazir of the Kababish
Nazir of the Hamar
Nazir of the Misiriyya
Kek of the Nuba
Rep. Nazir of the Gawam'a
deputy nazir of the Bideiriyya
Head o f El Fasher Court
Nazir o f the Rizeigat
Deputy Sultan o f the Masalit
Shartai& Deputy Head Court East
Darfur
Shiekh Dium; North Khartoum
Omda o f el Ghubsha
Former Govn Employee
Former Govn Employee






Agricultural and Business Enterprises
Agricultural and Business Enterprises
Agricultural and Business Enterprises















List No No. 3: Northern Members of the House o f Representatives (1954 - 1957)
Mohammad hamad Abu Sinn 
Abdalla Bakur 
Mirghani Hussein zaki el Din 
Tayfour Mohammad Shareef 
Majdhoub Ibrahim Farah 
Al Shareef e-Sayid el Faki 
Mahmoud el tayib Salih
Abdel Rahman Mohammad dabaka 
Abdel rehman Musa Madibbu 
Arbab Ahmad Shattah 
Hassan Jibreel Suleiman 
Mohammad el Siddiq Mohammad Talha 
Fadl Allah Ali el Tom
Hmmad Mohammad D af a Allah 
Hammad Abu Sadur 
Idris el Zaibag 
Rahamt Allah mahmoud 
Bannaga Mohammad el Yom 
Abdalla Mohammad el Tom
Imam D af Allah Mahmmmad
Mushawir Jum'aa Sahal
el Tigani Ibrahim 'Ayiff
Gism el Seid Abdalla el Nour
Mohammad Ahmad Abu Sinn
Yousif a l ' Ajab 
Abu Fatma Bakash
brahim Idris Habbani 
al Mardi Mohammad Rahmah 
Ya'qoub Hamid Babiker 
Majdhoub Ibrahim Farah 
Mohammad Mahmoud Mohammad 
el Fadil Mahmoud
Mohammad el Amir Mahmoud
Nazir of the Shuriyya ( Kassala)
Nazir of Dar Bakur
Deputy Nazir o f the Bideiriyya
shiekh;' Aliyab District
Brother o f Chief Nazir o f the Ja'aliyyin
Deputy Nazir
Brother of Shatrai of Dar Ghala & Clerk
of Native Court
Brother o f Nazir of Bani Halba
Brother o f the Nazir o f the Rizeigat
Shartai
Omda of el Gineinah 
Tribal Leader
Brother o f Chief Nazir of the Kababish 
& Head o f Sodari Native Court 
Omda & Son o f Former Nazir o f Zuruq 
Brother o f one of the Nuba Mount Meks 
Omda of e l ' Abbassiyya 
Heda of El Fasher Native Court 
Omda of El Burns (a tenancy in Gezira) 
Shiekh o f the ' Arakiyyin District (a 
tenancy in the Gezira)
Son o f the Nazir o f the Halawiyyin (a 
tenancy in the Gezira)
Son o f the Nazir o f the Majanin & Court 
clerk (business enterprises)
Brother o f a Omda o f Dar Hamid 
(agricultural & business enterprises) 
Shiekh o f the Kawahla District 
(agricultural entrp. Funj Co. for Constr.) 
Nazir of the Shukriyya(Rufa'a) (agric. 
entrp. Tawfiqiyya Agric. Co.).
Nazir of Rufa'a el Sharq ( agric. entrps.) 
Former Shiekh o f the Qash District 
(agric. and business enterprises)
Deputy Nazir o f the Hassaniyya 
(agricultural and business enterprises) 
agri., industrial & business enterprises 
business & estates enterprises 
agricultural and business enterprises 
agricultural and business enterprises) 
agricultural enterprises (an agricultural 
scheme, Blue Nile)
agricultural enterprises (an agricultural 
scheme, in the Funj)
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Kamal Abdalla el fadil 
Abdalla Khalil 




Ibrahim el Mufti 
Mohammad Ahmad Mahjoub 
ohammad Amin el Sayid 
Khidir Mohammad 
Hassan Abdel Gadir 
Hashim Mohammad Sa’eed 
Mohammad Karrar Kujur
Ibrahim Hassan el Mahallawi
Majdhoub Abu Ali 
Mohammad Jubarah el Awad 
Osman Ishaq Adam 
Mustafa Hssan Mohammad 
Mohammad el Shiekh el Mikashfi 
al Wassyla el Shiekh el Sammani 
el Shazhali el Shiekh el Bireir 
Ibrahim el Tayyib Badur 
Muhyi el Din Haj Hamad 
Mohammad Ahmad el Mardi 
Ali Abdel rehman 
Muddathir el Bushi 
Ismail el Azhari 
Hassan el tahir Zarrouq 
Mohammad Haroun Timah 
Abubakr Badri Abbakar 
Omar Hamza
Ibrahim Hassan Abu el Ma' ali 
Yahya el fadli
Yousif Abdel Hamid Ibrahim 
Ya'agoub Rijal 
Abdel Nabi Abdel Gadir 
Hussein Mohammad Zaki 
Ahmad Idris Abu el Hassan 
Hassan Awad Allah 
Nasr Allah Sarmin 
Mohammad Bour el Din 
Abder Rahman Omar Abdel Majid
agri., business & estates enterprises 
agricultural and business enterprises 
agri., business & estates enterprises 
agricultural enterprises; in Hassahisa 
Profssional engineering enterprises 
(Bridgeman Rex Co. Merghani Hamza) 
Professional legal business 
Professional legal business 
Professional legal business 
Professional medical business 
Business enterprises 
Business enterprises 
Business and industrial enterprises 
Business and industrial enterprises 
(Sawakin and North Rehabil. Co. & East 
Sudan Co. for Explorations & Mining) 
Business and industrial enterprises 
(Sawakin and North Rehabil. Co. & East 
Sudan Co. for Explorations & Mining) 
Business and industrial enterprises 
Agricultural enterprises 
Trade business, in Kutum 









Former Govern, employee (teacher)
Former Govern, employee (teacher)
Former Govern, employee (teacher)











Former, employee o f Company
Former, employee o f Company________




List o f Livestock Merchants in Kordofan, and Origins
Name of Merchant Origin
Awad Kaballo from Northern Sudan
Abdel Hamid el Mahdi from Northern Sudan
Al Sayid Taha El Hussein Bassawli, originally from Egypt
El Haj Kardaman from Northern Sudan
Ali KhidirHaj Ali now settled in Egypt
Al Bireir o f Moroccan origin
Osman Salih from Dongla,deals in livestock &
agric. produce export trade
Fadlallah Adam El Gaddal from El Obied, Shwaihi
Khalil Akasha from Berber
Abu Zeid Hilali from Berber
Hussein Abu Qadi from El Damir, Kahli Abbadi
Zein el Abdeen Salih Abu Qadi from El Damir, Kahli Abbadi
Geib Allah from En Nuhud
Salih Abbas from Dongla
Sharqawi Palestinian, from Gaza
Amina Fantas Palestinian, from Gaza
All have properties and possessions in Egypt. VIerchants buy a bull for S£ 3-5
thousand, and sell it for S£ 15-20 thousand. 
Personal communication during field-work 1993.
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Appendix G:
Local Plant Species, Local and Latin Names

































Shadar el Zaraf Maera angolensis
Homron Bosica solicifolia




Source: Sudan Resource Assessment and Development (ARAAD); A Report 1992.
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Appendix H:
List o f Local Tree Species which Disappeared from the Locality



















Shadar el Zaraf Maera angolensis
Homron Bosica solicifolia














List o f Local Plant and Grass Species which Disappeared from the Locality:
Local Name Latin Name
el Biqeil Blepharis linerifolia
um Libeina
el Sa'adan (Si'id) Cyperus rotundus
el Dahayan Faristize longislique
um 'Ajeina Crotalaria microphylla
Abu Rakheiss Andropogon gayanus
el Mahareib Cymbopogen nervatus
Simeimah Aristida pollida
el Natshah Stylothansus sp.
Hereishah Tephrozia sp.




el Mahalab Hibiscus sp.
Abu um Rakheesse






















List o f Local Wildlife Species which Disappeared from the Locality:

























Sudan's Balance o f Trade 1981 - 1986: (Value in £s. Millions)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Exports-value 357.0 483.1 810.7 817.3 844.7 833.2
(% change) (+31.6) (+35.3) (+67.8) (+0.S) ( - 4.8 (-1.4)
Imports-Value 1177.6 1278.1 2129.6 1803.7 2128.8 2402.2
(% change) (+49.4) (+8.5) (+66.6) (-15.3) (=18.0) (+12.8)
Trade Balance -820.6 -795.0 -1318.9 -986.4 -1284.0 -1569.0
(% change) (+2.8) (-65.9) (+25.2) (-39.2) (-22.2)
Source> Bank o f  Sudan: 27th Annual Report 1986.
Sudan's Exports During 1981 - 1986
Commodity 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Cotton 68.7 120.1 396.0 405.0 374.3 366.7
Groundnuts 66.5 33.2 16.5 26.7 23.1 2.5
Sesame 35.3 38.1 70.2 96.1 97.8 58.9
Gum Arabic 35.7 40.1 76.2 64.1 66.0 141.7
Dura 42.9 107.5 66.6 7.2 _ 13.9
Livestock 35.9 62.2 80.2 92.6 159.4 71.5
Hides & Skins 77.9 8.9 13.8 17.4 38,8 33.7
Cake and Meal 14.6 14.0 24.0 26.2 3.5 14.2
Others 49.4 58.4 67.2 82.0 81.8 130.1
TOTAL 357.0 483.1 810.7 817.3 844.7 833.2
Source: Bank o f  Sudan: 27th Annual Report 1986. p: 22.
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Sudan's Imports During 1981 - 1986 (in £S. millions)
Item 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Pertroleum Products 175.9 337.7 458.5 415.2 318.4 202.3
Manufactured Goods 184.2 180.9 344.3 279.0 514.6 481.4
Machinery & Equipmnt 120.5 186.5 266.8 217.2 354.0 405.7
Chemicals 71.1 99.1 213.9 182.2 261.8 341.2
Transport equipment 93.3 160.5 173.5 148.8 241.6 434.1
Wheat & Flour 53.4 55.7 90.5 77.7 148.1 120.5
Tea 14.5 17.0 40.2 30.0 94.7 71.9
Coffee 3.9 3.9 3.8 15.9 19.6 12.2
Sugar 75.7 65.9 31.5 18.6 0.9 _
Other foods 28.2 59.0 86.4 53.7 125.0 155.5
Drinks & Tobacco 15.6 17.4 20.7 28.5 15.8 14.3
Textiles 30.3 30.1 30.8 23.9 34.2 71.1
TOTAL 866.7 1213.8 1760.9 1490.8 2128.8 2402.2
Source: Bank o f  Sudan: 27th Annual Report 1986. p: 23
Share o f Sudan's Main Customers o f Exports During 1981 - 1986 (%):
Customers 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
E.E.C. 30.2 25.8 24.4 24.6 19.9 28.1
Saudi Arabia 21.8 36.7 19.0 15.0 20.1 13.5
P. R. o f  China 4.8 5.1 9.2 4.3 0.1 0.1
U.S.S.R. 5.5 1.3 5.4 2.2 1.3 2.6
Japan 7.5 6.5 5.3 6.0 8.1 6.7
Egypt 4.8 2.5 4.7 8.3 10.0 8.1
Other Arab Countries 6.5 4.7 4.0 6.7 4.7 3.4
Yugoslavia 2.3 2.0 3.2 4.8 8.3 6.9
Other Social Countries 2.6 2.2 3.2 4.8 10.3 8.0
Other W est Europe 3.9 3.1 2.2 2.0 1.7 0.8
USA 8.0 2.6 2.0 2.8 3.3 5.4
India 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
Other Countries 1.7 7.2 17.0 18.1 11.7 15.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source> Bank o f  Sudan: 27th Annual Report 1986. p: 24
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Share o f Sudan's Main Suppliers o f Imports During 1981 - 1986 (%):
Suppliers 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
E.E.C. 39.1 33.8 37.3 36.6 40.2 41.0
Saudi Arabia 14.5 16.3 16.6 16.1 16.3 14.9
U .S.A . 8.0 8.8 9.1 6.9 7.0 7.7
Other Arab Countries 7.1 10.7 7.7 10.6 6.1 4.4
Other Social Countries 2.5 2.5 5.1 4.0 2.0 2.6
Other W est Countries 2.3 3.0 3.3 4.6 3.1 3.1
Japan 6.0 3.9 3.2 3.2 5.1 7.1
P. D. R. o f  China 3.6 2.2 2.4 2.0 2.5 2.8
Egypt 1.0 5.3 1.7 3.1 1.8 4.2
India 2.0 2.3 0.8 1.9 1.6 2.2
Yugoslavis 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8
U.S.S.R. 0.1 0.1 _ 0.1 . 0.1
Other Countries 13.3 10.9 12.5 10.4 13.7 9.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Bank o f  Sudan: 27th Annual Report 1986. p: 25.
